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The study draws on both educational philosophy and literary works in order to 
illuminate its central idea. This idea is that attention, a vital pedagogical achievement, 
possesses preeminent worth in education. Yet institutionally, the state schools of Aotearoa 
New Zealand, with their recent move toward so-called Modern Learning Environments, have 
retreated very far from maintaining or marshalling regard for this idea. 
Drawing on the philosophical writings of two mid twentieth-century philosophers, 
Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch, this thesis argues that a person advances towards achieving 
attention by becoming better attuned to think well. A kind of conscientiousness in this 
endeavour is possible in every person, just as a potentiality to appreciate what is beautiful is 
seeded in us all. Attention improves persons not only in what they grasp and how they grasp 
things, but also thereby improves persons in the very quality of their being. The morally most 
choice-worthy way to be is on the one hand respectful of the experience and perspectives of 
others, while on the other hand it is also self-respecting, imaginative, judicious, curious, 
reflective, and alive. 
Literary interpretation, according to both Weil and Murdoch, possesses a special 
pedagogical potency, and is the readiest and most easily encountered training ground for 
attention. To explore the worth of their conviction, the thesis considers four literary works 
and, with respect to each, examines the pedagogically significant accomplishments that 
attentive literary reading enables. 
If one is to grow one’s power of attention, then one’s eyes must often fall on examples 
worthier than one’s own to follow; mentors are needed. This thesis contends that revitalizing 
attention is the defining educational imperative of our age. It calls for re-empowerment of the 
teacher as mentor. The hope towards which this thesis builds is that opportunities for 
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The central idea of this thesis is that attention is fundamental to education. Against 
the tide of contemporary managerialism across all sectors of human endeavour including 
education, it mobilises grave disquiet about the loss of regard for attention in education at the 
present time. While the implications of current educational trends are far from clear-cut, the 
thesis challenges the dominant pedagogical themes of the twenty-first century, and argues for 
us to revisit, grasp once more, and begin again to champion, the place of attention in 
education. 
The thesis seeks first to develop a philosophical understanding of the notion of 
attention in relation to education. It explores what pedagogical attention is, why it is 
important, how it might be inculcated, and what might foster (or impede) the development of 
an attentive bearing.  
The notion of attention that is utilized has been extensively worked up and developed 
by two mid-twentieth century philosophers, Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch. Truly to educate 
individuals is, according to Weil and Murdoch, to draw those individuals out of themselves. 
Education is in this way spiritual. An educated person becomes deeply oriented to conditions 
of ideal agreement among people. And while an ideal for agreement among people concerns 
community, it concerns community quite in the abstract. For these two philosophers, the 
worth of education is not merely personal. The worth of education is not even chiefly to foster 
community. The worth of education concerns something larger not only than individuals but 
also larger than any particular community. Individuals who are truly educated are therefore 
brought to be very far outside of themselves.  
Attention, far from being, in its concept, neutral, provides powerful direction for 
education practice. The philosophical case for upholding its imperatives is also powerful. The 
aim of the present thesis is to investigate the notion of attention, its metaphysical basis, and 
the implications for ethics, morality, and hence for education. Attention is presented as a 
moral concept, one that calls for a particular way of apprehending the world, one that 
involves intellectual focus, imaginative engagement, and so a deliberative as well as a 
particular kind of non-deliberative involvement. Attention is shown to be attainable by all, 
much as moral growth is attainable by all. The thesis argues that attention has an important, 




The case has both a negative component and a positive component. On the negative 
side, the thesis argues that without attention, learning is impossible. This means moreover 
that to quell the possibility of attention, to impede attention’s ever being possible, is to limit 
learning even to the point that learning cannot have occurred. The thesis examines some 
signs that institutions of formal education are being deflected precisely onto such a self-
defeating, education-defeating, course. On the positive side, the thesis argues that to enable 
attention, and to foster its full development, is to lead toward learning that is meaningful. In 
support of this, certain modes of classroom engagement that foster this very best sort of 
learning are examined.  
The thesis is motivated by a critique of contemporary trends in state-sector school 
education in Aotearoa New Zealand where comprehensive institutional reform currently 
unfolding in our formal education is arguably the reverse of sensibly-directed. The caution 
and warning that is offered is that these positive modes of learning are presently being worse 
than side-lined, since the very possibility of realizing the best modes of classroom engagement 
are being structured out of existence. The possibility of sustained, contemplative reading—for 
example, of fictional literature, to a pitch and intensity of absorption that is the antithesis of 
self-absorbed, and that is, on the contrary, outward, as in the grasping of beauty that the work 
possesses—is likewise being structured out of existence, not only in any classroom setting, but 
furthermore and beyond that, out of the lives of almost all the young people. 
0.1. Attention-giving versus attention-seeking 
The notion of muscular effort, rather than of attention, dominates contemporary 
educational thinking. Activities that call for in-depth attention run counter to contemporary 
educational requirements for progress, coverage, mastery. In the current environment, the 
very notion of giving full attention (from the Latin attentio/attendere—to apply the mind), with its 
attendant notions of contemplation and reflection, is compromised. As this research will 
explain and elaborate, this current educational emphasis on quantifiable goals deflects focus 
away from such aesthetic priorities as contemplation and immersivity. These latter pursuits 
are, within a parlance oriented to measurables, ‘unproductive’¾ for just as they call for 
patience, commitment, and thinking over the long haul, they hold no guarantee of immediate 
‘results’. 
In the wider neoliberal context within which education is currently situated, a culture 




overlook the value of the aesthetic experience.1 Contemporary education operates within a 
culture of quantitative methodologies. Emphasis has got to be upon gathering, into a kind of 
palpable possession by an individual learner, an inventory of ticked boxes. Muller (2018) 
characterises this culture in terms of what he calls the “gospel of managerialism” (p. 25). The 
aim for ostensibly ‘evidenced’ educational success are that of a manager’s wish for a ticked 
box. As a consequence, there is today a tendency to overlook entirely the value of what we 
might call the ‘intangibles’ in education—considerations that include a sense of moral 
purpose, of selflessness, of community, of giving respect and time to aesthetic experience. The 
very epitome of the muscular disposition behind contemporary managerialist educational 
gospel is that considerations such as these are called ‘soft’ and on that basis altogether side-
lined. 
No longer does western education emphasize that students should be thinkers, that 
they should give their reflective attention to nuanced issues and complex issues and topics. 
Contemporary education quite fails to orchestrate consideration by students of what even 
requires to be deliberated about. When educational aims become muscular, there is too little 
opportunity for students to evaluate and discuss, to be drawn into intricate and complex 
issues. Curricular models that prioritise human intelligence and ways of thinking are today 
uncommon. 
The emphasis in contemporary western education is increasingly on ostensible ‘hard 
evidence’. I term the ‘hard evidence’ that gets considered ostensible since actual evidence in 
support of any judgment will inevitably be nuanced and demanding. Facts do not fall out as 
knowable except through acts of attention, and do not ever truly ‘speak for themselves.’ Any 
evidence that is properly so-called is impossible without attention. Purportedly ‘soft’ matters, 
such as a shared aesthetic, or the cultivation of discutants’ capabilities for impersonal 
evaluation of matters they are mutually attending to, already pre-figure the possibility of 
evidence, properly so-called, ever being grasped as such. Often the ticked boxes that the 
gospel of managerialism lauds and enumerates are not truly worthy evidence for anything, at 
 
1 The neoliberal context is here understood in terms of economic and political arrangements that prioritize 
market forces ahead of social or moral considerations, and where individual competition, rather than state 
oversight or social co-operation, is viewed as the basis for society. (For discussions on the impact of 





least not for anything of value, and the bending of policy into pursuit of ticked boxes is 
deleterious to true educational functioning.  
The once regarded as worthy ideal for education (see Whitehead, 1962), has dropped 
away—along with aspirations that students should learn to love the giving freely of their 
attention to matters much bigger than the self, so that their fair mindedness, their capability 
to give due consideration, their faculty for rationally deliberating, their capacity to withdraw 
and humbly reconsider a point of view previously expressed—all ideally should grow through 
the process of their education.2 That large former ideal has dropped away since, among other 
reasons, qualities of selflessness are today systematically overlooked, and the forms of 
development that are now most prized are steadfastly individualistic. 
The lexicon of the 21st-century educationist reduces attention quite away from 
contemplation (let alone mutual contemplation) altogether. So individualistic are the 
understood aims of contemporary education, that the word ‘attention’ becomes differently 
appropriated, and falls out in a perfectly individualistic and partly negative light. To be 
attention-seeking is almost the only mode of individual attention that the lexicon accentuates, 
and then there is an almost schizophrenic attitude towards this. On the one hand, pride in a 
performance that both rises above that of others and is seen to do so elicits, within the current 
educational ideology, actual commendation. On the other hand, show-offs may be distracting 
themselves from what it takes to tick attainment boxes and this heads them towards being 
losers, which within current educational ideology is the epitome of the bad. Worse, just as 
contemporary education tends to pick as winners those who are most fit to say “look at my 
muscles,” it tends to consider as losers those who might actually seek out nuance rather than 
to shy away from it, or those who are inclined to be thoughtful in their approach. The 
rhetoric is misguided and incorrect to a degree that would be difficult to exaggerate.  
Today in education the purposeful and self-conscious pursuit of self-development is 
lauded. To this end, priorities are to set individual goals, to self-evaluate, to work within 
teams (preferably in a leaderly fashion), to think critically (insofar as this elucidates a 
justifiable answer), to network successfully in pursuit of one’s own ends, and to collaborate to 
the full extent (but only to the extent) that that promotes one’s own success. The measure of 
each of these priorities (goal setting, self-evaluation, teamwork, critical thinking, networking 
and collaborating) no longer comes to something of intellectual rigour, but reduces to forms 
 




of performance, prowess, or strategy. What is lost in this approach is a consideration of more 
complex responses—commitment to challenge, a specific grasp of the context or the 
constraints of a given situation or attention to the human story. Also the point of view misses 
completely the importance of mutual attainment for understanding, a word with two related 
senses: explanatory insight, and more fundamentally, mutually reasoned agreement among 
people. 
0.2. On contemporary education rhetoric: a turning of the tables 
Contemporary educational language is dominated by muscular metaphors of 
measurement, advancement and mastery.3 In the identification of educational priorities, 
sporting or business-world metaphors loom large: to set learning goals, to lift student 
achievement, to raise national standards, to meet national benchmarks, or to maintain 
international standing. All of these priorities involve attending to metrics that are quantitative 
(however unnatural and limiting of meaning may be the quantification) and pertain to 
individuals as individuals. These priorities place, at the level of compulsory schooling, the 
quantity of each single learner’s ostensible individual growth and progress as central. At the 
tertiary level, emphasis is also placed on considerations of national economic advancement, as 
though quantitative parameters could reflect growth and progress meaningfully, rather than 
at the centre of the enterprise something inherently qualitative and shared, namely, a cohort’s 
exercise together of attention.  
Such exercise together of attention is towards mutual grasp of some new learning that 
is not personal but impersonal—that is, by all, an accomplishment, not inwardly but 
outwardly focussed, of developing understanding. That something is to be grasped, whatever 
that something might be, may have had to be negotiated by discussion, and it may come into 
view only after alternative ways to think of that something have been trialled and rejected. 
The agencies of those who are slow to judge and of those who are quick to judge may 
intermingle usefully in a mutual movement forward towards that shared understanding. 
Some who are quick to judge may humbly rescind and correct an earlier judgment, but they 
will have added to the mutual act of judging by firming up the reasons for a point of view 
adopted ultimately. Some who were slow to judge may be vindicated for having been slow, 
 
3 The term ‘muscular’ is here used in the sense of ‘performance-driven behaviour’. By contrast, Simone Weil’s 
use of the term ‘muscular’ (See Chapter 1, Section 1.3), although not unrelated, connotes a distinction between 





and they are also helped towards ultimate clarity by way of thoughtful interactions with their 
fellows. Such mutuality of understanding is beautiful in that it involves participants in a kind 
of willing “unselfing”4 that awakens in them what it is to be perceptually attentive.  
Today, rather than the teacher seeking to foster educational attention and thereby 
helping a class to achieve together what is worthy for all, the emphasis has shifted to supposed 
growth of some kind that fulfils a checklist, by individuals who are assumed to be competitive 
with their fellows. In its individualism this characterises students’ agency as essentially aimed 
towards being a winner not a loser. The extent to which mutuality can be genuine is rendered 
almost or actually nil. 
While the contemporary educational rhetoric steers well clear of idealistically-oriented 
words like “virtue”, “good”, or “public good”, it very much emphasises its own quite 
different, professed educational goals. Today, business-oriented words like “accountability”, 
“learning purpose”, and “evidence-based practice” are invoked to characterise worthy goals 
for education. High “quality” education is made out as being “accountable” and “evidence-
based”. This rhetoric aligns with contemporary priorities for health services or other public 
service agencies, where the quantification of outputs is used as the sole measure for 
determining merit and effectiveness. Contemporary education rhetoric, with its corporate-
sounding, business-oriented vocabulary, carries the overtones of education as a formal 
transaction, with the implication that there will be tangible benefits to the so-called 
“customer”—the student, from their involvement in the so-called interaction. 
Yet we are potentially deceived by the contemporary rhetoric to the extent that we fail 
to observe that the old meanings (of what amounts to quality, excellence, rigour, 
achievement) have been seriously diminished or reduced. Muller (2018, p. 19), argues that 
“the calculative is the enemy of the imaginative”. In other words, the emphasis on qualifiable 
outputs as determinants of quality comes at a cost: a cost to creativity and to imagination—a 
“feel for the whole and a sense for the unique are precisely what numerical metrics cannot 
supply” (p. 62). 
Since the start of the twenty-first century, New Zealand schools have increasingly 
taken up a managerial approach to the delivery of education. Ravitch (2010) argues why a 
business-oriented approach is unsuitable as a means to achieve school improvement. She 
 




describes the impact of the emphasis on accountability in education, which started in the U.S. 
in the 1990s, and the way that this orientation paved the way for “a new era of testing and 
accountability” (p. 150), the effects of which have seriously undermined the quality of 
government-funded or state-funded education in that country.  
Kohn (1993) gives a number of reasons why schools are not appropriately viewed as, 
and ought never be viewed as, businesses. He reminds us that to consider schools in this way 
is to seriously undermine the enterprise of education. The reduction to dollars motivations, 
even in the circumstance that dollars may be won or lost dependently on the attainment or 
otherwise of certain other measurables, is grossly shallowing of the values that befit education 
that is worthy of the name. Kohn reminds us that when education has measurement as its 
sole criterion for quality, then aspirations are hollowed out at best to concern the individual 
students’ measured growth and progress (summed over the individuals involved). Lost to 
possible consideration are the nature and quality of students’ collective and in many ways 
mutual educational experiences (p. 62).  
One quality of mutuality is its tendency to make value in attainment multiplicative not 
additive, so the summing over individual achievements misses for deep reasons the actual 
value of mutuality and of mutually won understanding. While there are undoubtedly 
situations where metrical and checklist-type information can be of use in education (such as 
for tracking student attendance), it is surely wrongheaded to assume that metrics are, or ever 
could be, the sole touchstone for evaluation of educative worth. Concerns about the risks to 
education within a prevailing culture of quantification, where so-called “metric fixation” 
(Muller, 2018, p. 18) largely eclipses all else, provide part of the contextual background for 
this thesis. 
Perhaps it is precisely because linear measures for one’s capacity for attention are 
impossible that one’s capacity for attention does not receive any emphasis in education today. 
Perhaps also we have lost from view that one’s capacity for attention is affected very much by 
whether others who are in one’s company possess and exercise such a capacity. To capture by 
some quantity an individual student’s growth in attention would be difficult if not downright 
impossible to achieve. The quality of a cohort that concerns its capability for attention is still 
further distant from capture by a quantity, and certainly would be no mere sum over 
individual capability levels. However, to argue that because attention is deeply non-linear and 
quite clearly unmeasurable, it is therefore something that does not “count” in education, is, as 




Perhaps, attention is de-emphasised in today’s education environment precisely 
because it involves the individual thinker seeking to think independently of any mere 
orthodoxy. The quest to judge some matter impersonally allows as its touchstone for success 
no orthodoxy, any more than it allows as its touchstone for success merely personal whim. 
Here, the quest is to discover the best or most beautiful way to think in relation to some 
question, where the standard for this is not only bigger than any individual, but is also in a 
sense bigger than all individuals combined.  
While attention involves mutuality and helps to create and augment mutuality, it 
strives beyond something that is strictly collectivist in its character. Attention strives towards 
the ideal, and so it is not the collective that determines the standard. Progress of this kind 
towards the ideal for collective agreement sets every thinker the task of putting their mind to 
work in a way that is independent of the collective. It is the task of every thinker to work out 
independently, the best or ideal way to think about the question at hand. 
At first glance, the notion that attention is fundamental to education may appear odd 
or even slightly antiquated. Attention involves taking care of, respecting or nurturing, 
someone or something other than oneself, or viewing someone or something else as 
intrinsically interesting or important. An interest in attention may appear to run counter to 
the current tide of educational thought. This present tide floats the attitude that attention 
may be naught but a loser’s priority. According to such an attitude, attention cannot be 
fundamental to education, since attention takes time, and since its outcomes are neither 
visible, tangible, nor readily measurable. Attention cannot be easily called up, and its benefits 
cannot immediately be discerned. An individual’s progress in attention cannot be readily 
documented or tracked over time. To give attention generally calls for dedicated space and 
for quiet, if not silence. As Caranfa (2016) observes, “the state of attentive silence, of looking, or of 
seeing” (p. 1) calls for patience, receptivity and openness, and a certain kind of intellectual 
humility that comes with curiosity and the desire know more. 
0.3. Twenty-first century educational priorities 
Contemporary education practices and environments appear increasingly to delimit 
opportunities for sustained cognitive attention. The teacher is no longer the focal point of 
instruction, and possibly not even a joint participant in a shared experience or idea. 
Contemporary education priorities encourage individual enquiry and self-directed classroom 




case that in today’s schools, students are less often joint attenders in a classroom activity, but 
are more frequently encouraged to pursue their own individual lines of enquiry. The current 
government mandated emphasis on the study of Science, Technology, Engineering and 
Mathematics (the so-called STEM subjects) represents a determined move to emphasize those 
more rule-governed, compliance-based programmes of learning, ahead of arts subjects that 
are more open-ended in the form of their dependence upon imaginative involvement.  
Emphasis on the so-called twenty-first century priorities of collaboration and 
cooperation has increased at an accelerated pace in Aotearoa New Zealand in the past 
decade. This emphasis has been exacerbated to some extent by the rapid uptake of digital 
devices into school classroom programmes. Radical changes are also being made to the mode 
of classroom design and so of the dynamic for grouped education delivery in schools across 
the country. In particular, we are seeing a shift from classrooms that are teacher-led, to those 
that involve the integration of information technology, with the teacher playing a much less 
central role than previously.  
We are also witnessing radical changes to the physical design and layout of schools 
themselves, although, astonishingly, the pedagogical merits of these changes are yet to be 
ascertained. Indeed, it could appear that many New Zealand schools are intent on taking up 
the latest technological or pedagogical innovations well ahead of reference to any research 
base that would endorse the educational merit of those innovations.5 (So much the worse for 
the nevertheless insistent claims that contemporary education methodology is evidence-
based.) It is within this context of rapid educational change that the current study urges a 
reconsideration of the place and value of pedagogical attention.  
Today’s model of what amounts to educational “good practice” takes as its starting 
point that the school classroom must be predominantly social and interactive. Nothing is said 
about the role of education in developing students’ capacity for individual attention. This 
thesis argues that we should be deeply concerned that schools, as places of education, appear 
(at least implicitly) to have embraced a culture of inattention. Certainly contemporary schools, 
as sites of ostensible education, are effectively losing sight of the ‘norm’ of attention. Given the 
 
5 A specific example of this phenomenon, which will be discussed in Chapter 7, is the current uptake of so-called 





various forces that are impacting on contemporary education (and contemporary society), this 
vanishing regard for attention is, or ought to be, a matter of deep concern. 
We appear, both in our schools and in society more broadly, to have reached a point 
where slow, attentive, focussed reflection has been superseded by priorities of output, 
performance, mastery and attainment against measurable outputs. The relentless adoption 
and uptake of increasingly powerful digital technology contributes in no small way to this 
current situation. The very notion of taking the long view¾say through taking time for a 
concentrated study of the erudition of previous centuries, or through a detailed and applied 
study of primary rather than secondary texts, or through patient critical reading of a range of 
long-form literary fiction, are now relatively unfavoured approaches in curriculum design in 
our schools. On some contemporary views, to read long-form literary fiction is of limited 
appeal, in part because the benefits to the reader are likely to be minimal when weighed 
against the significant investment of time required. Yet the more that readers’ exposure to 
material is limited to shorter or abbreviated texts, the greater the likelihood that they will 
never want to venture into extended literary reading experiences.  
Today the very notion of school teachers and their students taking time to give 
detailed attention to primary texts, or to analyse the themes in lengthy works of literature, is 
viewed dubiously, and is considered an approach unlikely to hold much relevance, as though 
students of today have lost their powers of concentration on any but the briefest of texts. In 
his 2013 collection of essays on the state of liberal arts teaching in North America, 
Edmundson argues that his university-level students no longer have the ability to connect 
with classic literary texts because they have lost the ability to read extended and demanding 
literary works. He argues that as a consequence of this, not only are his students missing out 
on engaging with layers of literary complexity and artistic and imaginative challenge, but also, 
in his view, their capacity to interpret complex thought and argument is itself diminishing. 
Such concerns as these are echoed in recent New Zealand research into reading at both 
secondary and primary school.  
In May 2018, The New Zealand Education Review Office published a national report 
entitled Keeping Children Engaged and Achieving in Reading: Teaching Strategies that Work (Education 
Review Office, 2018a). In its summary, this report provides a dismal account of reading 
achievement and suggests that many New Zealand primary schools are falling short of 
providing their students with an adequate reading programme. The report acknowledges the 




raising an entire cohort of students who have been denied the opportunity to develop a love 
of reading.6 
Resistance to both the cognitive demands and the demands of time that lengthy 
literary works require are likely to be exacerbated when these demands are considered against 
the ease of accessing information by electronic means. This is particularly the case when 
factors of speed and immediacy are valued ahead of the contrasting qualities of pursuits that 
call for patience, reflection, and open-endedness. While this thesis does not argue against the 
use of digital tools per se (and indeed, much use of has been made of digital information 
seeking in undertaking the research), nevertheless the thesis does seek to question what may 
be seriously at risk given the current exodus away from ‘analogue’ reading experiences and 
away from activities that call for sustained and undivided attention.7 
0.4. A deficit view of attention 
Whereas contemporary education has much to say about developing the skills to get 
access to information, it has much less to say about cultivating attention, or about the role of 
the development of the imagination through attention. Neither the cultivation of attention, 
nor the development of the imagination are acknowledged priorities in contemporary 
education manifestoes. The only mention of the word ‘attention’ in education is made in 
relation to its absence. In today’s lexicon, educators are likely to work largely from a “deficit” 
or pathological model concerning attention, rather than working to champion attention’s 
potential and promise for students. 
A number of the digital communications tools of contemporary society area are now 
also an everyday part of the school environment. As many teachers are aware, these tools can 
be as much sources of inattention as of attention, yet as educators we have yet to determine 
what these impacts might mean for education, and what our levels of approbation ought to 
be. As recently as three years ago, the Board Chair of the country’s senior secondary 
examining body, The New Zealand Qualifications Authority (NZQA) was defending the 
notion of delivering online examinations via cell-phone. Perhaps, as Eppert (2004) argues, 
 
6 The most recent survey of reading in New Zealand  (run by the Book Council 2018) repeats and further 
underlines trends of previous years, indicating that adult readership of fiction in this country is becoming a lost 
priority for all but a small, largely female, group of readers. The loss of enthusiasm for reading is becoming 
evident in our schools as well. We are at risk of raising a generation of students who are effectively “ill-equipped” 
for literary reading.  




rather than those in education demonstrating greater and greater tolerance for 
communication devices which are themselves sources of distraction and inattention, 
educators ought to be seizing the opportunity to work with students to help them inculcate 
their own individual capacity for attention: 
The problem of the pervasiveness of habitual inattention needs to be addressed, 
not through the band-aid measures of increasing pressures on children or placing 
greater emphasis on exams, but rather through a revitalization of our 
understanding of attention itself. (Eppert, 2004, p. 44) 
As Ergas (2016) notes, we fail to see the formative role of attention for teaching and 
education, and “tend to conceive of attention as a means, and not as an end in itself” (p. 67).  
0.5. A brief genealogy of attention 
At first glance it might be assumed that attention is a simple and straightforward 
notion, one whose nature is easy to describe, but on closer inspection, questions begin to 
emerge about what just attention is, and what it makes even possible. While it may be 
unproblematic to suggest that attention is involved in aspects of perception, thought, and 
behaviour, it is evident, through the work of  Campbell (2002), Dickie, (2015), Eilan, Hoerl, 
McCormack and Roessler (2005), that attention has implications for a broad range of topics 
across consciousness, cognition and language. Allport (2011, p. 25) proposes that “attention 
(better still, attending) refers to a state or relationship of the whole organism or person”. Mole 
(2017, Section 1) proposes that attention is “involved in the selective directedness of our 
lives”. He notes that just how this selectivity works is “one of the principal points of 
disagreement between extant theories of attention.”  
Perhaps no single catchall account could possibly collect together all aspects of what 
attention is, since discussions on attention are complex and varied and have been carried out 
over centuries and across Eastern and Western cultures. As Mole (2017) points out, until well 
into the twentieth century, attention was considered more a philosophical than a 
psychological matter. Then, in the period between the mid-nineteenth century and the early 
twentieth century, scientific and experimental investigations into attention began to flourish. 
Mole’s research demonstrates that even within the confines of philosophy, discussions of 
attention have unveiled unexpected richness both about what it is and about how it expresses 
itself in our existence. This unveiling has been part and parcel the gleaning of unexpected 




disputed—that in important if unexpected ways, experience of the beautiful is itself 
antecedent to experience of material matters of fact or existence in the world.  
In the Western philosophical tradition, the work of the early modern empiricists 
(Locke, Berkeley and Hume) started this journey, commencing from a place where experience 
was as yet scarcely connected in philosophers’ minds with aesthetic appreciation or moral 
rumination. That there was something deficient in the point of view of the early modern 
empiricists has been identified in part through later philosophy, although credit may equally 
be given to psychological, neurological and educational findings, including many of recent 
times or of the present day. One outcome from more recent work in neurological studies has 
been to understand that attention and responsible action are richly interconnected. 
A key reference for philosophical discussions on attention and its connections to 
education is William James’s 1890 Principles of Psychology.8 James notes that attention shapes 
experience as much as is it shaped by it: “My experience is what I agree to attend to. Only those 
items which I notice shape my mind—without selective interest, experience is an utter chaos” 
(James, 1981, p. 380–381). James describes attention as “the taking possession by the mind, in 
clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible trains of 
thought” (p. 381). He recognises that many more things are encountered by the senses than 
are ever admitted to the mind as meaningful experience, and that a person’s attention reflects 
their interest: “The only general pedagogic maxim bearing on attention is that the more 
interest the child has in advance in the subject, the better he will attend” (p. 401). James 
considers that attention can assist us in a range of ways, including with perception, 
understanding, recognition, comparison, memory, and our capacity to respond. His 
subsequent comments imply that attention inevitably possesses the ethical significance of 
concern with choice of ideals by which to live: 
The practical and theoretical life of whole species, as well as of individual beings, 
results from the selection which the habitual direction of their attention 
involves…each of us literally chooses, by his ways of attending to things, what sort 
of a universe he shall appear to himself to inhabit. (p. 401) 
Thus, James identifies that attention has implications that relate to our ability to think, 
to choose, to be consistent, to regulate our behaviour, and it also has implications for moral 
 




choice, our ability to remember, to generalise, to use language, and to make associations 
across ideas. Attention clearly has implications for education: 
The faculty of voluntarily bringing back a wandering attention, over and over 
again, is the very root of judgment, character, and will. No one is compos sui if he 
have it not. An education which should improve this faculty would be the 
education par excellence. (p. 401) 
We might go further than this and conclude that any attempt to disconnect attention from 
education would seem to be entirely unhinged. 
The etymology of the word ‘attention’ (from the Latin tenere—to lean towards, to 
incline or to stretch) derives from the Latin past participle stem attendere meaning “to give 
heed to”, or “to stretch toward”. In our daily lives, ‘attention’ is typically understood to relate 
to aspects of our subjective experience: we talk of focussed attention, undivided attention, and 
also of fractured or split attention. While truly focussed attention requires effort and practice, 
in daily life we frequently manage to divide our attention (a practice that is colloquially 
known as ‘multi-tasking’)—such as when we listen to the radio while cooking, or converse 
while driving. If, however, we find that our situation demands greater intellectual focus, our 
instinct is to lessen the competing demands on our attention, say by turning the radio either 
up or off, or pausing the conversation in order to focus more intently on the driving 
conditions.  
It is evident that some tasks of attention make more demands on us than others, and 
that to achieve cognitively demanding activities for sustained periods would be impossible 
without attention. In their 2003 study of the effects of cell phone use on driving performance, 
Scholl, Noles, Pasheva & Sussman identified profoundly impaired visual attention (so-called 
“sustained inattention blindness”) among their control group when compared to the 
performance of those drivers whose attention was not split.  
Educationist John Holt makes some useful observations of a group of inattentive 
students: 
Watching older kids study, or try to study, I saw after a while that they were not 
sufficiently self-aware to know when their minds had wandered off the subject. 
When, by speaking his name, I called a day dreamer back to earth, he was always 
startled, not because he thought I wouldn’t notice that he had stopped studying, 




attention. Our minds slip away from duty before we realize that they are gone. 
(Holt, 1964, pp. 22–23, cited in Ergas, 2016, p. 69–70). 
Given that our human capacity for concentration is not unlimited, attentional focus is 
the means by which we are able to filter out some things in order to concentrate more 
effectively on others. Campbell (2002) uses the term “experiential highlighting” to describe 
this achievement. Wu (2011, p. 97) argues that such “selectivity” has a purpose at a personal 
level: “It helps us to get things done—to serve action, both bodily and mental behaviours (i.e. 
thinking, reasoning, imagining, etc.)”. This view resonates with the earlier view of James, that 
“volition is nothing but attention” (1981, p. 424). All these researchers present attention as 
involving some kind of ‘selectivity’ in order to navigate through multiple possible courses of 
action. 
There is nothing specifically Western about the topic of attention. To view attention 
as a discipline in its own right is significantly strong in Eastern philosophy. Eastern 
philosophical traditions regard attention as a key to settling the mind. Buddhists, for example, 
value the way that attention attunes the individual to the ‘here and now’. In Buddhist 
philosophy, the act of bestowing attention raises one’s awareness of the present. In the 
Buddhist tradition, attention is associated with openness and with withholding judgments or 
holding back rather than jumping to possibly reactive assumptions. Eppert (2004, p. 63) notes 
that the Buddhist notion of ‘mindfulness’ also celebrates attention, yet attention is better 
appreciated in terms of Buddhism’s doctrine of ‘no-self’. While there may be some overlap 
between the contemporary practice of mindfulness—of being aware of the present moment, 
the notion of pedagogical attention as championed by Murdoch and Weil has a far richer 
metaphysical, ethical, and moral quality.9 
Attention in the Buddhist tradition involves initiating a connection with something 
other than the self. It also involves the recognition that the object of one’s attention is 
something to be respected, and therefore that the act of bestowing attention is already 
something worthy: 
To be attentive is not to be captivated by an intention or a project or a vision or 
perspective or imagination (which always give us an object and catch the present 
 
9 For example Germer (2004) uses the term ‘attention’ in a way that suggests mindfulness rather than attention 
in the sense understood by Weil and Murdoch. His definition of mindfulness is “(1) awareness, (2) of present 




in a re-presentation). Attention does not offer me a vision or perspective, it makes 
an opening for what presents itself as evidence. Attention is lack of intention. 
Attention entails the suspension of judgment and implies a kind of waiting in the 
sense that Foucault wrote of critique as the art of waiting (in French too the idea of 
attention relates to the verb attendre, to wait). (Masschelein, 2010, p. 48) 
Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch each engage appreciatively with Eastern and Buddhist 
views within their own philosophical writings on attention. (An especially beautiful insight 
concerning attention that Weil and Murdoch lay hold of, is that a person is most nearly 
realized as such who accomplishes genuine selflessness through attention. Self-absorption in 
the guise of narcissism or selfishness is a kind of inattentiveness or a failure to be mindful—so 
much so that we could consider that a person who suffers from this condition in fact barely 
exists as a person at all.)  
0.6. Thesis overview 
The overarching purpose of this thesis is to interpret Weil and Murdoch’s 
philosophical interpretations of the notion of attention, and to explore the ways that their 
insights establish strong educative connections between attention-giving and moral and 
intellectual growth. 
Chapters 1 and 2 of the thesis provide the philosophical base for the thesis as a whole. 
They draw on the philosophical concept of attention as developed by Simone Weil (Chapter 
1), and subsequently adapted by Iris Murdoch (Chapter 2). The aim of these two chapters is 
to critique these two philosophers’ respective notions of attention, to outline the metaphysical 
and epistemological bases of their accounts, and to consider the implication of these ideas for 
ethics, morality, literature, and hence for education. Across these two chapters, the argument 
is advanced that pedagogical attention (alongside its attendant attributes, respect and 
humility) has both epistemological and moral dimensions, and that the concept has the 
potential to clarify fundamentally, what it means to be educated, and possibly even what it 
means to be human. Selected Platonic themes regarding education are considered (and 
critically appraised) as they provide significant backdrop to the thinking of both Weil and 
Murdoch.10  
 
10 Throughout their philosophical writing, both Weil and Murdoch use the male personal pronoun as generic. I 




Chapter 1 provides a discussion of aspects of Simone Weil’s philosophy that relate 
both to her to her pedagogical writing and her indebtedness to Plato. It considers aspects of 
Weil’s life and times, and the particular character of Weil’s adherence to principles of 
consistency in relation to the pursuit of that which is of greatest worth. Important 
considerations in this chapter include Weil’s understanding that attention is an ethical 
training, and that the practice of attention enables one to access ideals of virtue and 
perfection as timeless. 
Chapter 2 discusses Iris Murdoch’s philosophical writing on attention, particularly as 
discussed in The Sovereignty of Good, but also through various other of her philosophical works. 
This chapter considers how, and why, Murdoch adopts and develops Weil’s concept of 
attention. It discusses Murdoch’s neo-Platonic sympathies, her use of Plato’s myths, and her 
idea of the Good as even more perfect and timeless than the Forms, so that the Good 
represents an unachievable but nevertheless meaningful condition upon reality as such. 
Murdoch describes attention as “not just the planning of particular good actions but an 
attempt to look right away from self towards a distant transcendent perfection, a source of 
uncontaminated energy, a source of new and quite undreamed of virtue” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 
99). While the particular reading of attention that I pursue leans more towards Murdoch’s 
largely (but not entirely) secular interpretation than to Weil’s more spiritually-oriented 
approach, both philosophers show that the notion of attention has a noetic quality, and both 
see its application in diverse areas of a person’s moral growth and education, even across a 
lifetime.  
In Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6, I apply Weil’s and Murdoch’s concepts of attention to four 
separate literary works, in order to examine the philosophical and aesthetic dimensions of 
attention. Across these four chapters I offer reflection about, and a detailed response to, the 
concept of attention in relation to fictional texts that concern teachers, teaching, or education 
more broadly. I examine some of the ways in which Weil’s and Murdoch’s philosophical 
ideas (as outlined in chapters 1 and 2) provide a coherent structure within which to undertake 
literary readings. The interpretative approach, which is distinct from the scholarly domain of 
literary theory, rather follows an established approach in the philosophy of education, 
whereby literary texts are explored to reflect upon and develop philosophical concepts.11  
 
 
11 Such an approach is exemplified in the work of Greene (1973), Nussbaum (1990, 1992), Palmer (1998), 




The four selected texts are Muriel Spark’s 1961 novella The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie, 
Charlotte Bronte’s 1853 novel Villette, Herman Hesse’s 1943 work The Glass Bead Game, and 
Henry James’s 1898 novel The Turn of the Screw. These four texts have been selected both 
because they concern aspects of ‘schooling’ and also because they are texts of sufficient 
complexity that they support detailed literary reading. Each of these novels serves as a case 
study to exemplify aspects of Weil’s and Murdoch’s thought. They each connect to a 
discussion of the place of literature in the educative process, as well as to identify the place of 
attention as a tool of thought, the two main themes of the study. Across these four chapters, 
various philosophical concepts and interpretations are further developed through discussions 
of secondary literature. 
Two female and two male literary authors are represented in the sample of novels 
discussed. The publication dates of these works span a period of two centuries, so offer a 
broad spread of historical perspectives. The sequencing of these four chapters follows the 
order in which the chapters were written rather than any historical or ordering, since the 
themes that are discussed, while interrelated and various, are discrete, rather than 
cumulative. This means that these chapters are self-contained and may be read in any order. 
Nor does the literature selection champion works of a particular length to develop the 
argument in favour of attentive reading. Two of the four novels discussed (Villette and The 
Glass Bead Game) are over 400 pages long, while the other two works (The Prime of Miss Jean 
Brodie and The Turn of the Screw), could be more accurately described as novellas, each running 
to a little more than 100 pages.  
None of these four novels is offered as being superior or more compelling than any of 
the others. For instance, Hesse’s Nobel prize for life work that includes The Glass Bead Game 
does not elevate that work above the others, and neither does James’ complex rendering of 
language mark him out as the greater literary artist, nor Brontë’s attention to her 
educationally impoverished nineteenth century heroine necessarily exemplify the best or most 
beautiful way to portray a literary character’s growth in pedagogical attention. The four 
literary artists whose work is considered do mutually exemplify the theme of difference. As 
James acknowledges in his preface to The Portrait of a Lady, the house of fiction has “not one 
window, but a million”—a number of possible windows not to be reckoned…but they are, 
singly or together, as nothing without the posted presence of the watcher—without, in other 




Muriel Spark’s The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie (Chapter 3) is a work that tolerates irony 
and ambiguity. This is a work that self-consciously explores its own ‘modality’. It deliberately 
draws attention to its own literary devices and features, its own aporia. Yet although the novel 
is in some ways obviously contrived, in other ways it well represents how we experience life, 
with some life experiences staying with us forever. Ultimately the novel is inconclusive about 
the kind of teacher that Jean Brodie is, yet we know for sure that she has had a lasting impact 
upon her students. 
By contrast, Charlotte Brontë’s Villette (Chapter 4) is something of a Bildungsroman, a 
sprawling nineteenth century narrative based on memory, a retrospective view of a woman’s 
slow growth to maturity as she learns to forego fantasies about her own prospects. Whereas 
Spark’s novel is self-consciously plotted, the strength of Bronte’s novel comes from the 
progressive development of the central character, Lucy Snowe, including her growth into 
humility. Brontë’s novel presents the tension between the narrative that Lucy wants to 
believe, and tells herself, about her possible future, and the more difficult narrative of her life 
as it unfolds.  
Hermann Hesse’s The Glass Bead Game (Chapter 5) is a metaphorical work that 
combines a range of literary forms. This work functions as a fable or a myth ahead of a 
narrative, or rather, it epitomizes the narrative power of myth. It explores educative themes 
through dislocations of time and identity. The novel is made up of a series of stories and 
formative events that survey times past, present, and future. This serves to draw attention to 
the growth and maturation (Bildung) of Joseph Knecht, who, in part through the guidance of 
lifetime mentors, enacts a kind of non-attachment to his own self that culminates in his death 
and ‘rebirth’.  
The power of Henry James’s The Turn of the Screw (Chapter 6) lies in the beauty and 
artistry of the work’s construction. James’s attention to detail in the ways he exploits themes 
of haunting and mystery, and his exploitation of his reader’s apprehension are a tantalizing 
challenge to attention. This chapter argues that James presents a collision between what we 
think we are reading about and what James invites us to see for ourselves. This story, which 
suggests the moral consequences of pursuing fairy-tale readings, teases out some complex 
ideas about literature and moral education. 
Each of these four novels has its own distinct form and character, and as a group 




James’s story is an elegantly structured work of impeccable artistic design, and Hesse’s novel 
epitomises the narrative power of myth, the works of Spark and Brontë are more obviously 
open to the chaotic and untidy realities of life as we experience it. All four works show 
characters whose experience involves the vexations of doubt and uncertainty, and all four 
exemplify the important role of attention to memory and recollection in experience. Each of 
these four texts also captures the vitality (as well as the potential perils), of the educative 
experience—not just the opportunities but also the challenges, uncertainties, and potential 
missteps. 
Across these four chapters, the case is argued that through encounters with literature, 
readers may gain further insights about the notion of attention. This section of the thesis seeks 
to demonstrate the ways in which reading connects to our inner sense of self—something that 
is both singular and also quite mysterious, and that is itself quite difficult fully to comprehend 
or explain. It is argued that through reading, we may effectively “re-cognise” (i.e. make 
understood), imaginative experiences that are no less potent, though obviously not equivalent 
to, actual lived experiences. This section draws on Murdoch’s claim that attention to 
literature can charge our imaginative and moral sensibilities in ways that are morally 
significant. This is to argue, with other theorists including Bruns (2002), Nussbaum (1990), 
Diamond (1998) and Roberts and Saeverot (2018), that to read imaginative fiction is far more 
than a suitable recreational hobby, but an undertaking and a commitment that has the 
potential to awaken realizations that that are intellectually and aesthetically creative, 
potentially eye-opening and formative, possibly even life-changing. As Murdoch argues, “the 
most essential and fundamental aspect of culture is the study of literature, since this is an 
education in how to picture and understand human situations” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 33). 
Chapter 7 continues the moral and psychological explorations of attention but in an 
entirely different context. It returns to the 21st century and priorities for contemporary 
education. This chapter critiques the implementation of open classroom design into our state 
schools and education spaces in Aotearoa New Zealand. It queries the origins of this 
directive, and argues that opportunities for attentive engagement within the remodelled 21st 
century New Zealand school are virtually nil. The chapter critiques the kinds of managerial 
teacherly oversight that open classrooms demand, and argues that such configurations eclipse 
altogether opportunities for pedagogical attention of the character described by Weil and 
Murdoch. This chapter seeks to reinforce, based on ideas developed in earlier chapters, what 




show why the current emphasis within education upon workplace-readiness and upon social 
skills of self-advancement is at the very least egregiously uninspired, and that the pursuit of 
collaborative and interactive classroom activities in an open environment, to the exclusion of 
more contemplative and thoughtful approaches, not only undermines, but potentially even 
snuffs out, vital aspects of a teacher’s individual agency. This chapter emphasizes that 
ultimately the most important considerations in education are moral and aesthetic rather 
than economic or ideological, and that good classroom teaching is that which is built around 
appropriately attentive relationships. The chapter closes with recommendations for further 
research and investigation. A brief conclusion which revisits the overarching themes of the 
thesis brings the work to a close.  
Overall, the thesis seeks to explore what we might call the importance of the “glorious 
immeasurability” of the benefits of reading literature (Roberts, 2016, personal 
communication), at a time when so much educational emphasis is being placed on 
measurable and quantifiable data. The thesis defends the view that literary reading opens the 
door to finding wider meaning, and that this touches on wider or more fundamental truths 
about our subjective existence. Literary reading is important because, through attention, it 
connects us to our inner sense of self—a sense of self that is unique, mysterious, that possibly 
defies clear understanding, to which humility is essential, and that originally and ineluctably 









Chapter 1: Simone Weil 
1.0. Introduction 
Simone Weil (1909–1943) was a French philosopher, teacher, and political activist. 
Weil is today is recognised as a singular person of great intellection.12 Although few of her 
writings were published in her lifetime, these have subsequently been translated and 
published into many languages. During her short life, Weil wrote on a wide range of themes 
including those of a political, spiritual and educational nature. Weil’s philosophical ideas 
draw on Plato as well as on Eastern sources, and she considered spirituality to be 
fundamentally part of both political and educational arenas. As a Neoplatonist, Weil believed 
in the existence of transcendent moral laws. She considered that these moral laws require of 
all of us, obligations and responsibilities to others. Weil had a powerful social conscience, and 
she argued tirelessly against what she saw as the dehumanising forces of capitalism and 
industrialisation. Today, more than a hundred years after her birth, the legacy of Weil’s work 
continues to yield profound meaning, not least in relation to the study of the philosophy of 
education.  
At the centre of Weil’s philosophy is a belief in the Platonic ideal—that the object of 
philosophy is the pursuit of goodness. As a consequence, Weil’s philosophy is fundamentally 
centred on matters of morality. Her philosophical stance is that the human mind can never 
fully reconcile the ultimate mystery or “unknowability” of the world. Weil’s philosophy does 
not entail a systemic search for truth or knowledge, but is rather oriented towards the quality 
of reflection in the face of that mystery or contradiction. Weil’s central philosophical concept 
is that of ‘attention’. In her view, to give attention to that which is beyond the self is not only 
morally improving, but is also an act of creativity.  
In many respects, Weil’s overall philosophy is impossible fully to characterize. She is 
not formally connected with academic or scholarly circles in France and is, in this sense, 
something of a philosophical “outsider”. With few exceptions (for example Winch, 1989), 
Weil has received scant attention from Western philosophy—perhaps because she defends the 
Platonic view that there is a unity to different branches of knowledge, at a time when analytic 
 
12 In his introduction to The Need for Roots, T.S. Eliot describes Weil as a “great soul and a brilliant mind” (Weil, 




male philosophy was in its heyday. Sontag (1966, p. 1) respects Weil’s “scathing originality” 
and her “manifest willingness to sacrifice” herself for her truths. Steiner (1996, p. 178) 
recommends that we distinguish between “the singularity of the person” and “the 
autonomous weight” of Weil’s work. He identifies in Weil’s writing glimpses of what he terms 
“supreme moral intelligence” (p. 179).  
The purpose of this chapter is to appraise the pedagogical richness of Weil’s 
philosophical insights, particularly in relation to her philosophy of education. The discussion 
pursues a secular reading of Weil and involves an interpretation of Weil’s attention in light of 
her allegiance to Platonic thought. It considers Weil’s interpretation of attention, and 
considers the ways in which her understanding of intellection, ethical awareness and moral 
and spiritual growth might challenge or inform contemporary educational approaches and 
priorities. The chapter, which builds on previous Weil scholarship is written is four sections. It 
opens with an examination of Weil’s context and her notion of attention. Next, it discusses 
her considerable debt to Plato. The third section considers Weil’s view of education, and the 
chapter closes with a discussion of Weil’s conception of reading and its relation to her overall 
pedagogy of attention. 
1.1. Weil’s life and times 
Weil lived during a time of great political instability in Europe. War was very much 
part of her lived experience—she was only five years old when World War 1 broke out, and 
she died, aged 34, four years into World War 2. Weil’s writing reflects her lifelong 
commitment to social justice, as well as her assiduous efforts to maintain consistency between 
her ideals and the way she lived her life. Despite her background in a well-to-do French 
Jewish family, she chose to spend some months working in Parisian factories, including a car 
assembly plant, in order to experience first-hand the realities of blue-collar factory work. 
Through this experience, Weil discovered for herself the dehumanizing effects of repetitive 
menial work that lacked any sense of value. She later claimed that this factory experience left 
her feeling humiliated, as if she had been somehow branded by this experience, since to be 
compelled to concentrate endlessly on mindless things denied her the opportunity even to be 
able to think. This for Weil, represented the ultimate form of subjugation.  
Weil’s interest in education is evident across her writing. As a high school and 
university teacher, she repeatedly challenged teaching approaches that were, in her view, 




to 1938) was sporadic not only because of her commitments to various social and political 
causes, but also because her radical views sometimes put her off-side with the education 
institutions where she was employed.  
Weil’s writing repeatedly shows her deep commitment to social justice. Her biography 
reflects her thoroughgoing efforts to maintain consistency between her moral convictions and 
the way she lived her life. A recurrent theme in Weil’s social commentary is her critique of 
societal and educational systems that essentially undermine the integrity of the individual, and 
that ultimately disrupt, rather than nurture, what she sees as the rightful sense of dignity due 
to each and every person. Weil repeatedly expresses her disdain for what we today call 
“marketplace” thinking, a way of thinking that infiltrates all aspects of our lives. In particular, 
she despises what she calls “our false conceptions of greatness; the degradation of the 
sentiment of justice; our idolization of money; and our lack of religious inspiration” (Weil, 
2002, p. 216).  
The pitch of Weil’s writing is remarkable for the rare depth of compassion she holds 
towards others. She has the exceptional ability to see all other people as equally deserving. In 
one of her essays she writes that “those whom we call criminals are only tiles blown off a roof 
by the wind and falling at random. Their only fault is the initial choice by which they became 
such tiles” (Weil, 2009, p. 75). Weil’s pedagogical philosophy calls for clear thinking, 
generosity to others, and a capacity to see the limits of one’s own relative importance.  
Weil’s philosophy of attention has been interpreted and discussed by a number of 
philosophers of education.13 Her interpretation of attention, influenced by Plato, points to the 
existence of transcendent moral laws that involve obligations and responsibilities towards 
others. It is to the pedagogical, moral, and aesthetic implications of Weil’s notion of attention 
that this chapter now turns. 
1.2. Weil’s ethics of attention 
Weil’s concept of attention mobilises several other key concepts—chiefly, detachment, 
humility, and respect. Although these concepts may seem anachronistic and old-fashioned to 
the contemporary reader, removed as they are from current educational priorities of progress, 
motivation and self-improvement, they are the foundation of Weil’s pedagogical theory, and 
 





they form the basis for her insights into how we think and how we grow in understanding. 
Weil regards that attention is integral not only to the educative process, but also to how we 
flourish as thinking beings in the world.14 What exactly does Weil mean by the term 
‘attention’ and why does she consider it so pivotal? 
In order to be a properly reflective creative and attentive thinker, one must, according 
to Weil, enter a mentally detached state wherein all mental activity is literally suspended. The 
state of attention contains an intriguing paradox: in order to activate attentive thinking, one 
must enter a detached and contemplative state: 
Attention consists of suspending our thought, leaving it detached, empty, and 
ready to be penetrated by the object; it means holding in our minds, within reach 
of this thought, but on a lower level and not in contact with it, the diverse 
knowledge we have acquired which we are forced to make use of…Above all our 
thought should be empty, waiting, not seeking anything, but ready to receive in its 
naked truth the object that is to penetrate it. (Weil, 2009, p. 62)  
The mind, when in the attentive mode, is thereby oriented towards something that is beyond 
itself. It is directed towards something perhaps more abstract and impersonal—a sense of 
relationships perhaps, or an intersection of ideas. Weil holds that the attentive person thereby 
stands not without the diverse knowledge that they have previously acquired, but rather ready 
to do with that knowledge something creative, rather than something dull. In this state of 
suspended cognition, the mind is free to discern necessary relations and meanings (truths), 
and to make intuitive connections that are neither willed nor imagined, but are simply 
‘accessed’.15 
The student who starts off in a state of ‘unknowingness’ may, through attention, enter 
a state that is outwardly-focussed and beyond selfish distractions. In this detached and 
immersive state, the attentive one may achieve the capacity to see things in a new, altered 
way. Thus, Weil argues, what leads to truth in understanding is not necessarily related to 
incredible philosophical insight or intellectual brilliance (endowments that Weil herself 
possessed in spades), but more simply, to a right amount of attention. The ideal state for us to 
make progress intellectually or morally, is to attend to the reality that is outside us, such that 
 
14 Weil (2002, p. 260) describes attention as “immobile expectancy.” 
15 Weil notes that “this kind of passive activity, the highest of all, is perfectly described in the Bhagavad-Gita and 




we are no longer aware of ourselves, but feel ourselves to be part of something else, something 
larger and much more interesting. Weil’s attention is a state of preparedness or readiness, a 
state that calls for both selflessness and mental concentration, a state that is neither willed into 
being, nor entirely acquiescent.  
To arrive at Weil’s state of attention involves a kind of conscious mental detachment, 
a “de-cluttering” in order to empty the mind of unfocussed or self-preoccupied thoughts. This 
involves letting go of the “I” and turning the mind outwards, beyond the self. Weil argues that 
if we can succeed in this to the extent that we can suspend all self-oriented thoughts and 
attend impartially, we may truly be able to open our minds to that which is true. As examples 
of inspirational truth, Weil cites examples such as the complex thought systems of the Latin 
language, or the rules of geometry, or the beauty of particular works of literary genius: “For 
this inspiration, if we know how to receive it, tends—as Plato said—to make us grow wings to 
overcome gravity” (Weil, 1968, p. 165). Weil’s attention involves a purposeful commitment to 
turn away from that which is fleeting and ephemeral, and to strive towards that which is 
real—that which is eternal or continuous. In Weil’s view, it is only through acts of attentive 
concentration that a thinker can come even close to so-called ‘eternal truths’. The highest 
form of attention is, for Weil, a form of devotion or prayerful reverence.  
Although Weil’s attention is not immediately associated with obedience or 
compliance, there is a very precise way in which her pedagogical attention involves a kind of 
“inner” obedience. For Weil, attention and obedience are closely aligned: we cannot but 
attend to the subject matter that is the centre of our attention. Our intellectual engagement is 
connected with our being attentive and sensitive to that material, and importantly, with that 
material being itself worthy of our attention. Weil acknowledges that to attain attention is 
likely to involve considerable effort, but she considers that repeated efforts will serve to 
improve our capacity for attention. Her notion of attention aligns with the aspirations of all 
philosophical inquiry—both are in a sense mobilised by a search for that which is true.  
Although for Weil attention is ‘mobilised’ by a desire for the truth, she sees that 
attention is not something that can be simply summoned by an effort of will. Rather, 
attention is attained by long exercise of a patient disposition, under a steady yearning for a 
clearer understanding. Attention requires the capacity to wait without yet grasping, the 
willingness to be receptive, tirelessly to anticipate, and neither to hope for a breakthrough nor 
withdraw from reflection. Through attention, the mind is drawn away from the here-and-




that for Weil spans both intellectual and spiritual dimensions. However, she also recognises 
that attention can be pursued in a secular fashion, quite apart from any specifically 
theological motivation: “For an adolescent, capable of grasping this truth…studies could have 
their fullest spiritual effect, quite apart from any particular religious belief” (Weil, 2009, p. 
65).  
Weil’s pedagogy involves the need to be intellectually curious and receptive, rather 
than the need to gain intellectual mastery. Her pedagogy involves the capacity to look for 
deeper meaning or to seek for alternative meanings. Weil reminds us of the limitations of a 
purely analytical approach to philosophical questions and she extols the virtue of a more 
intuitive, open-minded attitude. She states that in her view “philosophy (including problems 
of cognition, etc.) is exclusively an affair of action and practice. That is why it is difficult to write 
about it” (Weil, 1970, p. 362): 
The proper method of philosophy consists in clearly conceiving the insoluble 
problems in all their insolubility and then in simply contemplating them, fixedly 
and tirelessly, year after year, without any hope, patiently waiting. (p. 335)  
Attention—an attitude of looking and waiting—enables thought by liberating the 
mind from the tethers of habit, fantasy, or wishful imagination. For Weil, attention is entirely 
separate from the imagination, which in her view, is a negative force because it is linked to 
the human ego and therefore works against being patient. Unlike her fellow philosopher, Iris 
Murdoch, who considers the imagination a promising source of intellectual energy, Weil 
mistrusts the imagination. She considers the imagination to be “essentially a liar” and 
“continually at work filling up all the fissures through which grace might pass” (Weil, 1997, p. 
62). Weil considers the imagination to be an impediment to knowledge because in her view, 
the imagination works in ways that encourage an egocentric perspective. Weil considers that 
personal thoughts that focus on the subjective are self-limiting, and that without the elevating 
discipline of graceful attention, the human mind inevitably drifts towards trivia, towards an 
egotistical focus. By contrast, through the practice of contemplative attention, the mind is 
drawn gracefully outwards and upwards. Weil’s attention thus has metaphysical as well as 
epistemological qualities.  
Although Weil directs her thoughts to school-based learning, her comments on 
attention are not limited to the young. She argues that as humans we all need to work hard to 




metaphorically, to a state of being lowered by our ego, as it were weighed down, grounded—
expressed in French as la pesanteur—weightedness. (It is remarkable to read Weil as 
counterpoint to the “triumph des willens” pathology sweeping into Europe in her day.) We 
are, by nature, inclined to withdraw down into ourselves, into our own blinkered selfish 
interests, a condition that Weil termed “gravity”.16 (In Weil’s explanation we may easily 
render ourselves no less sight-impaired than earthworms.) Weil maintains that it is vital that 
we seek to reverse this natural gravitational pull or inclination towards self-preoccupation by 
instead concertedly reaching outwards and upwards. 
Weil’s concept for achieving attention is, paradoxically, that of “decreation” (see Weil, 
1997, pp. 78–86). To achieve decreation, Weil urges that we consciously cease to give 
attention to the “I” and call upon our powers of attention. Decreation is conscious, not 
passive. We must stop imposing our own reading on the world and be prepared—as also 
happens in the state of extreme suffering—to completely abandon the “I” and become, as it 
were, anonymous. Cameron (2007) describes Weil’s decreation as “the point of losing all 
personal being…to produce a void that could receive supernatural grace” (Cameron, 2007, p. 
110). Decreation is a state “so alien to us that we barely have any concepts for it, so quick are 
we to find any attempt to eradicate egotism in terms this extremely repellent [sic]” (p. 110). 
Attention creates in the mind a void, it “decreates” the ego such that the individual self is 
utterly subdued.17 
To arrive at a state of attention we must guard ourselves against distractions or 
wandering thoughts. We must involve our powers of humility, because humble thoughts serve 
to focus the mind:  
Every time we catch ourselves involuntarily indulging in a proud thought, we must 
for a few seconds turn the full gaze of our attention upon the memory of some 
humiliation in our past life, choosing the most bitter, the most intolerable we can 
think of. (Weil, 1997, p. 178) 
To activate one’s powers of attention involves both sensible preparation and a very particular 
selfless kind of mental effort, of which humility is no small part. If we are to understand 
anything at all, we must first exercise our capacity for humility, and to be humble we must be 
 
16 Weil, 1997, p. 45. 





able to efface ourselves to some higher order. Through humility we may demonstrate 
appropriate respect for others by seeing clearly their merits and their concerns. Weil grants, 
however, to give attention to another is “a very rare and difficult thing; it is so rare that 
achieving it is almost a miracle, it is a miracle” (Weil, 2009, p. 64).  
Weil considers humility to be integral to attention since “in the intellectual order, the 
virtue of humility is nothing more nor less than the power of attention” (Weil, 1997, p. 182). 
To activate one’s powers of attention involves both sensible preparation and a very particular, 
selfless kind of mental effort of which humility is no small part. To achieve humility, which 
Weil ranks as “the queen of virtues” (p. 87), we must learn to employ compassion and, more 
significantly, we must learn to subdue our ego. In this way we may, in Weil’s words, seek to 
“destroy the evil in ourselves” (Weil, 2009, p. 62).  
Weil makes the link between humility and openness and generosity towards others. 
To exercise humility opens up one’s capacity for altruism: “Humility consists in 
acknowledging that in what we call ‘I’ there is no source of energy by which we can rise” 
(Weil, 1997, p. 76). Weil observes that humility can enable us to develop an appropriate 
regard for others wherein we see, with clear vision, the good in others and can respond to 
their concerns. Weil cautions that we must ensure we are not too intensely involved in our 
own efforts towards intellectual mastery, lest we become too preoccupied about our own 
outcomes.18 We must demonstrate a measure of humility and restraint in our expectations 
(Weil, 1997, p. 170). Weil considers humility to be integral to one’s efforts for attention, since 
“in the intellectual order, the virtue of humility is nothing more nor less than the power of 
attention” (p. 182). This is why Weil asserts that “there is nothing nearer to true humility than 
intelligence” (p. 183). 
Humility is relevant to education because to be able to learn anything involves being 
prepared to bestow interest on something other than one’s self. Weil’s interpretation of 
humility is also centrally relevant to education because in order to be able to understand 
anything properly involves acknowledgement that there is something we have yet to 
understand. Humility involves an acknowledgement of what we don’t know, an admission of 
our own mediocrity. Weil urges that each person should confront his or her own mediocrity 
 




and limitations, and accept what Weil bluntly refers to as “stupidity” and “mediocrity” (Weil, 
2009, p. 60). 
Humility is relevant also, since if we exercise humility as we go along, we will increase 
the likelihood of being able to recognise, acknowledge and ideally surmount our mistakes—a 
virtue that Weil considers has much significance if we are to make intellectual progress. Weil 
acknowledges the human tendency, particularly in study, to overlook errors, to “give a 
sideways glance at the corrected exercise if it is bad and hide it forthwith” (p. 60). She 
counsels that we must “take great pains to examine squarely and to contemplate attentively 
and slowly each school task in which we have failed, seeing how unpleasing and second rate it 
is” (p. 59), and that “we work without making much progress when we refuse to give our 
attention to the faults we have made and our tutor’s corrections” (p. 60). Somehow, Weil 
urges, we need to look for what is instructive in any situation, even the most dire, to try to find 
a meaning that will teach us in some way that is morally improving.  
Weil’s attention calls for a stringent level of self-discipline coupled with an austere 
degree of self-reflection. She invites us, through an attitude of humility about our own 
ordinariness, to enter a state of detachment that is outwardly-focussed and completely beyond 
selfish and self-oriented distractions, for it is only in a selfless, detached and immersive state 
that we might achieve the capacity to apprehend things differently, or with clarity of vision. 
Weil acknowledges that a person’s education in attention may involve considerable 
discomfort and struggle but for all that, she sees nobility in one’s conscientious effort. We 
must, according to Weil, work constantly to achieve a measure of humility and restraint in all 
our intellectual endeavours, in whatever sphere. Weil considers that through attention, the 
individual may, even in the face of innumerable false starts and frustrations, still be able to 
develop his or her capacity for attention in productive ways. 
While we might balk at Weil’s uncompromising level of self-discipline, there is 
nevertheless educative sense in her argument that to give attention to anything or anyone else 
in a sustained and meaningful way calls for both focus on the task, and the active elimination 
of competing distractions. If our minds are too biddable then it is likely we will drift into our 
own world, or worse, that without our consent our minds may be deflected away from patient 
inquiry. Many educators would agree that if students lack the capacity to focus their attention 
through their own agency, they could be vulnerable and subject to persuasion from outside 
influences, including in the present day those that operate in unseen ways through complex 




potentially coercive influences, have direct relevance to education. As Weil reminds us, “one 
does not know how much one is enslaved by social influences” (Weil, 1968, p. 98). She 
expresses concern about the human tendency to fall in with collective or unreflective thought, 
rather than to engage in careful reflection: “If we examine human society…closely and with 
real attention, we see that wherever the virtue of supernatural light is absent, everything is 
obedient to mechanical laws as blind and as exact as the laws of gravitation” (Weil, 2009, p. 
75).  
Although Weil’s notion of attention is mobilised by a desire for truth, it cannot be 
simply summoned by an effort of will, so much as by a patient, gracious disposition. 
Assiduous dedication to thought requires a particular kind of intellectual effort. Weil reminds 
us that we ought not confuse attention with determination or with force, since attention is not 
something that can be delivered on command. Ultimately, Weil considers that attention 
should be as natural as breathing. She admonishes that if students employ “muscular effort” 
they are likely simply to “stiffen their muscles” (p. 60). They will have stiffened themselves up 
physically rather than relaxing their minds. Weil provides a physiological analogy: “We have 
to press on and loosen up alternately, just as we breathe in and out” (p. 61). This analogy 
captures Weil’s notions of gravity and grace. Through attention we effectively bridge the 
worlds of body and intellect. 
Weil employs the metaphor of orientation to describe the “turn towards the source of 
wisdom…towards light that comes from elsewhere, from above” (Weil, 1968, p. 105). But 
Weil’s attention involves more than simply to “turn” in the right direction. Weil points also to 
the want of a method for attention: “Everything in creation is dependent upon method 
including the points of intersection between this world and the next” (Weil, 2002, p. 186). In 
attention, too, Weil states that “there is a method to be followed” (p. 186).  
It is Weil’s conviction that her contemporary world unnecessarily separates out 
scientific thought from everyday thought (with the implication that everyday thought cannot 
be elevated to higher realms). This separation is, to Weil, entirely wrongheaded, and she 
proposes the method of pedagogical attention as a way to address this situation. She presents 
her method of attention in the form of a scientific proposition and a formal demonstration. 
She argues that just as the study of mathematics brings students into contact with paradoxes 
and ‘incommensurable’ notions such as irrational numbers, so must all meaningful study, 




Weil explains that attention involves two requirements. The first is that we must have 
‘faith’ in the sovereignty of attention. Faith is “the indispensable condition” (Weil, 2009, p. 
58). Weil insists that attention must be believed in and practised ahead of any “proof” or 
certainty of its results (p. 58). She acknowledges that “certainties of this kind are experimental. 
But if we do not believe in them before experiencing them, we shall never have the 
experience that leads to such certainties” (p. 58). Weil insists that “to make this [attention] the 
sole and exclusive purpose of our studies is the first condition to be observed if we are to put 
them to the right use” (p. 59). Weil’s second condition is that through attention, we must be 
prepared to examine and critique our errors and faults and try to understand and overcome 
them. She admonishes that most of our errors will have come about through rushing: “All 
wrong translations, all absurdities in geometry problems, all clumsiness of style…all faulty 
connection of ideas…are due to the fact that thought has seized upon some idea too hastily” 
(p. 62).  
Weil’s attention is not a state of total mental detachment, but a detachment from the 
self and the will, a detachment from any desire to obtain or to possess understanding for 
purposes that are driven by ego or acquisitiveness. She acknowledges that this quality of 
attention is not simply a state of being open to thought, but one that connects to “all 
particular and already formulated thoughts” (p. 62). She draws the analogy of “a man on a 
mountain who, as he looks forward, sees also below him without actually looking at them, a 
great many forests and plains” (p. 62). Through this image, Weil points to the way that 
sustained attention of the right quality involves the capacity to appreciate and find beauty in 
things that are not clear or not yet clearly understood.  
For Weil, the apprehension of beauty is a route to attention, since the apprehension of 
beauty is both inspirational and other-regarding. Attention to the beautiful is a means to 
enable the mind to let go, to attend, in order (possibly) to come to a deeper understanding, a 
more nuanced expression, a more beautiful solution. Scarry (1999) reminds us that to see 
beauty, as Weil guides us to do, by way of attention, is to be reminded of one’s own relative 
insignificance, and to accept that very insignificance entirely without qualms:  
It is not that we cease to stand even at the centre of our own world, for we never 
stood there. It is that we cease to stand even at the centre of our own world. We 




The student of attention, absorbed in the intellectual task loses entirely his or her sense of 
selfhood. He or she no longer has a desire to ‘master’ a problem or challenge, but ‘confronts’ 
it in a more open way, perhaps to consider why this is an interesting problem. In this 
detached and immersive state, the attentive student may, like the man on the mountaintop, 
achieve the capacity to see things in a newly configured way. Thus, Weil places emphasis on 
contemplation far ahead of the quantifiable results of industry and effort—such as achieving 
good marks or meritorious examination results, which she deplores when such a favoured 
outcome is viewed as an end in itself: “The youth of our schools are as much obsessed by their 
examinations as our workmen engaged in piece-work are by their pay packets” (Weil, 2002, 
p. 46). 
Weil’s standards for intellectual commitment are high. She values genuine intellectual 
effort: “When we set out to do a piece of work, it is necessary to wish to do it correctly, 
because such a wish is indispensable in any true effort” (p. 59). Academic rigor remains 
paramount, for it is by dint of intellectual application that the student of attention focuses 
their thoughts. In her terms, attention to the academic task is a sign of love for the work. She 
argues that it does not even matter “whether we succeed in finding the solution or 
understanding the proof, although it is important to try really hard to do so”, since, in Weil’s 
view, “genuine efforts of attention are never wasted” (p. 58). Drawing on Platonic ideas, Weil 
suggests that the object of instruction is itself something quite beyond instruction (Weil, 1997, 
p. 173). The student who starts off in a state of ‘unknowingness’ may, through attention and 
humility, be transported to a state that is as it were outwardly-focussed and completely 
beyond selfish distractions. In this detached and immersive state, the attentive student may 
achieve the capacity to see things in a new, better way.  
Weil aligns attention to the concept of goodness. She argues that good actions come 
about when people direct their attention towards finding the good in situations, in and for 
people, and in aesthetic achievements: “It is untrue that there is no connection between 
perfect beauty, perfect truth, perfect justice: they are far more than just connected: they form 
a single mysterious unity, for the good is one” (Weil, 2002, p. 232). She considers that the 
context of quietness or solitude leads to a greater likelihood of achieving pedagogical 
attention, for then there is less likelihood of distraction from others or from ourselves. Weil 
urges that we use attention as the means to look beyond the senses, to ideas, in order to 




goodness, in the activity of a human being are the result of one and the same act, a certain 
application of the full attention to the object” (Weil, 1997, p. 173). 
1.3. Weil and Plato 
There are strong resonances in Weil’s notion of attention to wider issues of truth, 
morality and goodness, and in this we see links to Plato. Weil reflects Platonic thinking when 
she draws a connection between the right use of attention and moral perception: “We do not 
have to understand new things, but by dint of patience, effort, and method to come to 
understand with our whole self the truths which are evident” (Weil, 1997, p. 169). For Weil, 
philosophical activity involves encounters with mystery, with irreconcilable and complex 
concepts—not with the expectation of finding answers, but rather to provide opportunities to 
reflect further on the implications of their complexity. Weil considers that the best 
philosophical approach is one that eliminates the ego and any preoccupation with the self. 
She considers that Plato’s philosophical approach exemplifies this method.19  
Weil aligns her understanding of attention to the Platonic concept of the Good. She 
argues that good actions come about when people attend to the good in other people, in 
situations, or in aesthetic achievements. For Weil, the Good is a “transcendent reality”‘, and 
until we turn to the Good, we remain at the mercy of our human nature which Weil 
characterises in terms of the forces of gravity. Weil sees that we are inclined to be weighed 
down by our own nature: “Descending movements are the only ones within our power” 
(Weil, 1970, p. 297). To withstand such gravitational force is to experience the void. Such 
reversal can be achieved only through what Weil terms “grace”.20  
Like Plato, who holds that the Good is not a Form (because the Good stands as 
necessary for the very possibility of any Form, and so precedes them), Weil seems intent to 
imply that the Good, in lifting us to any knowledge that we may possess, could not possibly be 
either private to an individual, or an element of what may be known. The Good is beyond 
any self in the exact way that it is a condition on knowledge. But its way of being beyond the 
self at the same time leaves it common to all selves—even the plainest self with the humblest 
intellect. The Good cannot be required or achieved by desire; it has to come from God itself. 
If we can attend impartially, we may truly be able to open our minds to what is true. But, 
 
19 These and related ideas are discussed in detail in Springstead & Schmidt, 2015, pp. 1–18.  




Weil cautions, we can only really have experiences that will lead, in her view, to God (or to 
the unachievable seeking for the Good), if we act on the kind of faith Weil has outlined—that 
is to say, if we open our minds in a disciplined, humble and non-pressured way. If we are 
successful in doing this, and if we are able to experience a new way to see, then we will have 
made a connection, and (in very rare cases) we may even gain knowledge, certainty, and 
wisdom.  
Reflecting Plato, Weil believes that education ought to be oriented in ways that enable 
people to grow and flourish as independent thinkers. For Weil, philosophical activity is that 
which involves encounters with mystery, with concepts that are complex and possibly 
ultimately irreconcilable. Weil’s preferred philosophical approach is one based on meditation 
and reflective thought, rather than on expecting to find answers. She notes that both Western 
and Eastern philosophical traditions employ various routes to destroy the ego and foster lucid 
thought: “The Zen Buddhist technique of the koan is a method for effecting this destruction. 
And perhaps Plato possessed a method of this kind, in what he called dialectics?” (Weil, 1970, 
p. 292). Weil considers that education, if it is truly to support the development of students’ 
capacity to think well, must include silent, contemplative activities in balance with other more 
interactive, modes.21 
Weil considers that in order to arrive at such a state of ready attention, we must 
consciously and patiently prepare the mind, and such preparation is best achieved in 
meditative quietness, if not in solitude. To consider things from different perspectives, as well 
as to consider the great intellects of earlier times, requires time for individual reflection. In 
Weil’s view, twentieth century education of her day has lost the love of truth and beauty 
altogether. She looks back to Ancient Greece and points to the Greek’s unification of science 
and religion as the ideal: “The true definition of science is this: the study of the beauty of the 
world” (Weil, 2002, p. 258).  She thereby proposes a unified approach as the way forward for 
her own time (and for ours). Her method of attention is pivotal to this view.  
Following Plato, Weil considers understanding as a kind of recollection—the student 
calls attention to what is already in the mind, and effectively seeks to awaken the mind. This 
view is quite contrary to the contemporary notion of the active student in pursuit of answers 
that are “out there”, and who is busy seeking and searching for data as evidence and 
 




justification. Weil, by contrast, is taken by the mysterious workings of the mind and the 
memory. She provides an example of something that is both fairly commonplace and also 
rather mysterious, whereby a thought, for a time entirely forgotten is unaccountably re-
discovered: 
Suppose I had had a thought and have forgotten it two hours later…I direct my 
attention for a few minutes towards an empty space; empty but real. Then 
suddenly the thought is there, beyond all possible doubt. I did not know what it 
was, and yet now I recognise it as being what I was waiting for. An everyday 
experience, and an unfathomable mystery. (Weil, 1968, p. 121) 
This account calls to mind a scene in The Meno (81d), where Socrates declares that “nothing 
prevents a man, after recalling one thing only—a process men call learning—discovering 
everything else for himself, if he is brave and does not tire of the search, for searching and 
learning are, as a whole, recollection” (Plato,1997, p. 880). 
Similarly, Weil effectively challenges us to rethink entirely how we understand the 
process of education. The student who starts off in a state of “unknowingness” may, through 
attention and humility, enter a state that is, as it were, outwardly-focussed and completely 
beyond selfish distractions and, in this detached and immersive state, the student may achieve 
the capacity to see things in a better or more insightful way. 
Weil’s ethics of attention also informs her interpretation of aesthetic experience. Weil 
invokes Plato’s image of artistic creation as an analogy for divine creation:  
In creating a work of art…the artist’s attention is oriented towards silence and the 
void; from this…there descends an inspiration which develops into words or 
forms. There the model is the source of transcendent inspiration. (Weil, 1968, p. 
133) 
Weil calls up the Platonic notion of mediation (metaxu)—a term drawn from the character of 
the priestess/midwife Diotima in Plato’s Symposium. (It is Diotima who mediates, and who 
shows Socrates that things can be apprehended by different people in different ways.) For 
Weil, beauty is a bridge (metaxu) that provides a vital connection between the ‘here and now’ 
of everyday experience and that which is transcendent and eternal. Through metaxu (such as 
by way of nature, beauty, art, and literature), the human mind may be drawn to a higher 




activity of a human being are the result of one and the same act, a certain application of the 
full attention to the object” (Weil, 1997, p. 173). 
1.4. Attention and contradiction 
A key concept in Weil’s epistemology is that of contradiction. Weil considers 
contradiction to be “the test of necessity”, the very crux of learning (Weil, 1997, p. 151). Weil 
acknowledges Plato’s recognition that everything the human intelligence can represent to 
itself involves contradiction, and that to explore the very point of contradiction, one’s thought 
may be elevated to a higher level of understanding: “Contradiction is our wretchedness, and 
the feeling of our wretchedness is the feeling of reality” (Weil, 1956, p. 411). Cognitive 
ambiguities that are jarring to thought are, to Weil, the very events that deserve our attention. 
These events are for Weil (and, as we shall see, also for Murdoch) essential elements of reality, 
and not obstacles to it: “The contradictions the mind comes up against, these are the only 
realities, the criterion of the real. There is no contradiction in what is imaginary. 
Contradiction is the test of necessity” (Weil 1997, p. 151).  
Such cognitive puzzles are instructive, according to Weil, because it is precisely by 
virtue of facing impasse that the mind is truly challenged. As an example of contradiction, she 
instances the way in which we accept that a straight line is something that is definite and 
measurable, and of finite length, but at the same time we agree that it is made up of a 
countless (infinite) series of points. In another example, she explains her notion of attention in 
terms of a contradiction—as a “passive activity” (Weil, 2009, p. 126), and elsewhere, as a 
“non-active action” (Weil, 1956, p. 124). Weil argues that it is precisely in the face of 
contradictions that the human intelligence must call upon attention: “We make decisive 
progress if we decide to expose honestly the contradictions essential to thought instead of 
vainly trying to brush them aside” (Springsted and Schmidt, 2015, p. 36).  
Enigmas or ambiguities that are mentally puzzling, intriguing, or dissonant are for 
Weil (and, as we shall see also for Iris Murdoch), important and essential elements of reality, 
and not obstacles to it: “When the attention has revealed the contradiction in something on 
which it has been fixed, a kind of loosening takes place. By persevering in this direction, we 
attain detachment” (Weil, 1997, p. 151). Analogously, Weil shows us that thinking itself calls 
for a particular state of focussed attention. The attentive student can neither demand, nor 
take charge of, the thought process. The state of mind that is thinking requires first and 




Weil’s ethics of attention also informs her interpretation of aesthetic experience. She 
invokes Plato’s image of artistic creation as an analogy for divine creation:  
In creating a work of art…the artist’s attention is oriented towards silence and the 
void; from this…there descends an inspiration which develops into words or 
forms. There the model is the source of transcendent inspiration. (Weil, 1968, p. 
133) 
Following Plato, Weil draws on the notions of ‘attention’ and ‘wonder’ as means of 
developing moral perception. With Plato, Weil believes that the teacher’s role is to bring out 
that which is already latent in the student. The student literally “unfurls” or blossoms under 
the guidance of the teacher. The teacher’s task is to mobilise the student’s own readiness for 
immersion in the object of study, whatever the area. Weil summarises what she sees as the 
most important part of teaching: “The most important part of teaching = to teach what it is 
to know (in the scientific sense)” (Weil, 1956, p. 364). Weil draws on Plato’s notion of beauty 
as something so powerful that it can shock or startle, and that engenders both respect and 
love. She describes this in terms of a contradiction: “One is both attracted and kept at a 
distance” (Weil, 1968, p. 124). Weil references Plato’s suggestion that the contemplation of 
the beauty of intellectual work can lead to a “quest for perfection” (p. 129). The attention that 
beauty invokes itself sharpens the viewer’s capacity for attention, raises the awareness. 
For Weil, beauty can serve as a bridge to God (or, on a secular reading, and one 
which Iris Murdoch assumes, as a bridge, or ladder, to the Good). Beauty, which represents 
for Weil the “implicit love of God” (p. 99), can be found in various places, including in 
nature, art, aesthetics, and in great literary works. Beauty is characterised by form, 
proportion, order and balance. Weil explains that the aesthetic experience of beauty leads the 
mind to a higher plane. Something beautiful is apprehended, and this startles us, renders us 
breathless, and invites us to look for some way to make sense of it. This, according to Weil, is 
how beautiful things lead us to God: “The truly precious things are those forming ladders 
reaching towards the beauty of the world, openings onto it” (p. 116). Beauty also draws our 
respect.  
When we apprehend something beautiful, we appreciate it respectfully and at a 
distance—we regard it not as something to be seized or possessed, but rather as something to 
be contemplated, and to be shared (Weil, 1997, p. 206). We apprehend beauty as something 




Plato’s claim that the contemplation of beauty is not possible without love: “We cannot 
contemplate without a certain love” (Weil, 2009, p. 108). Weil notes the importance of love to 
Plato’s philosophy. She quotes from Plato’s Republic VI, 493 (Weil, 1968, p. 101) that “the 
love of God is the root and foundation of Plato’s philosophy”. Love is also at the root and 
foundation of Weil’s pedagogy of attention. In her account, attentive love is what frees the 
individual from the shackles of selfhood, and this is the means by which thought can be 
diverted from the false seductions of self-importance, self-love, and self-centredness. Attention 
also liberates the individual from fantasies about power, possessions or group entitlement.  
Following Plato, Weil’s metaphysics emphasises the function of the mediator/bridge 
(metaxu). Mediation, which was fundamental to Plato’s thought, is a way to bridge between the 
human and the divine. Weil notes that the Greeks: “perceived a divine relation in 
geometry…they invented the method of rigorous demonstration…a bridge leading towards 
God—not by diminishing, but by increasing precision, demonstration, verification and 
supposition” (Weil, 1956, p. 441). Plato, through his Socratic dialogues, held that moral 
education involved inducting the youth of the day into socially acceptable ways of being. 
Plato has his speaker, Socrates articulate the idea that education involves obedience to the 
idea of knowledge of what is good, and acceptance through reason. Plato’s education is 
neither conformist nor self-promoting. Plato’s education is a combination of dialectics (oral 
debates) and gymnastics (physical strength), thought and action.  
Weil, like Plato, draws on the metaphor of a physical wall as a middle way, a 
mediator. The wall represents both a barrier and a conduit. It is “is a closed door, it is a 
barrier and at the same time it is the way through” (Weil, 1997, p. 132). Just as the wall 
between two prisoner’s cells presents a physical separation but does not delimit 
communication between them, so too might we come to understand mental concepts through 
encounter with contradictions that literally ‘awaken’ the mind.  
Weil’s attitude is that an educational approach that is motivated by the quest for 
definitive answers or explanations is entirely misled. Her philosophy does not seek for a 
systematic and thoroughgoing interpretation of the world. Rather, she identifies a sense of 
mystery or contradiction as the means by which inspiration is revealed. The world is such 
that reason cannot fully account for everything. Thus Weil considers that the ultimate 
purpose of teaching is “not that the initiated should learn something, but that a 
transformation should come about in them, which makes them capable of receiving the 




training the attention, for the possibility of such an act. All other advantages of instruction are 
without interest” (p. 173). In Weil’s view, the teacher’s role is not to instruct students on what 
to think, how to pass tests, and nor is it the teacher’s role to impose on students a particular 
interpretation of the world. Rather, the teacher’s role is to help develop in each student his or 
her capacity to look at things in contemplative and questioning ways, so that each student’s 
individual capacity for rational thought and intelligence is developed.  
Echoing Plato, Weil considers thought as a kind of recollection—the student calls 
attention to what is already in the mind, and effectively seeks to awaken the mind. (This is 
quite the opposite of the contemporary western education view of the diligent student who is 
busy and active, working collaboratively and constantly in pursuit of evidence, data, or 
answers, who is forever in search of material to gather and provide as evidence and 
justification.) Weil deems that to spend time developing the educative faculty of attention is a 
worthy pursuit in and of itself—whether in the context of attempting to solve an algebraic 
equation, or in developing one’s proficiency in playing a musical instrument, or in 
encountering the complex structures of a new language. Classroom pursuits that call for 
repetition, concentration, dedication and sustained attention are all, in her view, worthy 
pursuits.  
Similarly, pursuits such as to give sustained and compassionate attention to other 
people, or to the beauty of nature, or to the beauty of a great work of art or literature are, if 
practised in humility, likely to bring the individual closer to that which is of most worth: 
There is something else which has the power to awaken us to the truth. It is the 
works of writers of genius, or at least of those with genius of the very first order 
and when it has reached its full maturity. They are outside the realm of fiction, 
and they release us from it. They give us, in the guise of fiction, something 
equivalent to the actual density of the real, that density which life offers us every 
day but which we are unable to grasp because we are amusing ourselves with lies. 
(Weil, 1968, p. 162) 
Following Plato, Weil uses the metaphor of vision to capture the process of thinking 
itself. She describes thought in terms of what she considers to be a “method for the exercise of 
the intelligence which consists of looking” (Weil, 1997, p. 174). Weil’s account of a person 
who is immobile, detached, held in deep concentration and yet still receptive, epitomises her 




takes place at the very roots of our sensibility, in our immediate reception of sense impressions 
and psychological impressions” (Weil, 2009, p. 100). This experience of contemplative reverie 
may, she argues, be so intense that “with time we are altered and if, as we change, we keep 
our gaze directed toward the same thing, in the end illusions are scattered and the real 
becomes visible” (Weil, 1997, p. 174). 
1.5. Education’s chief purpose  
Weil considers that attention is critically important to education—to the extent that it 
is education’s chief purpose to foster in students their faculty of attention: “Whoever goes 
through years of study without developing this attention within himself has lost a great 
treasure” (Weil, 2009, p. 64), and that “for an adolescent, capable of grasping this truth and 
generous enough to desire this fruit above all others, studies could have their fullest spiritual 
effect quite apart from any particular religious belief” (p. 65). Significantly, although Weil’s 
personal account of attention is spiritually oriented, she acknowledges that attention has 
importance even if it falls short of a theological commitment.  
As a Platonist, Weil considers that a balance between participatory dialogue with 
periods of silence is fundamental to clear thinking. She considers that education ought to 
include contemplative activities in balance with more interactive tasks. To have the 
opportunity to develop perspective, and to mull, critique, revisit, remember, to consider 
things from different perspectives, to be able to learn from the great minds of the past—calls 
for opportunity for individual reflection. Attention involves the disposition of waiting without 
grasping, of being receptive and ready, waiting tirelessly, in expectation. Weil considers that 
in order to arrive at such a state of ready attention, we must consciously and patiently prepare 
the mind, and such preparation is best achieved in meditative quietness, if not in solitude.  
In Weil’s view, the opportunity to silently mull over, to critique, to revisit and 
remember, helps the mind to develop perspective. It is unlikely that there is room for these 
priorities (whether figuratively or literally) within the busy, inquiry-focussed, assessment-
focussed contemporary classroom. To consider things from different perspectives, as well as to 
consider the great intellects of earlier times, requires dedicated space and time for individual 
reflection and contemplation.  
The context for Weil’s readiness is far from that of the active contemporary learner in 
the “driver’s seat”, whose purpose it is to gather and garner evidence for their own questions 




environment” with its vast, flexible teaching spaces, sometimes without fixed walls, delimits 
quite significantly any opportunities for fostering attention in Weil’s understanding of that 
word. In Weil’s vision of education, thinking is a solitary, not a collective activity. 
Caranfa (2010a, 2010b and 2016) argues that today’s western educational methods 
which typically deny a place for contemplation and reflection, not only fail to equip students 
with opportunities to reflect on and think about larger moral issues, but they also deflect 
student attention away from developing a sense of aesthetic appreciation, for example, by 
effectively denying opportunities to study works of literature. Caranfa argues that “by 
neglecting or separating speech from silence, today’s educational methods do not prepare 
students to respond to life’s questions; neither do they enable students to infuse their 
conversation with an appreciation of life’s beauty” (2010, p. 577). Caranfa urges that the 
reciprocity of speech and silence be reconsidered and resurrected. In Weil’s words, education 
must provide students with “the opportunity to reach even higher levels of attention, some 
solitude, some silence” (Weil, cited in Caranfa, 2010, p. 577). 
As part of her view of education, Weil considers it a virtue to expose young students to 
the wonders of possibility and to enliven in them a sense of their own (limited) autonomy. She 
values exposing students to aesthetic beauty:  
But above all, one would try to make the children feel all the beauty contained 
therein. If they ask: “is this true?” we should answer: “it is so beautiful that it must 
certainly contain a lot of truth. As for knowing whether it, or is not, absolutely 
true, try to become capable of deciding that for yourselves when you grow up. 
(Weil, 2002, p. 92) 
We might wonder how the contemporary classroom teacher might respond to such an 
enquiry from a student, given that contemporary pedagogy holds that the object is for the 
student to define their own inspiration for development. Faced with such a question, the 
teacher is likely to defer to the authority of the internet, and to guide the student to search 
online to find or the answer to their question. Then at least there would be in some sense the 
following by the student of their own inspiration. But the exercise, however consonant with 
contemporary priorities for education, pales compared to Weil’s injunction, that the student 
must aspire (in this order) towards beauty, goodness, and truth. This observation is not 




vast and growing resource of information on the internet, but is given simply to contrast these 
contemporary priorities with Weil’s pedagogy of attention.  
A follower of Weil, Scarry (1999) likewise addresses beauty as precedent to possible 
learning: 
The willingness continually to revise one’s own location in order to place oneself 
in the path of beauty is the basic impulse underlying education. One submits 
oneself to other minds (teachers) in order to increase the chance that one will be 
looking in the right direction when a comet makes its sweep through a certain 
patch of sky. The arts and sciences, like Plato’s dialogues, have at their centre the 
drive to confer greater clarity on what already has clear discernibility, as well as to 
confer initial clarity on what originally has none. (Scarry, 1999, pp. 7–8) 
Weil believes that a worthy education is one that ensures that people use their 
intelligence well in order that they make best sense of the world. Her philosophy of attention 
calls for fairness, tolerance and decency as mainstay values. Weil’s account of attention calls 
for us to revise completely our understanding of what it is to think well: 
Every time…a human being succeeds in making an effort of attention with the 
sole idea of increasing his grasp of truth, he acquires a greater aptitude for 
grasping it, even if his efforts produce no visible fruit. (Weil, 2009, p. 59)  
In Weil’s view, education is not at all to do with discovering talent, but has rather more to do 
with developing in each and every student, their faculty of attention: 
It is true that talent has no connexion with morality; but then, there is no 
greatness about talent, it is untrue that there is no connection between perfect 
beauty, perfect truth, perfect justice: they are far more than just connected: they 
form a single, mysterious unity, for the good is one. (Weil, 2002, p. 232) 
Weil’s educational philosophy discourages altogether questions of the form “is this true?” 
Instead, Weil’s pedagogy encourages students to be challenged by questions of the form “why 
is this an interesting question?”. Weil would reframe personally-directed questions such as 
“why should I care”, or “how does this affect me?” into more outwardly-focussed questions 
such as “why does this matter?” Her pedagogy also emphasises taking time to think for 
oneself rather than rushing to find the answer. She argues that to achieve this requires the 




the contemporary school emphasis on team-work and collaboration. Weil considers that one 
ought not to be in too much of a hurry, not too much seduced or motivated by goals, outputs, 
results, easily-found conclusions. 
Weil urges the careful use of language both to clarify thought and to preserve the 
ability to draw fine distinctions in meaning. She laments the human tendency to use language 
to employ what she calls “absolutes”, rather than making use of conditional verbs or phrases 
to modify or qualify ideas. Weil considers the tendency to employ “absolutes” to be an 
erosion of a vocabulary of value. Weil considers that when language is simplified in 
instrumental ways, the expression of more fine-grained thinking is, in important respects, 
diluted:  
Words like vice, nobility, honour, generosity, have become almost impossible to 
use or else they have acquired bastard meanings; language is no longer 
legitimately equipped for praising a man’s character. It is slightly, but only slightly, 
better equipped for praising a mind; the very word mind, and the words 
intelligence, intelligent, and others like them, have also become degraded. The 
fate of words is a touchstone of the progressive weakening of the idea of value. 
(Weil 1968, p. 168) 
Weil warns that “the desire to discover something new prevents people from allowing their 
thoughts to dwell on the transcendent, undemonstrable meaning of what has already been 
discovered” (Weil, 1997, p. 184). Harking back to the Greeks, she notes that “Greek science 
was based on piety. Ours is based on pride” (Weil, 1956, p. 548). Weil argues that as humans 
we all need to work very hard to reclaim humility in our interactions with the world, and we 
must work hard not to rush to seize upon an easy or ready answer.  
Weil considers that all truly meaningful human achievements are only achieved 
through efforts of attention. All cultural and intellectual achievements, whether mathematical, 
literary, musical, or whatever the field, are the result of sustained human efforts of selfless 
attention. She assigns a spiritual quality to all such achievements. She views them as the 
product of egoless human effort, which lifts them to a spiritual plane. Weil considers that this 
egoless effort amounts to willingness to wait, and is, at its most intensely pure, one and the 
same as seeking for God: 
The longing to love the beauty of the world in a human being is essentially the 




incarnation alone can satisfy it. (Weil, 2009, p. 109) 
As a Platonist, Weil considers that a balance between participatory discussion and 
silent contemplation is fundamental to thinking. She considers that education must include a 
balance of contemplative and interactive activities. Opportunities to develop perspective, to 
mull, to critique, to revisit and remember, to consider things from different perspectives, to be 
able learn from the great minds of the past are, in her view, vital. Weil acknowledges that her 
approach to education has no guarantee of immediate or even long-term success, and 
counsels that the direct “seeking out” of knowledge often goes unrewarded, and that “we do 
not obtain the most precious gifts by going in search of them, but by waiting for them” (Weil, 
2009, p. 62). In a similar fashion, we might help our children to know not to ask for gifts, 
since one does not give a gift because it has been requested, and one does not receive a gift as 
a result of grasping for it. Gifts are, by definition, things that come to us unsolicited. Weil also 
insists that the practice of training the mind through attention ought essentially be a positive, 
even joyful experience: 
The intelligence can only lead by desire. For there to be desire, there must be 
pleasure and joy in the work. The intelligence only grows and bears fruit in joy. 
The joy of learning is as indispensable in study as breathing is in running. Where 
it is lacking there are no real students but only poor caricatures of apprentices who 
at the end of their apprenticeship will not even have a trade. (p. 61) 
Although Weil is opposed to the delivery of a rigid curriculum, she nevertheless 
advocates lessons that expose students to different systems of value and thought. Weil believes 
that teachers should expose children to a range of spiritual ideas and concepts, and that all 
school students be given the opportunity to become acquainted with, and to critique, different 
systems of thought. She considers that there ought to be a spiritual aspect to children’s 
education and asserts that “an educational course in which no reference is made to religion is 
an absurdity” (Weil, 2002, p. 92). She considers that insights into the religious and mystical 
thought of past civilizations have value in that they serve to broaden students’ horizons and 
their tolerance. Further, she warns that in her view, “if children are not brought up to think 
about God, they will become fascists and communists for want of something to give 
themselves” (p. 91). Weil’s point here is not necessarily that religious studies ought to be 




particular values or ideals, students may themselves become unwittingly susceptible to 
dangerous or manipulative external influences. 
1.6. Reading as sense-making 
In an essay written in 1941, Weil employs the concept of reading as a metaphor for 
the way that we make sense of the world. She explains that reading (by which Weil means 
interpreting), is an activity we are all actively involved in on a daily basis: “What we call a 
correction of a sensory illusion is actually a modified reading” (Springsted and Schmidt, 2015, 
p. 23). Weil observes that in the same way that we experience physical sensations as “brute 
fact”, reading may also evoke in us a response that is immediate and visceral. She instances 
two women who each receive a letter that contains the same tragic news. Only one of the two 
women can read, and for her, the written words have a powerful effect, whereas the illiterate 
woman can draw no meaning whatsoever. Weil’s point is that what we read may convey 
powerful, even profound meaning. She reminds us that we mix our labour with what we read: 
The world is a text with several meanings, and we must pass from one meaning to 
another by a process of work. It must be work in which the body constantly bears 
a part as, for example, when we learn the alphabet of a foreign language: this 
alphabet has to enter into our hand by dint of forming the letters. If this condition 
is not fulfilled, every change in our way of thinking is illusory. (Weil, 1997, p. 131)  
Reading has, for Weil, an ethical or moral dimension. Our lives are affected by the 
ways in which we interpret the world, and further, once we know how to read, we cannot but 
read. She also warns just how difficult to change or challenge one’s own reading can be, for, 
as she says, readings can “seize us as if they were external” (Springsted and Schmidt, 2015, p. 
22). She says further that “meanings impose themselves on us successively, and each of them, 
when it appears and enters into us through the senses, reduces all opposing ideas to the status 
of phantoms” (p. 26). Weil argues that when we read, whether we are reading a human 
situation, a natural scene, or a written text, there is always potential for a kind of gestalt 
transformation, not simply a transfer of information, but an illumination. 
In Weil’s view, if we are to be truly thinking people, it is critical that we exercise our 
ability to review and possibly alter the ways that we ‘read’ the world, including other people. 
Attention to the quality of how we read is the means to achieve this. Weil acknowledges that 
to master our capacity to read with attention calls for considerable effort, but she argues that 




morally significant ways. In Weil’s view, the most promising way to ‘read’ the world is to try 
to read as it were ‘objectively’ in order to keep the interpretation open. She proposes that if 
we view reading in terms of the concept of value, and to keep in mind what is of most worth, 
we may be able to see how the concept of reading aligns with the values of truth, beauty and, 
ultimately, the good. In Weil’s view, these values are all intertwined: “We do not know how to 
think these things as one and yet they cannot be thought separately” (p. 27). How does Weil’s 
concept of reading illuminate her concept of attention, and what might we learn from this? 
According to Weil, although we each interpret the world in light of our own 
individuality, the quality of our reading is something that rests with each individual person, 
this can be improved through attention. For example, it is within our powers to ‘read’ 
another person respectfully, but it is also possible (and is sometimes easier) to read that person 
superficially, disrespectfully, disdainfully, even cruelly. She reminds us that the way we read is 
not a neutral or passive activity, but is value-laden and informed by all manner of prevailing 
factors. The way we read is never neutral: 
We read, but we also we are read by others. Interpenetrations in these readings. 
Forcing someone to read himself as we read him (slavery). Forcing others to read 
us as we read ourselves (conquest). A mechanical process. More often than not a 
dialogue between deaf people. (Weil, 1997, pp. 188–189) 
Weil’s point is that our default readings or interpretations are subject to what she considers a 
gravitational pull downwards, towards egotistical priorities and self-interest. It is only by way 
of engaging our minds in “a higher quality of attention” (p. 190) that we may achieve a finer, 
more elevated sense of balance in our reading. 
For Weil, attention involves the capacity to see beyond one’s own limited point of 
view—the capacity to see creatively, to find a stance outside of the self, to break from 
customary or habitual thought-ways. Weil’s discussion of reading the world also applies to our 
attention to literature. Just as the attentive student, through detachment, respect and 
humility, may become better orientated to intelligent thought, so too may the attentive reader 
of a literary work be opened to a wider view. To give literary attention calls for undivided, 




literature, if that literature is of the highest order, offers us the opportunity to widen our realm 
of experience and knowing.22 
Weil considers that attentive reading of the finest literary texts involves encounters 
with mysteries and contradictions, and that this feature of the reading process exercises 
processes that are “essential to thought” (Springsted and Schmidt, 2015, p. 35). Weil argues 
that “a work of art, like knowledge, and like love, contains inspiration” (Weil, 1968, p. 132). 
She draws a parallel between divinity and what she considers to be artistic creativity of the 
highest order: “In creating a work of art of the highest class the artist’s attention is oriented 
towards silence and the void; from this silence and void there descends an inspiration which 
develops into words or forms” (p. 133).  
Weil acknowledges that reading literary fiction has the potential to provide rich and 
suggestive lessons in attention, perhaps because aspects of engaging with narrative text have a 
relation to aspects of mystical thought. (Weil says famously that attention in its purest form is 
prayer.) She argues that in the best examples, literature enables readers to experience what 
she terms the “density of the real” (Weil, 1968, p. 162). Of the greatest of literary writers she 
states: 
Their contemplation is the ever-flowing source of an inspiration which may 
legitimately guide us. For this inspiration, if we know how to receive it, tends—as 
Plato said—to make us grow wings to overcome gravity. (p. 165) 
Weil’s statements on attention have a direct relation to the act of reading literature, 
since the act of reading also consists in “suspending our thought, leaving it detached, empty, 
and ready to be penetrated by the object” (Weil, 2009, p. 62). The expectant reader presents 
himself as someone whose “thought should be empty, waiting, not seeking anything, but 
ready to receive” (p. 62). The reader (or re-reader), embarking on a literary text, is in a sense 
not unlike like “a man on a mountain who, as he looks forward, sees also below him, without 
actually looking at them, a great many forests and plains” (p. 62).  
Attentive reading calls for contemplative and yet active mental engagement, a state 
that is both open and neutral, where we must let go of other thoughts or worldly distractions 
if we are to connect with the text as well as make sense of it. If our thoughts wander, we must 
retrace our steps, and re-read, in order to reconnect with the narrative. Reading is also an 
 




entirely individual process. No-one can read for us (although they may, of course, read to us, 
even “with” us). Weil considers reading literature to be morally instructive because it can 
illustrate difficult and different philosophical questions in terms of concrete, lived situations. 
In the best examples, literature depicts, in all manner of different ways, human encounters 
where moral questions are, so to speak, “lived”. (I am indebted to my supervisor Peter 
Roberts, for this line of thought.) 
Activities that nurture application, concentration, dedication and sustained attention 
to the beautiful achievements of others are always worthy pursuits. Practices that involve 
sustained and compassionate attention—to other people, to the natural world, or to a great 
work of art or of literature, are, if practised with the right kind of humility, likely to bring us 
closer to that which is of the greatest aesthetic and moral value. 
Weil’s is an idealistic model of education. She insists that “an educational method 
which is not inspired by the conception of a certain form of human perfection is not worth 
very much” (Weil,  2002, p. 216). Significantly, Weil identifies education with apprenticeship, 
such that time, repeated effort, and dedicated commitment to the overall project, are all 
required: 
Education—whether its object be children or adults, individuals or an entire 
people, or even oneself—consists in creating motives. To show what is beneficial, 
what is obligatory, what is good—that is the task of education. Education concerns 
itself with the motives for effective action. (p. 188) 
1.7. Summary 
Weil shows us that, properly applied, pedagogical attention develops abstract 
thinking, logical connections, and she shows us too, that attention has important parallels for 
ethical thought and conduct. The capacity to think independently and well, to seek to become 
more cognitively adept and more morally sensitive, the capacity to think through rationally 
rather than respond on impulse, are all tied in to Weil’s notion of attention.  
For Weil, attention is the means by which we come to see in new ways, how things in 
the world connect and relate to one other—not unlike the way a child who has mastered the 
ability to form letters, discovers that those letters carry power in the way they can combine to 
make words that carry meaning and offer new ways to make sense of the world. Attention 




an attempt to approach paradox, and find ways to navigate between what is known and what 
is yet unclear. In these ways, Weil’s attention draws us back to Plato.  
Weil’s writing on attention foregrounds aspects of schooling and education that are 
entirely undervalued at the present time—the value of contemplation, respect for the 
achievement of earlier thinkers, the virtue and importance of an inquisitive disposition, the 
value of reading literature. Her view of education is one that incorporates contemplative 
activities as well as verbal exchanges. Her notion of attention (a disposition that embraces 
mental, moral, and even spiritual dimensions), brings together themes of ethics and aesthetics 
in a meaningful way. Attention has important parallels for ethical thought and behaviour. 
Weil’s emphasis on attention (and its attendant notions of humility, sensitivity to others, and 
responsiveness to beauty, justice) is relevant to a discussion of twentieth-century education 
priorities, particularly at a time when personal remoteness and disengagement are likely to be 
exacerbated by so called innovative open classrooms and the proliferation of digital devices in 
classroom programmes.  
Weil challenges us to rethink the priorities of our contemporary educational 
approach. On one level, the contemporary notion of self-directed or collaborative learning 
would make little sense to Weil, for hers is a much more disciplined, reflective and 
contemplative approach to education. Whereas the contemporary student is encouraged to 
put personal meaning and subjective conviction first, Weil’s students must first humbly orient 
themselves appropriately to their studies in order to access ideal and necessary truths. She 
considers that aesthetic experience, such as may be achieved through the reading of 
appropriately inspirational literature, develops powers of attention that are vital to learning 
itself. As we will see in the following chapter, fellow philosopher Iris Murdoch adopts and 
develops Weil’s account of attention to further enlarge our understanding of thinking and 
moral progress. As the following chapter seeks to show, Murdoch adapts and builds on Weil’s 
insights to form the foundation for her theory of ethics, and shares with Weil a particularly 








Chapter 2: Iris Murdoch 
2.0. Introduction 
Iris Murdoch (1919–1999) is known perhaps less as an influential moral philosopher 
than as a distinguished novelist. She was a teacher of philosophy at Oxford University from 
1940 to 1963 before turning to novel writing full time. Murdoch’s prolific published output 
includes various philosophical treatises and twenty-six works of fiction. Literature illuminates 
philosophy as well as conversely for Murdoch. Her literary writing often reflects her 
philosophical thinking, and her philosophical treatises frequently invoke literary encounters. 
The current study focuses not on Murdoch’s fiction, but rather, on her often overlooked 
moral philosophy. 
Central to Murdoch’s philosophical position is the significance of aesthetic 
appreciation for moral growth, a theme that positions aesthetics at the very centre of 
education. Murdoch argues that behind both moral behaviour and acts of genuine moral 
growth is an element of aesthetic appreciation—an elevation to a particular way of seeing, 
one that involves a distinct clarity of vision. The faculty by which one may attain this clarity 
of vision is that of attention. Murdoch borrows the concept of attention from fellow philosopher 
and teacher, Simone Weil. Murdoch’s interpretation of attention, although more secular than 
that of Weil, is also informed by Plato’s thought. Murdoch develops Weil’s concept of 
attention towards interpreting for herself the meaning of Plato’s notion of the Good. 
Murdoch thereby shapes a philosophy of metaphysical experience that connects to education 
in the broadest sense. Murdoch’s consideration of education and moral growth is not 
specifically addressed to school-based or institutional contexts. In Murdoch’s estimation, all 
education is moral education and this concerns making of life as a whole something worthy to 
be chosen actively, not something that is merely passively received.  
As a philosopher, Murdoch quests to know how people progress intellectually and 
morally. The example she sets as an intellectual is both to think well, and to live a morally 
good, positive, creative life. She seeks furthermore to show that there is no real separation 
between these two ambitions. Recognised in the latter half of the twentieth century for her 
bold criticism of the analytic philosophy of her day, Murdoch’s philosophical writing has 
much to tell us about connections between morality, art, and human progress, and therefore, 
about priorities for education. A question for the present day concerns whether contemporary 




addressed not exclusively in the present chapter but across the thesis as a whole. From the 
outset however, it should be clear that the question is answered in the affirmative.  
Murdoch challenges what philosophical aspirations should amount to, and proposes 
that goodness is a virtue to aspire to. Her overarching theme is that intelligence 
fundamentally and ineluctably concerns how to live well. That is, wisdom is inseparable from 
morally good conduct and existence. Ethics cannot legitimately be thought to be an 
afterthought in philosophy. Ethics cannot be crowded to one side by epistemology. To know 
well and to act well are inseparably connected: epistemology grows out of ethics, metaphysics 
from morals, and conversely. Across the three essays that make up The Sovereignty of Good, 
Murdoch argues that on-going attention is the “essential feature of the active moral agent” 
(Murdoch, 2014, p. 33). The active moral agent is one who seeks to pursue consistency 
between thought and practice. In her philosophical writing, Murdoch interweaves concepts of 
goodness and virtue, and argues that the experience of beauty is integral to how we grow 
morally. She displays Plato’s sense that beauty is prior to goodness and goodness is prior to 
truth. Her interpretation of the Platonic notion of good, as well as her use of analogy and 
metaphor to explain metaphysical concepts, informs her overall discussion.  
The following chapter is organised into four sections. It opens with a discussion of 
Murdoch’s aspirations for moral philosophy, and her argument for the significance of the 
concept of attention, and the importance of language. The second section discusses 
Murdoch’s debt to Plato and the ways that Murdoch draws on Plato’s concept of the Good to 
develop her philosophical perspective. Section three explores Murdoch’s argument for the 
importance of imaginative and aesthetic involvement and its influence on the way we see and 
experience the world. Section 4 discusses Murdoch’s view that the attentive reading of 
literature can heighten our understanding not only of ourselves but also of ourselves in 
relation to others, thereby strengthening our moral connection with the society of which we 
are a part.  
2.1. Attention and human agency 
In The Sovereignty of Good (2014), Murdoch finds fault with what she considers to be false 
intellectual values of her day. She considers that contemporary moral philosophy is defective 
in that it fails to depict the human character as it really is, particularly in relation to individual 
experience and what it is that ‘makes us tick’ morally. Murdoch faults the moral philosophy 




secondly, it provides only a partial account of human agency; and thirdly, it portrays a view 
of morality that is in her view implausible since it does not connect to everyday human ethical 
situations. As Nussbaum (2012, p. 261) notes, Murdoch is interested in philosophy as it relates 
to the problems of real life. Against the tide of contemporary analytic thought of her day, 
Murdoch argues that the notion of reality needs to be radically reinterpreted if it is to relate to 
ordinary everyday experience. Our notion of reality is but partial and distorted if we link it 
only to morally disinterested observation and morally disinterested explanation. Such a 
notion of reality would not only create artificial separation of fact and value but would 
relegate value to unreality. Yet in ordinary everyday experience matters of value stand out as 
very real, and can knock a person no less surely than being knocked by a bus. 
Utilitarian analysis of moral questions emerged as the ascendant moral perspective in 
Murdoch’s time. Moral reflection, according to utilitarians, takes into account a particular 
kind of given or a particular kind of fact, namely facts concerning happiness or unhappiness. 
It suggests that the morally right action will be that which yields the greatest happiness. 
Utilitarians’ accountancy is merely additive: the more who are happy the better, the more 
any person is happy the better, all in direct additive proportionality to the “number of utiles”. 
Utilitarians reduce moral reflection to the scientific work of considering causality, about 
utility, and what could maximise it.  Murdoch argues that all this admits to consideration only 
“the ordinary world of rational argument” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 32) and fatefully omits from 
consideration “a reality infinitely more complex and various than that of science” (p. 33). She 
considers that the language of moral reflection refers us in fact to this “infinitely more 
complex and various” reality, involving subjective intricacies far beyond the ken or interest of 
utilitarians.  
Murdoch faults utilitarianism because it obliterates good understanding of ordinary 
everyday experience. Murdoch is equally sure, however, that confusion concerning ordinary 
everyday experience arises as well in everyday ways. What she calls “states of illusion” (p. 36) 
may be brought about quite independently of philosophy, simply by the limitations of the 
human ego. Murdoch equates the surmounting of these limitations with the attainment of 
attention, very much in Weil’s sense of the word. In particular, Murdoch proposes an account 
of moral freedom that involves the faculty of attention. To focus one’s mental energy 
sufficiently to surmount potential illusions, is in Murdoch’s view to work towards an 




Murdoch’s account of attention is well-known. She uses the term “to express an idea 
of a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality” and this she considers to be “the 
characteristic and proper mark of the active moral agent” (p. 33). For Murdoch, our human 
capacity to bestow reflective, loving attention is the central means by which we develop 
ourselves morally. Attention involves “looking carefully at something and holding it before 
the mind” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 3). The practice of attention involves both mental discipline 
and cognitive focus, such that the mind is emptied of self-preoccupied thoughts. This mental 
state opens the mind to think new thoughts, to see things from other perspectives, to find 
other interpretations, to consider alternative readings. Attention works to discipline the mind 
away from thoughts that are innately self-oriented or simply aimless. Moral improvement and 
change does not arise from specific acts of will or choice or obligation, but differently: 
…attention to the world whose natural result is a decrease in egoism through an 
increased sense of the reality of, primarily, of course other people but also other 
things. Such a view accords with oriental wisdom…ultimately we ought to have 
no will. (p. 52) 
Attention, Murdoch tells us, involves a diminished sense of the individual self, and a 
deflection outward of one’s inward-facing gaze towards another person (or object, or 
happening). Murdoch’s attention encompasses a Platonic belief (for Plato a truism), that there 
is intrinsic worth in the pursuit of goodness for its own sake. Indeed, Murdoch’s conception is 
that the pursuit of goodness is the highest and most defining pursuit of all. All other pursuits 
are to be understood in light of that pursuit. Murdoch’s debt to Plato for this conception is a 
theme that will be discussed in detail in the following section.  
In Murdoch’s ethics of attention, attention effectively humbles the ego because 
attention involves one’s being subject to what is subjectless, transcendent of any self but 
consequently accessible to all selves equally. Murdoch identifies the need for selflessness in 
order for the other to ‘be’. She invokes giving human attention to the artistic achievement of 
others as an excellent example of this phenomenon: “We cease to be in order to attend to the 
existence of something else, a natural object, a person in need” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 58).  
Attention is important because it is attention that gives access to an essential kind of 
selflessness, a kind of assimilation morally to there being something much larger than oneself. 
Similarly and relatedly, Murdoch argues that a person recognises beauty only when the 




felt—that is, felt as though the pleasing apprehension is greater than the individual. For these 
reasons, human ego is made out by Murdoch to be essentially limiting, essentially worthy only 
of being transcended and thereby let go. At the same time, the needed transcending of ego is 
alone what can make life as a whole something worthy to be chosen actively, and not merely 
passively received. 
Murdoch purposes Weil’s concept of ‘attention’ as the central instrument for our 
moral learning, and it is this concept that forms the core of her own moral vision. With Weil, 
Murdoch defends the view that moral (for Weil, spiritual) progress is achieved not through 
particular specific deeds or choices or resolve, but rather through the on-going application of 
careful and particular attention. Murdoch’s philosophical writing makes repeated references 
to her debt to Weil, and to their shared belief in the primacy of attention as the foundation 
for thinking and acting ethically and morally. 
Murdoch acknowledges that to achieve the quality of attention to other people or 
other things can involve quite some degree of discomfort, and that to maintain a “just and 
loving gaze”—the essence of attention, calls for patience and a very particular kind of focus. 
She insists too, that “concentrated attention” (which might be explained in terms of an 
intensely-held regard) is to be distinguished from the “hazy, muddled unclarified states of 
mind wherein one is content with a second best. The second best should be exchanged for 
void. (Try again. Wait)” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 506). 
Yet she also agrees that this “objectivity and unselfishness are not natural to human 
beings” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 50).  We must remain constantly alert and practice active 
vigilance against deeply-held prejudices and self-deceptions (p. 39). Attention, Murdoch 
argues, is “not something that is switched on and off in between occurrences of explicit moral 
choices” (p. 36), since it is a demanding, ongoing cognitive process: “The task of attention 
goes on all the time and at apparently empty and everyday moments we are ‘looking’, making 
those little peering efforts of imagination which have such important cumulative results” (p. 
40). Murdoch does not clarify whether she considers that every single individual will always 
merit the same level or degree of just and loving attention, and in this respect her vision is 
idealized. 
To convey her idea of attention as an everyday, reflective process, Murdoch presents 
an analogy in terms of a parable in which a fictional character whom she calls M, radically 




conduct, dress, and overall manner, M “reflects deliberately about D, until gradually her 
vision of D alters…the change is not in D’s behaviour, but in M’s mind” (p. 17). 
The quality of M’s attention, Murdoch argues, is simply that of “an intelligent and 
well-intentioned person, capable of self-criticism, capable of giving careful and just attention 
to an object which confronts her” (p. 17). M engages in a process that Murdoch calls 
“unselfing” (akin to Weil’s notion of decreation)—whereby M draws on her powers of 
reflection to revise her initially quite uncharitable view of her daughter-in-law D, and in so 
doing, she reorients her initial self-centred judgement to one that is based more on Murdoch’s 
well-known “just and loving gaze” (p. 33). This change in orientation in M’s way of looking, 
occurs privately. It involves M’s effort to see D more truthfully, more fairly, and in a more 
balanced way. This, Murdoch argues, is what moral growth is like—it is individual, complex, 
exacting, and ongoing.23 
It is not entirely clear just what prompts M’s internal reflections regarding her 
daughter-in-law, or what motivates M to “look again” (p. 17). It is implied that M initially 
views D in light of some gender or racial stereotype: she initially dislikes her daughter-in-law’s 
accent and clothing so it is possible that the younger D is of a different ethnic, religious or 
social group, or arouses some other deep-seated bias that causes M to view the younger 
woman as in some ways unworthy. In any case, M’s growth in moral respect for D, which 
comes about through M’s internal exercise of attention is, as Murdoch demonstrates, a 
process that involves M’s moral imagination. It is M’s imaginative attention that enables her 
to imagine D in a more generous way. M’s mental revisions enable her to see, with hindsight, 
what was unjust about her previous reading. M’s moral view is thus enlarged, through 
attention. As Murdoch says, “we use our imagination not to escape the word, but to join it” 
(p. 8). 
Murdoch’s sketch illustrates the ways that people are involved in making moral 
judgements all the time, and as well, that the quality of these judgements connects to their 
capacity to attend. The implication here is that constraints on our moral reasoning may relate 
to limitations of our disposition to attend—our disposition to be ‘other-regarding’. Murdoch 
acknowledges that a person’s sense of what good is, is one that will continue to develop over a 
 
23 Some may ask how we can reconcile Murdoch’s emphasis on “unselfing” with the ethical practice of self-
reflection or self-scrutiny. An answer is that in order to “grow” ethically, we must try to look critically at 
ourselves, and such self-scrutiny does not contradict the notion of selfless attention, since ethical self-critique, if 





lifetime, and is never simple: “Moral change and achievement are slow: we are not free in the 
sense of being able suddenly to alter ourselves since we cannot suddenly alter what we can see 
and ergo what we desire and are compelled by” (p. 38). 
To undergo moral reflection or review in search of self-improvement is a Platonic 
notion. Also Platonic is the notion that our capacity to understand anything new opens us up 
progressively to new awareness, and hence to further readings of the world. These are themes 
to which we will return in a subsequent section of this chapter. Murdoch’s sketch to explain 
M’s deepening grasp of moral concepts also demonstrates how deeply relevant to human 
beings learning through narrative and storytelling is, and as well, it is a reminder of the ways 
that narrative is importantly connected to our very humanness.24 In Bruner’s essay “The 
narrative construction of reality” (1991, p. 4), he notes that “we organize our experience and 
memory of human happenings mainly in the form of narrative—stories, excuses, myths, 
reasons for doing and not doing, and so on.” 
Murdoch reminds us that such private revisions of interpretation as that which M 
engages in, are themselves the stuff of literature. Readers of literary fiction repeatedly 
encounter such complex reinterpretations or re-interpretations: “Innumerable novels contain 
accounts of what such struggles are like. Anybody could describe one without being at a loss 
for words” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 22). Readers of novels are attuned from an early age to the 
ways that literature both demands from readers, and also invites readers, to take up ideas and 
subsequently interrogate, reflect on, and rearrange them. Murdoch observes that when we 
read fiction, “we follow, in context, these descriptions of states of consciousness with no 
difficulty” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 171). 
Murdoch’s anecdote about M and D points to wider questions about how we use 
stories to develop and refine our ideas about justice, love, and the pursuit of goodness. As 
Murdoch notes, “any story which we tell ourselves consoles us since it imposes patterns upon 
something which might otherwise seem intolerably chancy and incomplete” (Murdoch, 2014, 
p. 87). Literature is also a means to “unself” (p. 91)—that is to say, to get outside of one’s own 
self in order to view things from a more nearly neutral perspective. When we read attentively, 
we effectively “unself” ourselves. In this sense, literature represents, for Murdoch, the 
paradigm not only of moral awareness but of awareness itself. The seriousness with which 
 
24 Boyd (2009) provides a detailed discussion of the ways in which storytelling is an integral part of our very 




Murdoch takes this matter is clear. In Murdoch’s view the novelist, as artist, “has always been 
important, and is essential, as a truth-teller and as a defender of words…It may be that in the 
end the novelist may prove to be the saviour of the human race” (Murdoch, 1997, pp. 232–
233).  
…great art teaches us how real things can be looked at and loved without being 
seized and used, without being appropriated into the greedy organism of the self. 
This exercise of detachment is difficult and valuable whether the thing contemplated 
is a human being or the root of a tree or the vibration of a colour or a sound. 
Unsentimental contemplation of nature exhibits the same quality of detachment: 
selfish concerns vanish, nothing exists except the things which are seen. (Murdoch, 
2014, p. 64) 
Murdoch poses the rhetorical question whether or not reading literature can in any 
way “improve” us, and although the question remains unanswered, she nevertheless reminds 
us that stories involve us in attentive and imaginative contemplation, and that that activity is 
itself consequential for how we reflect on and understand ourselves and how we interact with 
others. Stories, Murdoch suggests, thereby have the potential to be educative in the sense that 
they engage our capacity for what she calls “unsentimental, detached, unselfish, objective 
attention” (p. 64). 
While Murdoch instances the ways that a person’s attentive engagement with 
literature may support their on-going personal moral growth, she also questions the character 
portrayals that she finds in much of the fiction of her day. She faults the novelistic depiction 
of character in terms of an ideal individual who is “free, independent, lonely, powerful, 
rational, responsible, brave…increasingly aware of his alienation” (p. 78). This, in Murdoch’s 
view, is unhelpful, and is in her words behaviourist, existentialist, and utilitarian. By contrast, 
she advocates a much more nuanced interpretation of the human condition, whether in 
philosophy or in literature, if we are wont to make sense of questions of human morality: 
Morality is, and ought to be, connected with the whole of our being….The moral 
life is not intermittent, or specialized, it is not a peculiar separate area of our 
existence. It is into ourselves that we must look…Life is made up of 
details…Aesthetic insight connects with moral insight, respect for things connects 




2.2. Metaphor and meaning 
Murdoch is well known for her emphasis upon the fundamental importance of 
metaphor for understanding. “Metaphors are not merely peripheral decorations or even 
useful models, they are fundamental forms of our awareness of our condition (Murdoch 2014, 
p. 75). She observes that “we are creatures who use irreplaceable metaphors in many of our 
most important activities” (p. 91), and that “metaphors can be a mode of understanding, and 
so of acting upon, our condition.” Platonic metaphors inspire Murdoch’s conceptual 
understanding of what the Good is. She draws on the concept of the Good to make sense of 
the ethical practice of attention as something that occurs as an everyday happening in the real 
world. 
Whereas analytic philosophy puzzles over how metaphor can be meaningful at all, 
Murdoch’s view is that metaphorical meaning precedes the possibility of any other meaning. 
As she says, “metaphors are not merely peripheral decorations or even useful models, they 
are fundamental forms of our awareness of our condition: metaphors of space, metaphors of 
movement, metaphors of vision” (p. 75). Murdoch argues that moral apprehension underlies 
the apprehension of any concept whatsoever, and that “moral concepts themselves are deeply 
metaphorical and cannot be analysed into non-metaphorical concepts without a loss of 
substance” (p. 75). By this, Murdoch means that any literal thought is tutored by a metaphor, 
such that one is, by one’s attention, made to regard what is universal and so what is far 
greater than one’s self. This is to propose that literal thinking is not necessary for the very 
possibility of metaphorical thinking, but rather, that the very reverse is the case: we cannot 
think about subjective experience and judgements without appealing to metaphor, and 
metaphors enable us deftly to traverse the inferential entanglements of complex thought. The 
mystery is not so much how metaphor can be meaningful, as how literal meanings are 
possible. The mystery is solved only by recognition of the worth of living life by a metaphor.25 
To step, as Murdoch does, from Weil’s questions about ‘spiritual’ advancement to questions 
instead about a progression (a pilgrimage) in the apprehension of meaning, Murdoch 
underlines that metaphor makes real for us what is not truly real. Yet she has also helped 
identify for us the true depth and significance of Weil’s own understanding. 
 




Murdoch argues that we develop our ethical understanding largely through anecdote 
and through narrative: “Words are the most subtle symbols which we possess and our human 
fabric depends on them. The living and radical nature of language is something which we 
forget at our peril” (p. 33). It is through language that we develop “a rich and diversified 
vocabulary for naming aspects of goodness” (p. 56). In her 1961 essay “Against dryness”, 
Murdoch talks of the need for what she calls a new “vocabulary of attention” and for “more 
concepts in terms of which to picture the substance of our being” since “it is through an 
enriching and deepening of concepts that moral progress takes place” (Murdoch, 1997, p. 
293). She makes a similar point in her 1976 essay “The fire and the sun: Why Plato banished 
the artists”, where she refers to Plato’s use of metaphor:  
Plato…was also the master, indeed the inventor, of a pure clean relaxed mode of 
philosophical exposition which is a high literary form and a model for ever. Of 
course he used metaphor, but philosophy needs metaphor and metaphor is basic; 
how basic is the most basic philosophical question. (Murdoch, 1997, p. 463) 
Murdoch acknowledges that metaphor is a means by which we deepen our 
understanding of abstract concepts, and that conceptual metaphors can usefully challenge 
and broaden our literal understanding because of the insights and inter-connections they 
provide. She considers that the metaphors we use to describe both moral progress and 
aesthetic appreciation are crucial to the shape of our moral thinking. She proposes that what 
is common to both moral behaviour and aesthetic appreciation is a particular way of ‘seeing’, 
one that calls for a distinct clarity of vision.  
Murdoch repeatedly draws on metaphors of vision in order to explain her notion of 
attention: “I can only choose within the world I can see, in the moral sense of “see” which 
implies that clear vision is a result of moral imagination and moral effort” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 
37). To achieve “clear vision” is difficult, she argues, since moral thinking is hard thinking, 
and has to be worked at in a rigorous and disciplined way. This, Murdoch reminds us, is 
because the human ego works relentlessly to limit or curtail our sense of connection with the 
reality of other individuals or the world: “We are anxiety-ridden animals. Our minds are 
continual active, fabricating an anxious, usually self-preoccupied, often falsifying veil which 
partially conceals the world” (p. 82). Murdoch considers that when this “clear vision” is 
achieved, by way of attention, “the self is a correspondingly much smaller and much less 




Importantly for the current study, Murdoch considers that we are able to foster the 
ability to see more clearly in this metaphorical sense by virtue of the literature we read. This 
is because literature can enable us to enter a realm of experience where we are not ourselves 
caught up in the distractions of self or of the moment. Direct involvement of the ego is 
thereby to some extent curbed. Reading literature invites us to pause and ponder, to see 
things in altered, possibly unexpected or different relations to other things. Literature enables 
us to rehearse what it is to reflect on our values, and in so doing enables us to revise our way 
of looking at things, such as we do when we change our position, recognise our fault, forgive, 
exercise remorse, or admit error. 
Murdoch’s appreciation for the potential of the novel form to convey powerful moral 
truths, as well as her willingness to give serious treatment to an unfashionable subject, is 
evident even in her first published book, a work on J. P. Sartre. Here, stating that she finds 
aspects of Sartre’s characters too clinical (Murdoch, 1953, p. 59),  she urges that “the novel, 
the novel proper that is, is about people’s treatment of each other, and so it is about human 
values” (p. 138).  
To return to the metaphor of sight, Murdoch suggests that if we can’t “see” 
sufficiently clearly in a particular situation this may be because we are not, or are not 
sufficiently accustomed, to look carefully. She reminds us that we need to pay careful 
attention not simply to the surface of things, but also, to what we unwittingly assume or take 
for granted more broadly: “Our ability to act well ‘when the time comes’ depends partly, 
perhaps largely, upon the quality of our habitual objects of attention” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 55). 
That is to say, our lives are enriched by the quality of our capacity for attention. 
In Murdoch’s ethics of attention, humility and respect are equally significant: humility 
is required if we are to make any progress intellectually and morally. Attention humbles the 
ego because attention involves one’s being subject to what is subject-less, transcendent of any 
self but consequently accessible to all selves equally. Murdoch identifies the need for 
selflessness in order to enable others to “be”, and she invokes human attention to the artistic 
achievement of others as an excellent example of this phenomenon:  
We cease to be in order to attend to the existence of something else, a natural 
object, a person in need. We can see in mediocre art, where perhaps it is even 
more clearly seen than in mediocre conduct, the intrusion of fantasy, the assertion 




Murdoch reminds us that “humility is not a peculiar habit of self-effacement, but is 
rather more like having “an inaudible voice, it is selfless respect for reality and one of the 
most difficult and central of all virtues” (p. 93). Once we cease to be preoccupied with 
ourselves, we are then in a position to be able to focus on the existence of someone or 
something else. Murdoch reminds us too, that to use our capacity to adjust our thoughts and 
beliefs is a vital part of what makes us human, and that to achieve a discerning moral 
awareness calls for an on-going and patient orientation to attention. “It is also a psychological 
fact, and one of importance in moral philosophy, that we can all receive moral help by 
focusing our attention upon things which are valuable: virtuous people, great art, perhaps the 
idea of goodness itself” (p. 55). 
Murdoch considers that our moral progress is to some extent correlated with a 
deepened attention not just to our inner lives (through our thoughts and memories), as shown 
in the tale of M and D, but also to an awareness of other people and the world. Murdoch 
proposes various ways consciously to direct our mental focus outwards and upwards, away 
from the self and towards others—such as by giving attention to great art, to the intellectual 
challenge of learning a new language, or to the attentive enjoyment of nature—attention, that 
is to say, to anything that alters our consciousness away from selfishness. She argues that it is 
through the faculty of attention that we can come to know what she terms the void—and to 
get ourselves to this state, we have to exercise selflessness. Selflessness opens the way to moral 
growth.  
To illustrate what she means by selflessness, Murdoch offers several examples. The 
first is of being suddenly arrested by the sight of a beautiful kestrel flying past her window: 
“Then suddenly I observe a hovering kestrel…the brooding self with its hurt vanity has 
disappeared. There is nothing now but kestrel” (p. 82). In her second example, Murdoch’s 
experience of learning a new language (Russian) requires all her cognitive attention. In such 
contexts as these, Murdoch explains that her individual ego confronts a new kind of humility, 
“something alien to me, something which my consciousness cannot take over, swallow, deny 
or make unreal”, not pretending “to know what one does not know” (p. 87). Through such 
experiences, she is humbled and awed, she experiences personal growth and is she changed 
for the good:  
If I am learning, for instance, Russian, I am confronted by an authoritative 
structure which commands my respect. The task is difficult and the goal is distant 




something which exists independently of me. Attention is rewarded by a 
knowledge of reality. Love of Russian leads me away from myself towards 
something alien to me, something which my consciousness cannot take over, 
swallow up, deny or make unreal. (Murdoch, 1992, p. 373) 
The authoritative structure of the new language, Russian, with its unfamiliar rules and 
demanding syntactical patterns and structures, draws her out of herself, and at the same time, 
commands her respect. The new language makes possible a shared communication with a 
community of others, one that was previously not available to her, and the prospect of this 
linguistic challenge, while it is daunting, and one that Murdoch judges she is unlikely ever 
fully to master, nevertheless gives her pleasure, and elicits in her a love of the language.  
Having pointed to the way that various personal experiences can draw us out of 
ourselves in ways that are morally improving (since they overcome our tendencies to 
selfishness), Murdoch turns to a consideration of aesthetic experience. She points to the ways 
in which the coherence and unity of form in art enables us to attend with imaginative 
sympathy, even with love. Engagement with art draws us out, and by this our ego “resists 
absorption into the selfish dream life of the consciousness” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 83). Murdoch 
reminds us of the way that that artistically created aesthetic works can give structure and form 
to experiences that in daily life we are more likely to experience as formless or chaotic 
happenings. Aesthetic experience can awaken in us what she calls “a pure delight in the 
independent existence of what is excellent. Both in its genesis and its enjoyment it is a thing 
totally opposed to selfish obsession” (p. 83). The perfection of the created and crafted work of 
art itself invites attention through what Murdoch terms “unpossessive contemplation” (p. 83). 
Murdoch acknowledges that to achieve, let alone sustain, attention of the quality she is 
aspiring to, is fraught with difficulty, and will inevitably involve fumbles and failures. 
Attention calls for considerable effort, and discipline of a very particular kind. She admits that 
any attempts to as it were “pierce the veil of consciousness and join the world as it really is” 
(p. 93), requires both concerted and repeated individual efforts, since the human ego works 
actively to prevent connection with the reality of other individuals and with the world. To this 
extent, Murdoch, like Weil, considers the successful inculcation of attention to be almost a 
form of moral training. 
In this regard Murdoch invokes what she terms Weil’s “profoundly disciplined” 




truth with a simplicity and austerity of personal living which gives to what she writes an 
authority which cannot be imitated” (pp. 157–160). Moreover, since by nature humans 
cannot hope entirely to eliminate impulses towards distraction and daydreaming (which 
Murdoch terms “fantasizing”), she recommends that we take effort to mitigate these impulses, 
in order to minimise their negative effects. She grants that “[w]e are ineluctably imperfect 
and goodness is not a continuously active organic part of our purposes and wishes. However 
good a life is, it includes moral failure” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 509). Nevertheless, moral growth 
and change, even if fraught with setbacks, is in her view entirely possible and eminently 
worthy to pursue: “Truth and progress (or some truth and progress) are the reward of some 
exercise of virtue, courage, humility and patience” (p. 400). 
Murdoch argues, perhaps not entirely convincingly, that by appeal to attention, the 
mind can be usefully shifted from even the most intense of emotional states: 
Where strong emotions of sexual love, or of hatred, resentment, or jealousy are 
concerned, ‘pure will’ can usually achieve little. It is small use telling oneself ‘Stop 
being in love, stop feeling resentment, be just.’ What is needed is a reorientation 
which will provide an energy of a different kind, from a different source. 
(Murdoch, 2014, p. 54) 
Even in situations as compelling as these, Murdoch argues that the mind can, with the right 
kind of intellectual effort, be redirected elsewhere, and towards more promising ends.  
Although she insists that her take on attention is largely secular, Murdoch grants that 
the contemplative energy that attention calls for is also in a sense noetic (prayerful) in 
character. She identifies ways in which her understanding of attention has some indirect, but 
nevertheless connected, relation to prayer, which she considers to be “the most profound and 
effective of religious techniques” (p. 67). This is not to invoke adherence to a particular 
religious dogma, nor to the practice of recitations to a specific Deity, but rather, an appeal to 
a kind of “selfless” orientation, which Murdoch describes as an energy for good action, and 
“simply an attention to God which is a form of love” (pp. 53–4). She explains that her notion 
of contemplative attention is not to be interpreted as “a quasi-religious meditative technique, 
but rather as something which belongs very much to the ordinary life of the moral person” (p. 
67).  
In Murdoch’s view, to learn anything properly has an important moral dimension and 




through attention not just to introspective thought, as in the tale of M and D, but in other 
ways that call for one’s full attention—such as through considering the beauty of nature, or by 
immersing oneself in the achievements of great works of art, or any other activity that 
involves a suppression of the active self:  
To silence and expel self, to contemplate and delineate nature with a clear eye, is 
not easy and demands a moral discipline. A great artist is, in respect of his work, a 
good man, and, in the true sense, a free man. The consumer of art has an 
analogous task to its producer: to be disciplined enough to see as much reality in 
the work as the artist has succeeded in putting into it…The appreciation of beauty 
in art and nature is…the checking of selfishness in the interest of seeing the real. 
(p. 63) 
Our capacity for attention is inculcated, for example, through due appreciation of other 
people, through the sheer beauty of nature, through learning the systems and structures of an 
entirely new language, through practising religion, or, as we will discuss later, through 
immersion in works of literature.  
Across The Sovereignty of Good, Murdoch outlines her philosophy of attention in terms of 
a fundamental moral activity. She draws frequent parallels between morality and art. In our 
encounters with art, and especially with literature, she argues, there is something to be 
discovered or revealed. Similarly, as moral beings we attend to others through observation, 
imagination, introspection and revision. In both realms, this project of discovery is a work-in-
progress, a process that “goes on all the time”, never entirely complete (p. 42). Murdoch 
identifies the fundamental value of the arts as a means to promote understanding of others. 
She emphasises the role of aesthetics as a means of liberating the self from the mechanisms of 
self-preoccupation.  
Murdoch argues that we make moral progress as we develop opportunities to develop 
shared understanding of other people. She reminds us that there is no neutrality in regard to 
moral issues, and in her words, “would-be neutral philosophers merely take sides 
surreptitiously” (p. 76). The same applies to teachers, since teaching is not value-free either. 
Murdoch reminds us that moral concepts and themes guide all our values all the time, across 
all aspects of our lives: “We learn moral concepts. Not only ‘true’ and ‘good’ but the vast 
numbers of secondary more specialised moral terms are for us instruments of discrimination 




vocabulary, a detailed value terminology, morally loaded words” (p. 35). She identifies “the 
way in which our moral experience shares in the peculiar density of art, and in its imaginative 
cognitive activity” (p. 341), and reminds us that “as we move from generalities toward the 
accidental and particular we introduce muddle but also variety and space” (p. 349). 
For a teacher to develop with his or her class a shared understanding of the character 
of Murdoch’s “variety and space”, the assembled students need to be able to listen to, hear, 
and respond to, the ideas of others. This is likely to involve interactions with an attentive 
teacher who orchestrates and develops the growing and ongoing relationship of the class. The 
task of the teacher, whatever the level, is to orchestrate and develop opportunities to work 
with students and to help them clarify their own thinking. Such a process, Murdoch argues, is 
simultaneously epistemological and moral: 
As moral agents we have to try to understand the world and thereby to construct 
‘our world’. Since morality is compulsory (we cannot avoid moral choices) some 
form of moral cognition is compulsory and we have to set up at least the forms of a 
distinction between what is real and what is not….These are considerations which 
must be fundamentally important in education, where a good teacher teaches 
accuracy and truth. The importance of getting things right. (p. 385) 
Murdoch is aware of just how difficult it is to understand not only ourselves, but also 
the world and other people: “We learn through attending to contexts, vocabulary develops 
through close attention to objects, and we can only understand others if we can to some 
extent share their contexts. (Often we cannot)” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 31): 
In intellectual disciplines and in the enjoyment of art and nature we discover value 
in our ability to forget self, to be realistic, to perceive justly. We use our 
imagination not to escape the world but to join it, and this exhilarates us because 
of the distance between our ordinary dulled consciousness and an apprehension of 
the real. (p. 88) 
In particular, Murdoch recommends that art, and especially literature, can guide the reader 
towards beauty, which is itself a path towards goodness. 
2.3. Plato and the Good 
Murdoch draws on the ideas of Plato to develop her theory that Goodness is 




actively incarnate all around us” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 478). She argues that our moral progress 
may be slow, painful.  
Our destiny can be examined but it cannot be justified or totally explained. We 
are simply here. And if there is any sense of unity in human life, and the dream of 
this does not cease to haunt us, it is of some other kind and must be sought within 
a human experience which has nothing outside it. (Murdoch, 2014, p. 77) 
The Platonic idea of the Good is a way of doing without God without dispensing with 
the notion of aspiration towards the highest of ideals. For Murdoch, the notion of the Good is 
something that is unifying. She considers that through our appreciation of artistic 
achievement, we are able to experience the unity of the moral life. Moral behavior involves 
respecting the reality of others. To live morally involves paying constant attention to the 
otherness of human life. It involves continually seeking to deflect one’s mind away from self-
interest and self-preoccupations, as well as seeking to avoid wasting attention and time on 
frivolous distractions (which Murdoch terms ‘fantasies’). Murdoch describes attention as “the 
effort to counteract such “states of illusion” (p. 36).  
Murdoch, a Platonist, sees that the goal in life is to be moral, and to be moral requires 
letting go of self-limiting fantasies in order to deliberately and consciously seek for that which 
is good. To turn towards the other is one way to diminish one’s sense of self, and to gaze 
lovingly outward away from the self is to pursue a quest for the Good, even if that Good can 
itself never be fully apprehended. “The image of the Good as a transcendent magnetic center 
seems to me the least corruptible and most realistic picture for us to use in our reflections on 
the moral life” (p. 74). Murdoch’s notion of the Good “as a transcendent magnetic centre” 
towards which we are constantly striving is, as she agrees, difficult to understand, and 
something we can really only come to understand through particular instances or examples 
that help illuminate what the Good amounts to. By way of these “instances” of the Good, we 
build up an understanding of what Goodness entails: 
The authority of the Good seems to us something necessary because the realism 
(ability to perceive reality) required for goodness is a kind of intellectual ability to 
perceive what is true, which is automatically at the same time a suppression of self. 
The necessity of the good is then an aspect of the kind of necessity involved in any technique for 
exhibiting fact. In thus treating realism, whether of artist or of agent, as a moral 




morals: that true vision occasions right conduct. (p. 64) 
The pursuit of the Good is, for Murdoch, related to living a morally good life, and 
this, Murdoch shows us, is precisely the life to aspire to. The Good is both inspirational and 
aspirational, but it is real. It is “the magnetic centre towards which love naturally moves” (p. 
100). “Good is indefinable …because of the infinite difficulty of the task of apprehending a 
magnetic but inexhaustible reality” (p. 41).  Murdoch argues that: 
The ordinary person does not, unless corrupted by philosophy, believe that he 
creates values by his choices. He thinks that some things really are better than 
others and that he is capable of getting it wrong. We are not usually in doubt 
about the direction in which Good lies. Equally we recognize the real existence of 
evil: cynicism, cruelty, indifference to suffering. (p. 95) 
Murdoch explores Platonic themes of goodness and moral progress to outline her 
interpretation of morality. She proposes a neo-Platonic conception of the Good (Murdoch’s 
secular interpretation of God), combined with a commitment to live a morally good life, as 
the nub of moral (or, as Weil would call it, spiritual) thinking. Murdoch draws on the 
metaphysics of Plato’s theory of Forms and argues for the immanence (i.e. the idea that it is 
everywhere and present in everything) of the Good.  
Murdoch’s Good is essentially an enlarged kind of love, one that draws the individual 
out of their own preoccupations and into a clearer view of the world. She describes the Good 
in Platonic terms as “a single perfect transcendent non-representable and necessarily real object of attention” 
(p. 54). She refers specifically to sections from Plato’s Republic to elaborate her idea of the 
Good as indefinable, while simultaneously considering that contemplating the inaccessibility 
of the Good has a vital place. She considers this to be “an attention which is not just the 
planning of particular good actions but an attempt to look right away from self towards a 
distant transcendent perfection” (p. 99). She argues further that “this attempt, which is a 
turning attention away from the particular, may be the thing that helps most when difficulties 
seem insoluble” (p. 99).  
Plato, Murdoch shows, connects knowledge (truthfulness) and learning with goodness 
in ways that can help us understand moral growth:  
…we must come back to that which we know about great art and about the moral 




Goodness and beauty are not to be contrasted, but are largely part of the same 
structure. Plato, who tells us that beauty is the only spiritual thing which we love 
immediately by nature, treats the beautiful as an introductory section of the good. 
So that aesthetic situations are not so much analogies of morals as cases of morals. 
Virtue is au fond the same in the artist as in the good man in that it is a selfless 
attention to nature: something which is easy to name but very hard to achieve. (p. 
40) 
Murdoch argues that there is a genuine human obligation to work towards the Good, 
not for any other purpose than because it is virtuous to work towards that which is good: 
“The Good has nothing to do with purpose, indeed it excludes the idea of purpose” (p. 69). 
How we come to grips with this, according to Murdoch, is a matter of attention. She asks 
“Can good be in any sense an object of attention?” (p. 67), and concludes as follows: 
When true Good is loved, even impurely or by accident, the quality of the love is 
automatically refined, and when the soul is turned towards Good the highest part 
of the soul is enlivened. Love is the tension between the imperfect soul and the 
magnetic perfection which is conceived of as lying beyond it…And when we try 
perfectly to love what is imperfect our love goes to its object via the Good to be 
thus purified and made unselfish and just. The mother loving the retarded child or 
loving the tiresome elderly relation…it is the energy and passion of the soul in its 
search for Good, the force that joins us to Good and joins us to the world through 
Good. Its existence is the unmistakeable sign that we are spiritual creatures, 
attracted by excellence and made for the Good. lt is a reflection of the warmth 
and light of the sun. (p. 100)  
Murdoch links morality with the indefinable Good, which she describes as something 
“non-representable and indefinable” (p. 72). “We are all mortal”, she argues, “and equally at 
the mercy of necessity and chance. These are true aspects in which all men are brothers” (p. 
72). She also links goodness with the virtue of humility. “The humble man, because he sees 
himself as nothing, can see other things as they are. He sees the pointlessness of virtue and its 
unique value and the endless extent of its demand” (p. 101). Murdoch considers that the very 
‘indefinability’ of Good is connected with what she calls the pointlessness of virtue: “In this 




Chance. A genuine sense of morality enables us to see virtue as the only thing of worth…” (p. 
96). Again, she brings our thoughts back to literature: 
The great deaths of literature are few, but they show us with an exemplary clarity 
the way in which art invigorates us by a juxtaposition almost an identification of 
pointlessness and value. (p. 85) 
Murdoch employs a variety of Plato’s metaphors (the sun, sight, vision, perception) to 
represent the idea of that which is Good: “In its light we see the things of the world in their 
true relationships” (p. 90). By this she means that although Plato’s “sun” is far distant, we can 
still enjoy its effects, and, despite the distance, our world benefits from its heat and light. 
Similarly, the Good has a positive influence for our lives:  
A genuine mysteriousness attaches to the idea of goodness and the Good. This is a 
mystery with several aspects. The indefinability of Good is connected with the 
unsystematic and inexhaustible variety of the world and the pointlessness of 
virtue…Good is mysterious because of human frailty, because of the immense 
distance which is involved...And if we look outside the self we see scattered 
imitations of Good. There are few places where virtue plainly shines: great art, 
humble people who serve others. And can we, without improving ourselves, really 
see these things clearly? (pp. 96–97) 
Goodness represents a standard of perfection that is transcendent and timeless. Murdoch 
understands from Plato that virtue is not something that can be explicitly taught, and nor is it 
innate in any individual. What is innate, in Plato’s view, still requires help in order to form as 
virtue. Help is needed from the unconscious mind through attention. Only the cultivation of 
attention, and so of reflection, can bring about truly moral change, or can help an individual 
to become, in themselves, truly virtuous.  
Murdoch reminds us that we may encounter aspects of the good only if we are truly 
able to look beyond ourselves, to see beyond our own limitations and relentlessly selfish cares, 
and she challenges us to recall ways in which we might be able to improve ourselves morally. 
Our mediocre inclinations may to some extent be checked through attention to the good—in 
Murdoch’s terms by the apprehension of some “magnetic but inexhaustible reality” (p. 41). 
“There are”, she insists, “few places where virtue plainly shines: great art, humble people who 




Murdoch considers that morality and aesthetics and are deeply inter-connected to the 
extent that they represent “two aspects of a single struggle” (Murdoch, pp. 39–40). Both 
morality and aesthetics invite contemplation and reflection, and both extend to considerations 
that reach beyond the limits of the self. In Murdoch’s view aesthetics, and especially 
literature, enlivens our capacity for understanding, and our capacity to develop a loving 
regard for others. She considers too, that artistic endeavours meaningfully direct our attention 
towards that which is good—towards that which moves us to love. Morality and aesthetics are 
inter-connected in their capacity to arouse an awareness of the reality of something other 
than the self—an awareness that is in Murdoch’s view, quintessentially that of giving love: 
“Art and morals are, with certain provisos…one…Their essence is the same. The essence of 
both of them is love. Love is the perception of individuals. Love is the extremely difficult 
realisation that something other than oneself is real. Love, and so art and morals, is the 
discovery of reality” (Murdoch, 1997, p. 215).  
Murdoch, like Weil, sees that fostering attention enlarges our capacity for altruism. 
Murdoch considers that the more, and the more readily, we appreciate the separateness and 
difference of other people from ourselves, the more readily we recognise that another person 
has their own legitimate needs and wants, “the harder it becomes for us to treat another 
person as a thing” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 64). To apprehend a reality beyond our selves—which 
is the crux of the engagement with the arts and literature—when combined with the ability to 
see that there are various different ways of seeing things, fosters a more empathic and 
attentive attitude towards others.  
Murdoch shows us how and why literature is a means of advancing both moral 
perception and a respect for the otherness of our human fellows. She argues that literature can 
address moral questions in ways that fulfil a separate but related purpose from that of 
philosophical analysis, and furthermore, that literature can reveal the world to us in ways that 
philosophy simply cannot: “If moral philosophy is the examination of the most important 
human activities” then art is “the most educational of all human activities and a place in 
which the nature of morality can be seen” (p. 85). 
Artistic disciplines, then, are essentially moral because of the way they engage our 
powers of attention. Literature describes and depicts human behaviour and may thereby 
provide guidance or insight into questions concerning moral growth and improvement. For 
instance, in literature, we see the details of a fictional individual’s thoughts, motivations, 




and remarkable detail. The very process of attending to literature establishes in the reader a 
focus towards something other than the self. “Aesthetic insight connects with moral insight, 
respect for things connects with respect for persons. (Education.)…(‘But are you saying that 
every single second has a moral tag?’ Yes, roughly)” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 495). 
Murdoch observes that while we may be able to relate to particular moments of 
selflessness attention, for example when absorbed in a scene of natural beauty, or when we 
master a piano piece fluently and without regard to the technical demands we have mastered, 
it is less clear how we might harness the power of these recognisable but incidental moments 
of selflessness into a more systematic approach. Murdoch’s recommendation in this regard is 
that we should look to aesthetics. She proposes that engagement with art and aesthetics (as 
well as intellectual study) not only advances our moral understanding, but can also help to 
make us better people. She proposes that through imaginative engagement with a literary 
artist’s crafted work, readers can confront, contemplate, and ideally widen their own 
experiences without those hair-trigger egotistical defence mechanisms coming into play. 
In her view, fostering attention to art and aesthetics provides a path towards that 
which is good. Moral thinking and aspirations for moral improvement may be cultivated by 
way of literary encounters. This is not to suggest that in Murdoch’s view engagement with 
literature, or with art and aesthetics is to be viewed as specifically ‘educative’. On the 
contrary, Murdoch sees the primary aim of aesthetic appreciation to be the apprehension of 
beauty and form. She considers that art and literature are promising places for our moral 
growth and progress precisely because through the arts we may readily detach ourselves 
imaginatively and unsentimentally, in ways that are broadening of our perspective: “It is 
important too that great art teaches us how real things can be looked at and loved without 
being seized and used, without being appropriated into the greedy organism of the self” 
(Murdoch, 2014, p. 64).  
2.4. Aesthetic education 
Murdoch addresses herself to the question of what education is for, and what schools 
should teach. Her emphasis on the kind of teaching that most connects with the mind centres 
on inculcating powers of attention and bears markedly little resemblance to contemporary 
approaches: 
Learning is moral progress because it is an asceticism, it diminishes our egotism 




of the world. What should be taught in schools: to attend and get things 
right….To attend is to care, to learn is to desire to learn…evidence examples of 
education and teaching, where the ‘intellectual’ connects with the ‘moral’ and 
where apparently ‘neutral’ words naturally take on a glow of value. (Murdoch, 
1992, p. 179) 
Murdoch’s view of education here aligns directly with that of Weil. The overarching 
purpose of education ought to be very much to instil the disposition to understand, the 
disposition to care and the disposition to persist. 
In Murdoch’s view, to learn anything properly has an important moral dimension, 
and therefore demands virtuous attention. “Any serious learning is a moral-spiritual activity” 
(p. 338). Her views on what should be emphasised in a formal education setting resonate with 
those of fellow philosopher, Weil. Both Murdoch and Weil consider that the first priority of 
formal education ought very much to be to emphasise attention and the inculcation of a 
desire to learn and to understand, to care and to persist. For Murdoch, learning anything 
properly has an important moral dimension, and it therefore demands virtuous attention. 
Murdoch’s enquiry emphasises the agency of the learner and points to the ultimate or original 
importance of aesthetic sensibility—that is, the ability to appreciate beauty—as key to the 
ability to learn anything at all. 
Murdoch considers that the capacity for attention can be inculcated even in very 
young children who, “if they are lucky, are invited to attend to pictures or objects, or listen 
quietly to music or stories and verses” (p. 3). She argues that children, even in the early years, 
can be guided to develop a sense of curiosity and exploration of the creative work of others, 
and, with adult help, they can be guided to attend closely say, to a painting, a dance, a story. 
They can be guided to pay attention to both the totality of the work and to the crafted fine 
details, and they can be invited to experience the work in an open-ended way. Even young 
children can learn to view a work of art respectfully, sympathetically and with a sense of 
curiosity and connection. In this way they may begin to develop the ability to be adept at 
reading and interpreting. Murdoch considers that fostering such attention or contemplation is 
itself moral education: 
Children, if they are lucky, are invited to attend to pictures or objects, or listen 
quietly to music or stories or verses, and readily understand in what spirit they are 




contemplate works of nature, which are unlike works of art, yet also like them in 
being ‘beautiful’. (p. 3) 
Murdoch identifies several further pedagogical considerations that are in her view 
fundamental to the inculcation of attention. For Murdoch the good teacher is “one who 
teaches accuracy and truth” (p. 484). She underlines the importance of positive modelling and 
warns that “[t]he child…who is led by his observations to conclude that ‘Do not lie’ is part of 
an espionage system directed against himself, since the prohibition obviously means nothing 
to his elders, is being misled concerning the crucial position of truth in human life” (p. 385).  
The effective teacher is not merely a neutral presence, since education involves 
challenge, forward momentum, the desire to improve and to progress in both an intellectual 
and a moral sense. In this regard, Murdoch sees the role of teacher that of being actively 
attentive and attuned, assisting students to discover new questions, to examine issues and 
events from different perspectives, and to value and respect the ideas, insights and 
achievements of others. Murdoch acknowledges the educative importance of listening, and 
questioning, whether ideas from the past, or of contemporary times. She observes that these 
moral concepts are grounded in daily experience. Just as the little child learns about nurturing 
through being cared for and loved and comes by this route to appreciate what it is to care for 
other people and things, so too does this child, through exposure to stories, learn to have 
feeling for the experience of others. Exposure to literature fosters, through the 
accomplishment of attention, an appreciation for the efforts of others, for works of art, for 
how to be valued by others and for how to value. 
Murdoch is in no doubt that great aesthetic experiences can direct our minds to things 
which are worthwhile, and can teach us how to attend imaginatively to other persons with 
patience and love. She considers that the more these kinds of experiences are in our lives the 
better, since these experiences are likely to guide us well. Murdoch champions our capacity to 
discover, through the arts, the value of being able to “forget self, to be realistic, to perceive 
justly” (p. 88). This is particularly so in our engagement with literature, where, she notes, 
“[w]e use our imagination not to escape the world but to join it” (p. 88). 
Murdoch argues (as have other literary philosophers, including Nussbaum (1990, 
1992), Palmer (1992), Roberts (2018), that reading literature can give us a unique connection 
to the world and that this connection can be a powerful source of moral improvement or 




showing us precisely those otherwise unobservable inward mental happenings, those moral 
dilemmas, dramas and perplexities of fellow persons, and by our intellectually coming to 
terms with these, to enable a context in which development of our moral selves may best 
occur:  
We are presented with a truthful image of the human condition in a form which 
may be steadily contemplated; and indeed this is the only context in which any of 
us are capable of contemplating it at all. Art transcends selfish and obsessive 
limitations of personality and can enlarge the sensibility of is consumer. It is a kind 
of goodness by proxy. (Murdoch, 2014, pp. 84–5) 
Murdoch considers that aesthetic experiences that call for attentiveness and 
contemplation such as reading literature, provide us with meaning because they offer us a 
sense of there being some greater unity to the world. She considers that the human mind 
innately seeks out such coherence, and that this is why the unity of artistic works can offer 
such a reassuring sense of congruence in the world (p. 51). She quotes Plato’s comment in 
Republic (VII, 532) “that ‘the technai have the power to lead the best part of the soul to the view 
of what is most excellent in reality’. This well describes the role of great art as an educator 
and revealer” (p. 63). Earlier in the same essay she underlines the view that “reflection rightly 
tends to unify the moral world, and that increasing moral sophistication reveals increasing 
unity” (p. 56). 
Murdoch is interested in the way that ideas work on and challenge the mind. She 
considers that not to shy away from, but rather to seek out and be challenged by ideas is 
crucial for acquiring virtue. Murdoch quotes from a passage near the end of Plato’s Meno to 
emphasise this point:  
I cannot swear to everything I have said in this argument¾but one thing I am 
ready to fight for in word and deed, that we shall be better, braver and more 
active men if we believe it right to look for what we do not know, than if we think 
we cannot discover it and have no duty to seek it. (Murdoch, 1992, p. 180) 
Within that same dialogue, the slave boy’s ‘remembrance” (anamnesis) “comes as the reward 
of a sort of morally disciplined attention” (p. 23). The slave boy “is orientating himself 
towards, bringing his attention to bear upon, something dark and alien, on which the light 




possession, nevertheless now has something that is his own, and that cannot be taken from 
him.  
Murdoch does not have a specific definition of the good, asserting rather that the good 
can be found in everyday life: “There is not a complicated secret doctrine” (Murdoch, 2014, 
p. 74). Further, that which is good has nothing to do with intention or purpose—in fact for 
Murdoch the good specifically excludes the idea of purpose. Murdoch’s notion of good is 
entirely impersonal:  
The only genuine way to be good is to be good ‘for nothing’ in the midst of a 
scene where every ‘natural’ thing, including one’s own mind, is subject to chance, 
that is, to necessity. That ‘for nothing’ is indeed the experienced correlate of the 
indivisibility or non-representable blankness of the idea of Good itself. (pp. 69–70)  
Murdoch admits that her Platonic notion of “good” is difficult—”both rare and hard 
to picture” (p. 51). She proposes that we may develop our capacity to discriminate that which 
is good only by our ongoing efforts to give attention. If we determine that a person is truly 
good, “we are led also to reflect on his states of consciousness, his capacity for recollection, for 
reflection, for attention, for the deep intuitive syntheses of moral vision” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 
378.) She contends that we only encounter aspects of the good if we are able to look beyond 
ourselves, “turn our attention away from the particular”, (Murdoch, 2014, p. 99), from the 
“avaricious tentacles of the self”, (p. 101), in order to look beyond our individual limitations 
and relentlessly selfish cares.  
Murdoch’s attention has connections to wider questions of objectivity, goodness and 
virtue, although she acknowledges that “clarity of thought and purity of attention becomes 
harder and more ambiguous when the object of attention is something moral” (p. 68). 
Murdoch aligns attention with moral sensibility, and explains that morality has a continuous 
forward momentum, and as such, is “essentially connected with change and progress” (p. 28). 
She argues, not unlike Weil, that since we are human historical individuals, the trajectory of 
our moral understanding is naturally “onward into increasing privacy, in the direction of the 
ideal limit and not backwards towards a genesis in the rulings of an impersonal public 
language” (p. 28). Murdoch also describes her notion of attention as “human consciousness at 
its most highly textured” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 419). 
As we saw in the previous section, Murdoch argues that evidence of the Good can 




for itself. It is an image of virtue. Its condensed, clarified, presentation enables us to look 
without sin upon a sinful world. It renders innocent and transforms into truthful vision our 
baser energies connected with power, curiosity, envy and sex” (p. 8). Furthermore, “Goodness 
is needful, one has to be good, for nothing, for immediate and obvious reasons, because 
somebody is hungry or somebody is crying” (Murdoch 1997, p. 233.) Murdoch shows us that 
there is much to be learned both from connecting with works of art that are the product of 
attention, and from recognising the important ways in which engagement with the arts 
cultivates our powers of attention. Both art and morality call for “imaginative cognitive 
activity” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 341).  
2.5. Reading and ‘unselfing’ 
Murdoch’s argument for the integral connection between reading literature and moral 
progress rests on her claim that attention to literature cultivates moral perception and that 
literary enactments can enable us to see the world “as it really is”. She considers that we are 
improved by the mental work that attentive reading calls for—not in the colloquial sense of 
‘self-improvement’, but in the deeper and more difficult moral sense of engaging in the virtue 
of ‘unselfing’ (Murdoch, 2014, p. 82)—a concept that is related to Weil’s concept of “de-
creation”. Murdoch argues that reading novels redirects our attention away from the self and 
outwards, towards others, towards some greater unity. Literature thus provides intrinsically 
beneficial moral value. Attentive reading helps us to “unself”—by which Murdoch means it 
enables us to better envisage our life as a shared or collective, rather than seeing it as an 
utterly self-bound experience. She proposes that literature can cultivate our moral sensibility 
and help us move beyond self-preoccupation, and further, that “anything which alters 
consciousness in the direction of “unselfishness, objectivity and realism is to be connected 
with virtue” (p. 82). 
Murdoch considers that the more we have imaginative reading experiences in our 
lives the better, since such learning lays down in us not only habits to exercise our 
imagination, but that when literature calls up in us ways to see how reason and insight and 
humility guide thinking, this can also inform our capacity for right judgment in situations 
beyond the world of fiction:  
There is nothing odd or mystical about this, nor about the fact that our ability to 
act well ‘when the time comes’ depends partly, perhaps largely, upon the quality 




As Murdoch insists, “the novel form more frankly admits, indeed embraces, the 
instability of art and the invincible variety, contingency, and scarcely communicable 
frightfulness of life” (p. 96). The novelist, as does the teacher, enables the receiver by reading 
the literary work, to recognize, interpret, conclude, and to discriminate evaluatively among 
interpretations and between different possible readings. Murdoch also suggests that in the 
very best literary examples, the reader is provided with an example view of what it might be 
to live a truly principled life.  
Murdoch argues repeatedly that the world of literature is educative since it provides a 
continuity of experience that connects us with others. Although reading literature may, to a 
non-reader, appear a solitary, silent and inwardly-focused pursuit, it is, paradoxically, an 
activity that fundamentally connects the reader, through imagination, with the wider world of 
humanity. This experience can be energizing and can increase our ability to exercise control 
over our own lived experience. “Art then is not a diversion or a side-issue, it is the most 
educative of all human activities and a place in which the nature of morality can be seen” (p. 
85).  
Murdoch draws on the Platonic notion that we all possess deep within our individual 
selves much that originally connects us all together, so that the sense that that each of us has 
of our own sense of self, of authenticity, and that constitutes our sense of separateness and 
uniqueness, at the same time purposes us to mutuality. We could not be selves at all without 
more originally than this being fellows, or thus without belonging to a society. Murdoch is 
aware of appreciable contrast between the complexity of our individual experience, and the 
neatness and unity of the artist’s fully formed work of art, and she considers that that 
difference recommends all the more highly that we should develop ourselves morally through 
the reading of literary art.  
Art and literature represent a rich site for moral thinking, according to Murdoch, 
because they condense and clarify the world for us in particular ways. Art directs our 
attention towards particular and specific details of experience: “Art illuminates accident and 
contingency and the general muddle of life, the limitations of time and the discursive intellect, 
so as to enable us to survey complex or horrible things which would otherwise appal us” 
(Murdoch, 1992, p. 8). She argues that finely crafted literature can give form to aspects of 
human experience in ways that are cognitively deeply satisfying. These are points that Boyd 




While Murdoch defends the aesthetic value of literature by arguing that literature has 
a broadly educative role in enhancing moral perception and developing unselfish, loving 
attention. She considers literature to be neither overtly morally instructive nor limited to a 
narrowly didactic or educative function. (See further Murdoch, 1997, p. 218). Rather, she 
argues, attention to literature cultivates our capacity for relational thinking:  
To say that the essence of art is love is not to say, is nothing to do with saying, that 
art is didactic or educational….The level at which love works which is art is 
deeper than the level at which we deliberate concerning improvement…the work 
of the great artists shows up ‘art for art’s sake’ as a flimsy frivolous doctrine. Art is 
for life’s sake, in the sense in which I have tried to indicate. Or else it is worthless. 
(p. 218) 
In further consideration of why, in an age preoccupied with consumption, the aesthetic 
experience of reading actually matters, Murdoch observes that “great art teaches us how 
real things, and beautiful things, can be regarded and loved, quite without their needing 
to be being seized or appropriated” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 64). This idea also has obvious 
implications for human conduct in relation to matters of human morality. 
Murdoch shows us that aesthetic experience is not simply incidental, but is integral to, 
our moral development. She defends the view that reading literature opens the door to 
finding a wider meaning—to themes that touch on wider or more fundamental truths about 
our subjective existence. She argues that reading literature is important because it connects us 
to an inner sense of self, one that is both mysterious and unique, one that possibly cannot be 
fully understood, and towards which humility is essential. It is from that inner self we find 
ourselves connected inescapably to others:  
Simone Weil said that morality was a matter of attention, not of will. We need a 
new vocabulary of attention. It is here that literature is so important, especially 
since it has taken over some of the tasks formerly performed by philosophy. 
Through literature we can re-discover a sense of the density of our lives. Literature 
can arm us against consolation and fantasy. (Murdoch, 1997, pp. 293–294) 
Murdoch reminds us that great art, and especially great literature, is a medium for 
both education and enlightenment. To read attentively calls for and develops a disciplined, 




give due attention to literature enables us to develop what Murdoch calls a “judicious 
respectful sensibility to something which is very like another organism” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 
87). Literature’s power lies in its capacity to extend our experience of the world, for as art, it 
“pierces the veil and gives sense to the notion of a reality which lies beyond experience” (p. 
86).  
Attention to literature is instructive in the sense that it can lead to improved 
perception, deeper interpretation, a more informed and loving understanding of others. 
Attentive reading draws us out of our default state of being utterly self-preoccupied. In the 
literary examples that Murdoch holds in the highest regard (nineteenth century literature), 
characters navigate their way through situations of moral ambiguity and challenge. Both 
during and after reading, readers need to take time to reflect, to ponder and withhold hasty 
judgment, to bestow Murdoch’s gentle regard for each character’s situation. 
Murdoch considers that the study of literature is the ideal site for developing our 
moral imagination and moral sense precisely because literary engagement engenders the 
capacity for a ‘patient, loving regard’ of others. In this regard Murdoch rates literature ahead 
of other modes of aesthetic experience. In her view, literature is the most interesting of the 
arts, since it offers unique possibilities for intellectual and cultural insight: “We read great 
novels with all our knowledge of life engaged, the experience is cognitive and moral in the 
highest degree” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 97).  
Our experiences of art and literature, Murdoch argues, can satisfy a human yearning 
for coherence and unity, and thus art and literature can be educative and morally instructive 
in relation to the most important values in life. “Art indeed, so far from being a playful 
diversion of the human race, is the place of its most fundamental insight, and the centre to 
which the more uncertain steps of metaphysics must constantly return” (Murdoch, 2014, pp. 
71–2). Murdoch also suggests that by way of the best literary examples, the reader is drawn 
into a deeper understanding of what a morally principled life might amount to.  
2.6. Reading as “embodied attentiveness” 
Murdoch argues that literature is a vital site for moral learning, declaring that “life is 
soaked in the moral, literature is soaked in the moral” (Murdoch, 1997, p. 27). Murdoch 
considers that the literary novel (she is particularly interested in novels of the nineteenth 
century) is in a sense ethically educative because of the way it portrays human situations, and 




can respond to the fictional characters as if they were real people confronted with real moral 
dilemmas and questions, even while knowing that those “made up” characters are contending 
with fictionally-created situations. As Felski (2015, p. 176), notes, “reading…is not just a 
cognitive activity but an embodied mode of attentiveness that involves us in acts of sensing, 
perceiving, registering, and engaging.” 
Through attentive reading, we not only learn about the lives of others, but we are also 
ourselves potentially changed by our reading experience. When we read we forge a kind of 
fellowship with the writer. We “sit with” and attend to the writer’s text, we accept it, tolerate 
it, follow its lead, even if we sometimes also question its directions. We cannot give our 
reading only partial attention, but must attend fully. Literary reading draws us into an 
imagined realm that is beyond the limitations of our own sense of self, or rather, that extends 
that self. Reading enables us to give cognizance to, and re-cognize in new ways—to develop 
insight, to cultivate reflective thought. 
Murdoch insists that attention to the arts generally, and to literature in particular, can 
satisfy and assist us by informing those innate curiosities, and, as it were, revealing precisely 
those otherwise private mental happenings (as in the narrative about M and D). We 
encounter the world of fiction in a way that we could never experience the actual world, and 
our moral understanding may be enhanced by the experience. Murdoch argues repeatedly 
that the world of literature is rewarding since it provides us with a continuity of experience 
that connects us to the lives of others.  
Murdoch invokes the image of an artist, possibly a writer, who is deeply engaged with 
a thinking task. This person is held in attention as if waiting for or experiencing some sort of 
revelation: 
The artist or thinker concentrates on the problem, grasps it as a problem with 
some degree of clarity, and waits. Something is apprehended as there which is not 
yet known. Then something comes; as we sometimes say from the unconscious. It 
comes to us out of the dark of non-being, as a reward for loving attention. 
(Murdoch, 1992, p. 505) 
Literature, both in the way it is crafted, and in the manner in which it is recreated 





In Murdoch’s view, “good art” provides us with sources of wonder that are so moving 
that our sense of our own selfish self is literally “usurped”. She considers that works of 
literature, if of the right quality, can draw us out of ourselves and provoke us to energetic and 
selfless thought: “We are presented with a truthful image of the human condition in a form 
which can be steadily contemplated; and indeed this is the only context in which many of us 
are capable of contemplating it at all” (Murdoch, 2014, pp. 84–85). Engagement with such 
humanly created works invites us to step outside of the self, and to detach ourselves in a way 
that can energise and disarm us—and in this way be truly ‘educative’. Australian philosopher 
Raimond Gaita (1991) expresses a similar view when he argues that literary descriptions of 
moral actions model and reveal to us useful ways of reflection: 
Descriptions of actions and character through which we explore our sense of what 
we have done and what we are, of what is fine and what is tawdry, of what is 
shallow and what is deep, of what is noble and what is base, and so on, are not 
merely descriptions of convenience. (p. 40)  
Literature vitally enhances reflective capabilities for attention such that the reader is 
able to draw his or her own original insights and lay claim to particular moral values that are 
truly their own. Reading literature animates and enlivens a sense of actual experience, which 
can then enable readers to gain knowledge about the world, about themselves, and even 
about the sort of persons they would most value being or becoming. Murdoch reminds us that 
literature draws us in by calling attention to the very way it unfolds and develops, and that 
literature insists on its own presence—and thus that reading literature, far from being a form 
of withdrawal or escapism, draws us into the very texture of experience. Attention to 
literature literally ‘opens our eyes’ to the world.  
When we take up a work of literary fiction, we do not hope for some simple “take-
home message”. Our expectation could never be so simple or shallow, given that the 
undertaking is large, and we must commit to investing into the work very appreciable time, 
emotion and cognitive attention. As readers, we tacitly agree that there is something 
worthwhile beyond ourselves in this activity. While we are reading, our awareness, regard, 
and consideration of, fictional others is engaged. In the act of reading we are drawn out of 
ourselves and into a realm where we can encounter and contemplate a view of the world that 




While Murdoch identifies examples of what she considers to be truly great literature 
and names various literary artists whose works she considers exemplary, she also observes that 
a “great deal of art, perhaps most art, actually is self-consoling fantasy” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 
83). Murdoch’s recommendation of what constitutes truly great literature could be contested 
on various counts. Her nominated authors and titles include only a handful of names and 
only those from the western literary tradition. Some might disagree with her judgement that 
Tolstoi [Murdoch’s spelling] did not manage greatness in The Death of Ivan Illych, or her 
judgement that King Lear is Shakespeare’s greatest play. Many would consider that seeking to 
make a determination of what constitutes literary greatness is by no means straightforward. 
Murdoch would herself have been aware that to instantiate particular titles or authors is to 
provoke challenge. But it is not Murdoch’s wont to provide a definitive checklist of literary 
greatness any more than it her wont to provide a specific, definitive account of goodness. 
Rather, her purpose is to instantiate examples of literary works that elicit and foster the 
reader’s moral attention. 
The effort to engage attentively with literature serves to silence and annihilate the self. 
To silence and annihilate the self is necessary in order to attain an objective point of view, just 
as philosopher Nagel in The view from nowhere (1986), calls objectivity “the view from 
nowhere”, or a “centreless view.” In his introduction, Nagel grants the existence of what he 
calls “conflicts between the [objective and subjective] standpoints and the discomfort caused 
by obstacles to their integration.” He observes that “certain forms of perplexity for example, 
about freedom, knowledge, and the meaning of life seem to me to embody more insight than 
any of the supposed solutions to these problems” (Nagel, l986, p. 4). 
In this way, we can see that the experience of reading literary fiction is instructive of 
what it even is to know. The effort of engaging attentively with literature may be entertaining, 
morally inspiring and broadly pedagogical all at the same time—a reminder of the 
uniqueness and otherness of all persons, and this reminder may ultimately help to bring us 
face-to-face with our own potentially deeply flawed assumptions about what it is to be a 
person. Through the attentive reading of literature we are made aware of a reality other than 
our own. The virtue of reading lies in the way we are caught up in attending, in seeking to 
understand, to make sense, and waiting to see rather than hastening to make an uninformed 
judgement.  
The reader of literature experiences the world vicariously but nevertheless with full 




presented. Through reading fiction, readers’ eyes are opened to other lives, other ways of 
being. They witness characters’ belief systems under strain, they see the tensions that arise 
from decision and consequences, as well as from chance, they see different ways in which 
characters’ think, process, reflect, respond, interpret and redefine experience, and how they 
advance thought as they cast about for their best next steps. Readers see the consequences of 
choices being played out in detail. In all these ways, novels are morally instructive. “How is 
truthfulness tested? How is memory tested? By consequences!” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 276). 
Murdoch points to the way that art is doubly created—initially by the literary artist, 
and subsequently, through imagination, by the reader. Murdoch considers that these 
“imaginative and intellectual activities may be said to be the point or essence of art” (pp. 2–3): 
Art illuminates accident and contingency and the general muddle of life, the 
limitations of time and the discursive intellect, so as to enable us to survey complex 
or horrible things which would otherwise appal us. It creates an authoritative 
public human world, a treasury of past experience, it preserves the past. Art makes 
places and open spaces for reflection, it is a defence against materialism and 
against pseudo-scientific attitudes to life. It calms and invigorates, it gives us 
energy by unifying, possibly by purifying, our feelings. In enjoying great art we 
experience a clarification and concentration and perfection of our own 
consciousness. Emotion and intellect are unified into a limited whole…[Art] 
inspires intuitions of ideal format and symbolic unity which enables us to co-
operate with the artist and to be, as we enjoy the work, artists ourselves. (p. 8) 
2.7. Summary 
Murdoch shows us that the concept of attention is fundamental to our capacity to 
learn and to grow, and that the quality of attention that is called for in the imaginative 
engagement with a literary text gives us insight into the way that attention links to our 
capacity to learn anything at all. Attention to reading prose literature can afford us a unique 
connection to the world, and as a result, it can be a powerful and personal source not only for 
our moral learning but also and still more deeply, for learning what it even is to come to 
know. 
Over against certain threats to taking value seriously in times that vaunt algorithmic 
reduction and logical analysis, and that have displaced spirituality by secularism, Murdoch 




but signals rather a call to selflessness. Murdoch reminds us that matters such as knowledge, 
friendship, and aesthetic appreciation of beauty all have intrinsic value, value of a kind that is 
prior to selfhood of any kind, not simply of value because egoistically we desire or want to 
have them.  
Murdoch argues that human morality is grounded in our relations with other people, 
and that morality lies in the specific ways that we interact—seeking to treat others as we 
would want to be treated, to respect, enjoy and be “uplifted” by the aesthetic achievements of 
others, to be inspired to work towards a better version of our individual self. She 
acknowledges that human self-interest is a powerful de-motivating force, and that humankind 
is naturally inclined not only to look to improve conditions for the individual even at the 
expense of the community but even, to applaud such behaviour in others as legitimate. 
Murdoch’s view of the usefulness of literature, not in an instructive sense, but as a 
stimulus for thinking, brings us to the theme of the place of literature in education. Murdoch 
reminds us of the aesthetic and moral power of literature as a site for moral learning, and this 
reminder leads us to consider the place and value of literature in contemporary education. It 
seems that the contemporary view of the value of literature is one that is at best ambivalent. 
Murdoch provides a compelling argument for placing a greater, rather than a lesser, 
emphasis on the virtue and value of reading literature in our schools and in our lives.  
Murdoch reminds us of the enriching opportunities that literature affords. Yet at the 
present time in human history her thesis is likely to be unappealing on at least several counts. 
In the first place, her support for a quasi-spiritual moral life and her emphasis on the moral 
virtues of truthfulness, goodness and morality are out of step with the cultural priorities our 
secular and largely cynical age. Secondly, Murdoch’s argument in favour of the patient and 
attentive reading of literary texts is likely to be considered anachronistic at a time when 
people are hard pressed to find time for any reading at all beyond what can be accessed on 
their smart phone, and at a time when the term ‘text’ has itself come to be understood as a 
truncated cell phone message or “tweet” of not more than 140 characters. 
Murdoch’s overall argument is that cognitive attention to crafted literature can play a 
fundamental role in supporting moral growth and development. The fact that she turned 
from her career as a philosopher to dedicate her life to full-time novel writing reflects 
Murdoch’s conviction regarding the importance of literature. She shows us that reading 




very practice of imaginative reading engages, exercises and improves what is fundamental to 
learning itself. Through reading, the reader cognitively “realizes” (i.e. makes real) the text, in 
in a way that is equivalent to, though not the same as, living the experience in the real world.  
In the following four chapters, Weil and Murdoch’s theoretical concept of attention is 
applied  to four separate literary works. These four case studies seek to exemplify, through 
detailed literary interpretation, the ways that the concept of attention as a notion that has 
both aesthetic and moral power, is played out in four, quite different and distinctive, literary 
works. These four chapters offer reflections on the ways that literature can be both 
aesthetically unified and morally instructive, and can turn the gaze way from self. These four 
works provide opportunity to “stretch the imagination, enlarge the vision and strengthen the 
judgement” (Murdoch, 2014, pp. 87–88).  
In the immediately following chapter, the notion of attention is interpreted by a 
fictional teacher, the main character in Muriel Spark’s 1961 novel The Prime of Miss Jean 
Brodie. This novel centres on a singular, somewhat maverick educator who delivers powerfully 
effective teaching from within her own classroom. Brodie ensures that her students are not 
restricted to learning from within those four walls, and regularly leads her class out, both into 
the school gardens and to the city beyond the school gates. She attends to each of her 
students and to their intellectual growth. She enlarges their appreciation of the world, and 
provides them with a challenging, varied and open-ended curriculum based on the arts. 
Above all, she inculcates their powers of attention. Spark’s Jean Brodie is an independent 







Chapter 3: Muriel Spark’s The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie 
3.0. Introduction 
Muriel Spark’s The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie (1961) is her best-known and most 
celebrated novel. It brought the then 43-year-old Scottish author Spark (1918–2006) into the 
literary limelight internationally. The novel, her sixth, is now considered one of the 100 top 
English-language books of the 20th century, and it has been adapted for both theatre and 
screen. Some other work of Spark’s also qualify her as a thinker who is vitally concerned 
about education and self-authorship.  
Educational themes and minor educational figures appear in various of her works, 
including The Girls of Slender Means (1963) and The Driver’s Seat (1970). Her final novel, The 
Finishing School (2004), which is in part a study in creative jealousy and narcissism, may also be 
read as an incisive and biting prescient satire on 21st-century education priorities. Yet, 
educationists and philosophers of education have to date scarcely paid to Spark’s work the 
scrutiny that is owed to it in that quarter. In order to redress this matter, The Prime of Miss Jean 
Brodie is the focus of the present chapter.  
To date, little has been written on the pedagogical themes within Spark’s writing, and 
in particular, on Spark’s exploration of attention and its educative power. Spark’s life was 
significantly contemporaneous with the lives of French philosopher and teacher Simone Weil 
(1909-1943) and Anglo-Irish philosopher and novelist Iris Murdoch (1919-1999), both of 
whom concerned themselves very much with how one thinks and how one learns from life. 
Weil and Murdoch, inspired by Plato, concern themselves with how one thinks and how one 
grows intellectually and morally. Attention is a pivotal concept in their philosophies. To argue 
that this concept is pivotal as well in Muriel Spark’s sixth and most famous novel, The Prime of 
Miss Jean Brodie, is the purpose of the current chapter.  
Set in a conservative school for girls in Edinburgh in the 1930s, Spark’s novel both 
provokes reflection and piques debate about the values underlying education, as well as about 
the methods and substance of pedagogy. The power of the book to shock has waxed and 
waned and arguably waxed again across the decades. Courageously, Spark charges the 
attentive readers of this book the task of interpreting what its message about ideals and 
realities in education might best be made out to be. Like Miss Brodie herself, Spark expects 




through that are complex and debatable. It is this approach of Spark’s, together with the 
message of her book as I interpret it, that bear further investigation in the present day. 
This chapter considers parallels in the evident intellection of Spark and that of her two 
fellow female philosophers. In so doing the chapter considers Spark herself as likewise a 
philosopher, specifically as a fellow moral philosopher and a fellow philosopher of education. 
This chapter argues that Spark’s signal concern in The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie seems to have 
been to accentuate the place for attention in pedagogy. It seeks to show that Brodie’s teacher-
led classroom, where the faculty of attention is central, is a site of richly meaningful, even 
transformational learning. The first section provides some contextual information about the 
novel. The second discusses Spark’s cultivation of attention in her readers and considers some 
of the key features of the novel. This is followed by a more focussed examination of Spark’s 
text in relation to Weil’s and Murdoch’s concept of attention. The final section explores some 
of the broader educational implications of Spark’s novel in relation to the pedagogical notion 
of attention. 
3.1. The primacy of attention 
The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie chronicles the experiences of a group of schoolgirls under 
the tutelage of their memorable and extraordinarily compelling, while simultaneously 
controversial, teacher. Brodie is a redoubtable, if also maverick teacher—someone who is 
personally committed to shape and influence the young girls in her charge, to whom she 
attributes elite status, describing them extravagantly as “the crème de la crème” (Spark, 1961, 
p. 8). Brodie’s morally ambiguous mantra is “give me a girl at an impressionable age, and she 
is mine for life” (p. 9).  
The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie develops and continues motifs that are evident in Spark’s 
other novels—the strangeness of life, the importance (and unreliability) of memory and 
recollection, the significance of noticing, as well as issues of influence and authority. These 
motifs, while present in other of her novels—Memento Mori, The Finishing School, are particularly 
to the forefront in this novel. The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie is to a great extent a study of the 
opportunities of education as well as of the forces that impel learners towards mere 
conformity that threaten to extinguish those very opportunities. It is biting in its critique of 
rules, rigidity, Establishment culture, and potential straight-jacketing of minds by school 
examination systems. At the same time, the novel shows, through the efforts and iconoclasm 




The uptake of literary heritage is made out to bear the best pedagogical fruits. Thus is the 
cultivation of imagination extolled. Spark foregrounds the educational virtues of application 
and discipline. She portrays an education that, above all, fosters and develops that faculty of 
attention. 
Spark’s novel critiques the common misunderstanding of education as a ‘putting in’ of 
knowledge. Brodie herself points out that literal meaning of the Latin ‘educare’ is a ‘leading 
out’ not a ‘putting in’. As will be discussed in a subsequent section, Brodie’s teaching 
approach is very much that of widening her girls’ horizons both literally and metaphorically. 
Spark draws on Platonic themes: to be a thinking person is to be able to reflect independently 
and for oneself, but at the same time to be able to draw upwards and away from the plane of 
mere personal opinion or conviction. A person needs other persons if he or she is to progress 
thought, for thought is progressed through dialectic, and a person’s community with others is 
partly from being a fellow discussant with others. Dialectical progress is possible not only by 
the intellectual jousting of Socrates, the ancient Greek male intellectual hero and his young 
male interlocutors, but equally by an inspired school mistress through her stimulating 
teaching of girls. 
Exactly as Plato’s Socrates becomes a martyr for the cause of reason, so does Spark’s 
Brodie become a martyr for the cause of a somewhat related ideal or quality. Brodie becomes 
a martyr for the cause of cultivating in her girls the capacity for attention. Socrates loses his 
very life, and Brodie suffers her own fate: she is caused to exit from her prime. Her 
employment as teacher is terminated. The possibility of her own continued iconoclasm is 
thereby snuffed out. Yet Brodie conditions deeply how, forever more, her selected students 
will understand themselves. She remains with them in their thoughts and in their characters 
and dispositions for independent reflection and debate for all the rest of their lives. Each girl 
makes of herself something different, and not every girl makes of herself what might be best, 
but Brodie’s aspiration for each of them—that they should be self-determining—affects them 
and stays with them all enduringly. 
First published over half a century ago, Spark’s novel provokes reflection and debate 
about the values underlying education as well as about the methods and substance of 
pedagogy. Like Brodie herself, Spark expects us, her charges, to think for ourselves, and she 
does not protect us from issues to think through that are complex and debatable. Spark’s 
work nurtures attention in the sense of this word that has been developed fully by Weil and 




Attention thus understood is something active, yet at the same time something not willed—
something that is emptied of any direct expression of the ego. Attention frees students to grasp 
some new thing that (should they reflect at all back upon their grasping of it), they will 
recognise, with ready humility, is far larger than themselves. 
According to the view promulgated by Weil and Murdoch and taken up and 
amplified by Spark, nothing will render one’s life truly worthy to have been lived if one is 
incapable of attention—that is to say, if one’s ego is forever to the fore. Attention 
emblematises the connection that there is between true respect for others and true self-
respect. Brodie nurtures her students’ capacity to be attentive, to think for themselves, with 
self-respect. The effect is, in the fullness of its development, not for Brodie alone to determine, 
for attention both engages the thinking spirit of her students and also emboldens that spirit. 
Further, while any two people who read The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie are liable to debate it, in 
this very debate they aim towards worth in their way of thinking, as well as towards worth in 
their way of expressing what they think. They aim in short towards what is higher than any 
individual self. This is Spark’s accomplishment, even if no two such debates are the same and 
Spark could not have anticipated their every form or character. 
Exploring philosophically the experience of being a classroom teacher, Spark’s novel 
not only challenges Establishment ideas of schooling and educational delivery, but ranges 
across themes of authority, truth, moral influence and moral ambiguity. By inviting as it does, 
philosophical reflection upon the very ideal for the teacher/pupil relationship, the novel 
causes its readers to attend to the limitations, as well as to the power, of charismatic 
instruction. It confronts us with the need to evaluate iconoclasm, to recognise its fatefulness, 
yet also acknowledge the value of its enduring expression. The novel also forthrightly 
concerns itself with issues of truth, goodness and beauty, as well as with the centrality of 
aesthetics and aesthetic appreciation for education. In particular, the novel explores the 
pedagogical notion that attention demands from the student exertion of his or her own 
agency, and is at the same time, indispensably the basis for truly developing the mind. 
The group of young students who are directly under Brodie’s influence include Sandy 
Stranger, a book lover with poor eyesight, and to whom Brodie attributes “insight”. Mary 
Macgregor is careless, clumsy, inattentive, and impulsive, and she will die young. Rose 
Stanley, who is beautiful, is attributed with “instinct” and will later be famous for sex. Other 
students in the set include Eunice Gardner, adept at cartwheels, Monica Douglas, whose 




Weil), a delinquent outsider who will die trying to get to the Spanish Civil War. Spark’s wider 
cast of characters includes various female teaching staff at Marcie Blaine school, including 
Miss MacKay, the school’s stern and disapproving Headmistress, Miss Lockheart, the 
beloved science teacher, and the two sewing teachers (two elderly sisters who spend their time 
in class patiently reconstructing the girls’ dismal sewing efforts). There are only two men on 
the staff, both of whom are said to be in love with Miss Brodie—Mr Gordon Lowther, the 
Music Master, and Mr Terry Lloyd, the one-armed Art Master.  
Spark’s novel is concise—a mere 128 pages in length. The early and middle parts of 
the work reveal Brodie’s charisma, although they also contain faint hints of her guile as well, 
and there are occasional hints that Brodie’s conduct is possibly morally questionable. We 
learn in Chapter Three of the lives and careers of the many single women living in Edinburgh 
in the 1930s, and how their lives are impacted by the loss of so many young men during 
1914–1918. The novel also reveals details of the Brodie girls’ adult lives, including Sandy’s 
conversion to Catholicism and her entry to a convent. By the end of the novel we have pieced 
together various biographical details about the characters—Mary has died, Rose is married, 
Eunice is a nurse married to a doctor, Sandy, now Sister Helena, has published a religious 
treatise, and Brodie has died of cancer. These biographical details, however, are not allowed 
to eclipse, but are merely there to season or round out, the prevailing themes of the novel. 
These themes relate very centrally to attention and to individual self-authorship.  
The primacy of attention in The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie is almost a pun. Brodie’s prime 
is precisely contemporaneous with her being an arresting teacher, one who commands 
attention, instils the power of attention, and who speaks for the value of attention as yet 
without anyone’s being able effectively to gainsay her. Brodie’s personal prime terminates 
before the novel has finished, yet this further arrests the reader’s attention onto attention itself 
and its value. 
3.2. Spark’s cultivation of attention in her readers 
Brodie’s ambitions to inculcate her girls as protégées, and the hints that she coerces 
and even manipulates them to implement her own plans and ambitions for them, are the 
seeds of her ultimate downfall. Her closest student, Sandy, is the very one to betray her to the 
school principal. In the course of her growing up, Sandy comes to the point where she can see 
the flaws in her teacher. When she considers her teacher in this new light, she suddenly sees 




protégées into her own likeness (pp. 32–33). Sandy reasons out for herself the dangers 
inherent in Brodie’s call for her girls’ allegiance to her. It is only after many more years that 
Sandy is finally able to reconcile fully the nature and impact of Brodie’s teaching on her own 
life. In this, Sandy’s growth reflects the Platonic view of the intellect moving from uncritical 
acceptance to a more sophisticated and ultimately more enlightened understanding. 
Spark is not the less courageous with respect to her readers than her creation Brodie is 
with the students at Brodie’s school. Stylistically and structurally, Spark’s text plays with the 
reader’s attention. Spark calls upon her readers to be constantly alert and to reflect constantly 
on what is known about what is revealed. While Brodie’s betrayal is disclosed early on in the 
novel, this proves not to be the central moment or the focal point around which the novel’s 
action revolves. Other, seemingly more trivial details, are, by repeated mention, themselves 
magnified and given much more importance. Importantly, the details of Brodie’s personality 
that are announced to the reader first, and which therefore take primacy in the reader’s mind 
in forming an overall impression of Brodie’s personality, are of her charm, her exhilarating 
influence on her girls, and her challenging interpretation of the role of the teacher and the 
meaning of education. While much of the novel in fact concerns the complexity (and perhaps 
the original or ultimate unknowability) of Brodie’s character, the impression of Brodie is 
established that she is an inspirational teacher, a mentor. S. E. Asch’s 1946 empirical study 
‘Forming Impressions of Personality’, provides a detailed picture of the so called ‘primacy 
effect’ in relation to how impressions of personality are formed on the basis of first 
impressions. In line with Asch’s findings, the reader’s initial impressions of Brodie prevail 
even at the end of the novel, and despite all the deliberate ambiguity. 
To be truly attentive when reading Spark’s novel is to ponder constantly just whose 
point of view is being given, and even whether or not ever to accept the veracity of the 
shifting narrative voice. Brodie’s direct command to her girls to “follow me” (p. 10) is 
ambiguous—does she mean that they are to follow her directly to the elm tree outside where 
they will have their lesson; is this a metaphorical command for the girls’ unflagging allegiance 
to their teacher; or is this a more general reaching out to her students, an invitation to each of 
them, to explore the possibilities of the world as Brodie herself does, but for the determining 
by each of her own life.26 
 
26 Anne Reynaud’s personal recollections of her own teacher, Simone Weil, include memories of lessons 




Spark’s reader is required to attend in a particular and somewhat detached or open-
ended fashion to the tale as it unfolds. The constant and deliberate disruptions to a 
commonplace narrative sequence require her reader to give full attention to the work. The 
novel is complex in design. It is meticulously constructed and calls for attentive and repeated 
reading. Displaced or fractured time sequences and overlaid events are so prevalent that 
initially the novel appears disordered. Discernment of the structure itself of the narrative is 
difficult when there are abrupt almost random-seeming changes in time or location. Key 
scenes and phrases are repeated, and we read comments or phrases that we sense we have 
already encountered some pages earlier, but we are not quite sure where. In this way our 
faith in our memory, and our ability to distinguish what is familiar from what is new, becomes 
unsettled. Our trust in what we are sure we remember is itself disturbed. 
In the characters’ relationships, too, there are similar ambiguities: characters’ thoughts 
are elided, their identities are blurred, and role boundaries (especially those between teacher 
and pupil) are transgressed, to the point that ultimately, trust becomes complicity. It is 
frequently unclear who is speaking or whose point of view is being given—that of the 
character, or of the interpretative narrator. Unlike the third person (extra-diegetic) narrator 
of, for example, the novels of Jane Austen, who reliably takes the reader aside and gives 
dependable information as it were out of earshot of the remaining characters, Spark’s 
(homodiegetic) narrator plays with the reader, suddenly revealing what would seem to be 
critical aspects of the plot completely out of the expected sequence.27 
While we are summarily told what happens to Brodie (that she is betrayed), yet we are 
given no supporting information to substantiate this allegation. At other times the narrator is 
playfully equivocal, even flippant. We are told of the Brodie girls’ lack of knowledge of certain 
basic skills—skills that one might reasonably regard as fundamental to being educated, in a 
very glib fashion: “all of the Brodie set, save one, counted on its fingers, as had Miss Brodie, 
with accurate results, more or less” (Spark, 1961, p. 6). While these features of Spark’s writing 
may initially appear haphazard, on closer inspection they are seen to be entirely purposeful 
and as well, to serve several important narrative functions. Similarly, the novel’s linear 
chronology is interrupted by frequent dislocation, uncertainty and elision. Details of the plot 
are revealed as pieces in a jigsaw puzzle or random clues to an unsolved mystery, piece by 
 
look for marks and positions which Simone Weil usually refused to give” (Weil, 1978, p. 24). These details may 
have inspired Muriel Spark’s portrayal of Jean Brodie. 




piece, although these the author crafts so that they contribute in the end positively to the 
novel’s overall coherence. Thus they function to illuminate in Jean Brodie someone who is 
complex—both genuinely good, but also quite able to cause harm or injury. 
The novel’s shifting point of view underlines the overall sense of uncertainty in the 
prose, and maybe serves as a reminder of the inter-subjectivity of selves, a theme that 
connects Spark’s novel to the philosophical thinking of Murdoch. An example of this 
‘slippage’ of viewpoint involves Sandy’s active engagement with her inner thoughts as she 
imagines herself in conversation with the main character of Robert Louis Stevenson’s novel 
Kidnapped, while the class group is walking the streets of the Old Town (p. 32). On another 
occasion, Sandy becomes engaged in an intense inner dialogue with the Lady of Shalott while 
Brodie is reading Tennyson’s poem aloud to the class. Such transfers of viewpoint underline 
for us the instability of the novel’s narrative point of view. They also serve to remind us that 
thinking and attending are complicated processes, and that there are many things going on 
inside these young students’ minds, while under the instruction of their teacher.28 
If we are truly attentive when reading Spark’s novel, we will have cause to ponder 
constantly just whose point of view is being given, and whether or indeed ever to accept the 
narrative voice as fact. The novel’s narrative point of view glides from one character to 
another, and only very rarely is Brodie’s own voice definitely heard. There are times when 
the reader may wonder whether Brodie really is so dazzling. Can we even trust the narrator 
to give us an impartial view, or is the narrative view always being to some extent being 
filtered through the eyes of the younger girls? There are examples of literal ambiguity in the 
text, such as when Brodie admonishes her girls: “But Safety does not come first. Goodness, 
Truth and Beauty come first. Follow me” (Spark, 1961, p. 10).  
Ultimately, it is Sandy (the student on whom Brodie appears to have the strongest 
influence) who comes to suspect that Brodie deliberately embellishes the narratives that 
Brodie relates to her class that are purportedly true accounts of Brodie’s travels and 
romances. Once Sandy suspects that Brodie crafts and embroiders her stories, Sandy finds 
herself torn, “fascinated by this method of making patterns with facts” and “divided between 
her admiration for the technique and the pressing need to prove Miss Brodie guilty of 
misconduct” (p. 72). Similarly Spark’s reader is torn between a fascination with Brodie’s 
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seeming innocence, and a growing uneasiness about the inherent recklessness of Brodie’s 
conduct. 
There is another and more primary function that these disruptions serve also, and this 
pertains to the reader. Because the reader’s narrative expectations are so regularly undercut, 
Spark’s reader is required to attend in a particular and somewhat detached or open-minded 
fashion to the tale that unfolds. The constant and deliberate disruptions to a commonplace 
narrative sequence require the reader to give full attention to the work. Otherwise they might 
miss an important detail or be diverted from the path to proper understanding. The fractured 
time structure of this novel also serves as a reminder that this is a piece of crafted fiction, as 
well perhaps, as a reminder of the somewhat fractured and chaotic way that we experience 
the real world. As in life, some details of the story are immediately clarified, while other 
aspects or motivations are only revealed in time, or remain forever mysterious or unknown. 
Although we learn relatively early that Mary McGregor is killed in a hotel fire, that 
Sandy becomes a cloistered nun, and that Brodie is betrayed, what takes much longer to be 
revealed is the precise nature and significance of each of these events. Spark’s readers are 
essentially invited to draw their own conclusions about the ideas being expressed in the work, 
and not necessarily to agree with everything that the narrative voice presents as ‘fact’. Spark 
enables us as her readers (and also in a sense as pupils of Brodie), to take any view we want, or 
even to hold contradictory views. As readers we are constantly given alternatives for authentic 
deliberation about the interpretations being given.  
To some extent The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie can be seen as a Bildungsroman, a moral 
tale about emergent adulthood, as well as a nostalgic reflection on the best of school days. We 
see Brodie’s students as it were simultaneously—both as a group of awkward, impressionable 
pre-teens who have not yet discovered their individual potential, and as mature, individual 
grown-ups living out their fully-fledged adult lives. As pre-teens the Brodie girls are captivated 
by their teacher’s seeming magnificence and they are held in thrall to her stories of her 
romantic exploits. It is noticeable that Brodie has the most persuasive power over her girls 
when they are around age ten, before they reach womanhood and start to discover their own 
individual identity and power. Later, the girls’ loyalties are significantly altered: “…now they 
were all fifteen there was a lot they did not tell each other” (p. 101).  
At the opening of the novel, Brodie’s girls are at a developmental stage where we 




teacher, someone who gives them a clear sense of their own moral and personal identity. Yet 
Spark seems deliberately to make debatable the value to the girls of their association with 
their teacher. A one-sided picture of obvious benefit would be a telling to readers of what they 
should think. Only by leaving debatable the central question of whether or not Brodie is a 
benefit can the educative value of attention itself become manifest via the novel.  
University educated and financially independent, Brodie has wide interests and travels 
extensively to Europe and the East during the school’s summer breaks. As a woman of 
independent means, and one dedicated to the education of girls, Brodie’s purpose calls to 
mind the educational aspirations that are expressed by Virginia Woolf in her 1928 treatise A 
Room of One’s Own. Brodie is a stickler for independent thought: she regularly deviates from 
the required curriculum, and she never allows her own teaching to be constrained by the 
limitations of the school’s rigid timetable. Brodie is a maverick who resists accountability 
based on strict adherence to the rules. Her stated educational mission is to challenge the 
minds of her young charges to whom she constantly implores that they must discover the best 
use of their minds that they are capable of as the way to reach their highest potential.  
Brodie is spirited and independent-minded. She declares that she has little time for 
unreflective collective opinion. She separates herself both physically and socially from the 
other teachers on the staff, whom she dismisses as narrow-minded, compliant and fixed 
thinkers:  
Outwardly she differed from the rest of the teaching staff in that she was still in a 
state of fluctuating development, whereas they had only too understandably not 
trusted themselves to change their minds, particularly on ethical questions, after 
the age of twenty. There was nothing Miss Brodie could not yet learn, she boasted 
of it. (Spark, 1961, p. 43) 
Brodie, however, appears capable of a certain fixity of thinking of her own. When we 
look closely at Brodie’s classroom teaching techniques, it is evident that she can be unduly 
assertive and demanding. She appears to require her students to hold views that confirm 
Brodie’s own tastes and attitudes and so she insists to the class that Giotto is the greatest 
Italian painter because “he is my favourite” (p. 11). (Curiously, Weil in Gravity and Grace, 1997 
p. 49, Weil herself singles out Giotto’s frescoes as art of the highest order, never to be sullied 
or thought poorly of. Weil’s praise of Giotto is, however, far less dogmatic and personal than 




treatment of Mary Macgregor is highly questionable. Acquiescent and biddable, Mary is an 
easy target for her teacher’s frustration, and she is at times treated as a scapegoat. The 
narrator is unconscionably belittling of Mary, as in the following description taken from the 
end of Chapter One:  
Mary McGregor, lumpy, with merely two eyes, a nose and a mouth like a 
snowman, who was later famous for being stupid and always to blame and who at 
the age of twenty-three, lost her life in a hotel fire, ventured “Golden”. (Spark, 
1961, pp. 13–14) 
This account, while expressed through the words of the narrator rather than of Brodie 
herself, are nevertheless made to appear to be Brodie’s own view. 
Brodie does not wish for her girls’ intellectual perspectives to be limited to a narrow 
range of academic offerings. She offers a culturally diverse education, and actively promotes 
the creative arts. Her students receive an education that is rich in literature and classical 
history. Brodie is fully committed to a project that will enlarge the intellectual horizons of her 
charges: 
Meanwhile I follow my principles of education and give of my best in my prime. 
The word “education” comes from the root, e from ex, out, and duco, I lead. It 
means a leading out. To me education is a leading out of what is already there in 
the pupil’s soul. To Miss Mackay it is a putting in of something that is not there, 
and that is not what I call education, I call it intrusion, from the Latin root prefix 
in meaning in and the stem trudo, I thrust. Miss Mackay’s method is to thrust a lot 
of information into the pupil’s head; mine is a leading out of knowledge, and that 
is true education as is proved by the root meaning. Now Miss Mackay has accused 
me of putting ideas into my girls’ heads, but the fact is that it is her practice and 
mine is quite the opposite. (pp. 36–37) 
Following the Latin meaning of educare to the letter, Brodie leads her students out, 
both metaphorically and physically, into the world. She literally widens her girls’ horizons. 
The class visit to the old town of Edinburgh is for one of her students the “first experience of a 
foreign country” (p. 32): 
And many times throughout her life Sandy knew with a shock, when speaking to 




Edinburghs quite different from hers…Similarly, there were other people’s 
nineteen thirties. (p. 33) 
While exploring the old city, Brodie’s girls are exposed to what Brodie terms the “idle” as a 
way of underlining the virtues of intellectual attention and application:  
A very long queue of men lined this part of the street. They were without collars, 
in shabby suits. They were talking and spitting and smoking little bits of cigarette 
held between middle finger and thumb. (p. 39) 
Brodie’s teaching philosophy of the 1930s reflects priorities for education that remain 
pertinent to this day. Brodie’s class visit to the poorer parts of Edinburgh also underlines her 
method of teaching—by showing rather than telling, also a feature of Muriel Spark’s craft as 
author of the novel. Indeed, this aspect of the novel’s structure and design, where the reader’s 
attention is called upon constantly to consider the aspects of both “showing” and “telling”, is 
a central characteristic of the novel.  
Brodie is an inspiring yet ambiguous figure. She is charming, witty, puzzling, even 
shocking. The young Brodie girls perceive her as mercurial, dynamic, ever changing. To their 
keen eyes she appears to change shape, sometimes seeming shapely and buxom, at other 
times as flat-chested as they are themselves: 
Some days it seemed to Sandy that Miss Brodie’s chest was flat, no bulges at all, 
but straight as her back. On other days her chest was breast-shaped and large, 
very noticeable...staring out of the window like Joan of Arc as she spoke. (p. 11) 
To Sandy in particular, Brodie is entrancing: “She was really an exciting woman as a 
woman. Her eyes flashed, her nose arched proudly, her hair was still brown, and coiled 
matriarchally at the nape of her neck” (p. 116). To Sandy she is many things at once: “Miss 
Brodie as the leader of the set, Miss Brodie as a Roman matron, Miss Brodie as an 
educational reformer” (p. 111). Sandy has difficulty summing Brodie up: “She thinks she is 
Providence, she thinks she is the God of Calvin, she sees the beginning and the end. And 
Sandy thought too, the woman is an unconscious Lesbian” (p. 120). Thus a further open-
ended question in the novel is the nature of Sandy’s emotions towards Brodie. Does Sandy 
herself have nascent sexual feelings for Brodie? In Ancient Greece, the notions of agape and 
eros (spiritual and sensual love respectively), were considered acceptable and even beneficial 




carefully critiqued by Plato, whose Socrates has only students who are forever safe whether 
they wish to be or not from Socrates’s acting out any sexual feelings. Similarly perhaps, Spark 
raises the inevitable questions, yet leaves them unexplored. (Wanitzec, 2012, discusses in 
detail the implied erotic subtext in the relationship between Sandy and Brodie, pp. 3–33.) 
In subsequent years Sandy observes that Brodie appears slimmer, a slighter, smaller 
version of herself. And even later, when, a year after the war, Brodie meets with Sandy 
declares herself to be no longer in her prime, the former teacher appears diminished, huddled 
and reduced: “Miss Brodie sat shrivelled and betrayed in her long-preserved dark musquash 
coat. She had been retired before time. She said ‘I am past my prime’” (Spark, 1961, p. 56). 
In her own later years, Sandy wonders “to what extent it was Miss Brodie who had developed 
complications throughout the years, and to what extent it was her own concept of Miss 
Brodie that had changed” (p. 120). 
Brodie the teacher is also very much also a student herself, keenly interested in her 
own formative development. She studies comparative religion part-time at the university and, 
in a curious (and contemporary) reversal of roles, arranges for two her former students to 
instruct her in Greek, which the girls are learning now that they are in the senior school. 
Under the tutelage of her two former students, Brodie makes some progress in Greek, 
“although she was somewhat muddled about the accents, being differently informed by Jenny 
and Sandy, who took turns to impart to her their weekly intake of the language (p. 82). Brodie 
assiduously reminds her girls that John Stuart Mill was similarly dedicated to his study of 
Greek. (Spark’s biographer Stannard (1963, p. 22) reminds us that Spark herself had a 
passion for the writings of J. S. Mill, and especially for his translation of Plato’s Symposium. (It 
is a matter of further minor interest that Spark’s nineteenth novel, entitled Symposium, itself 
contains an epigraph from Plato’s work.)  
Platonic references in the novel are frequent. Towards the end of the school Easter 
Break, Jenny is accosted by a man “joyfully exposing himself” beside the Water of Leith 
(Spark, 1961, p. 66). Jenny runs away, startled but unharmed, and both Jenny’s mother and 
the local woman policeman who becomes involved, advise her to forget the incident and not 
to talk about it further “and so they forgot the man by the Water of Leith” (p. 71). This scene 
relates to the themes of memory and concealment in Spark’s novel. (In Greek, the literal 
meaning of the word ‘lethe’ is forgetfulness, oblivion and lost memories, and in Greek legend, 
the Lethe is a river in Hades whose waters cause forgetfulness.) Sandy later refers to this 




thinking] in Book 6 of Plato’s Republic, also the subject of the chapter entitled “The Great 
Beast” in Weil’s Gravity and Grace, p. 216.  
The very idea of the inspiring teacher extends back as far as Ancient Greece. Socrates 
and his pupil Plato epitomise the ideal of the teacher and pupil relationship. (See further, 
Steiner, 2013, Chapter 4). While Brodie’s relationship with her own pupils is Platonic, and 
while she insists that her love for Teddy Lloyd, the married Art teacher, with whom she 
shares an artistic temperament, remains Platonic, Brodie’s ambitions for her students in this 
regard are less than clear.  
It is revealed that Brodie considers Rose a suitable artist model for Lloyd, and further, 
that Sandy has a brief sexual affair with her former teacher, Lloyd. Sandy’s motivations are 
not entirely clear—does she do this to usurp Rose’s position, or perhaps to eclipse Lloyd’s 
prevailing interest in Brodie? Whatever her motivation, Sandy is unsuccessful. Rose is shown 
to have little interest in Lloyd, and all of Lloyd’s paintings continue, as before, to resemble 
Brodie. Sandy subsequently loses all interest in her former Art teacher, and shifts the focus of 
her attention from Lloyd to that of his religion, Catholicism: 
By the end of the year it happened that she had quite lost interest in the man 
himself, but was deeply absorbed in his mind, from which she extracted, among 
other things, his religion as a pith from a husk. Her mind was as full of his religion 
as a night sky is full of things visible and invisible. She left the man and took his 
religion and became a nun in the course of time. (p. 123) 
3.3. Greek and Roman overtones 
The complex structure of The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie brings with it a sense of 
inevitability. The novel is built around the literary device of prolepsis (also sometimes referred 
to as fast-forwarding or flash forward)—a structuring device by which a future event is treated 
as though it has already been accomplished. Brodie’s betrayal, revealed almost at the opening 
of the work, is repeated several times throughout, although no details are given. By virtue of 
this, the novel unfolds simultaneously both as a puzzle to be solved and a prophecy to be 
fulfilled. As in the Greek story of Oedipus, the measures that are undertaken to prevent the 
prophecy (here Brodie’s betrayal) from being fulfilled, are the very measures that ultimately 
bring about the tragedy. Brodie’s ambitions to inculcate her girls as her protégées, and the 




for them, are the seeds of her ultimate downfall. Her closest student, Sandy, is the very one to 
betray her to the school principal.  
Further connections to Plato are found by way of references to Plato’s Republic, 
particularly through the depiction of Sandy Stranger, with her small, blinking eyes—as if she 
is permanently in semi-darkness, unused to daylight and quite unable to see clearly. Brodie 
frequently admonishes Sandy for peering at people, and recommends that Sandy should get 
glasses: “I’ll swear you are short-sighted, the way you peer at people. You must get 
spectacles”(p. 107). The only time that Sandy (to whom Brodie attributes “insight”) seems to 
be able to see clearly, is when she is fully engaged with her fictional imaginings. When 
authoring or reading aloud her own fictional works (such as The Mountains of Eyrie), Sandy 
describes herself as having large brown, sparking eyes. In the course of her growing up to the 
point where she can see the flaws in her teacher, Sandy, like Plato’s released prisoner, comes 
to the realization that Brodie is trying to make all of her protégées into her likeness: 
It occurred to Sandy…that the Brodie set was Miss Brodie’s fascisti, not to the 
naked eye, marching along, but all knit together for her need and in another way, 
marching along. That was all right, but it seemed, too, that Miss Brodie’s 
disapproval of the Girl Guides had jealousy in it, there was an inconsistency, a 
fault. (pp. 31–32) 
Nevertheless, it is only after many more years that Sandy is finally able to reconcile 
fully the nature and impact of Brodie’s teaching on her life. At this point we may wonder if 
Sandy’s act of reporting Jean Brodie remains for Sandy in tension—both a necessary action 
and also a point of genuine contrition. Perhaps Sandy’s action is best understood not in terms 
of action or volition, but rather in terms of a kind of “necessity” that is linked to a particular 
kind of attention. Sandy’s gradual recovery from her action connects her realization of Jean 
Brodie’s influence to the novel’s key themes of educative influence and transformation: 
It was twenty-five years before Sandy had so far recovered from a creeping vision 
of disorder that she could look back and recognise that Miss Brodie’s defective 
sense of self-criticism had not been without its beneficent and enlarging effects; by 
which time Sandy had already betrayed Miss Brodie and Miss Brodie was laid in 




The title of Sister Helena’s “odd psychological treatise on the nature of moral 
perception” (p. 35)—The Transfiguration of the Commonplace—suggests that over time, Sandy 
may have reconciled her experiences and memories. It appears that Sandy may have 
critically reflected on her earlier experiences, and the title of her dissertation suggests that she 
may even have experienced some sort of transformation through that reflection. Yet Sandy 
remains a puzzling character. When Sandy, now Sister Helena, is asked about the key 
influences of one’s teen years, she muses that these are very significant “even if they provide 
something to react against” (p. 35). And although she has chosen a religious path, the 
description of Sister Helena closed up in her nun’s cell is not an altogether happy one. Sister 
Helena appears to shun the dimness of her cell, and to seek the light of day: 
She clutched the bars of the grille as if she wanted to escape from the dim parlour 
beyond, for she was not composed like the other nuns who sat, when they received 
the rare visitors, well back in the darkness with folded hands. But Sandy always 
leaned forward and peered, clutching the bars with both hands, and the other 
sisters remarked it and said that Sister Helena had too much to bear from the 
world since she had published her psychological book which was so unexpectedly 
famed. (p. 35) 
Then, when asked by a researcher what she considers to be her greatest childhood influence, 
Sister Helena (Sandy) humbly recalls her maverick teacher. 
“What were the main influences of your school days, Sister Helena? Were they 
literary or political or personal? Was it Calvinism?” 
Sandy said “There was a Miss Jean Brodie in her prime.” (p. 128) 
Spark’s novel invites comparison to various elements of a Greek tragedy. Themes of 
prophecy, destiny and predestination prevail, and the chorus of character traits that are 
repeated through the work suggest echoes of the incantations of the chorus in a Greek drama. 
Brodie both “labels” her students and also predicts their futures—Sandy has “insight”, Rose 
has “instinct”, Rose will be “famous for sex”. Brodie is at times in prophetic mood, and she 
intones various incantatory phrases and epigrams that that carry a powerful oratorical effect 
despite their puzzling content—”There needs must be a leaven in the lump” (p. 112); “the 
age of chivalry is past” (p. 8); and “I am putting old heads on young shoulders” (p. 8). There 
are Greek influences too, in some of the character names. The name Sandra is a Greek 




Helen of Troy), a name that means “shining light”, with its metaphorical and Platonic 
implications. 
Spark’s novel also invokes details from Roman history. Brodie is said to have a fine 
Roman profile, and Sandy envisions Brodie as an Ancient Roman in the time of Caesar, 
holding her proud head high. The narrator describes Brodie’s sense of her disdain towards 
her scornful teaching colleagues in terms of her “flattening their scorn beneath the chariot 
wheels of her superiority” (p. 54). One of the few statements that can be directly attributable 
to Brodie is when she is recounting her vacation travels to Europe. She tells the girls “In 
Rome I saw the Forum and I saw the Colosseum where the gladiators died and the slaves 
were thrown to the lions” (p. 45).  
3.4. Teacher/student relationship 
Spark’s work explores the complex relation between teacher and student most 
particularly through Brodie’s relationship with her student Sandy Stranger. Sandy’s 
philosophical consciousness is awakened as she grows older, and eventually she comes to sees 
that her teacher Brodie is a flawed individual—although later still, Sandy comes to accept 
that Brodie remains a powerful influence in her life. In this Sandy’s growth reflects the 
Platonic view of the intellect moving from uncritical acceptance of Brodie to a more 
sophisticated and ultimately more enlightened understanding. Eventually, Sandy reasons out 
for herself the dangers inherent in Miss Brodie’s calls for her girls’ unquestioned allegiance. It 
is when Sandy hears that Brodie has encouraged the new girl to go to fight as an anarchist in 
the Spanish Civil War, that she reflects on the depths of the group’s allegiance to Brodie, and 
decides to take steps to stop it. It remains unclear, however, whether Sandy reports Brodie to 
the headmistress because she does not fully subscribe to Brodie’s requirements for loyalty, or 
because Sandy has genuinely come to know her own mind, thereby fulfilling the precise 
objective of Brodie’s educational methods, and Brodie’s repeated assertion that Sandy has 
“insight”. 
Although Brodie’s teaching appears to have little effect on some of her other pupils, 
her influence on Sandy is pronounced. Over time, Sandy gradually comes closer to grasping 
previously undeveloped thoughts. Ultimately, she shows herself capable of thinking for 
herself, and beyond that she truly gains perspective, insight, precisely as Brodie had claimed 
she would. By the time of the novel’s close, Sandy is literally transformed both in name and 




path of renunciation that is reminiscent of Weil’s own biographical trajectory, although Weil 
herself never formally embraced any Christian religion, preferring always to remain, as it 
were on the threshold of organised religion. 
These changes in direction in Sandy’s life put her once again in the role of author, the 
very role she was rehearsing in her mind in her very first year as a member of the Brodie set. 
Yet the seeming haplessness of Sandy’s adult situation may also attest to something about the 
still unreconstructed sexist culture of Edinburgh in the 1930s. Spark suggests that a self-
authoring woman in this era was almost bound to suffer for her self-authoring qualities. In 
this, Spark’s novel contrasts the situation in which Socrates leaves his charges, and the way 
that Brodie is shown to leave her own charges: insofar as Socrates’ protégées are left thinking 
for themselves their lives are higher and better, yet insofar as Brodie’s protégées are left 
thinking for themselves, they are, perhaps because of the ambient sexism of their context, 
liable to have rather fraught lives. Could Spark have intended us to see things in this way, 
thence possibly to draw attention to the implicit limitations of Brodie’s time?  
The fictional Jean Brodie is interested not so much in the content of what is taught, 
but in how it is taught. Brodie inculcates in her girls the development of memory, their sense 
of recollection, and of social awareness. She fosters in them a sense of culture and belonging. 
Most importantly, she fosters in her girls their powers of attention, a notion that is central to 
both Weil’s and Murdoch’s accounts of how we learn and how we develop morally.  
3.5. Echoes of Weil and Murdoch 
Weil considered that the overriding purpose of education is not so much to deliver 
curriculum content as to train the mind to think well—that is, to develop in students their 
faculty of attention. There are frequent echoes of Weil’s teaching philosophy in Brodie’s 
independent-minded commitment to deliver the kind of education that will help her students 
think differently. Hence her pupils are “vastly informed on a lot of subjects irrelevant to the 
authorised curriculum” (p. 5). Brodie fosters in her students the faculty of attention in 
precisely Weil’s sense of attending, taking notice, being patient, and learning to regard 
something as potentially interesting or important. As did Weil, the fictional Brodie considers 
that to arrive at a state of ready attention, one must conscientiously and patiently prepare the 
mind, and that such preparation is best received in focussed quietness, if not in solitude.  
There are regular echoes of Weil’s notion of attention too, in Brodie’s regular 




“Attend to me girls. One’s prime is the moment one was born for. Now that my 
prime has begun—Sandy, your attention is wandering. What have I been talking 
about?”  
“Your prime, Miss Brodie.” (Spark, 1961, p. 12) 
Brodie both requires and monitors her student’ attention, and she demands that they 
maintain that attentiveness. She poses questions in the classroom by calling on students 
unsolicited rather than waiting for hands to be raised, thereby requiring her students to be 
constantly attentive. Brodie is always alert to her students’ responses and quick to get their 
concentration back on track if she senses that their minds have been wandering: 
“Are you listening, Sandy?” 
“Yes, I’m listening.” 
“You look as if you were thinking of something else, my dear. Well, as I say, that is 
the whole story.” 
Sandy was thinking of something else. She was thinking that it was not the whole 
story. (p. 60) 
Spark’s emphasis on training the mind calls to mind Weil’s emphasis on the beneficial 
effects of mental agility, and which Weil termed “a form of gymnastics of the attention” (Weil, 
1997 p. 173). We learn of the Brodie girls participating “unbrainfully in the gymnasium, 
swinging about on parallel bars, hanging upside down on wall bars, or climbing ropes up to 
the ceiling…” (Spark, 1961, p. 83). Spark underlines the fundamental importance of the 
intellectual faculty of attention, and of the disastrous, even tragic consequences if attention is 
absent. It comes about that Mary Macgregor, who persistently fails to apply her powers of 
attention, meets an untimely death in a hotel fire at the age of just twenty-three. Mary, 
despite the efforts of her various teachers, fails to develop her powers of concentration. As a 
result, in a moment of crisis, she is left literally directionless and unable to select an intelligent 
course of action. Caught in a hotel fire, Mary panics, lost in a mental confusion that results in 
her tragic and untimely death. 
Brodie’s relationship with her students seems initially more mischievous than 
conspiratorial. She colludes with her pupils and freely discusses with them, almost as a point 
of morality, the various oppositions she encounters from the staff. Her girls adore her 
openness with them, and in this way she wins their hearts and minds: 




in your hands, in case of intruders. If there are any intruders we are doing our 
history lesson…our poetry…English grammar…Meantime I will tell you about 
my last summer holidays in Egypt…I will tell you about care of the skin, and of 
the hands…about the Frenchman I met in the train to Biarritz…and I must tell 
you about the Italian paintings I saw.” (pp. 10–11) 
Brodie encourages her to girls to use their books as if they will serve as a defence 
against intruders. She reinforces for the girls the notion that books represent a kind of 
protection against compliance. The girls are to use their books as a kind of totem for liberty 
and imaginative freedom, and as a way to ward off the prying eyes of the school authorities. 
Yet Brodie, we gradually learn, is not entirely faultless. We learn that she is careful to select as 
her favourites only those girls “whose parents she could trust not to lodge complaints about 
the more advanced and seditious aspects of her educational policy” (p. 26).  
Brodie becomes increasingly intimate with her set, disclosing attitudes that are quite in 
opposition to the other teachers on the staff. She is openly contemptuous of the kinds of 
examination questions that are set for the girls to answer (p. 82). Such disclosures are quite 
thrilling to her girls. So it comes about that while initially Brodie’s influence does not seem 
altogether ill-judged, we as readers come to question her approach – for example, her 
tendency to respond to what is beyond her scope of influence with scorn. Brodie is defiantly 
determined to have a powerful effect on her pupils and she makes this intention quite explicit 
to her charges: 
“It has been suggested again that I should apply for a post at one of the 
progressive schools, where my methods would be more suited to the system than 
they are at Blaine. But I shall not apply for a post at a crank school. I shall remain 
at this education factory. There needs must be a leaven in the lump. Give me a 
girl at an impressionable age, and she is mine for life.” (p. 9) 
In sharing this vision with her girls, however, Brodie also requires of them a code of 
compliance to her own ways of thinking: “It is because you are mine”, said Miss Brodie. “I 
mean of my stamp and cut, and I am in my prime” (p. 97). Brodie appears completely 
without guile in her stated ambition to build herself a legacy through her set – surely a trap of 
vanity for any susceptible teacher. She appears to have a certain disconnection from the 
consequences of her actions, and to have few, if any, misgivings about herself, her teaching 




own demise. Ultimately the way she uses her authority over her girls becomes her dilemma, 
for Brodie appears increasingly tempted to use and exploit the influence she has over her 
students. 
There are frequent echoes of Weil’s teaching philosophy in Brodie’s independent-
minded commitment to deliver the kind of education that will help her students think 
differently. Brodie’s pupils are “vastly informed on a lot of subjects irrelevant to the 
authorised curriculum” (p. 5). Under Brodie’s guidance, her girls learn what is educative 
about whatever it is they are studying. Brodie seeks to open her students’ eyes to the world. 
We know from historical records that Weil, also a classroom teacher for a time, pursued a 
similar educational philosophy to foster creative thought and to awaken her students’ minds.29 
Also like Weil, Brodie is disdainful of an educational philosophy that would prioritise 
factual knowledge over systems of thought: “I trust you girls to work hard and try and scrape 
through, even if you learn up the stuff and forget it next day” (Spark, 1961, 38). She shows 
herself to be rather proud that her students “knew the rudiments of astrology but not the date 
of the Battle of Flodden or the capital of Finland” (Spark, 1961, p. 6). A further implicit 
reference to Weil comes with the arrival of the new student, Joyce Emily Hammond, into the 
Brodie set. Joyce Emily, labelled a delinquent, has been dismissed from various schools prior 
to her arrival at Marcia Blaine. (The name ‘Joyce Emily’ bears some resemblance to the 
anagram Emile Novis, which Weil sometimes uses in place of her own name.) Joyce Emily’s 
brother has gone to fight in the Spanish Civil War and we learn from Sandy, that it is with 
Brodie’s encouragement that Joyce Emily runs away to join her brother in this fight: 
This dark, rather mad girl wanted to go too, and to wear a white blouse and a 
black skirt and march with a gun…six weeks later, it was reported that she had 
run away to Spain and had been killed in an accident when the train she was 
travelling in had been attacked. (p. 118) 
The narrator tells us that the year is 1936. This is the same year that Weil set off to 
enlist as one of the first foreign volunteers with the anarchist militia in the Spanish Civil War. 
Brodie’s comment to Sandy, years later, about this sorrowful event, is to Sandy quite 
unconscionable. Brodie muses with a seemingly dismissive tone: 
 
29 For further biographical information on Weil, detailed biographical accounts of Weil’s life are provided by 




“Truth is stranger than fiction. I wanted Rose for him, I admit, and sometimes I 
regretted urging young Joyce Emily to go to Spain to fight for Franco, she would 
have done admirably for him [Teddy Lloyd], a girl of instinct, a—” 
“Did she go to fight for Franco?” said Sandy. 
“That was the intention. I made her see sense. However, she didn’t have the 
chance to fight at all, poor girl.” (p. 124) 
It is not clear to the reader whether, or to what extent, Brodie herself ever sees the moral 
tensions inherent in her position in quite the way that Sandy does. It does appear, however, 
that this late admission by Brodie of her earlier influence over Joyce Emily might confirm for 
Sandy the rightness of her own decision to inform the school principal of Brodie’s undue 
interest in the politics of fascism. It remains unclear whether Brodie’s subsequent removal 
from the school is due to her political, or to her pedagogical convictions. 
Like Weil, Brodie the teacher forever seeks out learning opportunities that will engage 
her students as individuals. Brodie is open-minded about what and how lessons will be taught 
and is open to opportunities—lessons outdoors under the shade of an elm tree when weather 
permits, somersaults from the class gymnast for comic relief. She gives her students insights 
into the complexities of adult life. She takes her girls to the opera and to the ballet. She shares 
with them her love of painting and poetry, and offers the girls her own insights into the world 
of romance and sexuality. Brodie both expects, and inculcates, tremendous levels of loyalty 
from her charges: 
By the time their friendship with Miss Brodie was of seven years’ standing, it had 
worked itself into their bones, so that they could not break away without, as it 
were, splitting their bones to do so. (p. 115) 
Through these opportunities, Brodie wins her pupils’ loyalty, and that they become, over 
time, ever more deeply enlisted as members of her very private and exclusive set. As with all 
teachers, the depth of Brodie’s influence is various, so while Rose “shook off Miss Brodie’s 
influence as a dog shakes pond-water from its coat” (p. 119), Sandy is affected profoundly by 
her teacher and is, as it were, literally, transformed. 
Spark’s Brodie sees education itself as a worthy subject of study, one that does not rely 
on other disciplines to give it coherence and relevance. Echoing Weil’s thinking on this 
matter, the fictional Brodie understands that the teacher’s role is not to tell her students what 




considered that the most important part of being a teacher is to teach what it is to know, and 
that quite apart from any particular curriculum content or specified learning outcomes, the 
teacher’s primary function is to foster the students’ own faculties of attention. As noted 
earlier, Weil famously stated that the ultimate role of the teacher is help students develop 
their own capacity for attention and, compared to that, “all the other advantages of 
instruction are without interest” (Weil, 1997, p. 173).  
There are marked parallels too, between Jean Brodie’s emphasis on teaching her girls 
about history and about the past and Weil’s own respect for ancient learning and the 
achievements of millennia. Both teachers also place a far greater honouring of the need for 
quietness, time, and reflection than is generally afforded today. Solitude’s value, Weil tells us, 
“lies in the greater possibility of attention” (p. 175). Brodie uses words like ‘virtue’, ‘honour’, 
and ‘tradition’ when declaiming to her class—words that Weil herself considers to be an 
essential part of what she termed a ‘vocabulary of value’, as she explains in her essay “The 
responsibility of writers” (Weil 1968, p. 168). 
Unsurprisingly, Brodie’s educational philosophy is considerably at odds with that of 
the school’s headmistress, Miss Mackay. Similarly, Weil’s teaching career featured several 
dismissals because she failed to teach to the prescribed curriculum. Brodie confides to her 
girls: “We differ at root, the headmistress and I, upon the question whether we are employed 
to educate the minds of girls or to intrude upon them” (p. 38). McKay is increasingly 
suspicious of Brodie and is constantly spying on Brodie. McKay dislikes Brodie’s pedagogical 
approach, and she is also very critical of what she considers to be the disproportionate 
amount of influence that Brodie exercises over her charges. Unlike Brodie, Mackay requires 
that her girls show loyalty to the institution rather than derive inspiration from any particular 
individual teacher: 
“Culture cannot compensate for lack of hard knowledge. I am happy to see you 
are devoted to Miss Brodie. Your loyalty is due to the school rather than to any 
one individual.” (p. 66)  
Brodie, for her part, is aware of the liberties that she is taking with the curriculum. 
She sets up various strategies as a cover for her failure to deliver the timetabled lessons. For 
example, she keeps a long division sum on the board to imply that maths is being taught, and 
she trains her students to hold their textbooks as if they were reading them, while she 




enthusiasm for Mussolini. Brodie’s educational philosophy is essentially to work in the 
interests of the girls’ higher selves. This commitment seems eventually to lead her to a greater, 
and flawed presumption—that she can influence the girls’ individual autonomy and possibly 
assume responsibility for their destinies. It is in these latter ways that we are led to consider 
that Spark’s literary heroine very much deviates from Weil’s purity of thought and 
pedagogical understanding. 
Echoes of Iris Murdoch’s values for education also resonate in Jean Brodie’s various 
declarations regarding what she considers to be the most important educative pursuits. Just as 
Weil holds that “the authentic and pure values, truth, beauty, and goodness, in the activity of 
a human being are the result of one and the same act, a certain application of the full 
attention to the object” (Weil, 1997 p. 173), Murdoch also sees the importance of learning 
through aesthetic experience. There are echoes of Murdoch’s philosophy in Brodie’s 
declaration to her girls: 
“Art is greater than science. Art comes first, and then science…Art and religion 
first; then philosophy; lastly science. That is the order of the great subjects of life, 
that’s their order of importance.” (Spark, 1961, p. 25) 
Murdoch’s ideas on the fundamental connection between aesthetic appreciation and 
moral growth are reflected in several important ways in Spark’s novel, and they become 
clearer as the novel progresses. Murdoch, as does the fictional Brodie, sees that the 
relationship between aesthetic experience and moral development is central to learning. 
Spark, like Murdoch, is interested in how, through our social interactions and our interactions 
with art and literature, we are able to make moral sense of the world. This theme is developed 
through Brodie’s relationship with the one-armed Art Master, Teddy Lloyd.  
During an introductory art lesson Lloyd explains to the girls the details of form in a 
Botticelli painting, La Primavera. This painting, sometimes known as Birth of Spring (p. 44) 
and which features a group of female figures and two male figures along with a cupid in an 
orange grove, is sometimes interpreted as an illustration of the ideal of Platonic love. As Lloyd 
directs the girls’ attention to the lines of the female form, the girls giggle nervously, prompting 
Brodie to scold them for acting like “Philistines” (p. 44). These pre-adolescent girls cannot see 
the human forms in the painting in terms of artistic achievement, but only in terms of bodies 




exchange of glances implies that they, as mature individuals, and unlike the undeveloped 
young students, are the true appreciators of the arts. 
Lloyd is very much charmed by Miss Brodie. He is also a recreational painter, 
although his art is shown to be second-rate. His painting is mimicry, a kind of fake 
“truthfulness” which, in Platonic terms, degrades goodness rather than uplifting it. Lloyd 
objectifies Jean Brodie in his paintings to the extent that all his depictions of whatever subject 
come out the same, as if all from the same mould. He literally transfigures each of his subjects 
into the image of Brodie: 
Teddy Lloyd’s passion for Jean Brodie was greatly in evidence in all the portraits 
he did of the various members of the Brodie set. He did them in a group during 
one summer term, wearing their panama hats each in a different way, each hat 
adorning, in a magical transfiguration, a different Jean Brodie under the forms of 
Rose, Sandy, Jenny, Mary, Monica and Eunice. (p. 111) 
Perhaps Lloyd’s flaw is implicitly also Brodie’s flaw—perhaps, like Lloyd as painter, 
Brodie as teacher becomes too much concerned to shape her girls in her own image, or at any 
rate, in accordance with her own vision of how to flourish in the world. Then possibly Lloyd’s 
art tells something true. But Spark provides no clue about her meaning behind the foible of 
Lloyd’s, and the foible may simply underline the hopelessness of Lloyd’s infatuation with 
Brodie. 
Jean Brodie fosters in her students the faculty of attention in precisely Weil and 
Murdoch’s sense of attending, taking notice, showing interest, and looking carefully. As did 
Weil, the fictional Brodie considers that to arrive at a state of ready attention, one must 
consciously and patiently prepare the mind, and that such preparation is best achieved in 
focussed quietness, of not in solitude. Brodie is vigilant in her attention to her students and 
quick to get their concentration back on track if she senses that their mind have been 
wandering. 
Weil considers that the overriding purpose of education is not so much to deliver 
curriculum content or to find answers to questions, but to train the mind to think well – that 
is, to develop in students their faculty of attention. There are frequent echoes of Weil’s 
teaching philosophy in Brodie’s independent-minded commitment to deliver the kind of 
education that will help her students to think differently. Hence her pupils are “vastly 




fictional Brodie understands that the teacher’s role is not to tell her students what to think, 
but rather to illuminate for her students other ways of looking at things. Brodie, as did Weil, 
disdains her school’s educational emphasis on exam preparation, and the pursuit of a 
qualification ahead of the development of cultural awareness (p. 38). Like Weil, Brodie is 
disdainful of an educational philosophy that would prioritise factual knowledge over systems 
of thought. She shows herself to be rather proud that her students “knew the rudiments of 
astrology but not the date of the Battle of Flodden or the capital of Finland” (p. 6).  
In her philosophical writing, Murdoch repeatedly articulates the central connections 
between aesthetics and education. and the underlying educative value of art and literature 
(Murdoch, 2014, p. 33). She argues that encounters with art and literature can be educative 
and, in particular, they can be morally instructive. Murdoch argues, as does the fictional 
Brodie, that aesthetic experience is central to education and that art “so far from being a 
playful diversion of the human race, is the place of its most fundamental insight” (pp. 71–72). 
Murdoch considers that education’s chief purpose is to promote an essential kind of 
selflessness, a kind of assimilation morally to there being something larger than one’s self. 
Murdoch asserts that we can be easily deflected from what we ought best focus on by shallow 
collective thinking, distractions, egotistical preoccupations. To be morally aware requires a 
conscious and deliberate pursuit of that which is good. For Murdoch, the good education is 
the one that leads to an understanding of how to live well. 
These are the very values that underpin Jean Brodie’s education philosophy. Brodie 
steps away from the stodgy, traditional conformism of the Marcia Blaine school curriculum 
and instead tries to create a curriculum that is built around the creative arts. In so doing, she 
deliberately exposes her girls to dissonant viewpoints, to alternative or superimposed readings 
of the world. This philosophy is immediately evocative of Weil and Murdoch’s understanding 
of attention as the primary mechanism for education. Spark’s novel explores and plays with 
these notions and ultimately shows us just how difficult such an orientation can be. 
Drawing as she does on Weil’s own regard for the power of attention, Murdoch 
considers language to be the foundation of attention: “Words are the most subtle symbols 
which we possess and our human fabric depends upon them” (p. 33). Murdoch emphasises 
the fundamental importance of language as a tool to re-orient our attention: 
Learning takes place when such [normative-descriptive] words are used, either 




attending to contexts, vocabulary develops through close attention to objects, and 
we can only understand others if we can to some extent share their contexts. … 
Uses of words by persons grouped around a common object is a central and vital 
human activity. (p. 31) 
Murdoch believes that moral learning involves paying attention to the otherness of 
human life, and that we best learn about ourselves precisely by attending to our 
understanding of others. Murdoch values the learning we can experience by being immersed 
in art and literature of the highest order. Similarly, Brodie ensures that her girls are immersed 
in a wealth of literature and classical studies. They are exposed to the writings of a raft of 
celebrated literary figures in their daily programme. This includes both reading by and also 
reading to the students. Brodie regularly accompanies her girls to their sewing class and while 
the girls toil somewhat unsuccessfully over their sewing projects, Brodie reads aloud to them 
from Charlotte Bronte’s Jane Eyre.  
Murdoch reminds us that as human beings we can be easily deflected from what we 
ought best to focus on, by shallow collective thinking, by distractions, noise, false assumptions, 
fashions, and egotistical preoccupations. She cautions that the things that we come to focus 
on the most, or that we are exposed to the most, are likely to become the very things that we 
will end up the most valuing. Murdoch and Weil are both interested in the development of 
our capacity to move our thinking away from a first person subjective point of view, towards a 
view that involves our responsibilities to others, our involvement with the wider social fabric. 
Spark’s novel explores and plays with these notions, and ultimately, shows us just how difficult 
such an orientation can be.  
Murdoch argues that to be truly morally aware requires that we make a conscious and 
deliberate pursuit of that which is good “for immediate and obvious reasons, [such as] 
because somebody is hungry or somebody is crying” (Murdoch, 1997, p. 233). Similarly, Weil 
and for Murdoch, the good education is the one that helps us to understand how to live well. 
They hold the conviction that one must literally mix one’s labours with the world in order to 
truly grow in our thinking: 
The world is a text with several meanings, and we pass from one meaning to 
another by a process of work. It must be work in which the body constantly bears 
a part, as, for example, when we learn the alphabet of a foreign language: this 




is not fulfilled, every change in our way of thinking is illusory. (Weil, 1997, p. 185) 
Murdoch’s own view was that the task of the moral agent to learn, over time, to curb 
distraction and daydreaming, to focus, and to attend: “In the moral life, the enemy is the fat 
relentless ego. Moral philosophy is properly…the discussion of this ego and of the techniques 
(if any) for its defeat” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 52). What remains unclear in Spark’s novel is the 
extent to which Brodie’s unconscious egotistical purpose leads her to use others as means to 
her own ends. Over time, her influence over her girls is increasingly persuasive. They pay 
close attention to her not-so-veiled comments about how to make their subject choices for the 
senior school: 
“I am not saying anything against the Modern side. Modern and Classical, they 
are equal…You must make your free choice. Not everyone is capable of a 
Classical education. You must make your choice quite freely.’ So the girls were left 
in no doubt as to Miss Brodie’s contempt for the Modern side.” (Spark, 1961, p. 
61)  
Later in their education, Brodie’s students come to see the realities of their subject 
choices for what they are. The narrator has a somewhat mocking tone towards the study of 
the sciences, a view that Murdoch might have had sympathy with: 
But the Brodie set were on the whole still dazzled by their new subjects. It was 
never the same in later years when the languages of physics and chemistry, algebra 
and geometry had lost their elemental strangeness and formed each an individual 
department of life with its own accustomed boredom, and become hard work. 
Even Monica Douglas, who later developed such a good brain for mathematics, 
was plainly never so thrilled with herself as when she first subtracted x from y and 
the result from a; she never afterwards looked so happy. (p. 82) 
Weil and Murdoch each consider that humility and openness to new ways of seeing 
are integral to developing one’s powers of attention. Humble thoughts deflect the mind away 
from egotistical self-interest. Weil considers humility and openness to new ways of seeing, to 
be integral to attention. She advises that we guard ourselves against distraction or wandering 
thoughts, and to do this we must invoke our powers of humility. Humble thoughts serve to 
focus the mind: 




for a few seconds turn the full gaze of our attention upon the memory of some 
humiliation in our past life, choosing the most bitter, the most intolerable we can 
think of. (Weil, 1997, p. 178)  
It is perhaps here that we find the locus of Brodie’s fundamental human weakness: to 
the end of her life she remains immune to criticism, including self-criticism. Weil makes the 
link between humility in oneself, and openness and generosity towards others. She considers 
that humility about one’s own limitations opens one’s capacity for altruism and respect for 
others, and that if we exercise humility in our learning, we will increase the likelihood of 
being able to learn from our mistakes. Weil acknowledges that learning can involve 
considerable discomfort and struggle, but for all that, she sees nobility in conscientious and 
dedicated effort. On this view, the attentive learner may, even through frustration and failure, 
nevertheless be able to develop the capacity for humility in productive ways: 
So it comes about that, paradoxical as it may seem, a Latin prose or a geometry 
problem, even though they are done wrong [sic], may be of great service one day, 
provided we devote the right kind of effort to them. Should the occasion arise, 
they can one day make us better able to give someone in affliction exactly the help 
required to save him, at the supreme moment of his need. (Weil, 2009, p. 65) 
Weil considers thinking to be an act of obedience or tractability, a kind of intense 
concentration, to which one has willingly consented: 
Attention is bound up with desire…Or more exactly, with consent…Simply to 
desire it [attention] not to try to accomplish it…In such a work all that I call “I” has 
to be passive. Attention alone, that attention which is so full that the “I” disappears, 
is required of me. I have to deprive all that I call “I” of the light of my attention and 
turn it onto that which cannot be conceived. (Weil, 1997, pp. 171–172)  
Over time, Brodie’s influence is shown to be morally doubtful. By degrees, it appears 
that Brodie assumes responsibility not just for the girls’ education, but also, in a sense, for 
their fortunes as well. In Sandy’s eyes, Brodie appears unaware of the effects of her methods 
on her students, and she remains “indifferent to criticism as a crag” (Spark, 1961, p. 60), 
especially to any suggestions of error of judgement on her part. Perhaps Brodie comes to 
believe too much in her own powers of influence, to the extent that she completely fails to 




That would take us as far from Weil and Murdoch’s understanding of attention as we could 
possibly be. 
As readers we might wonder if Jean Brodie thinks deeply enough about the risks that 
her freedom presents both to herself and to her students. Does Brodie completely fail see that 
her authority has to be mediated, and that there are some things that she cannot or ought 
not, seek to choose or control? While Brodie enlists in her girls an unflagging loyalty, she 
simultaneously fosters in them a potentially dangerous sense of elitism. She establishes a 
relationship with them that goes beyond teacher/student loyalty and that becomes a game of 
subterfuge. Her declared scheme, however fanciful and speculative, for her student Rose to 
sleep with her former teacher Teddy Lloyd definitely has, as student Sandy notes, “a whiff of 
sulphur” about it (p. 109). It would be very difficult to reconcile this equable and impassive 
view of learning with the contemporary notion of a ‘self-directed’ learner, because for Weil 
and for Murdoch, the elimination of self-awareness is the very first step towards learning 
readiness. 
3.6. Implications for education 
Is The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie ultimately a send-up of Weil’s educational philosophy, 
or is Spark deliberately playing with elements of Weil’s biography to construct her own 
narrative, perhaps partly to demonstrate how very difficult it is to implement Weil’s notion of 
attention? Spark’s novel is suffused with contradictions. Yet in this respect too, we are 
reminded of the power of contradiction and paradox that characterises much of Weil’s own 
educational philosophy. Weil too, was fascinated by the capacity of paradox to open the 
mind: “The contradictions the mind comes up against, these are the only realities…There is 
no contradiction in what is imaginary. Contradiction is the test of necessity” (Weil, 1997 p. 
151).  
For Weil, contradiction is the crux of learning. Weil acknowledges Plato’s recognition 
that everything the human intelligence can represent to itself involves contradiction, and that 
it is by this very means that thought can be raised to a higher level. For Weil, then, 
ambiguities that are jarring to thought are the very things that demand attention. Drawing an 
analogy between mental and visual contradictions, Weil comments that mental contradictions 
are potentially just as useful to our imagination as sense perceptions are to our vision, and 
that both equally can lead to an altered view: 




while looking, and what is real becomes evident. In the inner life, time takes the 
place of space. With time we are altered and if, as we change, we keep our gaze 
directed towards the same thing, in the end illusions are scattered and the real 
becomes visible. This is on condition that the attention should be a looking and 
not an attachment. (Weil, 1997 p. 174) 
Similarly, in The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie, we learn that student Sandy feels the most 
warmly towards Miss Brodie precisely at those times when she sees clearly just how she is 
misled by Brodie. It is at the very moment that it dawns on Sandy that Brodie is potentially 
treacherous that she considers Brodie most favourably:  
It was then that Miss Brodie looked beautiful and fragile, just as dark heavy 
Edinburgh itself could suddenly be changed into a floating city when the light was 
a special pearly white and fell upon one of the gracefully fashioned streets. (Spark, 
1961, p. 111)  
Perhaps Sandy’s ultimate betrayal of Brodie (if that is what it is), can be seen in light of 
the strong and contradictory feelings that Sandy experiences towards her teacher, such that 
she finds it impossible not to act against her. We may wonder if Sandy’s betrayal of Brodie, 
while she felt it necessary, remained perhaps also for her a point of genuine regret, although 
the precise nature of that tension is never fully explored. At a meeting with Brodie years later, 
Sandy declares “If you did not betray us it is impossible that you could have been betrayed by 
us. The word betrayed does not apply” (p. 126.)  
Perhaps Sandy’s response to Brodie can be seen in light of a moral contradiction that 
Sandy experiences, such that she finds it impossible not to act against Brodie. In Gravity and 
Grace, Weil states that  
That action is good which we are able to accomplish while keeping our attention 
and intention totally directed toward pure and impossible goodness, without 
veiling from ourselves by any falsehood either the attraction or the impossibility of 
pure goodness. (Weil, 1997, p. 150)  
After revealing to Miss Mackay what Miss Mackay wants to hear about Brodie, Sandy admits 
that she herself is interested “only in putting a stop to Miss Brodie” (Spark, 1961, p. 125). 
Weil argues that the ultimate purpose of teaching is “not that the initiated should 




capable of receiving the teaching” (Weil, 1997, p. 135), and that “teaching should have no 
aim but to prepare, by training the attention, for the possibility of such an act. In her essay 
“Forms of the implicit love of God”, Weil illustrates how such a transformation might occur:  
It is a transformation analogous to that which takes place in the dusk of evening 
on a road, where we suddenly discern as a tree what we had at first seen as a 
stooping man; or where we suddenly recognize as a rustling of leaves what we 
thought at first was whispering voices. We see the same colours, we hear the same 
sounds, but not in the same way. (Weil, 2009, p. 100) 
Brodie’s initial philosophical commitment is to show her students that there are many 
ways to view the world. She is committed to expose to her girls the fact that the very things 
they have grown up to believe and to accept may only be a partial version of what is true. She 
points out to them that some of the ways in which their school world is organised (such as the 
institution of dividing the girls into four competing school houses) might be seen as a 
subversive strategy to divide their influence (Spark, 1961, p. 111.) She points out that the 
determination to divide the girls into four competing teams might also be seen as a deliberate 
means to eliminate their sense of their own individuality. 
In a number of ways The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie bears the positive influence of the 
ideas of both Weil and Murdoch, both of whom were also themselves teachers. Like Weil, 
Brodie allows her students to “become themselves.” Like Weil, she inculcates in the girls the 
development of memory, and their powers of attention. Like Weil, she imparts to the girls an 
enthusiasm for enquiry and for life and exposes them to a range of cultural experiences in 
order to develop her students as independent thinkers. She teaches them that truth depends 
on goodness and beauty. Brodie is committed to work in the interests of the girls’ higher 
selves. She guides her students away from what she considers to be distractions. She heightens 
their sense of themselves, and teaches them to extend their horizons beyond fixed or 
conventional ways of thinking and being in the world. 
Yet over time, Brodie’s influence is shown to be morally doubtful in the way that it 
fails to respect the girls’ own autonomy, and instead enlists the girls to fulfil Brodie’s own 
particular wants. That takes us as far from Weil’s understanding of humility and respect for 
others as we could possibly be. Weil’s The Need for Roots (2002, p. 3) opens with the declaration 
that “the notion of obligations comes before that of rights, which is subordinate and relative 




corresponds.” Ultimately, it appears that Brodie fails to consider her girls as autonomous 
ends, seeing them only as means to her own particular ends. This failure is one that would be 
completely at odds with Weil’s conviction that love for another necessarily recognises the 
relationship between “self” and the “other”. In discussing the attention that one person can 
give to another, Weil identifies the essential link that is established between otherness and 
truth, by way of attention: 
The love of our neighbour in all its fullness simply means being able to say to him: 
“What are you going through?” It is a recognition that the sufferer exists, not only 
as a unit in a collection, or a specimen from the social category labelled 
“unfortunate,” but as a man, exactly like us who was one day stamped with a 
special mark by affliction. For this reason, it is enough, but it is indispensable, to 
know how to look at him in a certain way. This way of looking is first of all 
attentive” (Weil, 2009, p. 63) 
Brodie instigates in her girls their powers of attention, but appears to lose sight completely of 
her own responsibility to her girls in this regard. While she genuinely seeks to rectify what she 
sees as the traditional power imbalance in the relationship between teacher and student, in so 
doing Brodie appears to invite a reciprocal and highly problematic relationship with her own 
students. 
3.7. Summary 
It is possible that The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie is intended as a send-up of Weil’s 
education philosophy. At the very least, Spark seems intent on taking ideas from Weil in 
order to play with them in a seemingly frivolous fashion, and in relation to a central character 
whose judgement seems not infrequently to be quite askew. Overall, the message from Spark 
seems to be that the notion of attention can lead to zealotry, to dangerous compliance, even 
to the point of fascism (or simply to sufficient moral confusion not to recognise that fascism is 
a very bad thing). One could possibly argue that Spark is trying to demonstrate in her novel 
the supreme difficulty of implementing Weil’s notion of attention, and that efforts to achieve 
Weil’s pure motive are likely to be imperilled by gossip and suspicion. 
Spark’s main character, while very good at producing opportunity for her students to 
stop and be attentive, appears in many ways completely reckless as an educator, with effects 
(or seeming effects) on her students that in many ways appear morally doubtful. Jean Brodie 




example, arithmetic ability) while indulging in other priorities for their learning. Yet through 
attention, one of Brodie’s students critically reflects on her experiences, begins to understand 
what led to those experiences, and takes a radical stand against her teacher. Then when that 
student is asked, twenty-five years later, about the key influences in her life, it is precisely her 
teacher Jean Brodie that she recalls. There remains an enduring bond in the girls’ lifelong 
relationship with their teacher and although the teacher’s students invariably move beyond 
their teacher, and although their memories of her contain some troubling contradictions, the 
full impact of their teacher’s influence on their lives remains strongly connected with their 
sense of engagement with the world and of “the hidden possibilities in all things” (Spark, 
1961, p. 81). 
Part of the educative power of Spark’s novel is that it shows us many things that could 
not be achieved by telling, and although the characters may judge each other, they are not 
themselves judged. Spark’s work shows us, through a detached and highly edited account, the 
profound impact that one teacher has on her students. For both the author and for the 
reader, this involves the “delicate question how to present Miss Brodie in both a favourable 
and an unfavourable light” (p. 72). The novel opens up opportunities for alternative readings, 
different interpretations, and it presents decidedly unexpected outcomes. In all of these ways 
the novel instigates a kind of controversy, a debate among readers or between potential 
readings. The attention needed to prosecute this very debate shows us something 
fundamental about education.  
The following chapter turns back to the nineteenth century, to Charlotte Brontë’s 
final novel Villette, which chronicles the growth and maturation of a novice teacher from 
youth to experience. The novel’s narrator, Lucy Snowe, looks back on her early adult life, 
and describe how she grows, in part through the guidance of others, in both intellect, and in 
the development of her own moral sense. Brontë’s unreliable narrator requires of her reader 
the commitment to read attentively, and not to accept everything that Lucy says at face value. 
This chapter examines Brontë’s Villette in light of the Bildungsroman tradition, whereby the 





Chapter 4: Charlotte Brontë’s Villette 
4.0. Introduction 
Charlotte Brontë’s Villette (1853) chronicles the experiences of a novice teacher, who 
must change a great deal before, in her chosen professional capacity, she truly acquires virtue. 
Platonic themes of attention, recollection and reasoned reflection are amply represented in 
the process, a process that, for Lucy Snowe, is beset by struggle and many challenges. Lucy is 
a solitary figure, unstable, and, where she travels to, entirely bereft of family, friends and 
community. After she arrives in a new country where she will become a novice teacher, Lucy 
suffers despair and dispossession and a great sense of rage. She rages significantly against an 
older man who is in fact an ultimately effective mentor to her. Her story is a stark and 
sometimes troubling one. While teaching in this novel is ultimately depicted as a good, Lucy 
Snowe’s trajectory towards this profession is by no means simple or painless. 
What elevates Lucy’s struggles above the plane of the merely personal is not only that 
they are psychologically rich and compelling and apt for occasioning readers to reflect. Lucy’s 
struggles are also concerned with appreciation of beauty: in their regard for what is best and 
most beautiful, her struggles concern fundamentally what it is to grow and develop morally. 
In time, and with mentor support, Lucy acquires ways to channel her anger and dismiss her 
ego. She oversteps herself and so can give due attention to the world around her, 
acknowledging its complexities. Before Lucy can herself become an effective teacher, she has 
to learn that attention is an ever on-going task, ever relational and ego-less. 
Villette is Brontë’s fourth and final novel.30 Published just two years prior to Brontë’s 
death at age 38, it is considered to be the most autobiographical of her novels, and it is 
considered by many to be superior to her earlier and arguably better-known work Jane Eyre. 
Both Mary Anne Evans [George Eliot] and Virginia Woolf appreciate Villette’s originality and 
power. In a personal correspondence, Mary Anne Evans wrote of the novel “I am only just 
returning to a sense of real wonder about me, for I have been reading Villette, a still more 
wonderful book than Jane Eyre. There is something almost preternatural about its power” (as 
cited in Allott, 1974, p. 192). Virginia Woolf considered Villette to be Charlotte Brontë’s 
“finest novel” and admired the work for its blend of secrecy and emotional disclosure. She 
 
30 Brontë’s other three published novels are Jane Eyre (1847), Shirley (1849), and The Professor (the latter published 




also admired the way that Brontë “calls in nature to describe a state of mind which could not 
otherwise be expressed” (Woolf, 1962, p. 201). 
Villette has been interpreted quite variously by literary scholars since the time of its 
publication. They have identified such themes as those of social deprivation, female isolation, 
repressed opportunities for self-expression, and the poverty of educational opportunities for 
nineteenth century women. (Among such interpreters are Allott, 1974; Eagleton, 1975; 
Gaskell, 1996; Gérin, 1967; Gilbert and Gubar, 1979; Heilbrun, 1989.) These commentators 
point also to the novel’s theme of the limited employment opportunities available to Victorian 
women. Unquestionably the book is a powerful cause for reflection surrounding these themes. 
Yet Villette may also legitimately be discussed as a text about pedagogy—about education in 
its own right. The present chapter undertakes this uncommon and overdue course of 
interpretation. Building in particular on the work of Menon (2003, Chapter 4), it aims to 
explore further frontiers of reading Villette. It seeks to reconsider the novel Villette as 
fundamentally a text about education. 
This chapter reconceives Villette as a study in the growth of pedagogical attention, and 
so marries it intellectually with the mid-twentieth century philosophical works of Simone Weil 
and Iris Murdoch. It argues that when Villette explores the tumultuous experiences of a young 
and inexperienced person’s foray first into a foreign country and then into the utter 
foreignness of the school classroom, it at the same time critiques the average or everyday 
concept of pedagogy. In place of the average or everyday concept of pedagogy, it studies 
pedagogical attention almost exactly as it is understood by Weil and Murdoch. Villette 
exemplifies education as a “leading out” from the self by way of reasoned, carefully 
recollective and reflective self-examination. The examination in question is initially more 
introspective than Weil at least will countenance, but reaches ultimately out to conclusions 
concerning the world and concerning beauty. Villette shows us a feisty, petulant and self-
absorbed young woman who is ultimately transformed, partly by mentor support, but most 
chiefly through her own introspection and deeply considered reflection. Ultimately Lucy 
embraces humility and respect and rises to the difficult challenge of pedagogical attention, 
learning what learning is, and drawing herself into a condition that is at last beautiful, and so 
choice-worthy. 
By the light of the philosophical writings of Weil and Murdoch that have been 
discussed in preceding chapters, the present considers that it is through attention that Lucy 




herself as one among a community, rather than standing any longer aloof, insular and 
ostensibly self-reliant. The first section connects the novel to the theme of pedagogical 
attention.  It then provides some contextual information about the novel. The next section 
examines the novel’s narration and the way that Brontë’s narrative design demands the 
reader’s attention. The next section analyses examples from Villette in the light of Weil’s and 
Murdoch’s ideas about attention, respect and humility, and the final section explores the 
notion of pedagogical attention in relation to Lucy’s mentor, the older teacher. A brief 
conclusion proposes some ways in which Brontë’s novel holds relevance for today. 
4.1. Pedagogical attention 
Villette is a useful text to consider in an analysis of pedagogical attention since it depicts 
not only teachers and students, but (and possibly more importantly), a teacher as a student. 
This piquant novel concerns a passionate novice teacher who, not without being herself 
sharply and continually challenged by another, older teacher, learns, through attention, to 
develop herself and her craft. Because the novel is told through the eyes of the 
protagonist/narrator Lucy Snowe, it conveys signal and clarion insights and reflections into 
her mental and emotional experiences. The novel is at times a frank and unflattering portrait 
of an anguished soul. We see Lucy’s inner struggles and angry protests against some of the 
injustices and constraints of her time. We note Lucy’s fears, anxieties, struggles, failures and 
frailties, and her slow progress in pursuit of independent, professional standing as a teacher. 
Lucy’s coming into her own in the end provides opportunity for us to grow. 
Villette is a carefully plotted and crafted work, one that places considerable demands 
upon the reader. The text of the novel is dense, poetic, and at times dry and difficult. While 
largely written in English, various passages of the work are expressed in French. (Footnotes 
are provided that translate these various passages into English for us.) The novel is set largely 
in a French-speaking land, a land that thereby poses challenges of linguistic and cultural 
interpretation for both the English-speaking characters and the English-speaking reader. We 
are made to participate in Lucy’s own feelings of foreignness and alienation. The novel is 
explicitly scholarly: there are frequent historical and literary allusions including to Greek 
sources, Shakespearian sources, as well as Biblical sources (also fully footnoted). Lucy’s 
narrative, like Plato’s Socratic dialogues, is delivered retrospectively as a memoir structured 
around her sometime unreliable memories. Also like Plato’s Socratic dialogues, the events of 




the civic theatre, the municipal garden, the public park. The wiser, older man who acts as a 
mentor teacher to Lucy sometimes epitomises stand-out educational thinkers such as Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, allusion to whose writings further mark this work as one that is 
fundamentally a novel of education. 
Villette is an educative work in other ways as well. The work is structured in a way that 
presents the reader with discontinuities and ambiguities, features that demand careful 
attention. Like an aporetic Socratic dialogue this novel perplexes us and ends leaving us with 
doubts still to be mulled over. We are thereby required to think matters through for ourselves, 
rather than to receive definitive clarity from the text. The novel appears to have been 
consciously designed to pose questions rather than to provide answers, and it is a work that 
requires several re-readings. (Mary-Anne Evans judged that to read Villette three times would 
be more profitable than to read many other novels just once.)31 The text contains many 
doublings, echoes, parallels, pairings, echoes and oppositions, all of which invite layers of 
interpretation. The reader, who operates within the limits of Lucy’s remembered and 
reconstructed account, has sometimes to query the relationship between the details that Lucy 
provides, and other possible readings of events. To be called upon to read in this way, as it 
were against Lucy’s narration, is a feature of the novel that goes to the very essence of 
pedagogical attention. 
The inner growth and progress of novice teacher Lucy Snowe occurs as she confronts 
the complicated and at times confusing process of how to be herself and at the same time how 
to connect with and earn, in her world, the respect of the students and of her fellow teachers. 
The novel, which gives voice to Lucy’s internal battles and frustrations, is something of a 
Bildungsroman in that it that charts the progress of a solitary young woman making her way 
in the world. Through an exploration of her memory and recollected experiences, Lucy 
improves her powers of attention and awareness. This is the cause of her spiritual growth. 
The novel illustrates Lucy’s difficult journey of de-creation (unselfing) and detachment from 
her need to be possessive in her attachments to other people. Lucy also learns to read her 
context more carefully. 
Lucy starts out not fully engaged with the world—her unfortunate life circumstances 
require her to attend to her basic needs for shelter and work ahead of other priorities, but 
these basic needs render her self-preoccupied, mistrustful and disconnected. Lucy is 
 




depressive, emotionally insecure and, it becomes clear, pathologically evasive. As Menon 
(2003, p. xx) notes, Lucy is presented as an individual of great contrasts. Lucy herself declares 
“I seemed to hold two lives—the life of thought, and that of reality” (Brontë, 2004, p. 85). 
Lucy’s surname emphasises her cold and frosty manner, which contrasts with her inner fury 
and deeply-felt fervour. She is subject to states of extreme emotional turmoil. She experiences 
tumultuous thoughts, passions, anxieties, and is unable to see (as her mentor teacher is able to 
do), the ways that these tendencies impede her growth as a person.  
Villette is also a work that poses important questions regarding the task of the teacher. 
It calls us to consider Parker J. Palmer’s question “Who is the self that teaches?” (Palmer 
(1998, p. 7). Palmer argues that “Good teaching cannot be reduced to technique; good teaching comes from 
the identity and integrity of the teacher” (p. 10). Villette addresses Palmer’s question in relation to the 
two central characters in this work, both of whom are teachers. (Lucy is the novice. The name 
of the pedagogue, Lucy’s colleague and eventual mentor, is Professor M. Paul.) It is largely 
Monsieur Paul who shows Lucy what it is to be attentive to something other than her own 
self. M. Paul invokes Phaedrus, 230e in the way that he implicitly responds to Lucy’s 
restlessness and emotional overdrive by guiding and challenging her to “know herself” (Plato, 
trans, 1997, p. 510). Over time, these two, not unlike Socrates and Phaedrus, find a way to be 
more attuned to one another, better able to listen, respect, and to be mutually attentive. 
(These themes are discussed and further explored in Canfara, 2013.) 
4.2. Historical context 
As does Villette’s protagonist Lucy Snowe, Charlotte Brontë (1816–1855) fictionalizes 
aspects of her own life experience and draws on her memories for her fictional material. 
Brontë’s first written (although only posthumously published) novel The Professor, was also set 
in a school in Brussels. The Professor is in some ways the progenitor for Villette, and anticipates 
some of its themes. Both of Brontë’s two later novels Jane Eyre and Villette provide detailed 
period depictions of life in Victorian schools—the former from the vantage point of the school 
student, the latter from the perspective of the apprentice teacher. We know from Brontë’s 
biographer Elizabeth Gaskell (1996, p. 85) that Brontë believed in the value of education for 
its own sake, although, as Menon (2003, p. 126) suggests, her aspirations were probably more 
towards being a writer than towards being a teacher. Brontë worked as a schoolteacher or 
governess in England from 1835 to 1838, and later as a governess in Brussels. Gaskell (1996, 




As Gaskell notes, on February 1842, Charlotte and her sister Emily (then aged 26 and 
24 respectively) sailed together to Brussels in order to study French together at a private girls’ 
boarding school. According to Gaskell this was part of their long-term intention to start a 
small school in or near the family home in Haworth. Some eight months later, however, their 
studies were interrupted by the death of their Aunt Bramwell (housekeeper to their widowed 
father) back in Haworth. The two young women promptly returned to Yorkshire, and 
subsequently only Charlotte opted to return to Brussels to complete her studies. Biographical 
evidence provided by Gaskell (1996, Chapter XII), and by Guérin (1967, Chapters XIII–
XIV, pp. 181–255), suggests that Charlotte’s decision to return was influenced in no small 
part by her deep and ultimately misplaced feelings for M. Heger, the married French teacher. 
The ensuing period abroad proved to be a time of great personal loneliness and affliction for 
Brontë. Various aspects of this period in her life are woven into the fictional texture of Villette. 
The importance of attention is established early in the novel. Lucy Snowe, a single 
twenty-three-year-old English woman who, upon finding herself with neither employment 
nor any immediate prospects of work in England, resolves to travel to the continent to start a 
new life. Lucy, who has little experience of the world, finds the ensuing sea voyage 
bewildering and arduous. Her luggage is lost when she arrives in Brussels and, although she is 
given directions to her intended destination (Villette, a fictional town in Brussels), it is night 
time and she loses her way. Fortuitously, Lucy finds herself outside her intended destination, a 
pensionnat (a private school for girls). Despite the late hour, Madame Beck, the school’s 
director, proves not unsympathetic to Lucy’s plight, and agrees to speak with her. Before 
making any decisions, however, she calls upon her cousin and teaching colleague, M. Paul, 
and instructs him to give Lucy his undivided attention. She asks him to make a phrenological 
reading of Lucy’s character: “‘I want your opinion. We know your skill in physiognomy; use it 
now. Read that countenance’” (Brontë, 2004, p. 73). Although it is hinted that his reading is 
complex, he nevertheless recommends that Madame Beck take Lucy in: “‘Engage her. If 
good predominates in that nature, the action will bring its own reward; if evil—eh bien, ma 
cousine, çe cera toujours une bonne oeuvre” (p. 73). [Translated as “‘Well, cousin, it will 
always be a good deed’” (p. 557)]. By the nature of this response, M. Paul demonstrates his 
capacity for benevolence towards Lucy as a person in need.  
In this way, Brontë establishes M. Paul’s pedagogical function in Villette. It is precisely 
because of his positive reading of Lucy’s physiognomy that Lucy is admitted to Madame 




future. Without being granted entry to the school that evening, Lucy risked being lost to 
destitution. From their initial encounter, M. Paul demonstrates his ability to “read” Lucy 
generously and lovingly. (That his reading is by the supposed art of phrenology is an 
incorporation into the story of vogue presumed science at the time. Brontë lived during the 
heyday decades for phrenology: for example, a leading German-language work on 
phrenology, by the Swiss pastor Johann Kaspar Lavater, was translated into English in 1832, 
when Brontë was 16, as The Pocket Lavater, or, The Science of Physiognomy; and, that the art of 
phrenology still had currency thirty years after Brontë had died is evidenced by the 1885 
publication of Samuel Robert Wells’ How to Read Character: A New Illustrated Hand-Book of 
Phrenology and Physiognomy, for Students and Examiners; with A Descriptive Chart.) 
As was discussed in an earlier chapter that addresses Plato, there may well have been 
artistic reasons why Brontë chose to have M. Paul “read” Lucy in this way by means of 
phrenology. In any case, M. Paul’s generous and loving reading of Lucy connects importantly 
with the notion of attention as understood by both Weil and Murdoch, as really looking, 
“making those little peering efforts of imagination which have such important cumulative 
results” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 42). From their initial meeting, M. Paul continues to pay close 
attention to Lucy. He determines her potential as well as ascertains her weaknesses. He 
concludes from his reading of her that she needs to be encouraged to extend herself. As 
Lucy’s mentor, M. Paul will later draw Lucy to discover herself what she is truly capable of. 
M. Paul has a positive impact on her life—he guides her to improve herself and thereby to 
improve her happiness and her prospects. He awakens her to further her education because 
he judges that she is ready. He exemplifies the power of a teacher to open a mind.  
Villette contains a number of characters whose presence is significant to Lucy’s growth 
and progress in attention. Teaching staff include Madame Beck (the astute school director 
and teacher of Geography), M. Paul (the French literature teacher and subsequent mentor to 
Lucy), and Josef Emmanuel (M. Paul’s talented musician brother). Other teachers on the staff 
include senior Mistress Madame Zelie St. Pierre (with an eye for M. Paul), and the German 
Mistress, Fräulein Anna Brun. Other major characters include Doctor John (formerly 
Graham Bretton, a childhood acquaintance from England who reappears as an adult in the 
town of Villette), Ginevra Fanshaw (a coquettish school student and eventual friend of Lucy, 
who is initially both pursued by and in pursuit of, Doctor John), Père Silas (an elderly Jesuit 
priest and earlier mentor to M. Paul), Paulina (first known to Lucy as Polly, now seventeen 




addition to these characters, there is a group of minor characters including Madame Bretton 
(mother to Dr John, also originally from England, godmother to Lucy), Marie Broc (a 
handicapped student at Madame Beck’s pensionnat who is entirely dependent on the attentions 
of others). Other characters include Rosine and Goton, household staff at the pensionnat, M. 
Minon (bookseller, and eventually Lucy’s landlord), Mrs Sweeny (the alcoholic governess 
whose governess job is given to Lucy when she first arrives), and a spectral apparition in the 
form of a ghostly nun. 
The majority of the novel recounts, through Lucy’s eyes, her struggles to find her way 
at Madame Beck’s pensionnat, not just as a novice teacher, but as one whose larger challenge is 
to become a balanced and integrated person. Events include an account of Lucy’s experience 
as an actor in the school vaudeville, her torrid first experiences as a classroom teacher, several 
occasions in which she is emotionally overcome by a spectral apparition, as well as a period of 
serious and complete mental collapse. A significant portion of the book focuses on Lucy’s 
social circumstances and her emergent, awkward, turbulent, and at times repressed, feelings 
for two male professionals who figure predominantly in her life, first Dr John, and 
subsequently her French literature teacher and eventual mentor, M. Paul. Of these two men, 
it is the literature teacher who emerges as the truer mentor for Lucy, the one who proves 
worthier of being (platonically) loved. 
Perhaps like Brontë herself, Villette’s protagonist sets out to become a teacher more out 
of necessity than out of any particular sense of calling. Teaching is a profession for which 
Lucy appears rather ill-suited, both by temperament and by mental disposition. She is 
depressive, emotionally insecure, evasive and unreliable. She is subject to flights of fancy, and 
is not yet awakened to the power of reasoned thought. Lucy must come to a better 
understanding of her own self, through attention, before she can lay claim to the role of a 
teacher able to attend to the needs of her own students. To achieve this level of self-
understanding, Lucy’s reason and emotion must be brought into better balance. Initially, 
Lucy is all emotion, too vulnerable and needy of being nurtured herself to be able to see her 
own deficiencies, including her own lack of respect and self-respect. Until Lucy has developed 





4.3. Themes of recollection and introspection 
Villette is a novel of recollection and introspection. Narrated by a much older Lucy 
Snowe, whose hair “which till a late period withstood the frosts of time, lies now at last, white, 
under a white cap, like snow beneath snow” (Brontë, 2004, p. 51), the novel is her reflection 
on her past and its effects in shaping her life. The novel is a reconstruction of Lucy’s 
memories, extending back as far as her early teens, although largely concentrated on her 
eighteen-month tenure as a novice teacher at Madame Beck’s pensionnat.  
As an account of a much earlier time in her life, there are times when Lucy’s memory 
draws a blank, and she is unable to recollect the relevant details. Sometimes she simply 
declares “I remember no more” (p. 181). It is entirely plausible that a person would find it 
difficult to reconstruct with complete accuracy an account of their distant past, particularly 
someone in Lucy’s situation. As the novel proceeds, various inconsistencies in Lucy’s account 
start to emerge and it becomes apparent that, for whatever reason, Lucy is not an altogether 
reliable narrator. Increasingly we realize that there is every reason to pay attention to detail, 
and to be on the lookout not only for possible slanted readings on Lucy’s part, but also, for 
potentially telling omissions by Lucy of what would have been, had they been included, 
important narrative details. Just as M. Paul cuts away some pages of the volumes he loans to 
Lucy, by these “retrenchments interrupting the narrative” (Brontë, 2004, p. 385), so does 
Lucy Snowe impose (whether haplessly or deliberately) certain retrenchments on her 
narration.32 
Concerning a matter that she does chose to convey, Lucy reports “I stored up this 
piece of casual information, as careful housewives store seemingly worthless shreds and 
fragments for which their prescient minds anticipate a possible use some day” (p. 50). Brontë’s 
reader must likewise attend with care, that is to say, read with attention, and sift and store 
information so as to create intelligent comprehension of the narrative. This is a novel that 
repeatedly calls on the reader to reflect on the reliability of the narrator who is telling the 
story. Indeed, to accept Lucy’s “guiding” narrative voice uncritically and without thinking 
would be to fail entirely to notice what pedagogical attention is all about.  
 
32 For example, Lucy fails to reveal that the person who assists her on her first night in Villette is both Graham 
Bretton and Dr John, she conceals her interest in M. Paul until well until well into the novel, and she withholds 





In his 1910 work How we think, American educationist John Dewey makes the point 
that “the origin of thinking is some perplexity, confusion, or doubt” (Dewey, 2012, p. 12). He 
notes further that: 
Reflective thinking is always more or less troublesome because it involves 
willingness to endure a condition of mental unrest and disturbance. Reflective 
thinking, in short, means judgment suspended during further inquiry; and 
suspense is likely to be somewhat painful. (p. 13)  
Brontë’s text entices in the reader an equivalent sense of suspense, of questioning, of disquiet 
—a sense of mystery—by the many diversions, misunderstandings, confusions over identity, 
and apprehensions in the story, as well as the various breaks in the narrative. The text draws 
us into a somewhat forensic approach to the very reading of it as we navigate its puzzles and 
challenges. We as readers are called upon to adopt an inquiring attitude to the text, a role not 
dissimilar to the scrutinising attitude to which Madame Beck herself subjects Lucy. As 
readers, we are like the spy who has to become what he sees. Further, we must acknowledge 
how unlikely it is that anyone retelling their own story, particularly one that includes such 
misery and affliction as the younger Lucy suffers, would, or ever could, be a completely 
reliable source of information. 
Menon also observes that Lucy’ tendency to neurotic or fearful fantasies not only 
impedes her progress and understanding of others, but also gets in the way of our 
understanding of her. That Lucy is not a forthcoming narrator becomes increasingly clear as 
the novel progresses. She neither delivers a straightforward story, nor works to establish an 
open and trusting connection with her reader. On the contrary, she admits she can be 
mischievous, teasing and ironic. Not only does Lucy misdirect the reader, she also admits to a 
spirit of mischievous play: “I liked, for instance, to see M. Emanuel jealous; it lit up his nature 
and woke his spirit” (Brontë, 2004, p. 171). While Lucy’s voice is human, it sometimes has a 
slightly sarcastic edge.  
For much of the novel Lucy describes M. Paul in negative or forbidding terms – as 
when she reports that “[his cloak] hung dark and menacing; the tassel of his bonnet grec 
sternly shadowed his left temple; his black whiskers curled like those of a wrathful cat; his blue 
eye had a cloud in its glitter” (p. 170), or as when Lucy notes that M. Paul’s complexion 
betokens his fiery mood. Thereby Lucy, or Brontë, brings ideas to the reader’s mind, by 




details may be at odds with other aspects, in this case of M. Paul’s behaviour. Consequently 
Lucy, or Brontë, both perplexes and challenges the reader. Lucy is as cautious and 
ungenerous with important details of her story as she is ungenerous with her handmade gift 
for M. Paul, which she withholds for no clear reason, despite his obvious mystification and 
disappointment (p. 377).  
Gilbert and Gubar (1979) identify Lucy Snowe as a persistently “self-effacing 
narrator” who evades revealing herself to the reader and who “often seems to be telling any 
story but her own” (p. 416). Lucy readily admits that she has a tendency towards secrecy and 
non-disclosure: “it suited me to be alone—quite alone” (Brontë, 2004, p. 502). She expresses 
a preference to withdraw “to a quiet nook, whence unobserved I could observe” (p. 156). 
Lucy conceals details, deflects our attention, masks meaning, and sometimes withholds from 
the reader critical information, only to reveal it some chapters further on. She never tells 
anything until she herself is ready, and it falls to the reader to detect these matters and to seek 
to clarify or revisit details previously obscured in the text. These features all serve to reinforce 
the importance of attention as a signal concept in the text. 
Lucy’s unreliable narration sets up a tension between her narrative “remembering” 
alongside the novel’s “showing”. Evidence of Lucy’s unreliability as narrator includes her 
failure to report certain material details until much later in the story—such as withholding the 
identity of Dr John at a critical juncture in the story, or failing to document particular acts of 
attentiveness or generosity on the part of M. Paul. “I forgot to enumerate many a paper of 
chocolate confits” (p. 384), precisely in order to portray him in a poor light. When Lucy 
explains how M. Paul came to be more her mentor than her colleague, she recalls vaguely the 
area of study that he offered to help her with: “I think it was arithmetic” (p. 389). Lucy 
excuses herself to the reader for these acts of narrative omission or erasure, but without 
apology: “To say anything of the subject, to hint at my discovery, had not suited my habits of 
thought, or assimilated with my system of feeling. On the contrary, I had preferred to keep 
the matter to myself” (p. 196).  
Brontë further sustains a sense of Lucy’s non-disclosure and changeability by the use 
of multiple names to refer to the key characters in the work. Ginevra calls Lucy by a number 
of different names including “cynic”, “old Crusty”, “old Diogenes” p. 98 (this refers to a 
Greek philosopher 320 BCE who was opposed to the corrupt society he lived in), “Mother 
Wisdom” p. 98, and “Timon” (footnoted as “misanthrope”). On the occasion of the school 




John’s name is given many variations: “Graeme Bretton”, “Dr Bretton”, and “Dr John”. The 
diminutive Polly is also known as “Paulina Home”. Monsieur Paul’s name is given the 
greatest number of variations, including “M. Emanuel”, “Professor Monsieur Paul”, 
“Professor Paul Emmanuel”, “Professor M. Paul”, “M. Paul”, “P. Emmanuel”, “Paul Carl 
Emmanuel”, and “Paul Carlos David Emmanuel”, sometimes reduced to the initials “P D C 
E”. He is also referred to as “the Priest’s Pupil” (p. 449), a name that possibly anticipates the 
title of Murdoch’s 1983 novel, The Philosopher’s Pupil, also a novel that explores the complex 
relationship between master and student. 
Because Lucy alternates character names within a chapter—or sometimes even within 
a paragraph—the reader is potentially distracted, their attention momentarily diverted from 
the character’s true identity. In another of her tricks, Lucy deliberately withholds a version of 
the name that would reveal more to the reader than she wishes to disclose. For example, she 
withholds from the reader for many chapters the fact that she first reconnects with Dr John at 
the coach station on her arrival in Villette, as well as failing to mention that the two education 
appraisers who come to examine Lucy’s writing skills are the same two people who had 
harassed her on her arrival into Villette. Lucy is consternated by the reappearance of these two 
as her examiners, and this motivates her to write an impassioned and pointed improvisation 
on the theme of ‘Human Justice’ (p. 445). Yet whereas Plato’s The Republic concerns Justice in 
the abstract, considered as a Form, Brontë, and Lucy, are drawn to consider Justice rather 
more concretely. They do not differ from Plato in holding that the subject of Justice is to be 
considered reflectively, by a rational consideration, but they are perhaps not on all fours with 
Plato regarding the abstractness of his thinking.  
As has already been mentioned, Lucy is selective in the narrative details that she 
provides. She only reveals to us as much as she wishes to share. Yet in doing this she 
sometimes reveals more about herself than she realizes. For instance, Lucy overtly portrays 
herself as shy, insular, and at times non-communicative—someone who finds it difficult to 
communicate with others. Yet, when given the opportunity to take part in the school 
vaudeville, we find Lucy showing herself able to perform very well in front of an audience. 
She even insists on limiting her actor costume to a few token pieces rather than taking on a 
full disguise. Sometimes it is Lucy who is herself surprised by a revelation. For instance, 
towards the end of the novel she discovers that the identity of the Catholic priest to whom she 




Brontë creates a series of revelations and potential confusions for the reader—events that are 
pivotal to the novel’s themes of discovery, revelation, and attention. 
Although Lucy is very keen to observe others, she reveals that she dislikes it intensely 
when she has to submit to being observed herself. She does not like to find herself under 
someone else’s gaze. It is not clear whether Lucy breaks M. Paul’s eyeglasses accidentally or 
deliberately, but there is a suggestion that if she can’t stop his gaze upon her, she can 
nevertheless use other means to impede his ability to see her clearly (p. 362). She prefers to 
observe others from the side-line, in secret, and she does not herself wish for Madame Beck, 
M. Paul, or anyone else, to be able to read her countenance. She consistently avoids direct 
encounters—she hides in shadows, uses clothing, poor lighting, or means of disguise to 
conceal herself: “I kept rather in the shade and out of sight, not wishing to be immediately 
recognised” (p. 240). Brontë’s novel is so designed that despite Lucy’s efforts at concealment 
of herself, she simultaneously reveals the harmful effects of holding in these “pent up” 
emotions on her mental and physical heath, and ultimately, on her human functioning. 
Lucy’s efforts to be aloof, private and separate, and her inclination to keep herself at a 
distance from others are, ultimately, catastrophic. 
During the course of the novel we learn a great deal about Lucy’s spirit and strength 
of will, and also about her physical and emotional susceptibilities. Lucy has an 
uncompromising personality. While she is a bright spark intellectually, ambitious for 
intellectual development, she is also censorious, intolerant, and quick to judge. She is depicted 
as neurotic, mentally fragile and emotionally volatile. Lucy uses isolation as a strategy to cope 
with her anxieties, but in her failure to make connection with others, she appears to lose 
entirely her sense of who she is herself. Lucy strains to withhold convulsive feelings and 
emotions and she suffers from an implied sexual agitation and frustration that threatens to 
destabilize her (see further Menon, 2003). She is subject to emotional swings of mood that 
impede her capacity to interact with others or to make the most of her intellectual potential. 
She is constitutionally uneasy and irritable and admits that she inflicts unpleasant and difficult 
behaviour on others: “I continued silent and icy” (Brontë, 2004, p. 540).  
In Lucy, Brontë presents human characteristics that are real and unpleasant and 
ultimately self-limiting: Lucy displays various familiar yet unpleasant aspects of human 
personality. Because Lucy has been in the beginning self-preoccupied and not always entirely 
pleasant, her capacity to connect with others, or to see the good in others, has been limited. 




self. Lucy has been subject to swings of mood, has been frequently melancholy and low spirits, 
and she has been one to tend to dwell on egotistical concerns. She has been unstable 
emotionally and, for most of the novel, appears to be on the verge of deep depression. She 
has suffered great terrors of the mind and her state at one time or another in her past is 
repeatedly described as “morbid”.  
That Lucy repeatedly apprehends a ghost further reflects her mental susceptibility and 
vulnerability. She tells us that she has literally days of being entirely ill at ease: “Complicated, 
disquieting thoughts broke up the whole repose of my nature. However, that turmoil 
subsided: next day I was again Lucy Snowe” (p. 132). It is likely that today there would be 
medical treatment for such depressive ailments as the younger Lucy suffered from. It is 
possible too, that part of Lucy’s struggle (as was possibly also the case for philosopher Simone 
Weil) is an unspoken fear of her own aspiring potential.  
It must be acknowledged that Lucy’s life contains many setbacks. She has no family 
and no ties. Possibly due to some previous tragedy in her life, she has no parents or siblings. A 
shipwreck in her early life is mentioned but beyond the brief details that “I must somehow 
have fallen overboard…In fine, the ship was lost, the crew perished” no further facts are 
provided (p. 39). Lucy has been mentally fragile and emotionally volatile. She has been 
uprooted and she has been very alone—not only geographically, but also culturally, socially, 
linguistically, even existentially. Lucy’s suffering in the absence of human companionship or 
contact is reminiscent of Weil’s own suffering. Lucy observes that “the world can understand 
well enough the process of perishing for want of food: perhaps few persons can enter into or 
follow out that of going mad from solitary confinement” (p. 303). Weil summarises the 
experience of extreme suffering or affliction thus: “Suffering, teaching and transformation. 
What is necessary is not that the initiated should learn something, but that a transformation 
should come about in them which makes them capable of receiving the teaching” (Weil, 
1997, p. 83).  
During the long school summer break, Lucy is left virtually alone at the school. 
During this period she suffers from a lack of intellectual stimulation or a sense of human 
connection. It is likely that the lack of contact either with other people or with the intellectual 
connections to the arts and literature that school life had provided for her, precipitates her as 
a lonely young woman into a state of deep affliction: “I wanted companionship, I wanted 
friendship, I wanted counsel. I could find none of these in closet, or chamber, so I went and 




During this period, Lucy is called upon to provide complete care and assistance for a 
“poor deformed and imbecile pupil, a sort of crétin” for several weeks (p. 172). It seems that 
this additional demand on Lucy, on top of her isolation and loneliness, is what precipitates 
her major breakdown. She later describes the time she spends caring for Marie Broc as 
nothing short of “terrible”. She reports that when during the extended holiday period she was 
alone with Marie Broc, the “strange deformed companion”, a state of “sorrowful indifference 
to existence often pressed on me—a despairing resignation to reach betimes the end of all 
things earthly” (p. 173). Lucy experiences fear, resentment and resistance towards her charge 
who “rarely spoke, and would sit for hours together mopping and mowing and distorting her 
features with indescribable grimaces, it was more like being prisoned with some strange 
tameless animal, than associating with a human being” (p. 174). When she later tells M. Paul 
that it was “terrible” to be alone with Marie Broc (p. 227), he admonishes her sternly and 
calls her an “egotist” (p. 227). While he admits to Lucy that Marie Broc is a difficult and 
demanding person, he tells Lucy that while Marie Broc’s unfortunate situation may stir 
negative sentiments, by the light of any thoroughgoing consideration, it calls for leniency and 
compassion: 
Her personal appearance, her repulsive manners, her often unmanageable 
disposition, irritated his temper, and inspired him with strong apathy....On the 
other hand, her misfortunes constituted a strong claim on his forbearance and 
compassion—such a claim as was not in his nature to deny. (p. 227)  
In this instance, M. Paul again demonstrates his capacity to give attention to another 
in just the meaning intended by Weil. Weil reminds us that true attention helps us to see what 
we are otherwise disposed to overlook completely. Attention means to consider of another 
person “What are you going through?” (Weil, 2009, p. 64). However, in this situation it is 
Lucy who is herself also a suffering person. In the condition she is in, she is utterly unable to 
show fellow-feeling to Marie Broc as another suffering person. Lucy says that “a want of 
companionship maintained in my soul the cravings of a most deadly famine…I almost wished 
to be covered in with earth and turf” (Brontë, 2014, p. 175), and “I had a pressure of 
affliction on my mind of which it would hardly any longer endure the weight” (p. 178). Weil 
reminds us that: “as for those who have themselves been mutilated by affliction, they are in 
no state to help anyone at all, and they are almost incapable of ever wishing to do so. Thus 
compassion for the afflicted is an impossibility” (Weil, 2009, p. 69.) In her own affliction, 




Indescribably was I torn, racked and oppressed in mind…galled was my inmost 
spirit with an unutterable sense of despair about the future. Motive there was none 
why I should try to recover or wish to live; and yet quite unendurable was the 
pitiless and haughty voice in which Death challenged me to engage his unknown 
terrors. (Brontë, 2004, pp. 176–177)  
Rorty (1989), cited in Menon, 2003, p. xvi) also comments upon the importance of 
“the imaginative ability to see strange people as fellow sufferers…Solidarity is created by 
increasing our sensitivity to particular details of the pain and humiliation of the other, 
unfamiliar sorts of people.” To understand Lucy, we have to see her as herself a suffering 
person—someone who, given her own turmoil, is as yet unable to show care for others. 
Because of her own desperate situation, Lucy is largely insensitive to the difficulties of other 
people. It is only following her recovery from this dark time that we see her start to make 
some small progress in respect of her ability to give attention to others and to master her own 
inner turmoil.  
In this regard we see further links to the writing of Weil who describes such affliction 
as a devastating experience, “an uprooting of life, a more or less attenuated equivalent of 
death, made irresistibly present to the soul by the attack or immediate apprehension of 
physical pain” (Weil, 2009, p. 68). Only once Lucy realizes that there really is no answer to 
her distress does she begin to demonstrate a subtle change in perspective, and a slight change 
in her readings of the world. The occasion of Lucy’s crisis comes at the end of Volume One of 
Villette, indicating that it is indeed intended to be a turning point in the novel. It is following 
this major crisis that Lucy quite literally finds herself in a situation that is both familiar and 
yet entirely unfamiliar (the relocated household of the Bretton family). It is following this crisis 
that she resolves to bury her ultimately uninteresting letters from Dr John, and it is also 
following this crisis that she is able to countenance a different reading of the spectral nun, 
although it will appear to her several further times. 
4.4. Attention, respect and humility  
To some extent Villette is a Victorian gothic tale for thoughtful readers. The narrative 
action is propelled largely by a series of chance coincidences that bring fortuitous outcomes—
such as when Lucy finds herself immediately outside her intended destination on her first 
night in Villette, or when a young man recognises her and brings her to safety following her 




home of her godmother Mrs Bretton, is another such example. Yet while these coincidental 
events propel the action of the story, they are not themselves pivotal turning points in terms of 
Lucy’s on-going growth in moral agency and understanding. 
To signal Lucy’s capacity for moral progress and improvement, Brontë employs a 
metaphor of forward movement to imply her “improving” or ascending trajectory. For 
example, when Lucy goes to visit a friend to find out about possibly heading to London, she is 
moved by the natural phenomenon of the Aurora Borealis, whose energy literally inspires her 
to “go out hence” (Brontë, 2004, p. 49). A further occasion takes place the following evening. 
From her London hotel bed, Lucy hears the chimes of St Paul’s Cathedral (whose name and 
cultural associations anticipate the presence of her future teaching mentor). Lucy reports that 
she experiences a “strong, vague persuasion, that it was better to go forward than backward, 
and that I could go forward (p. 52). A subsequent example occurs when Lucy responds to 
Madame Beck’s question to Lucy when given the opportunity to enter the classroom as a 
teacher, whether Lucy will go forward, or backwards. On this occasion, despite her 
misgivings, Lucy declares her resolve to proceed ‘En avant’ (p. 86). 
The metaphor of Lucy’s forward momentum connects with Murdoch’s notion of 
moral progress as incremental, on-going, evolving (Murdoch 2014, p. 76). Attention, as 
detailed by Murdoch, is a process that is “progressive…endless” (p. 23). Murdoch calls us to 
recognise the importance of attention as central to our moral vision of the world. “More than 
simply looking”, Murdoch says, attention is “the characteristic and proper mark of the active 
moral agent” (p. 33). Murdoch argues that attention is what enables us to see and behave in the 
light of moral considerations. Attention develops our sensitivity to those around us. Attention 
is the means by which we are able to factor in wider considerations than just our own.  
Lucy’s task of learning to see things ‘as they really are’, calls for on-going attention to 
detail. Her repeated apprehension of a ghostly nun offers further links to Murdoch’s notion of 
attention. The spectral nun appears at various times in the novel, including in the attic, when 
Lucy is preparing her lines for the theatrical performance, in the garden, and in the 
dormitory. These apparitions cause Lucy considerable emotional distress, but are 
subsequently explained away as a coincidence that involves a childish prank by a young man, 
De Hamel, who is pursuing Ginevra. In hindsight, Lucy reveals to us that her earlier 
apprehensions of the ghostly nun, while very real to her at the time, are explicable in terms of 




susceptibility to thoughts of fantasy (as opposed to imaginative explorations), and her 
subsequent understanding of her previous susceptibility to fantasy and superstition. 
For Murdoch, fantasy is the opposite of imagination. Murdoch warns that humans are 
too readily distracted by thoughts that are fanciful, inward-looking, self-limiting: “Any story 
which we tell about ourselves consoles us since it imposes patterns upon something which 
might otherwise seem intolerably chancy and incomplete” (p. 85). Murdoch reminds us of the 
need to keep the attention “fixed upon the real situation and to prevent it from returning 
surreptitiously to the self with consolations of self-pity, resentment, fantasy and despair” (p. 
89). Murdoch notes further that: 
It is a task to come to see the world as it is…we act rightly ‘when the time comes’ 
not out of strength of will but out of the quality of our usual attachments and with 
the kind of energy and discernment which we have available. (p. 89)  
Lucy’s lesson from her ghostly ‘apparitions’ is that she needs to learn to attend better to 
contexts, and to widen the way that she reads situations.  
In order to grow in understanding both of herself and of the world, Lucy’s task is to 
expand her reading of the world. Lucy has to be prepared to rise above her own individual 
perspective. To do this, she has to accept that there may be other readings, other ways of 
seeing. This realization does not come easily to Lucy, for she has a habit of viewing the world 
very much in terms of her own strategies for concealment. Lucy imputes that spying is 
Madame Beck’s modus operandi, although it is equally, if not more the case, that spying and 
espionage epitomise Lucy’s way of conducting herself. Lucy’s criticism of Madame Beck: 
“Yet, woe be to that man or woman who relied on her one inch beyond the point where it 
was her interest to be trustworthy” (Brontë, 2004, p. 81) could equally well apply to Lucy 
herself. (For a richer discussion of the trustworthiness of the narrative voice in Villette, see 
Menon, 2003, pp. 116–121.)  
Following Murdoch, we see that Lucy needs to learn to attend better to contexts—to 
consider things as if they might be otherwise, and not to jump to hasty conclusions. Lucy does 
experience momentary glimpses of selfless attention. For example, on the evening of her 
arrival in Villette, when she “fixedly looked at the street-stones, where the lamp shone, and 
counted them, and noted their shapes, and the glitter of wet on their angles” (Brontë, 2004, p. 
71), we are reminded of Murdoch’s comment that “We take a self-forgetful pleasure in the 




world is, but that it is, is the mystical’” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 83). Other, similar occasions, such 
as when Lucy admires the genius of several still-life paintings in the art gallery, are brief and 
disconnected. In contexts such as during her early experiences as a classroom teacher, Lucy’s 
capacity for attention to others is, perhaps understandably, shown to be poor. 
Following Lucy’s installation into Madame Beck’s pensionnat, her immediate needs for 
shelter and sustenance are satisfied. Although she does not yet have a home, she at least has 
both a residence and she has employment—as governess to the director’s three children. Lucy 
has time to settle in and learn about her new setting. Through Lucy we learn that the quality 
of education offered at M. Beck’s pensionnat is variable at best, and that poorly performing staff 
are constantly being dismissed and replaced. Lucy reports that there are teachers who are 
drunk, irresponsible, cruel, unreliable, and ill prepared for their tasks. Some are miserly, 
others avaricious. Classes are very large, with up to sixty pupils for some lessons. 
A short time after Lucy’s admission into Madame Beck’s pensionnat, M. Paul asks her 
to stand in for someone who is unable to perform in the school play. He calls upon her to 
memorise the part immediately, correctly intuiting that she is ready for such a challenge. His 
judgement proves correct: Lucy learns the script and executes the role convincingly that very 
evening. Following Lucy’s successful performance, M. Paul commends her to Madame Beck 
and, again drawing on his observations of Lucy, tells Lucy that he can see in Lucy’s facial 
expression “a passionate ardour for triumph” (Brontë, 2004, p. 171). He tells Lucy that, 
despite her efforts to conceal her feelings, they are evident to him both in her expression and 
in her bearing. Monsieur Paul essentially tells Lucy that he reads her very well, and that he 
intends to pay close attention to her. Lucy’s subsequent self-congratulatory comments are less 
positive, and reveal more than a hint of hubris: “Cold, reluctant, apprehensive, I had 
accepted a part to please another: ere long, warming, becoming interested, taking courage, I 
acted to please myself” (p. 156). (For an alternative analysis of how this passage may be 
interpreted, see Eagleton, 1989, p. 70.) The text continues to reveal this thread of hubris in 
Lucy, and in ways that are never to her credit. Lucy continues to find it hard to give positive 
readings of her interactions with others. She finds all acts of attention complex and difficult. 
Her reading of situations is repeatedly clouded by her apparent negativity and lack of regard 
for the agency of others. 
Details of Madame Beck’s school reveal that the pensionnat has around one hundred 
day pupils, as well as many borders, and there are four teachers on the staff, as well as eight 




and smaller teaching rooms as well as the main classrooms. Lucy observes that the teachers 
are “the more stringently tasked, as all the real head-labour was to be done by them, in order 
to save the pupils” (Brontë, 2004, p. 82). One day, the school’s English teacher fails to arrive 
and Madame Beck approaches Lucy to ask her to step in. Lucy has absolutely no preparation 
for this role, and while she had previous employment as a lady’s maid and a governess, she 
has never before been a classroom teacher. Moreover, her mastery of French, the language of 
instruction, is very weak. Nevertheless, when Madame Beck demands of Lucy “Will you go 
backward or forward?” (p. 86), Lucy calls upon her commitment to forward progress and, 
almost to her own surprise, assents to the challenge, despite her palpable fear and anxiety. 
Lucy is literally thrust into the school classroom. Here she confronts an unruly group 
of more than sixty students: “I shall never forget that first lesson, nor all the under-current of 
life and character it opened up to me” (p. 88). Lucy’s first classroom lesson is, by her own 
accounts, nothing more than an exercise in crowd control: “I knew I looked a poor creature, 
and in many respects actually was so, yet nature had given me a voice that could make itself 
heard, if lifted in excitement or deepened by emotion” (p. 88). Desperate to gain control by 
force, Lucy singles out several particularly unruly students and scorns them in front of their 
peers. She ridicules and then tears up the work of the first student, and then treats the second 
student equally, if not more cruelly, than the first. She uses stealth to take this student by 
surprise. She pushes the second girl into a cupboard and locks her in. Lucy then protects 
herself behind the estrade as if a barricade, as if to further withhold her own self. At the close 
of the lesson, Lucy discovers somewhat to her surprise that Madame Beck has been outside 
the classroom spying on Lucy’s performance the whole time. Madame Beck indicates her 
satisfaction with the way that Lucy has managed the situation, and so it comes about that 
Lucy is appointed to her first teaching post.  
After a first few difficult lessons delivered “amidst peril and on the edge of a moral 
volcano” (p. 91), Lucy appears to make some progress as a novice teacher. As with all 
teachers, Lucy has bad and good days. By her own accounts she eventually manages to gain 
some measure of control over the class, although she reveals that she employs sarcasm as well 
as other dubious techniques to gain this control. Lucy is highly critical of the girls she teaches. 
She is supercilious towards them and finds in them no redeeming features at all. She 
considers them dull-witted, indolent, work-shy and plodding. She has no respect or regard for 
them, but perhaps this is an indication that she also has very little regard or respect for 




themselves—who have no idea of grappling with a difficulty” (p. 336). She continues to be 
ungenerous and unflattering towards her students whom she considers a “stiff-necked tribe”, 
a “swinish multitude” (p. 91), dull and mediocre in relation to their English counterparts. She 
ridicules what she considers to be their hissing attempts to speak the English language and 
overall, her tone towards them is one of cultural condescension: 
They were to be humoured, borne with very patiently: a courteous though sedate 
manner impressed them; a very rare flash of raillery did good. Severe or 
continuous mental application they could not, or would not, bear: heavy demand 
on the memory, the reason, the attention, they rejected point-blank. (p. 91)  
Lucy is initially a poor reader of others—not only of M. Paul, but also of her students 
as well. She views them in terms of her own cultural and national prejudices and makes no 
effort to understand them as individuals. She describes her students in derisory terms—as 
creatures in need of being trained and subdued: “I never knew them rebel against a wound 
given to their self-respect: the little they had of that quality was trained to be crushed, and it 
rather liked the pressure of firm heel, than otherwise” (p. 92). For Lucy at this point in her 
development as a teacher, classroom teaching is a battle, a form of combat to eliminate the 
voices of her students, rather than an opportunity for her to develop her art or craft. Lucy 
finds teaching frightening and tiring, at least until she finds her way. Initially she is 
constricted, controlling, and overbearing. She withholds herself from her students, is fearful 
and anxious. Lucy cannot give her attention to her students until she is herself fully well.  
Lucy’s disrespect for her students extends to the wider community of Villette as well. 
She is as uncomplimentary and patronising towards the European culture of Labassecour as 
she is to her own pupils. Perhaps in part due to her own sense of physical displacement and 
her own insecurity, Lucy sets herself pridefully apart from the local people. She considers 
herself culturally superior in all respects. When she observes M. Paul deliver a patriotic public 
speech to the local people she observes coolly, and with some conceit: “Who would have 
thought the flat and fat soil of Labassecour could yield political convictions and national 
feelings, such as were now strongly expressed?” (p. 344). Lucy has such misplaced sense of her 
English superiority over the culture she has entered that she carries a powerful sense of herself 
as “above” the people she is now living among. In this regard, Lucy appears to perpetrate the 





Lucy’s lack of cultural sensitivity resonates with Spivak’s observation that nineteenth 
century English literature embodies an English imperialist view, thereby perpetrating “the 
production of cultural representation” and “axioms of imperialism” (Spivak, 1985, p. 243, p. 
244, as cited in Cooper’s Introduction to Villette, p. xl.) This is not to say that Brontë herself 
held imperialist views, and on the contrary, while it is possible to read Lucy’s account as 
English imperialist, the clear invitation to the reader is to think again. Lucy’s cultural attitudes 
underscore her lack of respect for others, a lack of respect that, while it lasts within her, will 
impede her as a teacher. In this way, Lucy’s foibles and her eventual surpassing of them bring 
to mind Murdoch’s account of attention as the ability to relate to others. Murdoch tells us 
that “we can only understand others if we can to some extent share their contexts. (Often we 
cannot)” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 31). Seen in this light, Lucy’s need for attention is of key 
importance to her own ongoing education. 
During her weeks of recuperation following her total physical and mental collapse, 
Lucy occasionally frequents the local art museum. Although she finds the majority of the 
paintings eminently forgettable, she detects in just a very few paintings the genius of artistic 
achievement: “An expression in this portrait proved clear insight into character; a face in that 
historical painting, by its vivid filial likeness, startlingly reminded you that genius gave it 
birth” (Brontë, 2004, p. 223). In particular, she admires a series of still-life paintings: 
I betook myself for refreshment to the contemplation of some exquisite little 
pictures of still life: wildflowers, wild fruit, mossy wood-nests, casketing eggs that 
looked like pearls seen through clear green sea-water; all hung modestly beneath 
that coarse and preposterous canvas. (p. 224) 
By contrast, Lucy is very unimpressed by a nude painting entitled ‘Cleopatra’ as well 
as a set of a set of four paintings which depict four stages of a woman’s life trajectory—young 
girl, married woman, mother, and finally widow. Neither these four paintings, nor the 
previous painting of the nude Cleopatra holds any interest for Lucy. None of them offers her 
a model of a thinking female person: 
All these four ‘Anges’ were grim and grey as burglars, and cold and vapid as 
ghosts. What women to live with! Insincere, ill-humoured, bloodless, brainless 
nonentities! As bad in their way as the indolent gipsy-giantess, the Cleopatra, in 




Lucy speaks to M. Paul of her frustration that she can’t find a workable representation 
of a thinking female person in any of these images. He makes it abundantly clear to Lucy that 
he disapproves of her regard of the painting of the Cleopatra—perhaps because he considers 
it potentially corrupting for her to view such a sexually suggestive image, or maybe because 
he considers that it will excite too vividly her already overactive imagination. Perhaps M. 
Paul (for the moment) imagines, in his own way over-actively, and also wishfully, that Lucy 
might one day warm to him sexually and warm to his warming sexually to her, and he wishes 
to dispel the prejudice that that would in Lucy be an unthinking state. Or, perhaps not. The 
reader is not given M. Paul’s interpretation of the situation. In any case, Lucy does ultimately 
manage to forge an identity for herself as a thinking person, although perhaps not quite in the 
way that she expects. Lucy achieves this in no small measure due to the pedagogical attention 
bestowed on her by the French literature teacher, M. Paul himself. 
Brontë invokes, through both her major and minor characters, a variety of 
interpretations of the notion of attention. These different interpretations have important 
pedagogical implications in the novel. They reflect the partial understanding of attention of 
the majority of the major characters—Lucy, Ginevra Fanshawe, Madame Beck, Dr John, as 
well as several of the novel’s minor characters. None of these interpretations of attention 
come close to that understood by Weil and Murdoch, and their very partial interpretations 
throw into relief the depth and quality of pedagogical attention that is bestowed by Lucy’s 
mentor teacher, M. Paul.  
Lucy’s interpretation of attention when working as Miss Marchmont’s maid rests 
upon the notion of service or servitude. Her attention in this context implies a kind of 
involuntary submission that relates to her contractual obligation as an employee. Later, when 
she is promoted to classroom teacher, but is as yet naïve in this role, Lucy makes use in her 
teaching strategy of a militaristic interpretation of attention. She considers the classroom a 
potential battleground, and calls upon physical force and cruelty to establish her authority. 
She uses a raised voice to maintain control, and shows no regard for the agency of her 
students. Yet these are months during which, as Lucy reveals, she finds it very difficult to 
focus her own attention or to concentrate her mind. Her attention readily wanders and she is 
all too easily distracted.  
Supporting characters in the novel also display partial or limited interpretations of 
attention. Ginevra Fanshawe understands attention solely in terms of self-regard. Her 




attention to her charms, her appearance, her costume. Dr John’s understanding of attention-
giving is partial in a different way. He is entirely selective in the way he bestows his attention. 
While his medical attention to his patients is diligent and complete, his attention to both Polly 
and to Lucy in the domestic sphere, is shown to be partial at best. Madame Beck, whose very 
slippers are described as “souliers de silence” (Brontë, 2004, p. 81), is described as if forever 
scanning Lucy, suspiciously of Lucy’s deeds, and suspiciously even of Lucy’s thoughts.  
On Lucy’s first night at the pensionnat, she wakes up with the awareness that Madame 
Beck is at her bedside. Madame Beck furtively sorts through and examines Lucy’s possessions 
(p. 76) and boldly takes a wax impression of Lucy’s keys for her own purposes. Lucy later 
declares of Madame Beck that surveillance and espionage were her “watchwords” (p. 80). In 
short, Madame Beck reduces attention to suspicion. The attention of several of the minor 
teaching characters is altogether to objects of pleasure. In them, attention expresses itself but 
in an all-consuming addiction, whether to whiskey or to money. Several other teachers are 
described in terms of deficiencies in their attention to the needs of their students (p. 387).  
Of all the characters in Villette, it is Lucy’s colleague and eventual mentor teacher, M. 
Paul, who best embodies attention in the sense understood by both Weil and Murdoch. M. 
Paul’s attention to the world combines aesthetic, moral and epistemological dimensions. M. 
Paul epitomises the kind of attention and regard for others described by Murdoch as a “just 
and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality…the proper mark of the active moral 
agent” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 33). The theme of M. Paul’s generous reading of Lucy, 
counterpointed with Lucy’s difficulty in reading others, provides important links to the 
philosophy of Simone Weil. 
Weil’s epistemology is founded on the concept of reading, and her account of reading 
informs an understanding of Lucy Snowe. Weil uses the metaphor of “reading” to describe 
the way that we make sense of what we apprehend in the world. She argues that all our 
experiences of the world (whether actual or through interpreting text), involve “reading”, 
since to experience is to interpret, which is to “read” the world. Weil acknowledges that to 
read carefully calls for considerable effort, and that, if done thoughtfully, is the means by 
which we shape thought to develop our conceptual understanding and moral awareness. Weil 
cautions that we may we read a situation, or a person, incorrectly. So too, may we ourselves 
be misread (Weil, 1997, p. 135). In another context, Weil observes that: 




oneself to be transported entirely, with a complete forgetfulness of self, into the 
atmosphere of the events recalled, keep the attention fixed for a very long time on 
any little significant details and discover exactly what their full meaning is. (Weil, 
2002, p. 222)  
Lucy’s reading of her world is, by definition, partial. Lucy is very keen to read others, 
but she is very reluctant to be herself read by others. Yet, as Weil reminds us, without proper 
attention, we are all disposed to read from an egotistical perspective. Weil reminds us that 
“what we expect from others depends upon the effect of gravity upon ourselves; what we 
receive from them depends on the effects of gravity upon them” (Weil, 1997, p. 45). This puts 
into context Lucy’s need for attention, and her need to develop in herself the capacity to 
attend to others in a benevolent way. Lucy is initially only able to read her context in terms of 
her own survival, and to read others in terms of their potential risks to herself. She finds it 
impossible to detangle love from secrecy or possessiveness. She mistrusts people and tends to 
impute negative readings on her encounters with others—Madame Beck, M. Paul, the other 
teachers on the staff, the students she is to teach, Père Silas, even Dr John.  
Whereas M. Paul is readily disposed to give a positive reading of Lucy’s character, it 
does not come naturally to Lucy to read others with equal generosity. This is made evident in 
the many conscious omissions in Lucy’s narration. She later admits that she omits small and 
repeated acts of kindness by M. Paul precisely in order to depict him as an extreme, even 
tyrannical personality. M. Paul, by contrast, reads others from a centre of generosity, and 
thus open-mindedly, in a way that admits fallibility and allows for other possible readings. 
Over time, the quality of Lucy’s reading of her situation becomes more positive and more 
flexible.  
Whereas she initially considers Monsieur Paul a “dark little man…pungent and 
austere…a harsh apparition, with his close-shorn, black head, his broad, sallow brow, his thin 
cheek, his wide and quivering nostril” (Brontë, 2004, p. 142), later she sees him in a 
considerably more favourable light: “I know not that I have ever seen in any other human 
face an equal metamorphosis from a similar cause” (p. 355). To the reader, however, it 
appears that it is only Lucy’s perception of him that has been transformed. With time, she 
comes to interpret and to better comprehend the sources of her own mysteries. Gradually 
Lucy shows herself capable of more reflective thought, and more readily able to see that it is 




Murdoch, “are cases of seeing the true order of the world in the light of the Good and 
revisiting the true, or more true, conception of that which we formerly misconceived” 
(Murdoch, 2014, p. 93). 
Bronte makes it clear that Lucy’s learning through attention is slow going. Lucy is far 
less attentive in her reading of Monsieur Paul, and far slower to deliver a positive assessment 
of her colleague, than he is of her. Lucy continues to be a harsh critic of M. Paul for the 
majority of the novel. She accuses him of delivering histrionic lessons, and of being a teacher 
who “apostrophised with vehemence the awkward squad under his orders” (Brontë, 2004, pp. 
142–143). On one occasion, Lucy discovers him at her desk, and immediately assumes he is 
rifling through her things, and only later acknowledges that he was simply leaving her some 
more material to read, as he had done on previous occasions.  
Lucy also misconstrues M. Paul’s requirements for attention in his class, and mocks 
his objections to people sewing, alleging that his demands for attention merely reveal vanity 
on his part: “He…considered sewing a source of distraction from the attention due to 
himself” (p. 269). Later, she repeats her complaint that “M. Paul owned an acute sensitiveness 
to the annoyance of interruption, from whatsoever cause, occurring during his lessons” (p. 
359). It falls to Villette’s reader to consider whether M. Paul’s strictures for attention in his 
classes are unreasonable or actually reasonable, and whether, or why, Lucy deliberately casts 
him in a poor light. Lucy’s repeated fault-finding in Monsieur Paul sometimes unwittingly 
throws light on flaws or dispositions that appear to be very much more her own: “He quelled, 
he kept down when he could, and when he could not, he fumed like a bottled storm” (p. 170).  
A feature of Lucy’s misreading of M. Paul is her judgement of him as proud. She 
draws this conclusion, failing to recognise that what she takes to be his pride (which he 
manifests as self-respect) as an important element of his humility. Her repeated mis-readings 
of M. Paul are almost humorous: When she sees him at a charity concert she mutters:”[W]hat 
business had he there? What had he to do with music or the conservatoire—he who could 
hardly distinguish one note from another? I knew that it was his love of display and authority 
which had brought him there” (p. 237), little realizing his stature within the Villette arts 
community. M. Paul’s is not a self-effacing type of humility, but humility in the form of a 
clear sense of purpose, a sense of self-respect, with its automatically accompanying respect for 
others, and an understanding of both his capabilities and his limitations. M. Paul’s humility 




M. Paul’s humility is a feature of his curiosity about the world and his openness to 
education. He is constantly open to learn new things, and he shows Lucy that humility—the 
capacity to admit that we don’t know—is really the only way that we can open ourselves to 
see new things. He admits to Lucy that he is capable of himself being mis-read, for he can 
admit to himself mis-reading others. If, on occasion, Paul’s demands of his students seem to 
them unreasonable, he at the same time conveys motivations that are entirely heartfelt. His 
sincerity is clear. He shows by his life and his life choices his genuine commitments to others.  
Humility is a key element in Weil and Murdoch’s understanding of attention. On 
their view, humility involves being other-regarding, and is, they acknowledge, the most 
difficult of virtues. M. Paul’s conduct towards Lucy draws together themes of attention, duty 
and humility. His admonishments to Lucy regarding her academic pursuits align with Simone 
Weil’s belief in the need for humility. When he cautions Lucy not to become too keen on her 
own success, Lucy mimics his admonishments with sarcasm: “What did it matter whether I 
failed or not? Who was I that I should not fail like my betters? It would do me good to fail” 
(Brontë, 2004, p. 396). Lucy frequently asserts that her mentor finds fault with her simply in 
order to put her down, whereas seen in a different light, M. Paul registers as someone 
concerned that Lucy not get too caught up in her own success. As Weil comments, “[w]e do 
not obtain the most precious gifts by going in search of them but by waiting for them” (Weil, 
2009, p. 62). Very late in the novel, M. Paul appeals to Lucy in terms that reveal him to be 
candid, humble, and truthful about his own situation: “Will Miss Lucy be the sister of a very 
poor, fettered, burdened, encumbered man?” (Brontë, 2004, p. 450). 
M. Paul recognises in Lucy her potential and her spirit, and he wishes to respect 
Lucy’s autonomy. M. Paul’s patient attentiveness towards Lucy is reminiscent of Weil and 
Murdoch’s account of attention as a commitment to watch, not to look for anything, but 
simply to wait and watch. M. Paul tells Lucy that in his view, she needs “keeping down”, 
“watching” and “watching over” (pp. 402–403). He reminds her “I watch you and others 
pretty closely, pretty constantly, nearer and oftener than you or they think” (p. 403). M. 
Paul’s attentive regard over his all students (and Lucy in particular), comes closest to 
Murdoch’s description of attention as a “just and loving gaze directed upon an individual 
reality” (see Murdoch, 2014, p. 33). Yet when M. Paul explains to Lucy that he watches over 
all the students through his window (Brontë, 2004, p. 403), she is quite outraged, and accuses 
him of spying: “The knowledge it brings you is bought too dear, monsieur; this coming and 




to laugh heartily at what he calls her own “high insular presence” and the “hauteur” of her 
judgments against him (p. 405). Against his humility, we are reminded of Lucy’s urge to 
humiliate. 
The contrast between M. Paul’s humility and Lucy’s attempted humiliation calls for 
further comment. Whereas the concept of ‘humility’ has a profoundly positive meaning, the 
concept of ‘humiliation’ has a profoundly negative connotation. How can this be possible? 
The answer may relate to the two opposing conceptions of respect that are implied. 
According to the former concept, self-respect requires equal respect for others, and according 
to the latter concept, self-respect does not require equal respect for others. Humiliation is an 
act that a person with self-respect of the former kind is incapable of perpetrating, and it is an 
act that is effective only against a person whose self-respect is of the latter kind. While Lucy 
attempts to humiliate M. Paul, his self-respect comes from an ineluctable equal respect for 
others, and so he is immune, and she is not at all liable to succeed in her attempts. This is 
partly because M. Paul already possesses humility. It is mostly because the variety of humility 
that would result from any “successful” act of humiliation (a variety that we in fact never use 
the word ‘humility’ to name) is irrelevant to anyone of M. Paul’s character. 
M. Paul plays a pivotal role in the novel. What kind of Professor is he? Is he a cruel 
pedagogue, as Lucy would have us believe? Is he a person who exploits and dominates Lucy, 
or does he engender in her a reciprocal respect and help instil in her the basis of a true 
friendship? To what extent is M. Paul, as her mentor teacher, the initiator of Lucy’s growth 
and emergence, and to what extent does Lucy learn for herself how to make better sense of 
things and how to look at things otherwise? Through careful narrative design, Brontë leaves 
these questions open as puzzles for the reader at least until the closing pages of the novel. 
Again, we can turn to Simone Weil for her ideas on this matter. Weil considers reading 
carefully as a means to see seemingly insoluble puzzles in wider or different contexts. This 
calls for us to broaden our perspective, to be open to further readings, and not to be limited 
by one reading only. Weil’s view is that reading in this way broadens understanding and 
elicits further possible readings.  
While Lucy finds many faults with her teacher in the early and middle parts of the 
novel, and while she conveys these in no uncertain terms, her view of M. Paul changes 
completely once it is revealed that M. Paul has, like Lucy, endured considerable personal 
tragedy and loss in his life. When Lucy learns from Père Silas the tale of ‘the priest’s pupil’, 




provide financial support to the family of his dead fiancée from twenty years earlier, as well as 
to his own former mentor, the Jesuit priest Père Silas—at considerable financial sacrifice to 
himself.  
Against Lucy’s earlier mis-readings of M. Paul as despotic and overbearing, there is 
ample alternative evidence in the text to show him in quite different light, as someone who 
pursues good actions without seeking anything in return. It is only very late in the novel that 
Lucy herself comes to countenance the possibility of a positive reading of M. Paul. 
M. Paul detects in Lucy her spirit and potential, and, because he has the capacity to 
truly feel for others, he walks alongside Lucy first as her colleague, and then as her mentor 
teacher. Gradually, through many small acts of attention, he draws her out of herself. He is a 
serious scholar, perhaps along the lines of Murdoch’s observation that a “serious scholar is 
also a good man who knows not only his subject but the proper place of his subject in the 
whole of his life” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 94). This leads us to a consideration of the relationship 
between Lucy as trainee teacher, and M. Paul as her pedagogue, in her growth towards 
pedagogical attention. 
4.5. The authority of M. Paul 
M. Paul is an authority figure in the novel in the double sense that he is highly 
knowledgeable about French literature, and also that he is a presence who commands often 
critical attention in the classroom. M. Paul is also an authority in the sense meant by R. S. 
Peters in Chapter IX of his Ethics and education—he is a change agent:  
Paradoxically enough, a teacher must both be an authority and teach in such a 
way that pupils become capable of showing him where he is wrong. The teacher is 
an agent of change and challenge as well as of cultural conservation. (Peters, 1966, 
p. 261)  
Against Lucy’s largely negative accounts of his manner, we can see that M. Paul is 
able to deal with and diffuse rivalries and tensions in the classroom. He is both shrewd and 
respectful, and he teaches in such a way that his pupils are often able to show him his own 
faults and errors. As Lucy’s mentor teacher, M. Paul both challenges and encourages Lucy. 
Whereas she starts out believing that her task as teacher is to dominate her pupils, to coerce 
and subdue them even if by physical force and restraint, she eventually learns from M. Paul’s 




Yet Lucy’s and M. Paul’s verbal interchanges with one another, even to their final 
conversation together, are often barbed. In their interactions, Lucy vacillates between the 
persona of meek governess and that of angry warrior, between modes of surrender and modes 
of rebellion. She appears caught between an understanding of herself as weak and submissive 
on the one hand, and as furious and ungovernable on the other. M. Paul finds her frustrating, 
sympathetic and even at times amusing. He describes her as both “mournful and mutinous” 
(Brontë, 2004, p. 258), but Lucy feels this is unwarranted: “I am ignorant, monsieur, in the 
knowledge you ascribe to me, but I sometimes, not always, feel a knowledge of my own” (p. 
394). 
Unlike Lucy, M. Paul is an extrovert—he is charismatic, loyal and passionate. He 
provides Lucy with mentoring support, and intellectual challenge. He guides her to improve 
herself intellectually and thereby improve her prospects, such as by preparation for 
examinations, and improvement of her knowledge of mathematics. M. Paul demonstrates the 
ability to relate to others, students and staff alike. He attends to his students, arranges plays, 
concerts, outdoor picnics for them. He is an idiosyncratic teacher, one who uses both drama 
and histrionics, although he is never cruel or hypocritical. He thereby enables Lucy to 
become more of the kind of person she would wish herself to be. Monsieur Paul shows in his 
conduct that respect is an element of attention. M. Paul exemplifies this kind of humaneness 
in his behaviour towards Lucy, and others. He demonstrates his capacity for benevolence 
towards her as a person in need. From their initial encounter, he demonstrates his ability to 
“read” Lucy both generously and lovingly. This connects importantly with the notion of 
attention as understood by both Weil and Murdoch. Attention involves looking at another 
person with the “patient eye of love” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 39).  
M. Paul’s capacity for generous readings of others set alongside Lucy’s tendency to be 
both ungenerous and partial in the way she reads others, provides important further links to 
the philosophy of both Weil and Murdoch. They see attention as the true foundation for 
relations between people—friends, teachers, students, fellow travellers, people in need. To 
pay attention means to really look and listen without pre-judgment or prior assumptions. Weil 
reminds us that our capacity for attention is what helps us to discriminate illusion from 
reality: “In our sense perceptions, if we are not sure what we see, we change our position 
while looking, and what is real becomes evident. In the inner life, time takes the place of 
space” (Weil, 1997, p.174). She reminds us that virtue is the disposition to do the right thing 




desire to discover something new prevents people from allowing their thoughts to dwell on 
the transcendent, undemonstrable meaning of what has already been discovered” (Weil, 
1997, p. 184).  
Both Weil and Murdoch talk of attention in terms of the ability to look with respect at 
another person. They also talk of the value of intellectual study, attention to the works of 
literary or artistic genius, as routes to attention. Weil reminds us that “the love of our 
neighbour in all its fullness simply means being able to say to him: ‘What are you going 
through?’ It is a recognition that the sufferer exists, not only as a unit in a collection, or a 
specimen from the social category labelled ‘unfortunate’, but as a man, exactly like us, who 
was one day stamped with a special mark by affliction” (Weil, 1997, pp. 64–65.)  M. Paul 
shows a genuine concern for the realities of Lucy’s predicament, as well as for her general 
well-being. He is mindful of her situation and encourages her to improve her lot through 
further education: “After all, you are solitary and a stranger, and have your way to make and 
your bread to earn; it may be well that you should become known. We will be friends: do you 
agree?” (Brontë, 2004, p. 172). Nevertheless, he is not afraid to admonish Lucy for her 
excesses of emotion and her lack of humility. He tells her in no uncertain terms that she is a 
“young, she wild creature, new caught, untamed” and he admonishes her to “take your bitter 
dose duly and daily” (p. 259). Weil also talks of ‘taming’ the beast in us all, and recommends 
that we seek to subdue our basic instincts in order to find an orientation towards goodness. 
(Little, 1988, pp. 120–122, provides a fuller discussion of this point.) Lucy is infuriated by his 
admonitions, and receives his advice in silence, but hers is the silence of sullen resistance and 
anger, not of acceptance. Lucy uses silence to placate him when he is angry or demanding: 
“Silence and attention was the best balm to apply: I listened” (Brontë, 2004, p. 147). 
Ultimately, however, when Lucy arrives at a considerably changed view, harmonious silence 
with M. Paul is something that she cherishes: “Silence is of different kinds, and breathes 
different meanings; no words could inspire a pleasanter content than M. Paul’s wordless 
presence” (p. 385). 
In his analysis of the figure of the pedagogue, Steiner (2003, p. 2), proposes three 
scenarios to capture the nature relations between master and disciple: (1) conflict in which the 
master destroys the disciple “both psychologically and, in rarer cases, physically”, (2) conflict 
in which the disciple betrays and ruins the master, and (3) a state of harmony and reciprocal 
trust between master and disciple. Lucy’s account implies that the relationship between 




is told, it is evident that the relationship finds its resolution in the third. Ultimately Lucy 
reveals that she is changed by her teacher, and there is a reciprocal change in M. Paul as well, 
in terms of his ability to establish a genuine lifetime friendship between them. Lucy does not 
ultimately outgrow her master, but she does come to a place where she can flourish on her 
own terms. Lucy absorbs from M. Paul through a kind of attainment of her own the authority 
to be a teacher.  
Steiner (2003) underlines the powerful sense of connection that can occur between 
teacher and student. He says further that “eroticism…is inwoven in teaching, in the 
phenomenology of mastery and discipleship” and that “the pulse of teaching is persuasion” 
(p. 26). He provides an account of the intensity of the pedagogue’s influence in the following 
terms: 
Every “break-in” into the other, via persuasion or menace (fear is a great teacher) 
borders on, releases the erotic. Trust, offer and acceptance, have roots which are 
also sexual. Teaching and learning are informed by an otherwise inexpressible 
sexuality of the human soul ...Add to this the key point that in the arts and 
humanities the material being taught, the music being analysed and practised, are 
per se charged with emotions. These emotions will, in considerable part, have 
affinities, immediate or indirect, with the domain of love. (Steiner, 2003, pp. 26–
27) 
Certainly the relationship between M. Paul and Lucy from time to time suggests 
affinities with this domain. Brontë paints a picture of an intense and sometimes implicitly 
sexual tension between M. Paul and Lucy, and subdued actual sexual closeness is implied in 
Lucy’s comment that “the hand of M. Emmanuel was on intimate terms with my desk” 
(Brontë, 2004, p. 380). However, while sometimes implicitly sexual, the tension between the 
two is portrayed as predominantly intellectual in character. In the case of M. Paul, like 
Socrates, the physical attraction of the teacher to the student is interpreted in the best possible 
light, as an unexplored erotic desire that is kept in check, and where the energy of the 
relationship is largely intellectual.  
Like Socrates, M. Paul does not so much convey or pass on knowledge to his disciple 
Lucy, as enable her to better understand herself. Like Socrates, M. Paul enjoys oral exchange 
and dialogue: “M. Emanuel was not a man to write books; but I have heard him lavish with 




indeed my library; and whenever it was opened to me, I entered bliss” (p. 422). In physical 
terms too, M. Paul, like Socrates, is outwardly unremarkable. Both are teachers who demand 
attention from their students, and in both cases, there is a hint that there is an erotic 
dimension to this relationship.  
Monsieur Paul’s mentorship of Lucy (perhaps following the example of Rousseau’s 
Emile), includes both academic and moral guidance. M. Paul embodies the Platonic notion 
that to give academic instruction and to support the formation of another person’s moral 
character is the truest and best basis for love. He reminds her that she needs to develop 
herself and make something of her abilities. He sees the good in her at the same time as he 
poses challenges, the latter frequently balanced by small acts of kindness or confidence in her, 
details which are often omitted until later in the story. His friendship towards Lucy is not 
motivated by charity, nor self-gain, but is a response that is linked to the discipline of 
attention. He insists that he sees their friendship in terms of reciprocity, which, in Weil’s 
terms, is “a miracle by which a person consents to view from a certain distance, and without 
coming any nearer, the very being who is necessary to him as food” (Weil, 2009, p. 157). Weil 
elevates friendship to the highest level. She reminds us of the active quality of friendship: 
“Friendship is not to be sought, not to be dreamed, not to be desired; it is to be exercised (it is 
a virtue)” (Weil, 1997, p. 116). 
M. Paul’s professional convictions about teaching are deeply held. He is shown to 
have high expectations for the design and delivery of classroom instruction. He abhors 
complacency and laziness in teachers and it is he who becomes instrumental in the removal of 
Madame Panache (in French, the name ‘Panache’ translates as a plume or feather hair 
ornament, indicating a flamboyant person) whose teaching methods he judges to be poor, and 
whose attitude towards teaching is in his view “self-complacent” (Brontë, 2004, p. 387). Lucy, 
who has up to now been his sternest critic, on this occasion approves his actions in getting this 
teacher “fairly rooted out of the establishment” (p. 387), and declares him to be an exacting 
judge of character. We may conclude that Lucy comes to understand the importance of 
pedagogical attention in the classroom, and now agrees with M. Paul’s assessment of 
Madame Panache’s teaching deficiencies. M. Paul is not, however, a vindictive person, and 
when, three months later, he hears that the former teacher is now in financial difficulty, he 
supports her to secure other work (p. 388). 
Twice Lucy’s age, M. Paul is an older, wiser teacher who is instrumental in Lucy’s 




ultimately he draws out Lucy’s innate talents. Through attention he helps Lucy to reconnect 
with her true self. Lucy learns from M. Paul’s pedagogical attentions to her, how to be 
attentive to others. M. Paul detects in Lucy not only great potential, but also a tendency 
towards self-denial in the name of virtue, a tendency which he strongly discourages. He is 
curious about her. He genuinely learns from Lucy and sees in their connection the possibility 
a true friendship. As a result of M. Paul’s interest in her educational progress, Lucy comes to 
a place of better balance, where she has room for both reason and emotion. This reflects 
Steiner’s suggestion that there can be reciprocal relationship between pedagogue and student: 
“By a process of interaction, of osmosis, the Master learns from his disciple as he teachers 
him. The intensity of the dialogue generates friendship in the highest sense” (Steiner, 2003, p. 
2). 
M. Paul demonstrates simple taste and aesthetic discernment in the way he furnishes 
Lucy’s new school rooms. M. Paul discourages Lucy’s use of ornamentation, and discourages 
her any ostentatiousness in dress. In his view, humble clothing and humble origins do not 
have to signal deficiencies in cultural refinement. His taste correlates with respectability, 
virtue, and morality, as well as the careful and responsible use of resources. By Lucy’s 
tentative exploration with her appearance and presentation, Brontë seems to suggest that her 
aesthetic sensibility needs to be guided and inculcated. 
M. Paul is unsentimental in his dealings with Lucy. He admonishes Lucy, reminding 
her of the importance of good judgment: “I think your judgement is warped—that you are 
indifferent where you ought to be grateful—and perhaps devoted and infatuated, where you 
ought to be cool as your name” (p. 383). He advises Lucy to avoid self-promotion as well as 
egotistical pursuits, including vanity about her dress and appearance—he suggests to her 
critically that she sometimes tries to be too clever. M. Paul tells Lucy that passing exams is not 
so important since study is a worthy goal in itself. He encourages Lucy to think for herself. He 
teaches her by imparting knowledge, modelling, and developing in Lucy her capacity to look 
at things in new ways, so that her powers of rational thought are developed. He upholds the 
importance of critique, debate and argument, and shows Lucy how to modulate her mind 
away from a reliance on emotion and towards more measured and reflective responses. M. 
Paul understands Weil’s maxim that the most important part of being a teacher is “to teach 
what it is to know” (Weil, 1956, p. 364). However, Lucy demonstrates considerable 
resentment towards his methods, and several times expresses the wish to give up entirely: 




profoundly that learning is not happiness” (Brontë, 2004, p. 390). When M. Paul queries 
what he considers to be her remarkable ability in her studies, she comments sarcastically “to 
me was ascribed a fund of knowledge which I was supposed criminally and craftily to 
conceal” (p. 392).  
Although M. Paul is shown to be volatile at times, he is never cruel, flippant, or 
exploitative. Like the fictional Jean Brodie, Monsieur Paul sees education as opportunity. He 
inculcates in his students their curiosity and interests and he encourages them to broaden 
their experiences. He develops Lucy’s intellectual interests, widens her reading experience, 
and urges her to develop her mind. He encourages her to improve her knowledge of 
mathematics, and arranges for her to take examinations. He gives Lucy’s written work 
detailed attention, and leaves in her desk material that he judges she will enjoy reading: 
I saw the Brownie’s work, in exercises left over-night full of faults, and found next 
morning carefully corrected: I profited by his capricious good-will in loans full 
welcome and refreshing. Between a sallow dictionary and worn-out grammar 
would magically grow a fresh, interesting new work, or a classic, mellow and sweet 
in its ripe age. (pp. 380–381) 
Against Lucy’s partial and constantly critical view of her mentor teacher, M. Paul can 
be seen to be a dedicated teacher, organised in both manner and classroom delivery. Against 
Lucy’s reportage, we can discern that he is a learned and gifted teacher. He promotes reading 
literature and the arts in general. He is a great storyteller, and enjoys both oral exchange and 
being read to. He tailors class material to the needs and interests of his students. Over time 
Lucy realizes that he is a person consistent in his principles, and that if he is at times overly 
sensitive to his own needs for attention, this relates more to his lively personality than to 
unreasonable or tyrannical demands. He admits to Lucy his tendency to be volatile: “I have 
my malevolent moods: I always had, from childhood” (p. 172). Moreover, while he loves to 
receive simple presents from his students, and is mildly offended if his birthday is forgotten, 
Lucy insists that he is never hypocritical and that his moral values are sound (p.171). We see 
that he seeks to connect with his students and colleagues, and that he has moral convictions, 
principles, and human feelings. He is honest about himself and he teaches as he means to live.  
4.6. Attention and goodness 
Weil and Murdoch align attention with the concept of goodness. They argue that 




situations, people, aesthetic achievements. M Paul embodies themes of goodness in Villette. 
His evident belief in moral goodness and his willingness to create good outcomes for other 
people is not limited to his reading of Lucy. Monsieur Paul is generous in ways that Lucy 
seeks entirely to mask in her narration. Against Lucy’s account of him as a cruel and despotic 
man, he is revealed to be a genuinely fine and other-regarding person. M. Paul is shown as a 
teacher who tries to see the good in people and situations and who looks for good outcomes 
for others, in even the most minor of ways. (He regularly shares his lunchtime brioche with 
less well-off students of the third division.)  
M. Paul is someone who works for the greater good, and who gets pleasure from 
doing that. He does not see himself as a martyr, nor does he ever strive to gain sympathy. 
Rather he is someone genuinely committed to the work of improving things for his society 
and for his students. He values honesty and hard work. While his excitable temperament is a 
flaw and he has the capacity to reduce his students to tears if their attention is less than it 
should be, this is not a moral weakness so much as an idiosyncrasy of temperament, and 
when this happens, his remorse is genuine and immediate. When his ultimate departure from 
the school is announced, the students are all completely devastated. 
M. Paul’s evident belief in moral goodness, and his willingness to create good 
outcomes for other people is not limited to his reading of Lucy. It is revealed that he also 
helps Père Silas, his former teacher and mentor, as well as others from his past, including 
Madame Walravens. He makes it a personal mission to promote and champion Lucy’s talent 
for teaching even to the point of setting her up in her own school at the Faubourg Clotilde. 
He does this at his own expense, so that Lucy can enjoy independence of employment. He 
has a singular way of enabling Lucy to find her way as a person, even when she is not herself 
quite aware of what that way might prove to be.  
Through M. Paul, Brontë appears to advance the conviction that genuine pedagogical 
attention is possible, that it is an orientation that overlooks superficialities, and that attention 
of this kind strives always to look for the good in people and situations. M. Paul’s attentiveness 
to Lucy is characterised by acceptance coupled with guidance. He sees the good in her at the 
same time as he poses her with considerable challenge and provocation, the latter frequently 
balanced by small acts of kindness or confidence. Monsieur Paul arouses in Lucy what she is 
capable of. He has an impact on her life. He awakens in her because she is ready. Roberts 
(2017, p. 119) reminds us that “teaching is a necessarily interventionist process; it is not a 




Nothing is made completely easy for Lucy, however. Even the school that M. Paul 
makes possible for Lucy to manage will call for much hard work and on-going commitment. 
Gradually, under M. Paul’s tutelage, Lucy emerges as a dedicated scholar, having discovered 
the joy of study for its own sake. She appears to develop the capacity for attention, even if by 
the briefest of flashes. “What I loved, it joyed me by any effort to content; but the noble 
hunger for science [knowledge] in the abstract—the godlike thirst after discovery—those 
feelings were known to me but by briefest flashes” (Brontë, 2004, p. 390). Still her relationship 
with her mentor teacher remains testy. She accuses him of wanting to find fault with her: 
“[h]e liked me to commit faults: a knot of blunders was sweet to him as a cluster of nuts” (p. 
386). Subsequently, however, she describes her writing pleasure in terms that imply full 
attention: “But I got books, read up the facts, laboriously constructed a skeleton out of the dry 
bones of the real, and then clothed them, and tried to breathe into them life, and in this 
pastime I had pleasure” (p. 444). 
In time, Lucy learns to accept other readings of her world, particularly although not 
exclusively, in relation to M. Paul. The conflict that appears to present the greatest obstacle to 
their continued friendship is the tension between his Catholicism and her Protestantism. Even 
here, M. Paul is instrumental in showing Lucy that this difference can be ultimately a point of 
respect between them both. Monsieur Paul is not afraid of difference, and wants Lucy to 
maintain her Protestant faith despite the fact that her beliefs are not in keeping with his 
Catholic views. He tells Lucy that such differences in their religious convictions are 
differences to be cherished, not to be stifled, and he reassures her that he welcomes her ideas 
and convictions. He shows Lucy that to be open to different ideas and opinions is the way to 
develop and progress. Once again, his attention to Lucy links to the educative theme of the 
novel. 
Finally, Lucy literally finds her own voice: “I spoke. All leapt from my lips. I lacked 
not words now” (p. 540). She now acknowledges her own faults and demonstrates a degree of 
humility towards M. Paul that is genuinely felt: “Warm, jealous and haughty, I knew not till 
now that my nature had such a mood; he gathered me near his heart. I was full of faults; he 
took them and me all home” (p. 541). Now Lucy is able to see M. Paul as a man of generosity: 
“He was a man whom it made happy to see others happy… only to the very stupid, perverse, 
or unsympathising was he in the slightest degree dangerous” (p. 423). Lucy’s ability to picture, 
through attention, the reality and existence and needs and wants of other people, develops 




She resists M. Paul’s repeated acts of attention towards her—although bit by bit, slowly and 
progressively over time, his “little peering efforts” of attention towards her do gradually 
amount to something (Murdoch, 2014, p. 42).  
4.7. Summary 
Villette explores the suffering of an apprentice teacher in her struggles to become 
worthy to teach. Lucy’s educative progress involves not only her cognitive engagement in 
academic study, but also her development of sensitivity towards others, and growth in her 
ability to see herself as a member of a community. Initially, Lucy resists the attentions of her 
mentor teacher and she rebuffs him at every turn. M. Paul’s persistent interest in Lucy’s 
progress goes to the heart of his function as pedagogue. M Paul sees in Lucy a complex and 
genuinely good person, capable even of teaching M. Paul, through her passionate ways—and 
he persists in efforts to set up a purposeful dialogue between them. Gradually Lucy becomes 
more social, less neurotic. Lucy eventually comes to an understanding that educative power 
and attention does not have to be coercive or cruel.  
As Lucy grows in attention, so too does her capacity to build up “structures of value” 
around her (Murdoch, 2014, p. 36). M. Paul’s part in her progress is not something that can 
be fully explained (p. 37). Lucy’s final state of self-awareness is far removed from her earlier 
self-preoccupation, uncertainty and insecurity. She finally indicates that she finds purpose, 
value and meaning in her role as a teacher who lives in relatively mundane and humble 
circumstances. If Lucy recalls the influence of her former mentor teacher on herself, she is 
likely also to call to mind her own slow progress. Given her newfound understanding of 
humility, this should enable her to better attend to the needs of her own students. 
Lucy’s progress in this regard resonates with Weil, who supports the Platonic view 
that the teacher’s role is to bring out what is already latent in the student, and that the student 
literally unfurls under the guidance of the teacher. Weil tells us that education, “whether its 
object be children or adults, individuals or an entire people, or even oneself—consists in 
creating motives. To show what is beneficial, what is obligatory, what is good—that is the task 
of education” (Weil, 2002, p. 188). R. S. Peters (1969) also argues that education “involves 
essentially processes that introduce people to what is valuable in an intelligible and voluntary 
manner and that creates in the learner a desire to achieve it, this being seen to have its place 
along with other things in life” (p. 98). He further argues that “the job of the educator is not 




creates new wants and stimulates new interests” (p. 105). In Villette, Lucy’s self-education is 
portrayed in just this way. In no small part through M. Paul’s interventions, Lucy comes to 
value her own progress, and to see education as valuable in itself, and a route to improve the 
quality of her life and the lives of others.  
Murdoch tells us that true attention involves an on-going process of mental 
recollection and revision. This, Murdoch reminds us, is a difficult, demanding, and essentially 
“endless” process (Murdoch, 2014, p. 27). Murdoch calls for us to be attentive in our 
thinking, not in slavish, militaristic, self-serving, or obsessive ways, but in ways that lead us out 
of ourselves, and that develop our regard for the other. Murdoch reminds us that good 
teaching requires self-knowledge, and that good teaching calls for measured and appropriate 
acts of attention. She reminds us too, that all our growth is educational since themes of moral 
progress and attention are closely intertwined.  
Weil and Murdoch remind us that such headwork as attention calls for requires time, 
detachment and patience. They also remind us that it is through attention that our moral 
being is developed. Lucy Snowe’s trajectory in Villette is exactly of this character. At the start 
of Villette, Lucy is only in her early twenties and she has not yet experienced a great deal of the 
world. Her progress is essentially a moral and aesthetic quest, an education in attention. Lucy 
has to come to terms with her own sense of self before she can flourish. Initially Lucy feels 
herself to be completely hidebound and constrained. She is blindsided by the social demands 
that are placed on her. Lucy has to learn to understand her own nature before she can 
function as a teacher. Initially she resists situations that will involve herself in conversation or 
dialogue, preferring to hide away and be a spectator.  
Lucy is not completely the author of her own change and she is not unassisted. Her 
progress is in part due to the challenges and provocations of M. Paul, Lucy finds her teaching 
voice and her teaching persona, and a base from which she will be able to see the good in her 
own students. Liston (2008, p. 389), cited in Roberts and Saeverot (2018, p. 42), notes that 
teaching is “frequently a struggle and a sacrifice. It is a struggle and a sacrifice to see beyond 
our egotistical selves so as to see our students more clearly.” Lucy’s encounters with M. Paul 
help her to discover the kind of a teacher she can be. M. Paul shows Lucy what it is to care 
about whom, what, and how she teaches. He teaches her too, how to employ contemplation, 
meditation, solitude and silence for their own sakes and not simply as an escape, or a cover 




Ultimately Lucy finds that she has a professional role that suits her. She is in a position 
to work not simply for an income, but more importantly, with a sense of meaning to her life. 
Lucy’s satisfaction at the close of the work is not that of self-congratulation for her own 
achievements, but is a rather more subdued ‘Murdochian’ celebration of her discovery of the 
nourishment of human connection, friendship, and a newfound quiet sense of her capacity to 
cope, even despite the likely death of her friend and mentor M. Paul:  
The secret of my success did not lie so much in myself, in any endowment, any 
powers of mine, as in a new state of circumstances, a wonderfully changed life, a 
relieved heart…. Here pause, pause at once. There is enough said” (Brontë, 2004, 
pp. 415–416) 
Villette is a novel that is so constructed that it that calls repeatedly for reflective 
thinking and the reader’s willingness for “judgement suspended during further inquiry, and 
suspense is likely to be somewhat painful”—a further reference to John Dewey’s How we think. 
(Dewey, 1934, p. 13). Brontë’s work reminds us of the power of the nineteenth century multi-
volume novel as a forum for moral education and as an avenue for the presentation of ethical 
ideas. Villette is a novel about teachers and teaching that sensitises readers to the experiences 
of others. It demonstrates the limits of insularity, and shows the value of human connection. 
Villette explores ideas of humility, compassion, and understanding another’s plight. It shows 
that the ability to respond to and integrate the needs and interests of others is fundamental to 
education in the broadest sense. Villette also acknowledges that education involves debate and 
challenge. For our minds to be open to ideas, we need to accept that we may need to have 
even our most deeply held convictions changed or challenged.  
As a study in educative attention Villette shows how a young teacher may, with support 
and guidance, develop her standing. Beginner teachers need time to find their way, and 
failures will occur. As Lucy observes “nothing happens as we expect” (Brontë, 1853/2004, p. 
354). Lucy’s education as a beginner teacher involves learning to look at things in new ways. 
To learn how to be in the classroom is demanding, and involves self-understanding, as well as 
decisions about how to establish order and structure, how to connect with the students, and 
how to ‘be’ in the classroom. We are reminded of the importance of the teacher’s attention, 
as well as of her respect and curiosity towards her students and of her orientation to the 
students’ “betterment”. We are reminded of the ways that a teacher may use creative tensions 




flow of challenging literature and political pamphlets. He engages her in debate and critical 
thinking as well as coaching her on her mathematical ability. He guides her to further her 
own education and chides her for not rising to challenges. He encourages her to give 
attention to her own career trajectory—not just to the immediate moment, but to consider 
how she might build on her innate gifts in order to develop herself for a meaningful future. 
He encourages her to be a person of good character. 
Villette exemplifies, through Lucy’s mentor teacher, M. Paul, the long-term beneficent 
effects of small acts of attention that involve generosity and regard for others, for both the 
giver and the recipient. The novel also reminds us that schools can and ought to be places 
that inculcate self-belief, places that widen students’ perspectives and provide an environment 
that invites and enables discussion and the confrontation of difference. Finally, the novel 
recognises that the best teachers may prove to be influential, even positively life-changing, in 
ways that are not immediately apparent. 
The following chapter considers pedagogical attention in quite a different light. Here, 
Hermann Hesse’s 1943 novel The Glass Bead Game is considered as a literary work that 
explores the notion of pedagogical attention through the lens of myth. This work represents a 
monumental effort on Hesse’s part to capture a sense of the depth of courage and  
uncertainty that teaching calls for, while at the same time expressing a sense of positivity for 
the future and hope for the young, and a willingness to consider again the importance of the 
relationship between teacher and student. 
The Glass Bead Game can be read as something of a “revisioning” of Plato’s ancient 
philosophy in that it charts Joseph Knecht’s educative growth along the lines of Plato’s 
philosophy of ‘paideia’—a process of character formation that involves educating the entire 
person (body, mind and spirit). This analogy of emergence reflects Knecht’s own pedagogical 
progress as he develops his capacity to see more, and further, just as Plato tells us that the 
fundamentals of a happy life, a life of ‘eudaimonia’, involve not only efforts to develop mastery, 
whereby the individual strives towards their best efforts, but also concerns individuals being of 










Chapter 5: Hermann Hesse’s The Glass Bead Game 
5.0. Introduction 
If Hermann Hesse’s final novel, The Glass Bead Game (1943) were fashioned a fable, 
then its moral would be that there is no hope without courage, just as there is no courage without hope. 
Yet the work is not a fable, but rather is mythological; and mythological significances do not 
reduce to a single moral. Nevertheless, to have produced a literary work that depends so 
much for its significance on the quality of attention of its readers reflects for Hesse both 
monumental courage and a monumental quality of hope.  
Hesse hands to his reader the task of interpreting an especially sophisticated fiction. 
Confidence seems conveyed that one day, much by working together in critical discussion of 
the book, some readers will prove match to this almost preternatural, interpretative 
undertaking. The novel, outwardly predicated on courageous hope, is also inwardly so 
predicated. The novel’s action is ethically demanding to the extent that it has the reader 
gather into an uncomfortable whole, a kind of tension—a dilemma of parts and wholes, in a 
dialectical development down through ages. The sense of unbridled urgency with regard to 
this tension must be met with patience. To progress with it calls not only for patient attention 
of one’s own, but also willingness to depend upon others: any reader is likely to develop the 
need to discuss with other readers the significances of this work. 
Hesse’s novel integrates forms of real and fictional history, fictional biography, 
documentary, legend, and anecdote, and intimates a world that, like Plato’s Republic, is part 
utopian, part dystopian. Not only in the fictional world of Castalia, but also among readers of 
the novel, there is a problem for intellectual understanding that is hidden, but that becomes 
urgent once it is recognised. The problem for understanding is almost beyond what any one 
reader can think through. Hope in the novel is made out to be something absolutely 
courageous and intellectual, dependent on a kind of faith in others to carry things forward. 
Hesse’s novel demands of its reader mental work that requires patience and obedience, each 
of an intensity that approaches that which is demanded of Joseph Knecht, the novel’s chief 
protagonist. But the reader’s task is also to understand Knecht’s step beyond either patience 
or obedience, to the actualisation in himself of a kind of authenticity not less singular than it is 





Hesse’s depicted world of Castalia represents a far advance not of science or 
technology, but of art, towards some kind of defining cultural attainment. As in several of 
Hesse’s earlier novels,33 this work also pursues themes that derive from philosophy—under a 
rich, unusually eclectic understanding of this word. Hesse draws our attention to “eastern” as 
well as “western” philosophical interpretations that help bring coherence to our experience of 
the world. The work encompasses various philosophical themes—the value of aesthetic 
experience, the quest for authenticity, the limits of spoken and written language, the making 
sense of oneself and of life itself. Hesse’s novel explores the idea of pedagogy as the ‘leading 
out’ of human potential. The work ponders the very idea of education and questions how to 
make best sense of it.  
As Craft (1984, p. 9) notes, there are two quite different Latin derivations that make 
up our understanding of the English word “education”—the one as an undertaking to educare 
(to mould, to fashion), and the other as an undertaking to educere (to enable, to elicit). Hesse’s 
novel considers the idea of education in both these senses, and suggests how, as a rare 
occurrence that is yet of singular importance, a balance between them might eventually be 
achieved through the agency of one who is open to being educated. One quality of good 
educators that is revealed in the book is how they help create for others the richest possibility 
for such an eventual achievement. Yet Hesse leaves his readers with some sense that there 
might be instability in that mix. In order to be true to itself, an especially finely educated 
agency will come to reflect an originality that is so vaulting as to make ambiguous whether it 
involves creativity or spite.  
As a work of fiction, The Glass Bead Game mobilises extraordinary insights of sociology, 
psychology, history and the study of art and religion, while at the same time it is constructed 
within an aesthetic at the heart of which is a timeless, dialectical kind of challenge to 
timelessness or stability. Perhaps better read as intellectual critique, a novel of ideas that 
straddles both fiction and philosophy, the novel is representative of no particular literary 
genre. The work may be termed ‘mythological’ in that the novel’s abstraction from a 
recognisable ‘actuality’ at the same time enables Hesse to explore some deeper themes and 
truths concerning education. Within the plane of the fiction, this novel is an account of the 
life and moral growth of Joseph Knecht. On a higher plane that relates to its mythological 
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significance, the novel considers Knecht as a prototype and the true meaning of the 
prototype; the novel considers Joseph Knecht’s relationship with reality, a point that is made 
early in the novel. 
Despite its epic length, Hesse’s work bears some characteristics of allegory or fable in 
the sense that the novel is an ‘apologue’ (derived from the Greek apologus)—a form of 
storytelling that has an educative or moral function. Taken as a whole, Hesse’s novel is not so 
much a detailed exploration of the growth of Joseph Knecht, as it is an illustrative idealised 
treatment of how inchoate selfhood may be brought along by social conditions towards that 
selfhood’s bringing itself truly into being. The work concerns not only what is involved if one 
is to achieve individuation in an authentic and meaningful way, but in addition, it concerns 
why, within this accomplishment, an individual must realize the utmost humility and 
reference to others. Also, any individual achievement itself remains open to further 
transformative reinterpretation by others. 
The Glass Bead Game offers an account of education that resonates profoundly with that 
of Plato, the more so when Plato’s ideas are interpreted as consonant with ideas of the East. 
Various commentators have identified an Eastern influence on Plato in The Republic and 
elsewhere, through Plato’s play with the Eastern idea of reincarnation, an Eastern idea with 
which Hesse also plays in The Glass Bead Game. Also, as others have noted, there are important 
similarities between Knecht’s educational trajectory and the Platonic ideal for education as 
outlined in Book VII of Plato’s Republic. Building on the research of Götz (1978), Milek (1970), 
Taylor (1982) and others, the present chapter pursues this connection further, and identifies 
themes in The Glass Bead Game that connect the novel in important ways to the Platonist 
inclinations of philosophers Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch.  
The current chapter, which is necessarily a tentative interpretation of Hesse’s vast and 
challenging work, considers the novel as a statement of the ways that education gives meaning 
not just to an individual life, but to life overall. It seeks to consider the open-endedness of 
Hesse’s work and to demonstrate that an understanding of Plato can enrich (and be enriched 
by) that understanding, and that Weil and Murdoch can similarly, and for related reasons, be 
appreciated more richly by reference to Hesse, and vice versa. The chapter also addresses a 
relationship to Plato’s dialogues in what Hesse’s novel says about teachers and teaching. This 
reading of the novel considers that the educator is tasked with a kind of faith that among the 
young some may make good in carrying things forward in a way that offers not merely 




parts. The first offers an explanation of the structure and conception of Hesse’s novel, and 
considers the resonance of the novel’s Platonic themes including the influence of Knecht’s 
three main mentors. The second considers Knecht’s “awakening”, and the final section 
connects the novel to the educative lessons of Plato’s dialogues.  
5.1. Structure and strategy 
The Glass Bead Game embodies themes that were important to Hesse across his 
lifetime—the nature and worth of education, the difficulty of truly realizing one’s self, and the 
relationship between aesthetics and morality—themes that also interest Weil and Murdoch.34 
A central idea in Hesse’s novel is the nature of a person’s lifetime journey of educational 
growth.35 Composed during the turbulent political period in Europe that culminated in the 
horrors of World War II, Hesse’s novel can nevertheless be read as a subtly optimistic work, 
one that offers an idealized sense of pedagogical emergence and renewal. 
The majority of the novel takes place within the so-called “pedagogical province” of 
Castalia (Hesse, 2000, p. 54). Hesse depicts his Castalia (the name is derived from Greek 
legend) as a ‘pinnacle’ society, a privileged community restricted to élite male scholars who 
are endowed with extraordinary intellectual gifts. We learn that the province of Castalia (and 
with it the invention of the Glass Bead Game), has emerged following some catastrophic 
event of such magnitude that it has caused an entire cultural collapse. The narrator refers 
derisively to the time prior to this collapse as an age of “untrammelled individualism” (p. 10), 
and “the Age of the Feuilleton” (p. 9). (The French word ‘feuillet’ means a leaf of a book, and 
its diminutive ‘feuilleton’ could mean either a thin, flaky pastry, or, figuratively, a light ‘gossip 
column’—the analogy here being matter without substance.) We are given to understand that in 
this time people had lost any telling sense of what is of value. They had become shallow, 
individualistic, and entirely disconnected from a sense of history or from markedly moral 
sense.  
Hesse’s fictional world depicts a cultural system whose entire purpose is to recover and 
re-enact, through play, the highest attainment of aesthetic sensibility. In Castalia, the glass 
bead game players are involved in endlessly compounding new permutations and 
combinations of their established knowledge forms. Castalia is a perfect-seeming and yet 
 
34 Hesse’s biographers—in particular Field (1968), Milek (1970) and Remys (1983), note that Hesse worked on 
the novel’s manuscript for over a decade. 




substantially self-enclosed world, whose openness to new modes of recovery and re-enactment 
of highest historical aesthetic attainments masks at the same time a condition that is closed 
and even insular. By virtue of an effort of creativity that is almost inexplicable, the novel’s 
main protagonist, Joseph Knecht, ultimately challenges Castalia. His enlightened view looks 
both beyond, to Castalia’s dependency on a larger society, as well as ahead, to changes that 
are not wont to be foreseen by Castalian minds.  
The limitation that Joseph’s awakening surpasses and that his conduct challenges, is 
not only from Castalians being too self-absorbed, but also from their being insufficiently 
‘original’. His awakening leads him to surpass, to challenge, and ultimately leave the entire 
order. Hesse leaves the meaning of this exit open to wonder and interpretation, the more 
because Knecht does not himself personally long survive the making of his great change. To 
the extent that Hesse’s narrative leaves room for an optimistic reading, it is that change that 
constitutes a challenge to an entire way of life may be looked upon with hope—albeit as a test 
of the agency of those in future generations. 
Hesse’s narrative is centrally concerned with the intellectual and educative growth 
and progress of the main figure, Joseph Knecht, rather than with the trajectory of his career, 
or an account of his social or emotional growth to maturity. (The narrator explicitly expresses 
disapproval for “the rebel who is driven by his desires and passions to infringements upon law 
and order” (p. 5)). The narrator, who expresses a “distaste for the cult of personality” (Hesse, 
2000, p. 243), is explicitly “not interested in a hero’s pathology, or family history, nor in his 
drives, his digestion, and how he sleeps” (p. 5). His central concern lies with Knecht’s 
intellectual and educative path. The narrator’s explicit aim is to discuss the figure of Joseph 
Knecht only insofar as he is of interest for what he shows, and so “only if his nature and his 
education have rendered him able to let his individuality be almost perfectly absorbed” in a 
way that does not annihilate “the savor and worth of the individual” (p. 5).  
Thus although the narration focuses on the chronology of Joseph Knecht, the work 
simultaneously provides for the reader an outline of something more schematic—an 
exploration of what a truly meaningful life might amount to. Rather than a psychological 
exploration, Hesse’s novel charts his chief protagonist’s ongoing pedagogical progress, 
“toward ‘awakening’, toward advancing, toward apprehending reality” (p. 258). The novel is 





The Glass Bead Game is a complex and multi-layered text.36 It is structured into three 
main parts: a short, formal introduction to the nature and existence of Castalia; a lengthy 
account of the life and education of the central figure, Joseph Knecht; and a subsequent 
compendium of some of the younger Knecht’s posthumously published writings. Across these 
three parts, the novel’s chronology spans vastly different historical time periods, establishing 
themes of fraternity and kinship across sweeps of human history, geography, and culture. It 
remains unclear to the reader whether Hesse’s novel chiefly looks ahead towards Castalia’s 
implied future—that is to say, towards the 25th century, or chiefly looks back to the time of 
Knecht’s growing up, some two centuries prior or much further back, to the time of Knecht’s 
three fictional biographies. These temporal dislocations serve to distance the novel from 
Hesse’s own historical period and they underline the essential timelessness of the novel’s 
pedagogical themes. The novel’s expansive structure also promotes a sense of open-endedness 
and its elusive chronology opens the door to consider an eastern mode of contemplation of 
the meaning of life. For example, the three fictional biographies of Part 3 (Knecht as 
Rainmaker, as Hermit, and as Buddhist) celebrate the meaningfulness of reincarnation just as 
they amplify the possibility that the central figure, Knecht, is himself a timeless prototype.  
The novel’s narrator tells us that the glass bead game connects in its origins back to 
Greek and Pythagorean intellection, as well as to ancient Chinese and Arabic culture (p. 7). It 
is based on forms of contemplation and meditative thought that amalgamate Eastern and 
Western thought-ways (Zen and Plato) such that the individual player may sense that “he has 
extracted from the universe of accident and confusion a totally symmetrical and harmonious 
cosmos” (p. 185). We are told that “to play the game, which is aligned to the nature and spirit 
of classical music, requires “great attentiveness, keenness, and concentration” (p. 24).  
Hesse’s emphasis on attention invites connection to the moral philosophy of Weil and 
Murdoch, both of whom see attention as fundamental to the development of intellectual and 
moral growth. Murdoch reminds us that when we are involved in moral investigations, if we 
explore the right questions in the right way, we may, through attention, come to a better 
understanding: “The process of discovery is to be thought of as accompanied or motivated by 
a passion or desire which is increased and purified in the process (Murdoch, 1992, p. 400). 
 
36 Scholars who have provided detailed analyses of the novel’s complexity include Johnson (1956), Boulby, 




Hesse’s novel involves a particular kind of moral investigation, and his call for attention, 
keenness and concentration applies equally to his readers and to Joseph Knecht. 
Consistent with the novel’s overall ambition as an exploration of ideas rather than of 
character, its central figure is never described physically—although aspects of his bearing, 
including his exemplary courtesy and his significant intellectual and musical gifts, are 
repeatedly emphasized. Joseph is depicted as a sapiosexual, one who is keen to consider with 
others his most deeply-held beliefs. He is ever willing to engage in protracted intellectual 
debates with his peers, but he holds himself physically and emotionally to himself. Further, 
the most intense intellectual sharing proceeds for Joseph most naturally to periods of deep 
and reflective solitude.  
Identified as musically gifted from a young age, Knecht’s family of origin is never 
mentioned. He is raised as a ward of the state, within the confines of select, intellectually elite 
male communities—first Escholz and then Wadzell, a former Cistercian monastery. Then, in 
his early twenties, he is admitted to the training school for Castalia. The majority of the novel 
chronicles his steady educational progress that leads, in time, to the opportunity to join the 
prestigious Castilian Order.  
We follow Knecht’s exemplary progress through the hierarchy of the Castalian Order 
until, still only in his late forties, he is nominated to the prestigious role of Magister Ludi. This 
role involves oversight of the entire operation of the Glass Bead Game, a role that he fulfils 
masterfully. Over a further, extended period of time, hints are given that Knecht doubts that 
the aesthetic idealism of Castalia is sufficient for a meaningful life. He comes to see that 
Castalia is an end in itself rather than a site for further creativity (Hesse, 2000, p. 222). He 
arrives at a point where he forswears his role in Castalia and all that it represents. He 
determines that he will leave Castalia to pursue a different, humbler, and far less certain path 
as a school tutor. Tragically, a few days after leaving Castalia in pursuit of his new, humble 
role, Knecht’s life ends in his accidental drowning in a mountain tarn.  
On one level, Knecht’s death serves as a useful memento mori—a reminder that death 
inevitably comes to us all. On another level, this dramatic parting scene ‘mythologises’ 
Knecht’s actions in a way that brings to mind a theme of Plato’s dialogue Phaedo, that to teach 
is to prepare for death. (Significantly, for Plato, death means to give up the ego.) While we 
might be startled by Joseph’s untimely death, particularly since his new path has barely 




than this one individual’s life. Knecht’s death is an acknowledgement of the reality of another, 
younger person, Tito. It is implied that Tito, who witnesses Knecht’ drowning, may, as a 
consequence of this event, himself become Joseph’s pedagogical “offspring” and thus 
commence his own new, more focussed, educative chapter: 
Only later would he [Tito] realize that his dance and his transported state in 
general were only partly caused by the mountain air, the sun, the dawn, his sense 
of freedom. They were also a response to the change awaiting him, the new 
chapter in his young life that had come in the friendly and awe-inspiring form of 
the Magister. (p. 401) 
Knecht’s capacity to overcome the limits of Castalia and to direct his attention 
towards Tito as another worthy individual, supports a reading of the novel as an account of 
the older man’s growth in pedagogical attention, as understood by Weil and Murdoch.  
Knecht’s final act of diving into the mountain lake emblematizes his step away from 
the ‘intellectualized’ Castalia. In this action he achieves the realization identified by 
Murdoch, that virtue “is concerned with really apprehending that other people 
exist…Freedom is knowing and understanding and respecting things quite other than 
ourselves” (Murdoch, 1997, p. 284). Murdoch also tells us that “morality, as the ability or 
attempt to be good, rests upon deep areas of sensibility and creative imagination, upon 
removal from one state of mind to another, upon shifts of attachments, upon love and respect 
for the contingent details of the world” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 337). Cohn (1959, p. 353) 
discusses Knecht’s death as “at the same time a beginning, not only for Tito, but for himself 
as well”. Cohn further argues that “in his last transformation, Knecht enters new, unknown, 
and mysterious bonds, not as one who flees, but as one who is called” (p. 355). However, 
another way to view Hesse’s story is to see it as a mythological account, whereby Knecht’s 
death ennobles his life because it represents the culmination of his determination to follow his 
true path and chart his own purpose. Following Weil’s account of the parable of the Good 
Samaritan as an example of genuine attention, we can also read Knecht’s death as in some 
sense a truly creative act. Weil writes: 
The attention is creative. But at the moment when it is engaged it is a 
renunciation. This is true, at least, if it is pure. The man accepts to be diminished 
by concentrating on an expenditure of energy, which will not extend his own 




independently of him. (Weil, 2009, p. 90) 
The Glass Bead Game has a semi-documentary tone, and employs a literary technique 
sometimes called “montage” (see further Ziolkowski, 1965, p. 284), whereby references to 
actual historical figures, quotations, literary allusions and subtexts inform the narrative. The 
novel’s stylised characters then become vehicles for arguments and theoretical debates about 
philosophical matters. Literary commentators (for instance Fickert, 1986; Ziolkowski 1965), 
have explored the novel’s implied references to leading literary, philosophical, poetic and 
historical figures of Hesse’s own time—Goethe, Nietszche, Mann, and Burkhardt. It seems 
likely that Schiller (1759–1805) was another influence. Hesse appears to draw on Schiller’s 
notion of aesthetic education in his novel’s overall conception.  
Schiller’s 1794 On the Aesthetic Education of Man is comprised of a series of letters that 
emphasize the value of aesthetic education to support an individual’s self-realization, the 
fulfilment of their individual potential. A central concept of Schiller’s treatise is that ‘play’ (not 
to be confused with frivolity) is the foundation not only of art, but also of a well-lived life. 
Schiller identifies respect and attention (which he identifies as ingredients of love), as 
foundational to the capacity for such ‘play’. Schiller outlines three stages of development 
whereby the individual develops from an initial state of ‘unselfconsciousness’ to one of 
intellectual clarity, and, from there, to possible new realizations about self and place in the 
world. This three-stage process could be said to mirror Knecht’s progress from his initial state 
of unreflective consciousness (boyhood) to a second stage of intense intellectual focus 
(Castalia), from which he emerges to enter a third stage (stepping out) that represents further 
progress beyond the first two stages. (Field, 1968, pp. 673–688, offers an especially thorough 
discussion of Knecht’s educative progress.)  
A further influence on Hesse’s work beyond Schiller, and one of particular relevance 
to the present chapter, is that of Plato. Hesse’s resonance with Plato in this novel is far-
reaching, so that the themes of emergence and self-realization that are central to The Glass 
Bead Game align not only with such themes in Plato but accordingly remark challenges for 
education of precisely the kinds identified by Weil and Murdoch, that they in turn remark as 
recognized by Plato. 
5.2. Recollecting Plato 
Resonances with Platonic thought are evident from the novels’ opening pages. Götz 




“unchangeable reality” and one that connects the novel to the realm of Plato’s Forms (Hesse, 
1943/2000, p. 9). The disclaimer on the part of the narrator that there is no way to teach the 
glass bead game except by playing it, constitutes refraining from any attempt to articulate 
what cannot be said. Similarly Plato, in Letters VII 341d, has Socrates comment as follows on 
the ideal nature of the relationship between teacher and pupil: 
There is no writing of mine about these matters, nor will there ever be one. For 
this knowledge is not something that can be put into words like other sciences; but 
after long-continued intercourse between teacher and pupil, in joint pursuit of the 
subject, suddenly, like light flashing forth when a fire is kindled, it is born in the 
soul and straight away nourishes itself. (Plato, trans, 1997, p. 1659) 
Members of Hesse’s Castalia, like those of Plato’s Republic, are exclusively male. While 
the narrator tells us that there other, similar communities beyond Castalia, we are never told 
if these other communities are led by, or even admit, women scholars. We are also never told 
if Castalia is ethnically diverse. What we are told is that Castalia is a prestigious, gated 
community, open only to the brightest of minds and dedicated to the preservation of aesthetic 
intellectual achievement. Castalian scholars live a life of fraternal seclusion not unlike monks 
or priests within a closed seminary. Although sexual relations are not absolutely prohibited, 
Castalians view sexual encounters with the utmost caution and mistrust (Hesse, 2000, p. 101). 
The select few who are admitted to the Order are guaranteed a lifetime of uninterrupted 
contemplation, research and scholarship, entirely sheltered from the distractions of everyday 
life. 
As in Plato’s Academy (described in Republic, VII, 519 b–d), Castalian scholars are 
explicitly protected from the mundane aspects of practical life. They participate in a rigorous 
education system, and only after many years of preparation may they even be considered for 
admission as members of the Order. Once admitted, their primary task is to participate fully 
in maintaining the glass bead game, although they are also charged with the further 
education of the so-called “mandarins” (Hesse, 2000, p. 55)—those pedagogues who are not 
destined to remain permanently in Castalia but who will eventually become teachers in the 
province’s specialist schools and universities. Within the hierarchy of Castalia, the pinnacle 
role is that of Das Glasperlenspiel, the Magister Ludi. He who is assigned this illustrious position 





In many respects Knecht’s education reflects the education system that Plato outlines 
in Republic. Friedländer (1958, p. 86) speaks of the “conscious selection of qualified students” 
in Plato’s time, wherein one of the responsibilities of a teacher is specifically to identify such 
talent. Götz (1978) identifies a series of parallels between Plato’s Republic and Hesse’s The Glass 
Bead Game and, more specifically, between Plato’s Guardians as described in Republic VII, 
519–521, and the Castalian bead game players. Just as the primary role of Plato’s academy is 
to develop the Guardians, so the Castalian game masters are charged with maintaining the 
perfection of their game, as well as with ensuring that all players are suitably equipped for the 
role.  
Götz recalls Plato’s parable of the Cave (Republic, VII, 514–518), where Plato talks of 
the need for a mentor or a guide to “turn the mind” of the student, and of the mentor’s role 
to provide ongoing support and direction. (Plato, 1997, pp. 1132–1136). Further, just as 
Plato’s trained Guardians do not remain forever in their exclusive role, but eventually return 
to take up local leadership or educative roles, similarly Knecht follows a cycle of ‘ascent’ 
followed by a return to the ‘unenlightened’ world in order to guide selected others toward 
greater understanding.  
Plato’s notion of emergence is captured most famously in his analogy of the Cave. 
Here, the untutored individual emerges from a limited reality into another stage of 
understanding that is new, difficult, and ultimately transformative. Plato’s analogy offers a 
theory of education in terms of a progression from a state of dull repetition towards greater 
understanding, or illumination. By way of education, the individual who is released from the 
confinement of the Cave draws on his own agency to move ahead. By contrast, those who 
remain in the Cave because they are not yet oriented towards the light, are not able, perhaps 
because not motivated, to reach even that which is technically within their grasp. They are 
destined to remain effectively prisoners of their own situation until they too turn 
appropriately towards the light. Socrates says in Republic VII, 514 that he offers this parable in 
order to “compare the effect of education and of the lack of it on our nature” (Plato, trans, 
1997, p. 1132). For Plato, education involves the fulfilment of one’s human potential, a 
process that is supported both by the influence and oversight of the Guardians of the Forms, 
and as well as through the efforts of the individual soul. These same ideas that Hesse engages 
with in his novel resonate equally with the moral philosophies of Weil and Murdoch.  
For Weil, and also for Murdoch after her, the fundamental priority for education is to 




to give meaning to life. They identify the primary purpose of education to be to foster in 
students their capacity for attention—by which they refer to the capacity to think well, to face 
mystery and contradiction, and to wait. They recognise the usefulness of analogies and 
mythological explanations for pedagogical clarification. When Murdoch comments on the 
way that Plato employs myths as a pedagogical tool, we can see also that Joseph Knecht’s 
desire for what we might call “just and true understanding” relates also to his desire for moral 
goodness: 
The Platonic myths are an explicit resort to metaphor as a mode of explanation. 
Plato continually pictures education as moral progress and indicates the kind of 
relation which exists between moral goodness and a desire for just and true 
understanding. (Murdoch, 1992, p. 177)  
In her philosophical writing, Murdoch predominantly employs metaphors of “energy 
and vision” in relation to moral growth (Murdoch, 2014, p. 42). Hesse also draws on these 
same metaphors. Of particular relevance to the novel’s pedagogical themes are the occasions 
in Joseph Knecht’s life when he reports an experience of illumination which he describes as a 
sudden ‘leap’ of awareness that comes to him forcefully, as if out of nowhere. Not only does 
he experience such intuitive leaps on several occasions in the course of his life, but he is also 
able to recognise the significance of such leaps in others, and the sheer courage that such 
leaps require. For example, when several fellow trainee Castalians opt to leave their 
‘pedagogical province’ in order to return to their families and the wider community, Knecht 
intuits that in Castalia such choices are frowned upon and passed off as a sign of weakness, 
rather than being viewed as opportunities for individuals to explore new directions.  
Knecht, by contrast, considers that these choices represent interesting and meaningful 
initiatives. He observes that “possibly the apparent relapse they had suffered was not a fall 
and a cause for suffering, but a leap forward and a positive act” (Hesse, 2000, p. 63). When as 
a young student, Knecht is chatting with an unnamed fellow classmate, he observes “we 
haven’t taken any leaps” (p. 67), implying that they haven’t yet been truly challenged, and 
thus they have not yet shown any true intellectual courage:  
I do wish that if ever the time comes and it proves to be necessary, that I too will 
be able to free myself and leap, only not backward into something inferior, but 




Knecht’s ultimate, literal leap into the icy mountain tarn, an action which precipitates 
his own death, but which simultaneously creates new opportunities for the growth of his 
student, Tito, might itself be interpreted as Knecht’s own mighty “leap forward and a positive 
act” (p. 63). (A detailed interpretation of Knecht’s courageous venture into new and unknown 
waters is provided by Milek, 1978, p. 304.)  
Murdoch (1992) also employs the metaphor of the ‘leap’ to illustrate an advance in 
moral understanding. She comments that certain points in the process of creative imagining 
“we may be inspired or overcome by a sense of certainty at a particular point”, and that we 
may experience this sense of conviction in the form of an ‘intuitive leap’” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 
400). Murdoch observes further that “to decide when to attempt such leaps is one of the most 
difficult of moral problems” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 42). Joseph Knecht’s own “intuitive leaps” 
are connected to his courage and his willingness to test himself in as yet untried ways. His 
capacity to take risks and to face doubts has a bearing on his own understanding of the open-
endedness of pedagogical growth.  
Roberts (2008b) identifies Knecht’s commitment to a pedagogical function beyond 
Castalia as a decision that holds deep moral significance, since by making this commitment, 
Knecht demonstrates “the ability to take risks—to make oneself uncomfortable, to go beyond 
one’s prior experiences and existing understanding of the world”, and as well, to recognise 
that “one’s contribution as a human being need not be tied to the achievement of great status, 
wealth, or recognition” (p. 7). Roberts’ observations connect to Knecht’s capacity to see not 
only what is “there”, but also, to be able to make out what is not quite so obvious, and his 
capacity, in Murdoch’s words, to be “open to continual reinterpretation” (Murdoch, 1997, p. 
91). 
There are further, relevant affinities between Plato’s view on education in Republic and 
the educational themes in Hesse’s The Glass Bead Game. The period of Joseph Knecht’s early 
adult education corresponds closely to Plato’s ephebia—a period of concentrated intellectual 
study. (See further Götz 1978, p. 514.) According to the educational vision described in 
Plato’s Republic, prospective rulers of the state are, at around age twenty, challenged to bring 
everything they have learned into a “unified vision” (Republic VII, 537c–d). Later in their 
education, they are introduced to the power of dialectic, a process that we are told, requires 
“great care”. Plato does not overlook the importance of play in his educational programme, 
however. Throughout their education, prospective leaders are charged with engaging in what 




Socrates explains in Republic VIII, 558b that “unless someone had transcendent 
natural gifts, he’d never become good unless he played the right games and followed a fine 
way of life from early childhood” (Plato, trans, 1997, p. 1169). Of particular relevance to the 
current discussion is the emphasis Hesse places in the novel on a kind of fundamental 
dialectic whereby seriousness (rationality) works against the ability to play. By emphasising 
this as a kind of fundamental dialectic, Hesse shows a playful instability that comes about when 
rational demands on an individual person become altogether too excessive. Joseph Knecht 
seeks to be true to himself, while at the same time to align himself with the order and 
conformity that Castalia requires. Ultimately this proves to be for him an impossibility.  
In Plato’s Republic, VII, 519, as in Hesse’s Castalia, the theoretical and practical 
spheres of life are entirely separate (Plato, trans, 1997, p. 1136). Hesse’s narrator warns the 
reader that the glass bead game, is, by virtue of its separation from the world of action, in 
danger of corruption, and that life in Castalia, by its very isolation, “can lead to empty 
virtuosity, to artistic vanity, to self-advancement, to the seeking of power over others and then 
to the abuse of that power” (Hesse, 2000, p. 223). Socrates expresses a similar concern in 
Republic VIII, 564, where he expresses the view that theory and practice in education need to 
be in balance. In Republic VII, 519–521, Socrates warns that only those who have the greatest 
intellectual promise are to be selected to teach, and advises that preparation for the role of 
teacher requires not only the study of teaching theory, but also a willingness on the part of the 
teacher to work in service of others. This is to ensure that the selected candidates themselves 
continue to grow in understanding.  
Plato’s views on methods of education are evident not only in Republic, but appear also 
in his other dialogues. For example, in his dialogue Protagoras Socrates asks how Protagoras 
can consider himself a teacher when he is simply passing on his own relativist theories to his 
students (Plato, trans, 1997, pp. 746–790). In Meno (82) Socrates talks about what knowledge 
amounts to, and demonstrates that (mathematical) knowledge is not so much taught as 
reasoned and recollected. In Phaedrus (247–250e), Plato reminds us of the nature of the Forms. 
He tells us we can see beauty in a way that we cannot see goodness. He talks of knowledge in 
organic terms, and likens the seeding of ideas to the planting of a seed that will flourish in 
time. (See Plato, trans, 1997, pp. 506–556. These are metaphors for educative growth that 
Hesse himself develops in The Glass Bead Game. Hesse’s use of the organic metaphor of a tree 
sapling that is staked for support until strong enough to support itself, connects to wider 




from one generation to the next, beyond the life of any one individual, or even any one 
community.  
Also relevant to the pedagogical themes in The Glass Bead Game is that in Republic VII, 
Plato talks of the need for a mentor or a guide to ‘turn the mind’ of the student, and he 
emphasises the role of the mentor to provide ongoing support and direction. In Republic, VII, 
537a, he recommends that individual students are best supported if they have an assigned 
mentor who will respond to each individual student’s particular aptitudes and interests—
someone equipped to “see better what each of them is naturally fitted for” (Plato, trans, 1997, 
p. 1152). The mutually respectful quality of this relationship is very much emphasised. In 
Letters VII, 344, Plato makes a similar recommendation and notes that “only when all of these 
things—names, definitions, and visual and other perceptions—have been rubbed against one 
another and tested, pupils and teacher asking and answering questions in good will and 
without envy—only then, when reason and knowledge are at the very extremity of human 
effort, can they illuminate the nature of any object” (p. 1161). The following section considers 
the role and function of Knecht’s three mentors in some detail. 
5.3. Knecht’s three mentors 
Joseph Knecht’s interactions with others, particularly those mentors to whom he is 
closest in his life, are instrumental in shaping his decisions and progress over the course of his 
lifetime. (See further, Johnson, 1956, p. 166.) The notion of the mentor as the educative guide 
who elicits the student’s own innate potential can be traced back not only to Plato, but to the 
myths of Plato’s own time, including those of Homer and Hesiod, which are mentioned in 
Republic 11, 379a. (See Plato, trans, 1997, p. 1017.) In Homer’s Odyssey, Mentor is a figure 
who serves as the teacher and guide to Odysseus’s son, Telemachus while Odysseus is away. 
Mentor’s role is to guide and wisely support his student’s potential.  
In a similar fashion, in the absence of any family ties, the quality of Knecht’s 
education is largely determined by three older male mentors—the revered Music Master who 
identifies Knecht’s innate musical gifts; Father Jacobus, an older Benedictine historian who 
functions as something of a father-figure to Joseph (in Biblical terms Jacob is the father of 
Joseph); and so-called Elder Brother, a Buddhist monk (formerly a Castalian and now a 
recluse). These three mentors each provide assistance and support for Joseph, but they also 
remind him that he must find his own way, develop his own potential. Even when Joseph has 
arrived at the illustrious position as Magister Ludi, his mentors and friends continue to play a 




is indicated by the quality of his interactions with similarly acute individuals—not only the 
aforementioned mentioned mentors, but also his colleagues Fritz Tegularius, Carlo 
Ferromonte, and especially, his close friend Plinio Designiori.  
Joseph Knecht’s first mentor, the Music Master, is a commanding, Socrates-like 
figure. The Music Master’s distinguishing features are his eyes, and much emphasis is placed 
on his prescience and his ability to see things clearly. It is the Music Master who first identifies 
the young Knecht’s musical genius, and it is he who guides Knecht to undertake the study of 
Buddhism and eastern mysticism under the guidance of Elder Brother. More than this, it 
appears that it is the Music Master who ensures that throughout his career, Knecht is able to 
maintain contact with the world beyond Castalia. It is the Music Master who arranges 
Knecht’s visits to the Mariafels Monastery, purportedly on an emissary role, but, as Knecht 
later discovers, largely in order that he be exposed to new and challenging ideas, “less to 
teach than to learn” (Hesse, 2000, p. 147). It is possible that the Music Master intuits that 
Knecht is brilliant enough to able to bring into effect the very changes that are needed if 
Castalia is to regenerate, and not simply stagnate and founder. Of particular interest in their 
relationship is its non-verbal nature.  
While the majority of Knecht’s interactions with others take the form of vigorous 
verbal dialogues, his exchanges with the Music master are sometimes conveyed entirely 
through musical dialogue (as in their initial meeting). Their capacity to communicate 
powerfully by way of aesthetic experience reinforces Hesse’s overall imaginative statement in 
the novel that there are different ways to communicate, to interact and to shape a selfhood. In 
his waning years, the Music Master retreats entirely into silence—possibly to indicate his 
lessening hold on life, possibly to indicate his personal misgivings about the emerging 
disintegration of Castalia through his tacit awareness of the decisions that Knecht is taking, 
possibly to leave Knecht room to make his own decisions. The Music Master epitomizes 
unselfishness in just the way that Murdoch describes: 
An unselfish person enlarges the space and the world, we are calmed and 
composed by his presence. Sages in deep meditation are said sometimes to 
become invisible because of the absence of that cloud of anxious selfish obsession 
which surrounds most of us. (Murdoch, 1992, p. 347) 
When Knecht becomes momentarily concerned that he has lost his equilibrium in his 




that he confides. The nature of the Music Master’s subsequent counsel to his young protégée 
is instructive: 
There is truth, my boy. But the doctrine you desire, absolute, perfect dogma that 
provides wisdom, does not exist. Nor should you long for perfect doctrine, my 
friend. Rather, you should long for the perfection of yourself. The deity is within 
you, not in the ideas and books. Truth is lived, not taught. Be prepared for 
conflicts, Joseph Knecht—I can see that they have already begun. (p. 73)  
The message that the Music Master offers Knecht is that he needs to be able to 
determine for himself, the truth or falsehood of Plinio’s arguments. The Music Master implies 
that Plinio’s claims are probably too simplistic, since they involve ‘telling’ Joseph what to 
believe, whereas the Music Master, like Socrates, reminds Joseph to follow a more enquiring 
and rigorous method of analysis to reach his own understanding. Just as, in contrast to his 
interlocutors, Socrates does not look merely to rebut the arguments of those he is in dialogue 
with, but rather uses a series of questions to demonstrate how reason works in practice, this 
becomes Joseph’s method with Plinio.  
The Music Master’s oblique encouragement to Knecht to find his own answers also 
resonates with the statements in Plato’s Meno (99e–100a) that virtue is “neither an inborn 
quality nor taught, but comes to those who possess it as a gift from the gods, which is not 
accompanied by understanding” (Plato, trans, 1997, pp. 896–897). In other words, there are 
matters that cannot be ‘taught’ as such, but can be figured out. There are reverberations of 
Weil’s philosophy in the Music Master’s further counsel to Joseph that it is “precisely when 
we run into difficulty and stray from our path and are most in need of correction, precisely 
then we feel the greatest disinclination to return to the normal way” (Hesse, 2000, p. 92). In 
contrast to the views of Durrani (1982), who sees the Music Master as “naively optimistic 
about the organisation to which he belongs, and blind to its defects” (p. 660), another 
interpretation is that while the Music Master’s comments are perhaps a thinly veiled warning 
to Joseph that Plinio’s challenges to Castalia are potentially reckless and wrongheaded, his 
comments are nevertheless ambiguous, and could also be a veiled invitation to Joseph to 
continue to examine his own ingrained loyalty to Castalia.  
The Music Master urges Joseph to be more attentive to his meditations as a way to 
direct his mind to more meaningful things, to think of his life as something whole and worthy, 




elevation to the heights of office in the Glass Bead Game could become intertwined with his 
human ego. The Music Master is aware of the limiting character of the self-aggrandizing ego, 
worthy only of being let go of. His mild admonition to Knecht invites comparison with 
Murdoch’s observations that the human ego (as Murdoch defines it) can be a damaging force. 
Murdoch (2014) identifies a way, through attention, to achieve a kind of assimilation to 
something larger than the self, whereby there is a ‘letting go’ of the distractions of the “fat, 
relentless ego” (p. 51). Hesse elsewhere recognises the dangers of “the sordid egoism of those 
who lust for money or power” (Hesse, 1981, p. 74) as undermining of the pursuit of worthy 
educational and ethical values.  
A second mentor figure and a further significant influence on Joseph’s moral 
education is Father Jacobus, a Catholic Benedictine Monk who lives beyond Castalia at the 
Mariafels Monastery. It is through his conversations with Father Jacobus that Joseph comes 
to see more clearly the value of education. The Benedictines’ stated function “is to gather, 
educate, and reshape men’s minds and souls, to make a nobility of them not by eugenics, not 
by blood, but by the spirit” (Hesse, 2000, p. 157). This view resonates with Plato’s conviction 
that education can itself constitute a path to nobility. It is during his two years’ stay at the 
Mariafels Monastery that Father Jacobus persuades Knecht that it is because Castalians are 
so self-contained that they have lost a sense of history or an historical perspective. It is unclear 
whether as a result of these discussions Knecht begins to consider himself to have been 
brainwashed, or whether he realizes that he is himself part of the problem of Castalia. In any 
case, he comes to see the truth in Jacobus’s argument that Castalians are not inclined to learn 
from the past because they never ever think about it: Castalia does not invite, but works 
rather to eliminate, any creative or challenging criticism.  
Knecht comes to see that Castalians are potentially subject to a kind of indoctrination 
that threatens, in Murdoch’s words to “imprison the mind, impeding new understanding, 
new interests, and affectations, possibilities of fruitful and virtuous action” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 
322). It is in light of this realization that Joseph comes to see why it is that his friend Fritz 
Tegularius fails to fit in at Castalia. Fritz’s mood fluctuations and his divergent ways of 
thinking are interpreted by other Castalians as a form of weak-mindedness rather than as 
singular aspects of a quirky personality that in no way detract from Fritz’s worth as a person. 
Joseph is also an individual of extraordinary intellect, and so is able to recognise in Fritz some 





It is instructive that although Knecht becomes critical of the ideals of Castalia, he 
never loses his ability to see good in others, including those in Castalia. He continues to show 
respect for his colleagues and friends as people even though he experiences frustrations and 
recognizes their quirks and limitations. This is especially evident in the level of consideration 
he shows for his somewhat troubled friend and colleague, Fritz Tegularius. It is a mark of 
Knecht’s capacity for loving attention that he is always empathic towards Fritz. Knecht works 
to maintain a sympathetic relationship with this fellow despite his so-called ‘imbalances’, for 
he recognises that Fritz’s demeanour and poor health reflect that he is ‘out of equilibrium’. 
(In Plato’s Republic, good health is associated with equilibrium.) This is why, when he holds 
the position as Magister Ludi, Knecht consciously seeks out opportunities that he knows will 
best build on Tegularius’s considerable strengths. This reflects Knecht’s responsiveness to 
another person’s needs. 
The depth of Knecht’s attentions to others is exemplified not only in his respect for 
Fritz’s quirks, but also in in the help he offers to the devastated Petrus who is momentarily 
grief-stricken over the death of his mentor, the Music Master (p. 267). Knecht’s capacity for 
compassion is further evident is his reaction when he sees that the Shadow Master is being 
poorly treated by colleagues, who imply that Brother Bertram had brought his problems 
upon himself. It is in this spirit that Weil (1968, p. 173) notes:  
Men have the same carnal nature as animals. If a hen is hurt, the others rush up 
and peck it…Our senses attach to affliction all the contempt, all the revulsion, all 
the hatred which our reason attaches to crime.  
Unlike his fellow Castalians, Knecht has a different interpretation of the situation. He 
is able to view the Shadow Master as a person in distress. His capacity for compassion 
resonates with Weil’s claim that to be able to recognise the suffering of another means “to 
know how to look at him in a certain way. This way of looking is first of all attentive” (Weil, 
2009, p. 65). Knecht’s solicitude and loving attention in these instances exemplifies his 
capacity for “psychiatric and educative work” (Hesse, 2000, p. 267) and is further evidence of 
his moral “soundness and balance” (p. 268).  
After a somewhat poorly thought-out visit that he and Fritz undertake to the Mariafels 
monastery, Father Jacobus observes that he considers Knecht’s friend to be “inexperienced, 
overbred”…”arrogant” (p.186), although he also admires Knecht for his loyalty in defending 




remain loyal to Fritz as a person, rather than to see Fritz’s faults foremost. Humility takes 
Knecht beyond self-interest and into regard for others. In this, we see further links to the 
ethics of both Weil and Murdoch whose moral philosophy argues for generosity of spirit 
ahead of hasty judgment and, through appropriate humility, of striving always to be open to 
see the best in the other. This feature of Knecht’s character also aligns with Plato’s educative 
model. Plato advances the understanding that education is a means to develop a person’s 
sensitivity to the needs of others. Socrates takes this to the highest extreme: in his view, a 
person ought to defend the rights of others even to the point of the person sacrificing that 
person’s own life. 
The insights that Joseph Knecht develops by virtue of his travel away from Castalia 
are resonant with Plato’s observation in Republic that the individual needs to be able to see 
himself as smaller than, and separate from, the larger state or institution of which he is a part, 
in order to gain proper understanding of his relation to it. It is precisely when Knecht engages 
with folk who are not themselves wedded to Castalian thought-ways that he is able to open 
himself to intellectual opportunities that are simply not available within Castalia. Then, just 
as Joseph’s elder mentors enable him to grow and develop on his own terms and enable him 
to find his own voice, Knecht eventually models this same fraternal respect in his interactions 
with his own new student, Tito, the son of his lifelong friend Plinio Designori. In this 
student/teacher relationship we see further affinities with the themes of Murdoch’s moral 
philosophy. Joseph sees the talented, possibly overindulged Tito, both justly and lovingly, and 
he offers the younger man the kind of creative pedagogical attention that will benefit them 
both.  
When Joseph visits Plinio’s home beyond the precinct of Castalia, the rapport he 
establishes with Tito is immediate. Tito is enthralled by the fact that the older man gives him 
respect, and the fact that this friend of his father “thought him grown-up and intelligent 
enough to be interested in these complicated matters also gave him greater assurance” (p. 
322). It is instructive that Tito is also attuned to music and becomes “rapt and attentive” (p. 
321) when he hears Joseph play some Scarlatti on the piano. During this visit, Joseph 
ascertains with some concern that elements in Plinio’s own life appear “a shade too 
handsome, too perfect, too well thought out” and there is, to Knecht’s eye “no sense of 
growth, of movement, of renewal” in his friend’s life (p. 310). He confides to Tito that Tito’s 




of anger, or spite, or frustration, and that this rejection may have been to the disadvantage of 
Plinio himself.  
It remains ultimately unclear whether Joseph steps away from his past as a Castalian 
scholar as an act of rebellion or of malice against Castalia, or whether his reasons can be 
expressed solely in terms of his own spiritual maturation and his own realization “that a 
hitherto idle and empty part of his self, of his heart and soul, was now demanding the right to 
fulfill [sic] itself” (p. 323). In any case, Knecht has grown in self-understanding to the point 
where he has uncovered for himself a new meaning of his life’s purpose—to work as a 
teacher. 
5.4. Seeking selfhood 
Knecht’s educational trajectory draws significantly on metaphors of musical forms, 
particularly those built around figures of movement and return—sonatas, preludes and 
fugues. The very word ‘fugue’, which has its origin in the Latin ‘fuga’ (flight) is highly 
significant here. Readers may be aware that ‘fugue’ is the name of a musical form where 
themes chase and intersect with each other as if in a playful dialogue of voices, but the word 
‘fugue’ also carries a specific and important psychological meaning. If a person is in a ‘fugue 
state’ they are said to be “fleeing from their own identity often involving travel to some 
unconsciously desired locality.”37  
This interpretation is consistent with Knecht’s search for self-identity in the novel. 
(Elsewhere, Hesse uses the term “self-will”, and notes “that self-will is highly prized under the 
name of originality; indeed, a certain self-will is regarded as positively desirably in artists” 
(Hesse, 1981, pp. 71–2). Hesse’s music metaphors, which explore the density and rich 
sonorities of interconnecting musical harmonies, remind us that there are a multitude of ways 
for the self (and for selves) to find expression, and not necessarily through the language of 
words. Similarly, Plato (in Republic III, 401e), tells us that music and harmony have a morally 
improving effect on the soul (Plato, trans, 1997, p. 1038). 
Through the image of fugal flight, Hesse captures a sense of interacting musical voices 
changing places, changing keys, changing position and weight. His musical metaphor also 
invokes the image of reciprocal relationships, such as between student and teacher, disciple 
and mentor, whereby as the relationship deepens, roles can be imitated and alternated, and 
 




where energy is derived from the interplay of intersecting voices. This metaphor also conveys 
the sense both that there are gifts and aptitudes that Knecht was born with, and as well, that 
he is part of some larger, inter-generational cycle of meaning and perpetual forward 
movement.  
All his life, Knecht is drawn to the sensuous qualities of music, and he remains 
fascinated by his love of music to the end. It is his ability to respond to the subtleties of 
aesthetic nuance that alerts him to the tension and potential disharmony within Castalia, and 
this same sensibility leads him to explore the contradictions within himself that leads 
ultimately to his decision to leave Castalia for good. Knecht’s decision to leave Castalia is 
importantly connected to his experience of pedagogical growth. 
Over time, and as he becomes more aware of the world beyond, Knecht begins to 
realize that there is a risk that Castalia, because of its separation from the wider world, could 
become subject to a kind of insular thinking. Similarly, Murdoch (1992) warns of the ways 
that blind trust in authoritative truths can “imprison the mind, impeding new understanding, 
new interests, and affections, possibilities of fruitful and virtuous action” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 
322). So it comes about that Knecht experiences limits to his tolerance of Castalia. In this 
connection, Laverty (2007) refers to Murdoch’s account of learning in the following way: 
“Learning, as Murdoch defines it, occurs when an individual comes up against a limit in her 
conceptual understanding” (Laverty, 2007, p. 5). Similarly, Spanish philosopher Miguel de 
Unamuno (1972, p. 154) as quoted in Roberts, 2015, p. 112, observes that one’s sense of self 
is experienced precisely at the point when one experiences a sense of one’s own breaking-
point, one’s own limitations:  
To possess consciousness of oneself, to have personality, is to know and feel oneself 
distinct from other beings. And this feeling of distinctiveness is reached only 
through a collision, through more or less severe suffering, through a sense of one’s 
own limits. Consciousness of oneself is simply consciousness of one’s own 
limitation.38 
In Joseph Knecht’s case, the limit that he reaches is the limit of his moral imagination. As 
Laverty tells us, “the discernment of a limit implies the creation of new, yet-to-be discovered 
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limits, because to demarcate a limit is, in some inchoate sense, to see beyond it to the other 
side, that is, to detect what conceptual understanding could be like” (Laverty, 2007, p. 5).  
Weil also employs the metaphor of a limit, often as a wall, which she presents as 
emblematic of an impasse that only appears impenetrable, but that may also offer unexpected 
(metaphorical) openings. She reminds us that humans need to work very hard to garner 
humility in relation to intellectual puzzles or difficulties that they encounter, and neither to 
give up in the face of seemingly impossible obstacles, nor to rush to answers that are too easy, 
too ready-made: “When the attention has revealed the contradiction in something on which it 
has been fixed, a kind of loosening takes place. By persevering in this direction, we attain 
detachment” (Weil, 1997, p. 151).  
After decades spent within Castalia, it is revealed that Knecht yearns for a more 
active, perhaps more morally exacting life, and so he announces that he will leave Castalia for 
good in order pursue the very much more ‘ordinary’ task of being a school tutor. Knecht’s 
momentous decision to depart Castalia is not precipitous – we learn that he has been mulling 
it over for years. Nor does he turn his back entirely on education, but rather, opts for a 
different, far less ‘illustrious’ educative role (one that is, at least in Plato’s terms, the most 
important of all). He discloses in his letter of resignation his realization “that making music 
and playing the Glass Bead Game are not the only happy activities in life, that teaching and 
educating can be just as exhilarating” (Hesse, 2000, p. 377). He declares further that it is 
teachers who “give the young the ability to judge and distinguish, who serve them as 
examples of the honouring of truth, obedience to the things of the spirit, respect for language” 
(p. 342).  
But how and why, we might wonder, does Joseph arrive at such a clear and articulate 
understanding of the limitations of Castalia, to the extent that he has the strength to break 
himself free? Is this capacity perhaps related to his implied reincarnation and to the possibility 
that the ideas he is working with have been honed and refined over many generations? Just 
what is the educational significance of Knecht’s decision to leave Castalia?  
The answer seems to lie in Knecht’s own insights into what will make his life most 
meaningful. Knecht comes to see that for his life to be meaningful, it needs to be more 
properly grounded, more involved in interaction with, and service towards, others. Whereas 
Castalians seek to distil all human wisdom into a synthetic unity, Knecht determines that such 




not admit the disruptive challenge of human creativity. Hesse invites his readers to see, as his 
protagonist comes to do, that despite its mystery and wonder, there are grave limitations to a 
life dedicated solely to the glass bead game, and that singular devotion to the game leads to 
an ambition for mastery that itself becomes a distraction to attention, and one that stifles 
Knecht’s creativity.  
Joseph comes to realize that the game has the power to become so all-encompassing 
that individual players may become obsessed, even addicted, and preoccupied with the game 
to the complete exclusion of regard for others and what they might have to offer. He 
concedes his own ambivalence towards the game, and admits that “he had doubts and 
divided feelings; the Game was a vital question for him, had become the chief problem of his 
life” (p. 114). Further, the game’s intensely personal experience is shown to be subject to 
corruption—by dispositions that are entirely human, such as hubris, greed and competition. 
Hesse’s novel suggests that the Castalian community lacks the pitch or extremity of 
intellectual courage that alone would allow it to be properly self-critical, so that it is not 
sufficiently open to challenges or to new or difficult ideas. It is not open to any consideration 
of its own flaws. Hesse implies that any educational institution built on an ideological system 
that is as insular and averse to self-criticism as Castalia is shown to be, is fraught and highly 
likely to founder. 
In taking his departure from Castalia, Knecht achieves something that is entirely 
original to himself: Knecht demonstrates that he is the consummate artist, ultimately not 
bound by any tradition or any requirement from others, but able to determine his own 
course. His decision to leave Castalia is, to all those around him, unsettling, disturbing, 
potentially spiteful, even scandalous, and as baffling to their understanding as a Zen koan. 
Weil (1970) notes that in various cultures various different routes have been taken to destroy 
the ego and to foster lucid thought: “The Zen Buddhist technique of the koan is a method for 
effecting this destruction. And perhaps Plato possessed a method of this kind, in what he 
called dialectics?” (Weil, 1970, p. 292). Hesse depicts Knecht’s departure as the act of a 
courageous hero who responds to a higher law rather than submit to the demands of comfort 
and conformity. There remains the possibility, though, that there is some spite in the mix. 
By his act of departure from Castalia, Knecht “makes real” the nature of his vocation 
for education: he determines that he needs to live his life in a more meaningful sense, and to 
be of service to others in community. Although he has proved himself eminently capable to 




artistically creative. In order to be truly creative, Knecht needs to be part of the real world, 
and to be truly human he needs to be able to acknowledge the reality of other people. Knecht 
wishes to find meaning in a world beyond the one that is shaped by Castalia, and to embrace 
life on his own terms, and through a greater sense of his own sense of “being”. We are to 
understand that this leave-taking is most difficult for Knecht, but that it is a move most in 
keeping with his emergent sense of self-understanding. Knecht’s trajectory exemplifies the 
view of Thomas Mann, a colleague and friend of Hesse, who writes that “vocation towards 
educating others does not spring from inner harmony, but from inner uncertainties, 
disharmony, difficulty—from the difficulty of knowing one’s own self” (Mann, as cited in 
Kirsch, 2016, paragraph 12). 
5.5. The importance of dialogue 
One way to interpret Knecht’s growth in self-understanding is to consider the 
educative model presented in the dialogues of Plato. The central method of Plato’s dialogues 
is to relate verbal exchanges that draw on analogies, narrative examples, and sometimes even 
myths (although Plato’s attitude towards myths in his Republic is ambiguous). In Republic, 
Socrates stresses the importance of dialectics (dialogue), of talk and debate as a means not 
only to clarify thought but, ultimately, to work out what it means to live one’s life the best and 
thereby to draw oneself onto that path. Socrates is associated with a model of education that 
focuses on using questioning and self-discovery. He invites his listeners to follow the same 
process of reflective questioning and interrogation that he himself models.  
Socrates perhaps also uses questioning and reflection to expose what could be undue 
influence by the teacher, or a failure on the part of the student to grasp for him or herself the 
depth or implications of what is under discussion. Through the process of methodical 
(sometimes seemingly mechanical) dialogue, Socrates helps his interlocutors come closer to 
being able to make sense of their own understanding. From a Platonic perspective, this is an 
ongoing and open-ended process. Similarly, through the quality of his dialogues with others, 
particularly with fellow student Plinio Designori, Joseph Knecht deepens his own capacity for 
sense-making through questioning. 
Aspects of intellectual relationship between these two men invoke Plato’s idea of eros 
and of duly measured, Platonic love. These two young men are at times depicted as tightly 
connected “brothers in arms”—perhaps a reminder from Hesse that we are in need of a finer 




education brings forth. (There are other relationships in the novel that evoke Plato’s 
pedagogical eros, most notably the relationship between Knecht and his beloved Music 
Master.)  
During their time at the Wadzell school, Plinio and Joseph form a significant and 
enduring friendship. Plinio has a more secular approach to life than Joseph, who expects to 
be ensconced within the academy for life. Plinio, by contrast, will pursue his adult life beyond 
Castalia—a life of business interests, politics, family and social connections. These two young 
men feel each other out intellectually in order to spar and challenge each other in debate. 
Plinio is slightly older than Joseph, and a somewhat more skilful debater. Joseph is intrigued 
and fascinated by Plinio, “constantly endeavouring to learn from his antagonist and to 
promote not the rigid isolation of Castalia, but its vital collaboration and confrontation with 
the outside world” (p. 252). Plinio is depicted as something of a Sophist—part philosopher, 
part politician, “always the centre of attention…he always exerted an attraction so strong that 
it was akin to seduction” (p. 85).  
While Joseph is impressed by Plinio’s skills as a rhetorician, he resists being drawn into 
debate without himself gaining a deeper understanding of the issues at stake. Unlike his older 
comrade, Joseph does not want to use the process of dialectic and argument simply as a 
mechanism to outwit his opponent. His purpose is rather to engage fully with the ideas that 
are being proposed. The debates between these two young men bring to mind a theme in 
Plato’s dialogue Protagoras, where Socrates debates Protagoras, a Sophist educator who claims 
to be able to teach human virtue. Socrates, by contrast, consistently questions whether virtue 
can be taught, at least in the way that Protagoras proposes. (Plato, trans, 1997, pp. 746–790). 
In another of Plato’s dialogues entitled Sophists, teachers of rhetoric and persuasion are 
characterized as debaters who are paid to speak falsely while nevertheless appearing to appeal 
to truth. Similarly in Gorgias, Plato critiques the pretention that a Sophist can improve a 
student morally simply by way of instruction. In this particular dialogue, the Sophists claim 
that they not only know what virtue is, but they claim to be able to pass this knowledge on 
directly to their students. Socrates, (in Gorgias 448d) asks Polus to shorten his speeches and to 
try to be more specific in his argument, arguing that “Polus has devoted himself more to what 
is called oratory than to discussion” (Plato, trans, 1997, p. 794). The implication here is that 
Polus is more concerned with the effects of his own speech than with the meaning he conveys. 
A clue that Socrates values the pedagogical importance of dialogue is that he enjoins 




process that involves people explaining how the make sense of things—as do Father Jacobus 
and Joseph—so that they can learn from each other. Socrates, like Knecht, distinguishes 
dialogue from Sophistry or persuasive talk. Whereas Plinio has charm and charisma and uses 
persuasion, he does not necessarily convey his own understanding. Hesse may be developing 
a critical pedagogical idea here: although dialogue per se cannot eliminate woolly thinking or 
closed-mindedness, it does nevertheless represent a model of how to approach the goal of 
clear thought. In particular, dialogue should be used for purposes of interaction and 
understanding, not as a mechanism to confuse or to argue a point for its own sake, as do 
Plato’s Sophists. While Plato may have been too harsh in his view of the Sophists, Hesse 
implies sympathy for Socrates’ demonstration that dialogue be used for purposes of 
clarification of understanding rather than for commercial gain, or for purposes of persuasion.  
Knecht manifests the ability to participate in dialogue and engage in questioning with 
ease. He is able to track his interlocutors’ arguments with enviable clarity. He is careful to 
track and clarify his understanding so that he can readily understand the ways that ideas 
connect or intersect. When, in verbal interactions, he is brought up against the limitations of 
his own understanding, he sustains a modest attitude towards his discussants. He never shows 
the least impatience or the least need to be proved correct, but models the capacity to 
question his own received or prevailing assumptions. He effectively participates in dialogue in 
ways that involve participation with his interlocutors, open and receptive.  
Burbules (1993, p. 15) reminds us that the etymology of ‘dialogue’ has connotations 
that imply a transaction between, among, or across people, and that to enter into a dialogue is 
to enter a relationship. Burbules reminds us that it is through interactive dialogue—whether 
spoken or written—that we give voice to ideas, hear ourselves speak, and, crucially, connect 
with and give attention to the views of others. Joseph Knecht’s mentors and interlocutors 
challenge him in dialogue that involves just this kind of respectful and challenging attention. 
Knecht’s pedagogical dialogue with others take on a life of their own, rather like themes of 
musical exploration, always open for further play and exploration. 
Similarly, Blacker (1997, p. 18) identifies dialogue of this quality to be at the “heart 
and soul” of education, the more so because at its best, such pedagogical dialogue is always 
incomplete, invitational, always leading further. In this way, Hesse models Knecht’s ongoing 
education as a “leading out” of his own, and others’, understanding. Another of Hesse’s 
novels that explores, in must more dramatic fashion. the distinction between educare and 




second, Beneath the Wheel. First published in 1906 (later published under the title The Prodigy), 
this work portrays an education system that is so severe and so opposed to dialogue and 
interaction that it ultimately crushes the spirit of several extremely gifted students, despite 
their promise and aspirations. As a critique of a schooling system that emphasizes academic 
outcomes to the complete exclusion of self-development and personal growth, Under the Wheel 
closes with just a hint of a realization among the older generation of how very much these 
methods have failed their youth. 
Knecht acknowledges that while his dialogues with Plinio are serious, there is also a 
sense in which his “oratorical contest with Plinio had been partly a game” (Hesse, 2000, p. 
252). In his Philosophical Hermeutics, Gadamer (1976, pp. 66–68) draws a parallel between 
dialogue and game-playing. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to engage with the 
complexities of Gadamer’s philosophical arguments, there are comments that Gadamer 
makes in this essay about the nature of participation in dialogue that are pertinent to the 
current discussion. What Gadamer says about dialogue and play draws us back to Schiller’s 
comments about play as self-actualisation. Gadamer draws an analogy between dialogue and 
game playing, whereby the ‘game’ of dialogue holds significance ahead of the involvement of 
any single participant. The metaphor of a game carries with it the notion of the individual 
being swept up into something that is both larger and of greater consequence than anything 
bounded by the individual’s agency alone:  
When one enters into dialogue with another person and then is carried along 
further by the dialogue, it is no longer the will of the individual person, holding 
itself back or exposing itself, that is determinative. Rather, the law of the subject-
matter is at issue in the dialogue and solicits statement and counterstatement and 
in the end plays them into each other. Hence, when a dialogue has succeeded, one 
is subsequently fulfilled by it, as we say. The play of statement and 
counterstatement is played further in the inner dialogue of the soul with itself, as 
Plato so beautifully called thought. (p. 66) 
Hesse’s novel can be seen to capture the spirit of dialogue as an open-ended play of statement 
and counter-statement in just this way. This he achieves in large measure through the 
prevailing metaphor of music. Perhaps Hesse is seeking to present Plato’s dialectic between 




Knecht’s educational progress is in many respects a reflection of Plato’s educational 
ideal. He seeks to engage in dialogue with like-minded others in order to clarify his own 
thought. At the same time, he seeks to know things for himself, rather than accept them on 
trust or hearsay. From the get-go, he is portrayed as having a profound intellect and an 
extraordinarily even temperament. He is spirited and mentally strong, someone capable of 
standing up to attitudes that are questionable and keen to engage in reflection on his own 
life’s purpose. Hesse depicts Knecht as both a journeyer—a reference to Hesse’s 1932 novel 
Journey to the East, and a journeyman—one who continues to seek better self-understanding 
and who struggles to achieve a balance between his obligations to his own self, and his 
relationships to others. Throughout his time as Magister Ludi, he is shown to be consistently 
clear-thinking. He has a natural tact and courtesy and does not easily offend people. Because 
of his life of monastic seclusion, Knecht is able to benefit from uninterrupted stretches of time 
for his intellectual work. He establishes himself both as a scholar and as a conscientious 
teacher. From his students he develops a wide knowledge, and as a teacher he manifests the 
capacity to be tolerant, to listen and take a genuine interest in the other person. He takes 
ideas seriously and is willing to debate. He is thoughtful and dutiful, and typically works 
through questions and puzzles logically and carefully, to arrive at well-formed conclusions. 
He keeps conversations going and open, and he shows interested in how one person relates to 
another.  
Yet as Knecht’s adult life proceeds, he undergoes a process of quiet but profound 
transformation. This metamorphosis is revealed gradually, and over time we begin to see a 
more nuanced account of Knecht. With the benefit of hindsight, we see that Knecht was 
beginning to critique Castalia from a young age, although his experience of ‘awakening’ to 
the realities of Castalia’s limitations is gradual and protracted. Knecht’s sense of self-
realization is less a discovery of how he might live a happier life, and a rather more profound 
pedagogical realization that leads him to see in a new way, and far beyond what he had 
previously imagined to be right and true, how he might proceed in his life. (For these ideas I 
am indebted to Ziolkowski, 1965, who develops these points in some detail, p. 322.) Knecht’s 
‘awakening’ involves a gradual reassessment of some fairly uncomfortable truths about 
himself in relation to Castalia, a community to which he has devoted the majority of his life. 
Joseph Knecht faces down the devastating realization that his previous understanding of 




To explain his intended departure from Castalia, he writes his fellow administrators a 
candid letter in which he expresses his own critical reflections: “[W]e have already been 
infected by the characteristic disease of nobility—hubris, conceit, class arrogance, self-
righteousness, exploitativeness—if we conduct such a self-examination, we may be seized by a 
good many doubts” (Hesse, 2000, p. 328). By using the plural first-person pronoun “we”, 
Knecht indicates that he includes himself as part of the problem.  
Joseph’s reflection on the ways in which his own new self-understanding has 
developed over time calls for great humility on his part, and a recognition that there are 
things he has been mistaken about, or has not properly understood. As a younger person he 
had considered his own “awakening” more in terms of “a slow, step-by-step penetration into 
the heart of the universe…a continuous path or progression which nevertheless had to be 
achieved gradually” (p. 357). “Each time he had taken a larger or smaller step on a seemingly 
straight road—and yet he now stood at the end of this road, by no means at the heart of the 
universe and in the innermost core of truth. (p. 358).  Against his own earlier understanding, 
he declares that “his path had been a circle, or an ellipse or spiral, or whatever, but definitely 
not straight; straight lines evidently belonged only to geometry, not to nature and to life” (p. 
358).  
In this declaration of his new-found understanding, Joseph’s position aligns closely 
with Weil and Murdoch’s notion of attention, a concept that has epistemological, moral and 
educational dimensions. For these philosophers, attention and obedience are closely 
connected: we cannot but attend to the subject matter that is the centre of our attention. Their 
understanding of right moral action as ‘obedience’ resonates with that of Hesse’s protagonist. 
In her own description of attention, Weil explains that “once it [the will] has gone, 
one has passed beyond will into obedience” (Weil, 1970, p. 326). This is in accord with 
Joseph’s own explanation that “the apparent willfulness [sic] of his present action was in 
reality service and obedience” and that he is “not a fugitive, but a man responding to a 
summons; not headstrong, but obedient’ (Hesse, 2000, p. 359). In taking his decision to 
depart Castalia, he does not seek to negate the ideals of Castalia, nor does he berate himself 
for his prior work within Castalia, but he recognizes the need to take steps to achieve a better 
balance contemplative work with a more active function. Perhaps his departure is also an act 





This interpretation of Joseph’s situation connects with Murdoch’s understanding of 
moral attention, and her belief that the ability to see objectively ought to be the chief goal of 
moral philosophy. Murdoch considers “consciousness or self-being as the fundamental mode 
or form of moral being” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 171). Her notion of attention is the means to find 
a moral reality that exists beyond the self. As Murdoch notes, “If I attend properly, I will have 
no choices and this is the ultimate condition to be aimed at” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 38). 
Murdoch goes on to say that “the idea of a patient, loving regard, directed upon a person, a 
thing, a situation, presents the will not as unimpeded movement but as something very much 
more like ‘obedience’” (p. 39).  
Joseph Knecht’s process of ‘awakening’, of ‘emergence’, while momentous in 
consequence, is not described in fine-grained detail, and his resolve to leave is only 
announced once his decision to leave Castalia has already been taken. Given this situation, 
his unexpected announcement is all the more staggering. In the quiet way that Hesse reveals 
the outcome of Knecht’s moral enquiry, he reminds us, as does Murdoch, that people are 
involved in making moral judgements all the time, and that the quality of these moral 
judgements is very much connected with their capacity for attention: 
Moral change and moral achievement are slow; we are not free in the sense of 
being able suddenly to alter ourselves since we cannot suddenly alter what we see 
and ergo what we desire and are compelled by. In a way, explicit choice seems 
now less important: less decisive. (p. 38) 
Again we find connections to the work of Plato. To undergo moral reflection or review in 
search of self-improvement is a Platonic notion. Also Platonic is the notion that our capacity 
to learn anything new opens us up progressively to new realizations that may lead to further 
new discoveries or further new readings of the world.  
Laverty (2007) suggests that to learn “is less like something that is the direct result of 
our efforts and is more like something that we become ready to receive” (p. 6). Laverty 
suggests further that to learn “is less a function of freedom and more a function of obedience 
or, more accurately, given that we are to a certain extent free, it is a function of using our 
freedom to become more obedient” (p. 6). In this sense we can read Joseph’s decision to leave 
Castalia as a selfless one, a product of his attentive deliberations and motivated more by 




attention is that “I will have no choices, and this is the ultimate condition to be aimed at” 
(Murdoch, 2014, p. 38). Murdoch states in more detail: 
Freedom is not strictly the exercise of the will, but rather the experience of 
accurate vision which, when this becomes apparent, occasions action. It is what 
lies behind and in and between actions and prompts them that is important, and 
this is an area which should be purified. By the time the moment of choice has 
arrived the quality of attention has probably determined the nature of the act. (p. 
65) 
Murdoch’s notion of attention involves a diminished sense of the individual self, an 
ability to deflect one’s inward-facing gaze outward, away from the self, and it encompasses 
the Platonic idea that there is intrinsic worth in the pursuit of goodness for its own sake. She 
reminds us that such moral growth and change, even if slow and difficult, is the fruit of 
dedicated pedagogical attention: “Truth and progress (or some truth and progress) are the 
reward of some exercise of virtue, courage, humility and patience” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 400). 
Murdoch argues that in a sense, “explicit choice seems now less important: less decisive (since 
much of the ‘decision’ lies elsewhere) and less obviously something to be ‘cultivated’” 
(Murdoch, 2014, p. 38). To act on the basis of ideals is to be guided by commitment to the 
kind of person one wants to be. So it is that after decades of productive and successful work 
within the system of Castalia, Joseph Knecht’s accomplishment is to determine for himself 
that he must pursue quite another direction altogether. 
Although Knecht appears to question his longstanding loyalty to the order of Castalia 
only once he assumes the role of Magister Ludi, in fact the narrator lays some early clues 
about Knecht’s capacity for independent thought from the days of his youth. Even as a young 
student, Knecht pondered on “that one question of whether the Game really was the 
supreme achievement of Castalia and worth devoting one’s life to” (Hesse, 2000, p. 123). We 
are told that on this matter “his doubts had by no means been silenced” (p. 123), and that he 
was quietly alert “to all the dubiousness of the Game” (p. 123). We are given a further, early 
glimpse of Knecht’s independent moral spirit in the way that even as a young student, he 
“refused to be intimidated” by draconian headmaster Zbinden in Wadzell (p. 81). In this 
example and others, Knecht shows that he has a strong sense of morality, and that he, like 
Plato’s youngster (Republic III, 402), “rightly object[s] to what is shameful, hating it while he is 




Nevertheless it takes many years and much quiet deliberation and dialogue with 
others before Joseph comes to the painful realization that he could make a different, more 
meaningful contribution by leaving the pedagogical province altogether. By virtue of the 
opportunities created by his mentors and friends, in combination with much extraordinary 
soul-searching and reflection on his own part, he arrives at a reassessment of his own 
understanding of the value of his place within Castalia. Not unlike a mythical Kaspar Hauser 
figure he declares: “I really feel as if I had lain asleep or half asleep for a long time, but am 
now awake and clearheaded and receptive in a way I never am ordinarily” (Hesse, 2000, p. 
374). He says that he now craves “risk, difficulty, and danger; I’m hungry for reality, for tasks 
and deeds, and also for deprivations and suffering” (p. 370).  
On the eve of his departure, Knecht explains to Master Alexander that he experiences 
at odd times “a kind of spiritual experience…which I call awakening” (p. 373). He explains 
that these experiences involve a sense of connection to what he calls an “intensified reality”, 
“a sense of irresistible immediacy and tension” (p. 374). He aligns his gradual awakening in 
terms of “experiencing and proving oneself in the real world a Castalian but also as a man” 
(p. 370). This connects his sense of life as a progression or series of stages, and once again he 
calls up a music metaphor to explain his meaning: 
My life, I resolved, ought to be a perpetual transcending, a progression from stage 
to stage; I wanted it to pass through one area to the next, leaving each behind, as 
music moves on from theme to theme, from tempo to tempo, playing each out to 
the end, completing each and leaving it behind, never tiring, never sleeping, 
forever wakeful, forever in the present. (p. 376) 
This account connects in interesting ways to Weil’s account of pedagogical attention, and, as 
well, to the creation myth that takes up most of Plato’s Timaeus, a dialogue that Weil herself 
greatly admired.39 In Timaeus (33a) the demiurge (artist/creator) creates a world that exists in 
perfect balance, “as whole and complete as is possible and made up of complete parts” (Plato, 
trans, 1997, p. 1238), and in Timaeus (33b) we read that the artist creator gives this world “a 
round shape, the form of a sphere, with its centre equidistance from its extremes in all 
directions” (p. 1238) since this is the most beautiful shape of all. This newly created world, 
presented as a system capable of intellectual thought, reflects the spherical shape of Joseph 
 
39 Whitehead (1962) notes that Timaeus was the only Platonic dialogue available in Latin translation for scholars 




Knecht’s imagined pedagogical model. This is a realm where order can be achieved out of 
chaos, and where it is possible to achieve a unity of experience between thought and action.  
Whitehead (1962) remarks that that Plato’s Timaeus gives an account of a dynamic, 
changing organism, as against his theory of the unchanging Forms in Republic, and that 
whereas Plato’s Republic suggests that it is only the best who are destined for the rewards of a 
good life, Timaeus (44c) presents a scenario where a fairer balance is possible—particularly the 
balance of nurture (love) and education as ingredients towards human wholeness: “If such a 
person also gets proper nurture to supplement his education, he’ll turn out perfectly whole 
and healthy, and will have escaped the most grievous of illnesses” (Plato, trans, 1997, p. 
1238.) 
In Timaeus, a person’s moral growth is achieved not by operating in isolation (as is the 
case in Hesse’s Castalia), but rather, by being in connection with others. (See further Allan, 
1966, pp. 243–257). Plato’s Timaeus upholds the belief in the value of working creatively 
alongside others in patience and service. Timaeus is a world that allows the synthesis of 
opposites in ways that the idealised Castalia cannot. Because Castalian society does not have 
an in-built capacity to anticipate and respond to its own weaknesses, or to generate change 
from within, it is unable to grow and thrive. As Roberts and Freeman-Moir (2013) note “in 
the closed, stagnant world of Castalia there is nothing to nourish the dream—to keep 
reinvigorating the myth in a manner appropriate to new times, new contexts, and new 
challenges” (p. 163). By contrast, Plato’s created world of Timaeus, which is organically alive, 
is a world much more likely to support human creativity and flourishing. Within the 
mythology of Hesse’s The Glass Bead Game, Knecht comes to see that “the world and its life 
was in fact infinitely vaster and richer than the notions a Castalian has of it; it was full of 
change, history, struggles, and eternally new beginnings” (Hesse, 2000, p. 378). 
5.6. Knecht’s Bildung 
The concept of Bildung is central to Hesse’s novel—not simply in terms of Knecht’s 
steady progression through the ranks of the Castalian education system, but more 
importantly, in relation to way that Knecht develops himself through his capacity for self-
reflection and self-awareness. In line with the Platonic and mystical references in the novel, 
Hesse suggests that Knecht’s true self may already exist in its perfected form, but it remains 
Knecht’s task to ‘uncover’ this for himself. This he does both through ongoing self-reflection, 




complex and lifelong. (Swales, 1978, Roberts, 2013, and Laverty, 2007, each in their own 
way also discusses the complexity of this process. In particular, Swales, 1978, notes that 
Hesse’s work explores not only the nature of Knecht’s formal education, but it also wider 
themes that relate to aspects of human ‘becoming’ and the search for a sense of self, an 
approach that Swales aligns with the literary tradition of both Goethe and Schiller.) 
The concept of ‘becoming’ in philosophy combines the idea of forward movement 
with things enduring or maintaining themselves through the change. ‘Becoming’ is an idea 
that time does not dissolve into separate moments, since time is a whole, actively connecting 
across all those moments. Swales (1978) argues that the Bildungsroman form amounts to “much 
more than a discursive essay on the aesthetic mode” (p. 4), and that at its best, it captures the 
sense of “organic growth, of a maturing process that somehow eludes even conceptual terms”, 
one that “seeks to assert the reconcilability of human wholeness on the one hand and the facts 
of limited and limiting social experience on the other” (p. 390). The Bildungsroman, according 
to Swales, “binds together contingencies into the weighty sequence of a human destiny” (p. 
33). Swales’s description of this literary form as involving “the alteration of certainty of 
purpose with a sense of the overriding randomness of living” and of seeing these matters as 
“the very stuff of human experience” (p. 34), brings to mind Murdoch’s claim that to look for 
unity is something that is hardwired and instinctive to the human mind. To maintain one’s 
personal identity in a diachronic sense is the epitome of connection through a process of 
change. Consider Shakespeare’s Sonnet 60: 
Like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore, 
So do our minutes hasten to their end; 
Each changing place with that which goes before, 
In sequent toil all forwards do contend. 
Nativity, once in the maim of light, 
Crawls to maturity, wherewith being crown’d 
Crooked eclipses ‘gainst his glory fight, 
And Time that gave doth now his gift confound. 
Time doth transfix the flourish set on youth 
And delves the parallels in beauty’s brow, 
Feeds on the rarities of nature’s truth, 
And nothing stands but for his scythe to mow: 




Praising thy worth, despite his cruel hand. 
Just as the self in its wholeness recognises ‘becoming’, so too does ‘becoming’ emblematise 
unity behind the apparent diversity of moments and things. Murdoch (1992) states that “[t]he 
urge to prove that where we intuit unity there really is unity is a deep emotional motive to 
philosophy, to art, to thinking itself. Intellect is naturally one-making” (p. 1). The unity of the 
self is a model for unity of the world. Murdoch goes on to point to the chancy, accidental 
glimpses of something mysterious, even mystical, that can take place within in everyday 
happenings. She argues that we all want to put faith in the conviction that there is some kind 
of unity that makes sense of things, quite ahead of us having any real understanding about 
what that unity might amount to:  
There are innumerable points at which we have to detach ourselves, to change 
our orientation, to redirect our desire and refresh and purify out energy, to keep 
on looking in the right direction: to attend upon the grace that comes through 
faith. (p. 25)  
To realize self-hood is aspirational, just as truly to know the world as a unitary whole 
is aspirational. To take a leap of faith in how one hangs together, if the leap is of the right 
quality, enhances the self morally, much as a leap to a whole new mode of understanding can 
enhance human knowledge of the world. The courage or mettle called for in either kind of 
leap is one and the same, and Murdoch recognises it everywhere. She considers that everyday 
life can be the site of the greatest faith, the most noble of pursuits, even in the midst of what 
seems like chaos. Murdoch’s conception of a reorientation that is at once shattering and also 
productive, is reflected in Joseph’s rejection of, and consequent reorientation away from 
Castalia to a role that is both more participatory and more creative. As Hesse’s narrator notes 
“The idea of this image-making abyss is also the concept of a via negativa, which is both 
iconoclastic and fertile of new images” (Hesse, 2000, p. 465). 
In Dying to Teach (1997), Blacker argues for the ideal of education as an enterprise that 
is essentially “out of time”, an a-temporal project of mythic proportions, and one that is built 
on positive relationships. Drawing on Blacker’s ideal, the Bildung of Joseph Knecht can be 
made out as transcending the temporality and temporal boundedness of the individual life. 
This is not so much (as in Shakespeare’s Sonnet 60) from the life being remembered by others 
as from things that gave special wholeness and meaning to the life going on and being taken 




rise to something larger and beyond the individuals doing the enacting” (Blacker, 1997, p. 
103).  
Similarly, if Hesse’s chapter entitled ‘The Legend’ marks the end of Joseph Knecht’s 
life, the novel’s subsequent section explores themes of teaching and education in ways that 
give his life meaning within a far broader perspective. In this final section of the novel, Hesse 
plays with themes of reincarnation, immortality, and destiny, and he introduces further 
possibilities for the way that knowledge and values may be conveyed across time and culture. 
The purpose of this section can be seen not as a consideration of various pathways of 
causality, but rather as a consideration of progressions of meaning. One way to enrich one’s 
sense of a kind of timeless significance of Knecht’s life is to consider the archetype, as 
reincarnation stories can assist one to do.  
The novel’s final section contains in addition to thirteen of Knecht’s youthful poems 
three lengthy fictional biographies—almost short novels in themselves. Hesse’s narrator 
identifies this section as “possibly the most important part of the book” (Hesse, 1943/2000, p. 
105). The significance to the novel of the three fictional biographies have been analysed by 
many Hesse scholars including Field (1968), Milek (1970), Remys (1983), Johnson (1956), and 
White & White (1986). White & White point out that this section of the novel underlines the 
ways in which the main figure is “constantly evolving and widening his horizons” (p. 943). 
Each of Hesse’s three fictional biographies depicts an aspiring “Knechtian” namesake—
always a younger male who looks to an older, wiser male figure, and who stands as a potential 
replacement for that older person. (Johnson, 1965, provides a detailed analysis of this aspect 
of the autobiographies.)  
The content of the third section of the novel gives further meaning to the idea that 
individual selves may be inter-connected in mysterious ways that we do not fully understand. 
Knecht’s youthful writing samples provide a perspective on how he envisioned his adult life 
might possibly ‘have been’ in another time. Of relevance to the theme of his intellectual and 
moral development is that each of his three fictional biographies involves Knecht’s giving 
loving attention to the needs of another person. This anticipates Murdoch’s account of 
virtuous attention as a practice that is “concerned with really apprehending that other people 
exist” (Murdoch, 1997, p. 284). It is precisely Joseph’s capacity to apprehend “that other 




Knecht’s three imaginative biographies also connect importantly with his emergent 
sense of selfhood. Following Bakhtin (1986) we could argue that that Knecht “emerges along 
with the world and that he reflects the historical emergence of the world itself” (p. 23). In his 
discussion of literary forms, Bakhtin discusses what he terms “novels of emergence”. He 
proposes that in the most interesting examples, such novels explore what he calls “problems 
of reality, and man’s potential, problems of freedom and necessity, and the problem of 
creative initiative” (p. 24). Joseph’s Bildung is understood as a process of ‘becoming’ in just this 
way, of his taking increased responsibility for his own further self-development. No-one else 
can assist him with his challenges, and he must forge for himself his own self-understanding. 
This involves him in much struggle, self-criticism, and self-reflection, a process that calls for a 
curious mixture of audacity and humility. In taking the direction that he wants to pursue in 
order to be the kind of person he wants to become, Joseph Knecht embodies the spirit of 
Bildung.  
Laverty (2007) connects the term Bildungsroman to texts that explore pedagogical 
questions by way of the growth and maturation of the characters. She identifies the 
Bildungsroman as a literary genre that describes the gradual deepening of the protagonist’s 
understanding of what it means to lead a good life, thereby linking the form to Plato’s 
underlying questions in Republic. Murdoch (2014) makes a similar point when she claims that 
“Morality is connected with change and progress” (p. 28). Hesse’s novel belongs to the 
tradition of the Bildungsroman, both in the novel’s overarching themes and in the way in which 
that overall theme is delivered. 
Hesse depicts Knecht as a “hero who finds the courage to fulfil his destiny”, one who 
“follows his own star” (Hesse, 1981, p. 73). Knecht’s efforts to be an “egoless” self (in the 
sense of responding to a higher calling) can be seen to connect with Murdoch’s moral 
philosophy and her belief that goodness exists independently, and that we can recognise what 
it is: “Goodness is connected with the attempt to see the unself, to see and to respond to the 
real world in the light of a virtuous consciousness” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 91). It is by way of his 
quiet and unassuming process of ‘un-selfing’ that Knecht finds a way to countenance a 
different, albeit difficult, path. Knecht shows on various occasions that he is deeply responsive 
to natural beauty, which draws him out of himself and, in Murdoch’s words, “invites un-
possessive contemplation and resists absorption into the selfish dream life of the 
consciousness” (p. 83). Murdoch reminds us that this mental state of ‘unselfing’ opens the 




attention works to discipline the mind away from thoughts that are innately self-oriented or 
simply aimless. In Murdoch’s ethics of attention, the ego is humbled and one’s being is 
subject to what is subjectless, transcendent of any self, but accessible to all selves equally. She 
proposes that to give attention to the artistic achievement of others is an excellent example of 
this phenomenon, as is sensitivity to another person’s plight: “We cease to be in order to 
attend to the existence of something else, a natural object, a person in need” (p. 58).  
Murdoch understands from Plato that virtue is not something that can be explicitly 
taught, nor does virtue appear fully-developed in any individual. An aptitude that is innate 
can be woken by reflection, in Plato’s view, and in Murdoch’s is an aptitude to draw towards 
the good, even if this good is significantly “forgotten”, and requires painstaking “recollection” 
in order to form as virtue. Only the cultivation of attention, and so of reflection, can bring 
about truly moral change, or can help an individual to become, in themselves, truly virtuous. 
Murdoch reminds us that we may encounter aspects of the good only if we are truly able to 
look beyond ourselves, to see beyond our own limitations. She challenges us to reflect on ways 
in which we might improve ourselves morally.  
Joseph Knecht’s aesthetic experiences through music awaken in him what Murdoch 
calls “a pure delight in the independent existence of what is excellent. Both in its genesis and 
its enjoyment it is a thing totally opposed to selfish obsession” (p. 83). Murdoch reminds us 
that music, like other aesthetic forms, gives structure and form to human experience whereas 
in everyday reality we are more likely to experience life as a series of formless or chaotic 
happenings (Murdoch, 1992, pp. 1–2). Hesse shows how artistic endeavours such as music-
making meaningfully direct our attention towards that which is good—towards that which 
inspires love. “Love is self-mastery, the power to understand, the ability to smile in sorrow” 
(Hesse, 1981, p. 69). Murdoch similarly argues that morality and aesthetics are inter-
connected in their capacity to arouse an awareness of the reality of something other than the 
self – an awareness that is in Murdoch’s view, quintessentially the experience of loving: 
Art and morals are, with certain provisos…one…Their essence is the same. The 
essence of both of them is love. Love is the perception of individuals. Love is the 
extremely difficult realisation that something other than oneself is real. Love, and 
so art and morals, is the discovery of reality. (Murdoch, 1997, p. 215)  
Knecht’s gradual realization that he sees the world beyond Castalia differently from 




morally active inner reflection. Murdoch explains that “as we move from generalities toward 
the accidental and particular we introduce muddle but also variety and space” (Murdoch, 
1992, p. 349). Murdoch defends the view that moral progress comes about not by way of 
particular acts or deeds, but rather through the consistent and on-going application of careful 
and contemplative attention—that is to say, through patient and attentive waiting. Murdoch 
maintains that moral improvement arises from “attention to the world whose natural result is 
a decrease in egoism through an increased sense of the reality of, primarily, of course other 
people but also other things. Such a view accords with oriental wisdom…ultimately we ought 
to have no will” (p. 52).  
On the eve of his departure from Castalia, Knecht pens a letter to Tegularius, in 
which he explains the depth of his moral concerns: “Castalia without the Game is 
conceivable, but not a Castalia without reverence for truth, without fidelity to the life of the 
mind” (Hesse, 2000, p. 342). This declaration is followed by an eloquent defence of the role of 
teacher and Knecht’s statement of his determination to pursue a quite different, albeit more 
lowly, more open-ended path: 
Teachers are more essential than anything else, men who can give the young the 
ability to judge and distinguish, who can serve as examples of the honoring of 
truth, obedience to the things of the spirit, respect for language…That is where 
the basis for the cultural life of the country is to be found, not in the seminars of 
the Glass Bead Game. (p. 342) 
The momentous decision that Knecht takes, and his reasons for taking it, connect us 
to thoughts that Socrates raises regarding what a good and virtuous life amounts to. These 
are questions that Murdoch also draws us back to. Murdoch argues that art, literature and 
aesthetics bring us face to face with questions that religion and mysticism also explore—what 
it means to be a truly good person. Murdoch proposes that one way that we can make sense 
of our ordinary everyday experience is by aligning it with aesthetics and art. She suggests that 
if an individual person can re-orient himself towards the good, that achievement has within it 
something of a spiritual dimension. She observes that people are “continuously striving and 
learning, discovering and discarding images” and that “our business is with the continual 
activity of our own minds and souls and with our own possibilities of being truthful and good” 




Murdoch observes that “…form in art, as form in philosophy, is designed to 
communicate and reveal. In the shock of joy in response to good art, an essential ingredient is 
a sense of the revelation of reality, of the really real…the world as we were never able so 
clearly to see it before” (Murdoch, 1997, p. 454). Similarly, Hesse’s novel invites his readers to 
consider the capacity for art to bring about changes in the way we think about the world and 
how we interact with it. Hesse’s narrator comments that “[t]o study history means submitting 
to chaos and nevertheless retaining faith in order and meaning” (Hesse, 2000, p. 157). The 
narrator draws a link between history and literature and notes that “history’s third dimension 
is always fiction” (p. 39), thereby suggesting that literature, like history, provides useful 
knowledge about the human condition.  
In a many-textured way, Hesse’s novel supports the view that creative and artistic 
investigation, not unlike historical investigation, can lead to revised interpretations and ways 
of seeing things anew, or in ways not before considered. The connections that Hesse draws 
between pedagogical and aesthetic explorations are clear—both enterprises are open-ended 
and imaginative, and both are open to new ways of interpretation. Artistic authenticity and 
originality involves thinking for oneself, or as Hesse puts it elsewhere, “having a will of one’s 
own” (Hesse, 1981, p. 72). This also connects his novel thematically to the moral philosophy 
of Murdoch, who recognises the importance of art and aesthetics as fundamentally educative 
because, as she argues, this is the site of moral growth and change. 
In some respects, an analogy can be drawn between Knecht’s encounter with the 
bead game and our own experience as readers of Hesse’s text. In both cases there a sense of 
anticipation coupled with confusion, and the somewhat bemused but also deeply-held desire 
that we will come to some fresh understanding or illumination, some clear and new insight. 
Like Joseph, we are called upon to review our own beliefs and assumptions and to consider 
how they might need to be modified in light of further illumination or clarification. We are 
likely to empathise with Knecht’s recognition that his earlier understanding of life’s journey as 
a steady march towards clarity was wrongheaded, or at least wrongly ‘formulaic’, and we 
gradually learn that the actual trajectory of Knecht’s intellectual and moral progress is very 
much more textured and elusive than he, or we, might initially have guessed: “The pattern 
grew confused and he lost it; he had to begin over again; for a moment his concentration left 





The Glass Bead Game presents education as an open-ended, inherently perplexing 
undertaking. The novel promotes the idea that intellectual growth is analogous to moral 
growth, one that resonates with Murdoch’s comment that “consciousness or self-being is the 
fundamental mode or form of moral being” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 171). Through the figure of 
Joseph Knecht, Hesse offers an interpretation of teaching pedagogy as artistic exploration, 
where new ways of interpretation are constantly possible, and where dialogue, contemplation 
and storytelling all play a part. More than the description of a utopian dream for education, 
Hesse’s novel shows that an individual’s education represents a lifetime of endeavour, 
commitment, and ongoing self-realization. While the novel ultimately portrays a harmonious 
balance between the two aspects of life, vita contemplativia and vita activa, Hesse’s novel also 
reminds us that such a state is rarely, if ever, achieved.  
Through his not-so-veiled critique of Castalia, Hesse reminds us that intellectual 
(moral) harmony is difficult to achieve, and that a pretence at intellectual (moral) harmony 
may be illusory, or worse, could facilitate a kind of inhumane indifference (consider the 
hierarchy’s cruel treatment of Shadow Master Bertram). But Hesse does not conclude from 
this that the educative project is ultimately hopeless. On the contrary, he defines education as 
the chief way that we might hold out hope for the future. For Hesse, the test of the worth of 
the pedagogical achievement, and one which Joseph Knecht ultimately masters, is his 
capacity to hold to truth. By the time Knecht leaves Castalia he has developed the courage to 
commit himself to a pedagogically uncertain but optimistic relationship with Tito, a choice 
that (unexpectedly) creates an early opportunity for the younger boy to assume the 
pedagogical challenges modelled by his elder.  
But Hesse’s achievement in The Glass Bead Game is even more than this. Through his 
artistic vision, he draws his readers into the working of his own imaginative literary game. His 
readers are then tasked with synthesising imaginatively the complex world of Hesse’s vast 
inter-textual references, displaced chronologies, blended literary genres and dialectical 
tensions. The readers are invited to play in a way that is itself like a glass bead game. More, 
then, than the fictionalised historical biography of a single individual protagonist figure, 
Hesse’s novel is a work of art that calls on its readers to undertake their own imaginative, 
moral, and educative struggles in the effort to understand and interpret what it is to be 




Hesse points to the way that aesthetic (as opposed to didactic) education can inform 
our intellectual insights and our moral dispositions. He underlines the importance of the 
imagination and aesthetic experiences in education, and he reminds us that while the faculty 
of reason is critical, this must not be pursued to the exclusion of creative development. 
Hesse’s novel also advances an education that actively critiques implied assumptions or 
hidden beliefs, and that encourages students to avoid replicating the thinking of their 
teachers. His novel suggests that, in balance with dialogue and study of the works of others, 
there should be space and time in education for individual contemplation and reflection. In 
accordance with the views of both Weil and Murdoch, Hesse’s novel demonstrates that the 
basis for teaching pedagogy is love. 
Hesse’s novel also serves as a reminder that we must always to look to youth with 
respect, kindness, and invitation. This novel exemplifies that the first and most difficult task of 
the teacher or pedagogue is truly to ‘know oneself’, that a high level of self-understanding can 
be achieved only through sustained and searching reflection, and that this is the best 
background for anyone in an educative role. Hesse grants that within the educative 
experience, the teacher must realize, as Knecht ultimately does, that both student and teacher 
need time and space to grow and develop themselves. Hesse acknowledges that his novel 
intersects with timelessly important aesthetic and moral themes: “All the things we call a 
product of the mind or a work of art or objectified spirit—are the outcomes of a struggle for 
purification and liberation. They are escapes from time into timelessness” (Hesse, 2000, p. 
263). 
The following chapter considers a very much shorter, but no less complex text. Henry 
James’s enigmatic novella The Turn of the Screw, has been endlessly interpreted since its first 
publication. Consistent with the metaphor of a ship’s propeller, or screw, this story gains its 
momentum in unseen ways, as if just below the textual surface. The reader’s inevitable sense 
of a loss of direction, even of their own moral compass, links to the story’s themes of 
intellectual and moral confusion. James’s reader is put into a state of constant doubt, 
repeatedly tasked with figuring out just who and what to believe. This story absolutely 









Chapter 6: Henry James’s The Turn of the Screw 
6.0. Introduction 
That it is impossible truly to grow without being improved morally by the 
accomplishment, is a thesis of Simone Weil’s and Iris Murdoch’s, upon which their entire 
account of pedagogical attention vitally depends. Yet their thesis that all learning is partly 
moral learning, will strike many people as implausibly strong. The present chapter subjects to 
a test their claim that pedagogical attention possesses an inevitable connection with moral 
growth. The work of literary fiction that has been selected for use as this test antedates both 
Weil and Murdoch—by fewer decades, but no less surely, than Charlotte Brontë’s Villette (of 
Chapter 5) also antedates them.  
The fictional work that is chosen so as to test whether it is impossible truly to learn 
without being improved morally by the accomplishment reflects the following circumstance. 
Society may sometimes be mightily blinkered against entertaining at all, certain forms of 
moral reflection. Late Victorian society illustrates this strikingly. Among the various forms of 
moral reflection against which late Victorian society was tightly blinkered, one form 
concerned (or would have concerned if such reflection had been even possible), sexual 
predation upon the young. So tightly blinkered was Victorian society against consideration of 
this matter that even if there were the words to form a description (and those that there were, 
were relatively few), the possibility of using them in speech or in literary writing was 
immediately stifled.  
If a work of literature were in this circumstance able to educate its contemporary 
readers, that is to say, if the fiction were to create inducements for attention that are far-
reaching because especially challenging, then very emphatically, that work of literary fiction 
would need to help its readers to adjust the boundaries of what was psychologically possible 
for them. For a reader to engage his or her own reflective agency in this circumstance would 
appear to be both virtually impossible, but, at the same time, entirely necessary.  
Obviously, if the work of fiction were to seek to force its readers’ blinkers to come 
down, this would constitute a violence that would defeat the idea that the work could be 
morally improving in the way understood by Weil and Murdoch. Indeed, were the work to 
attempt to force the needed psychological change upon the reader, it would both infantilize 




thinker. A work of fiction that contrived to be violent in this way would be itself deeply 
troubled. A fictional work that was of this character would be oppressive, uninviting, and 
destined not to be widely read. 
For a literary work to concern engagingly such a situation depends on the author’s 
own subtlety concerning how new reader insight might be accomplished, and by what means. 
For the literary artist to enable a society to be more open and honest with itself requires, 
ironically, that the literary work itself employs some degree of subterfuge—some refusal, as 
art, explicitly to state its very own point. This is because the success of the literary artist in this 
situation depends on the reader’s own accomplishment—not so much to arrive at new insight 
that will lead to a new form of moral understanding, but to experience a growth (Bildung) in 
reader understanding from which might develop a greater capacity to describe how things are 
and might be otherwise. To be effective, the literary work must be eminently ingenious in 
what reflective effort it requires of its readers, and in how that reflective effort is elicited. 
The challenge for the literary artist in this circumstance is especially weighty. Not 
simply to flaunt the codes of decorum of polite society has to be high among the 
requirements, in order for such a fiction to “work”. The task of the writer is not himself or 
herself to peer behind the blinkers of society, but rather to help to create cognitive urgings for 
his or her readers so that they begin to imagine for themselves that those blinkers are down. 
The powers of articulation that are stifled before the bare capacity to exercise them even 
begins, must, on that account, not be exercised by the writer—even if the moral point of the 
writing is to alter those possibilities, and thereby to oppose the stifling. The test of the 
argument that all education is partly moral education will be passed if a writer who accepts 
such a challenge rises to it in some way that wholly depends upon his possessing and 
exercising the pedagogical powers that Weil and Murdoch associate with attention. 
Our test case here concerns Henry James (1843–1916) and his acclaimed novella The 
Turn of the Screw. Written in 1898, the story’s inner narrative tells the first-person experiences 
of an unnamed governess who takes up the care of two orphans in a remote country house. 
Her story ends with one of the two children dead in her arms in highly ambiguous 
circumstances. James’s novella has been analysed multiple times by researchers fascinated by 
the power of the tale to persuade, to convince, and even (it is said) to manipulate its readers. 
Yet whatever any person’s interpretation of the story, it is a common experience for James’s 
reader to find that this tale retains a lingering hold on the reader’s mind and plays on the 




are developed further by others (Felman,1985, Felski, 2015, Leithauser, 2012, and Seltzer, 
2014). In short, James’s reader is led by the text to take significant steps of reflection that 
reach beyond it. If The Turn of the Screw is beautiful as art (and certainly this work is much 
acclaimed), then its beauty has everything to do with this power.  
The purpose of the present chapter is to reveal how this power is every inch moral in 
its character. It explores reasons why the story’s pervading disquiet is vital to the initiation of 
difficult moral advancement in the reader. The chapter is written in three main parts. The 
first considers the connection between moral attention and aesthetic appreciation, and seeks 
to explain the overall structure and design of the novella. The second (which draws on ideas 
from Weil and Murdoch) explores the work’s educational themes in relation to attention. The 
third and final section (in reference beyond Weil and Murdoch back to Plato) explores 
James’s use of language, dialogue, and silence in the text. The chapter concludes with some 
broader comments on the connections between attention, imagination, and moral sense. 
6.1. Calls for reader attention 
Critics across many decades have sought to “explain” James’s Turn of the Screw story, 
almost as a way to soothe the disquiet that any attentive reader experiences in reading the 
tale. The disquiet of the story is very painful, so it is no wonder that critics have sought a salve 
or a means to resolve it. However, the mode of scrutiny of the story in the present chapter is 
different: this chapter directly considers what the story’s disquiet is for. The work’s refusal as 
art ever explicitly to state its very own point is not in order to soften the story, for that would 
diminish James’s artistic achievement. The work’s refusal, as art, to state explicitly its own 
point is not to be seen as a kind of perverse blank on James’s part. The uneasiness that the 
text arouses in its readers is essential to the beauty as art of James’s art work.  
James explicitly uses the term ‘attention’ both within this novella and repeatedly 
within his acclaimed literary prefaces (many of which post-dated the works themselves, and 
were published between 1907 and 1909). While James’s use of the term “attention” is not 
altogether on all fours with Weil’s and Murdoch’s, the following agreement with those later 
philosophers is beyond question: James makes it clear that just as failure of attention will quite 
prevent any character in the story from achieving worthy insight, so also no reader of the 
story will without attention achieve worthy insight. Failure of attention fates all who suffer it to 





Only the adequate exercise of attention can pull beyond the confusion, to warrant, no 
doubt painfully, but nevertheless convincingly, an explanation for them all, according to 
which not only is the psychology explicable but the seemingly supernatural aspects made 
psychologically telling and natural. Those critics who have overtly filled in the blanks 
(perhaps as though to do so would save readers some work), may not so much have 
understood James’s purpose as they have trampled upon it. They have not thereby 
“explained” the story, and instead may have mangled its point.  
Critical interpretations of the story’s meaning have been the source of ongoing heated 
debate and scrutiny virtually since the time of the story’s first publication. Among these 
critical interpretations have been those developed by Beidler (1989), Bewley (1952), 
Bromwich (2011), Felman (1977), Hadley (2002), Leithauser (2012), Lustig (1994), Wilson 
(1948) and Yeazell (1976). Against these prevailing readings of the story, I here argue that 
there is a “preferred” moral reading of James’s novella, albeit one that is altogether not 
explicitly presented to our minds by the story’s telling. (By calling the moral reading 
“preferred” I do not preclude there being other, different readings that have partial worth.) I 
argue that James has silently fashioned precisely those matters that cannot be broached, 
contained, captured, or politely summed up, precisely so as to draw the reader’s imagination 
in most intensely, and so to engage the reader morally and ethically. 
The implications of horrific child sexual abuse by adults in the story are surely 
magnified by the silence that James has kept concerning them. Against the typical critique of 
the artistry of the story, the present reading of The Turn of the Screw leaves, as the novella itself 
does, all truly reflective required effort to each individual reader. Neither simply a ghost story, 
nor a tale of madness and hysteria, I argue that James’s story epitomises instead the writer’s 
demand for moral attention from his reader. Even a reader who has possessed no power to 
discuss a hidden evil must remake the power of their own imagination and consider that evil 
for the first time.  
In his portrayal of Miles and Flora, the two children at the centre of the story, James 
presents us with two equally ruinous dimensions of sexual predation: on the one hand we see 
evidence of the irreparable harm that is done to the children by the adults entrusted to care 
for them; while on the other, James shows how these two children have themselves learned to 
behave in highly manipulative ways. The ruinous behaviour of the adults towards the 
children exposes them to things that are entirely corrupting, and that they cannot 




themselves equally incapable of “unlearning” the complex manipulative behaviour towards 
others.  
Our moral reflection on this question has to be uneasy and disturbing. While there 
exists a moral imperative never to blame a victim of sexual abuse—since that person is an 
innocent victim, it is less clear, when considering the pathology of child sexual abuse, just how 
we ought to think about the fact that the victim is likely to become, in time, a violator of 
innocence, since this is precisely how the pathology of sexual abuse is perpetrated through the 
generations. This is not at all to suggest that we should give up on the ideal of never blaming 
the victim, but it does raise the question just how much any individual person can hope to 
influence the change of another other individual in such a dire situation. In this, as in so 
many other respects, James’ story catches his readers off-guard. While it is eminently helpful 
to reflect on these matters through a work of literature, it appears impossible to get to the 
bottom of the complexities of this particular aspect of James’s tale—and maybe we can never 
entirely get to the bottom of this particular moral dilemma—just as those who are subject to 
the ruinous effects of sexual abuse may have learned, through the lived example of their own 
damaging experience, the power to manipulate and outsmart others. 
James’s reader must take their own step in moral imagination, a step in moral 
imagination that their whole society systematically shies away from taking. And if they truly 
do take that step, then that evil (an evil that they previously had not possessed any power to 
discuss), they will surely wish to be confronted and ameliorated, and thus thought about 
explicitly after all, and abhorred. In The Turn of the Screw, it seems that none of the characters 
have any ways to discuss taboo subjects or to broach vexatious issues. Theirs is a world of 
constraint, anxiety, of “strange passages and perils, secret disorders, vices more than 
suspected” (James, 2014, p. 41). James’s story seems to emphasize the difficulty and the perils 
of failing to navigate such areas in a measured and compassionate way. The text invites us to 
consider not only the impoverished quality of the governess’s attention towards her two 
young charges, but also, and perhaps more significantly, the authority of the text itself over us 
as James’s readers. 
It is precisely what remains implicit in The Turn of the Screw that deserves our undivided 
attention. Herein, moreover, lies the moral significance, as well as the artistic beauty, of 
James’s work. The Turn of the Screw invites us to consider the social and societal repercussions 
that can occur when people fail to give attention to—or chose to ignore completely—issues 




for the implications of our own reading. His story, which is written tersely and tightly, offers 
no sympathetic characters. It exploits themes of uncertainty, fear and avoidance, and helps us 
consider what can go awry when people conduct their lives with no sense of their moral and 
ethical responsibility to others.  
Repeatedly, James challenges his readers’ understanding, and repeatedly the 
coherence of the governess’s story is undermined and eroded by unfolding details that ought 
to serve to make things clearer, but that only serve to increase the obscurity. James’s text calls 
for intense and detailed attention. At every turn, readers’ attention is tasked with questioning 
and further interrogating the text—to the extent that it comes to be that the more that 
readers commit to making sense of the tale, the greater are their unsatisfied demands of 
attention. James’s text shows its readers how the characters themselves, insofar as they lack 
attention, can remark no further meaning in the puzzling details that they encounter. 
Similarly, any reader who lacks attention will be left puzzling mightily and so is powerfully 
invited back to being attentive after all. Yet there is no doubt that James makes his readers’ 
task as difficult as possible. The demands of reading The Turn of the Screw point perhaps to 
what is entailed when the human mind is tasked with handling something of significant 
intellectual complexity. The text reminds us how very difficult sustained attentive thinking 
actually is. Yet the allure and essence of this work—as well as its horror—lies in the fact that 
although the story refuses to be explicit regarding what it is centrally about, it is in fact what 
remains implicit in this story that deserves our utmost attention.  
James’s story helps us consider what can go awry when people’s sense of their moral 
and ethical responsibility to others is completely ignored. James thereby leads us to consider 
the ethical implications of freedom of the attention. He reminds us, obliquely, what it means 
to bestow attention, and he shows how, not only on an individual scale, this capacity can be 
limited by failure to reinterpret, qualify, or imaginatively explore, hastily drawn moral 
judgments. The text reminds us that we must be not merely careful, not merely observant and 
not merely reflective in our reading—rather we need to be, as well, truly attentive and 
morally engaged. This is entirely attuned to the thinking of Weil and Murdoch.  
6.2. Moral attention and aesthetic design 
Across James’s famous literary prefaces (in which he analyses some of the demands of 
fiction writing), he repeatedly explores the connection between attention and moral 




“re-creates” it, which calls not merely for an intellectual response from the reader to the story 
as given, but for a quality of attention that, in reaching beyond the given elements of the 
story, creates anew the whole. James construes readerly attention as involving not just an 
intellectual grasp of the details, but something further—a quality that is more critical, more 
considered, and more richly and deeply imaginative. James identifies the writer’s challenge in 
this regard in his preface to What Maisie Knew, where he notes that “the effort really to see and 
really to represent is no idle business in face of the constant force that makes for muddlement” 
(James, 1962, p. 149). 
In his preface to The Turn of the Screw, (written some years after the novel’s publication), 
James makes some further, crucial points that link this work directly to attention. He 
describes the work as a tale of “exquisite mystification” (James, 1962, pp. 172–173), one that 
contains “intense anomalies and obscurities” (p. 173) and he describes the story as “an 
excursion into chaos while remaining…but an anecdote, though an anecdote amplified and 
highly emphasised and returning upon itself” (p. 172). James’s characterisation of this novella 
as a work that “returns upon itself” informs the current reading of the novella as a work that 
invites a sceptical, almost resistant reading. James grants that this work is complex and 
demanding—”a piece of ingenuity pure and simple, of cold artistic calculation, an amusette to 
catch those not easily caught (the ‘fun’ of the capture of the merely witless being ever so 
small)” (p. 172).  
Perhaps somewhat ironically, James refers to “a slight reproach made me by a reader 
capable evidently, for the time, of some attention, but not quite capable of enough” (p. 173). 
Evidently this reader judged that James “hadn’t sufficiently ‘characterised’ my young woman 
engaged in her labyrinth, hadn’t endowed her with signs and marks, features and humours” 
(p. 173). In reply, James defends his “general proposition of our young woman’s keeping 
crystalline her record of so many intense anomalies and obscurities” (p. 173). He reiterates his 
artistic purpose of the story: “To knead the subject of my young friend’s, the supposititious 
narrator’s, mystification thick, and yet strain the expression of it so clear and fine that beauty 
would result” (p. 173). James’s description of his narrator as “supposititious” (meaning “not 
genuine”) is a reminder to us that it is James who is ultimately the “true” narrator of the story. 
Also relevant to the current discussion is that the word “supposititious” is easily confused with 
the word “suppositious” (meaning “one who is subject to suppositions”), since James’s main 
narrator, the Bly governess, is very much inclined to base her decisions on assumption and 




6.3. “Attention of perusal” 
A primary ambition for James as literary artist is to get his readers to give careful 
attention to the details of the story (both those given and those implied) and then to think for 
themselves by engaging imaginatively. He aligns the faculty of attention to the faculty of 
aesthetic appreciation, which is for him a sign of cultivation of the mind, and a sign of a truly 
moral sensibility. On James’s view, it is moral attention that forms the foundation for our 
understanding, thinking, responding, and acting ethically. He says that as a literary artist he 
puts “for the beautiful always, in a work of art, the close, the curious, the deep” (p. 174). The 
connection that James draws between imagination, moral attention, and mystification, 
provides a useful conceptual frame in which to consider The Turn of the Screw.  
James demands a great deal of his readers. In his preface to The Wings of the Dove James 
notes that: “Attention of perusal, I thus confess by the way, is what I at every point, as well as 
here, absolutely invoke and take for granted” (James, 1962, p. 304). In his preface to The 
Lesson of the Master he notes: “Suggestive and illuminating incident is indeed scarce frequent 
enough to be referred to as administering the shake that starts up fresh the stopped watch of 
attention” (p. 225).  
From these comments, it is evident that James considers the fully committed reader to 
be one who bestows “attention of perusal” and who, by “the shake that starts up fresh the 
stopped watch of attention” has the capacity to think creatively, reflectively, and 
independently. James’s metaphor of the “stopped watch of attention” to capture the state of 
complete mental absorption resonates with Simone Weil’s well-known account that 
“attention consists of suspending our thought, leaving it detached, empty and ready” (Weil, 
2009, p. 62). Weil states further that in the state of attention, “the soul empties itself of all its 
own contents in order to receive into itself the being it is looking at, just as he is, in all his 
truth” (Weil, 2009, p. 65), and although James’s understanding of moral attention is not 
fundamentally spiritual in the sense understood by Weil, James does consider that attention 
and truth-seeking are fundamentally connected. 
James acknowledges that there will be various levels of reader attention on a 
continuum from “the muffled, the faint, the just sufficient” to “the intense, the complete, in a 
word—the power to be finely aware and richly responsible” (James, 1962, p. 62). He defines 
his ideal reader as one who reads in an open-ended, perceptive and imaginative way, ever 




who approaches his reading by way of what James terms a “fond attention” (p. 62). James 
draws an analogy between reader attention and aesthetic appreciation, “his quiet attention, 
his faculty of appreciation” (p. 71). He wants to provide in his fiction “an agreeable unity, of 
the roundness, in which beauty and lucidity largely reside” (p. 171). He recognises that both 
the artist and the reader share in a need to impose shape, to give order and meaning to the 
inevitable sense of commotion and disarray of human experience: 
Life being all inclusion and confusion, and art being all discrimination and 
selection, the latter, in search of the hard latent value with which alone it is 
concerned, sniffs around the mass as instinctively and unerringly as a dog 
suspicious of some unburied bone…the artist finds in his tiny nugget…the very 
stuff for a clear affirmation, the happiest chance for the indestructible…life 
persistently blunders and deviates, loses herself in the sand. (p. 120) 
James’s views of the nature of moral attention aligns in some respects with those of 
Murdoch (2014, p. 63), who also maintains that both the creative literary artist and the reader 
partake in the shared responsibility of bestowing moral attention. Nussbaum (1986) observes 
that for James, “the literary work is a moral achievement, just as the well-lived life is a work of 
literary art” (Nussbaum, 1986, p. 516). She notes further that for James, human “obtuseness 
and refusal of vision are our besetting vices. Responsible lucidity can be wrested from that 
darkness only by painful vigilant effort, the intense scrutiny of particulars” (p. 516). James’s 
achievement in this novella is, through his own invitation for an intense “scrutiny of 
particulars”, to leave it to his reader to reflect on the story’s projected morality. 
James considers that the role of the literary artist is of high importance to the 
functioning of society, to the extent that the artist’s task is one of “enlarging” the moral 
imagination. In another preface he observes that “the value I wished most to render…our not 
knowing, of society’s not knowing, but only guessing and suspecting, trying to ignore, what 
‘goes on’ irreconcilably, subversively, beneath the vast smug surface?” (James, 1962, pp. 77–
78). He believes that both writer and reader must work to keep open the possibilities and 
potentialities of interpretation, and that both must respect the need to explore rather than to 
close down on, a final interpretation. He considers that literary works have the capacity to stir 
us intellectually and to render us less complacent about what we claim to know about 




James’s demand for reader attention is embedded in the very design and structure of 
The Turn of the Screw. From the story’s overarching structure down to the smallest syntactical 
feature, the work is meticulously constructed. While the story’s outer narrative is an homage 
to oral storytelling traditions that span generations and that carry myths and meanings across 
time, the inner narrative of the governess suggests that beneath the grand veneer of the 
“beautiful lost form” of literary and cultural traditions and the old forms of the romance, may 
lie something far less beautiful, far worthier of thinking beyond than of deserving obsequious 
respect. Through the novella, James invites us to consider what he calls “a view of the back of 
the tapestry” (James, 2011, p. 66). 
The work opens with an (unintroduced) framing section which serves as a “prologue” 
(see p. 8) to the “inner story” (Chapters 1–24) of the governess. This enclosed structure where 
one story is embedded inside another, effectively positions the story of the Bly governess (who 
is author and narrator of the inner tale), at several removes not only from James the author, 
but also from the first narrator (Griffin), and the subsequent narrator (Douglas). This 
structure also sets the governess’s subsequent documented narrative (which is read aloud by 
Douglas), at several removes from us, James’s reading audience.  
The opening context is an extended Christmas gathering at a country estate. A group 
of friends have assembled, and during the evenings they provide entertainment by sharing 
recollected ghost stories. Griffin (the outermost narrator) is a member of this party. One 
evening he notices that Douglas, another member of the assembled group, seems inattentive, 
and concludes that this inattention is because Douglas has called to mind a ghost story that is 
superior to those he is being told. Douglas agrees that he has a compelling story to share, but 
he insists that his particular story must be told precisely as written, so if he is to share it, he 
will need to have the original manuscript to read from. The manuscript is duly sent for and 
when it is delivered several days later, Douglas takes up the role of narrator from Griffin and 
prepares to read to his assembled audience.  
The purpose behind Douglas’s stipulation that his narrative be told with absolute 
precision rather than being related “off the cuff” becomes clearer as the governess’s tale 
unfolds, for we discover that every tiny detail of the story is carefully placed. 
James’s prologue serves several textural purposes. It sets up the expectation that 
Douglas’s assembled fictional audience will need to be attentive, and thereby reminds us, 




Douglas’ manuscript has arrived from London, the interest of his assembled audience is high, 
such that Douglas reports “in the light of it we lost all attention for everything else” (p. 6). In 
the interim, however, the size of his assembled audience has dwindled, and has become more 
“compact and select” (p. 7) and his final assembled group of listeners has become a smaller, 
more discerning and attentive group. In response to a question from a member of this 
assembled audience regarding the character of the governess, Douglas declares “you’ll easily 
judge” (p. 5), thereby implying (incorrectly) that the ensuing story will be one that is entirely 
accessible and straightforward.  
With three changes of narrator within the first eight pages of the text, James’s reader 
must work hard to determine who is talking, and where the “authorial” voice of the story lies. 
Narrator Douglas promises that his forthcoming story will reveal “horror”, “dreadfulness” 
and “general uncanny ugliness and pain” (p. 4). At the same time, and despite his earlier 
reassurances, Douglas also introduces a hint of equivocation. He warns his audience that the 
forthcoming story will not necessarily be one that will answer all their questions, declaring 
“[t]he story won’t tell…not in any literal, vulgar way” (p. 6). In this sentence, James gives us a 
significant clue as to his overall strategy in the novella. 
Douglas’s prologue provides some further contextual information. The forthcoming 
story, he explains, involves a twenty-year-old unmarried woman, the daughter of a country 
parson, who has recently completed her governess training. For her first post, she is hired by a 
Harley Street businessman to provide for his orphaned nephew and niece, Miles and Flora, at 
his remote country estate called Bly. This guardian uncle, who is funding the care and 
education of the two children, stipulates one binding condition on the governess’s 
employment. Once engaged, she will make no further contact with him and will assume all 
further decisions around the care and education of the two children. She will assume the 
position of “supreme authority” at Bly (p. 8). After a second interview, partly out of a wish to 
please her new employer, and perhaps also motivated by aspirations to improve her own 
future lot, the young woman agrees to abide by his rather odd employment conditions. This 
essential contextual information, as conveyed by narrator Douglas, functions to frame the 
story that follows.  
The ensuing chapters recount the governess’s personal recollections, recorded in her 
own voice, of her time at Bly. There are four main characters in this “inner” story: the 




and Flora (eight). (Other presences are the ghosts of Peter Quint, the former valet, and Miss 
Jessel, the former governess, although these two are only ever witnessed by the governess.)  
Here we learn about the governess’s first arrival at the Essex country house, her initial 
meeting with the two children, the context for her first apprehensions of the ghosts and her 
mounting anxiety that all is not well. In time, the governess’s increased anxiety and her 
deteriorating state of mind lead her to the conviction that there are malevolent forces at work 
at Bly that place the children in mortal danger. Yet although the story’s plot details can be 
readily provided in summary form, the fascination of James’s story lies less in the plot line 
than in the literary and artistic complexity of James’s work. James’s novella is as much about 
giving attention to what is unsaid, and about inviting us to think, as it is about traditions of 
fireside stores or the experiences of a mad (or at least a neurotic) Victorian governess. James’s 
reader is apt to experience some of the same heightened anxiety and bewilderment that the 
governess confronts when she declares, early in her time at Bly: “The more I go over it the 
more I see in it, and the more I see in it the more I fear. I don’t know what I don’t see, what I 
don’t fear” (p. 45).  
Leithauser (2012) also explores this point, arguing that “attempts to ‘solve’ the book, 
however admiringly tendered, unwittingly work toward its diminution…Its profoundest 
pleasure lies in the beautifully fussed over way in which James refuses to come down on either 
side” (para. 8). Leithauser notes the paradoxical way in which James’s text, which seems to 
offer the reader an open and inquiring narrative that provides a range of interpretations, 
actually works on the reader’s mind in an opposite way, so that the reader’s attention is 
crowded, rather than enlarged, in such a way that “the ultimate effect is precisely the opposite 
of openness” (para. 11).  
Leithauser also notes the story’s clear links to Victorian melodrama and fireside ghost 
tales and leaves open the possibility that the central evil of James’s story is that of overlooked 
and unreported child sexual molestation. Raine (2007) also takes this line and insists that 
readers of James’s time would have readily detected the story’s hints of sexual abuse, easily 
seeing Quint and Jessel as likely child molesters (p. 69). For James, the refusal to name the evil 
was a way of magnifying it: each reader would supply his own horror. In practice, the 
novella’s restraint goes for nothing. The reader rapidly supplies the only solution 




Hints of adult predation on children in the text of The Turn of the Screw through such 
references as to the “criminality of those caretakers of the young” (James 2011, p. 67), and 
statements from the governess like “I continued, unmolested” (p. 75), are reiterated in James’s 
literary preface, where he notes that “the essence of the matter was the villany of motive in 
the ‘evoked predatory creatures’” (James, 1962, p. 175). From the very start of her sojourn at 
Bly, we get some insight into the psychology of the governess. When she declares her spirited 
aspiration to succeed “where many another girl might have failed” (James, 2011, p. 41) we 
are reminded of Plato’s conception of the ‘spirit’ as the instinct of ambition, the slightly 
exaggerated sense of one’s own importance. Captivated by Flora, whom she describes as “the 
most beautiful child I had ever seen” (p. 12), the governess’ initial love is effusive and gushing. 
Initially her pedagogical attention to Flora seems to be guided by Flora’s own interests and 
curiosity. She announces her intention to support Flora in a pedagogically rich way that is 
dedicated to the little girl’s flourishing: “To watch, teach, ‘form’ little Flora would too 
evidently be the making of a happy and useful life” (p. 13). After a relatively short time, 
however, the governess’s fulsome praise of the child has waned considerably, and she is 
demonstrably less patient with the child, complaining of “the singing, the gabbling of 
nonsense and the invitation to romp” (p. 50). The governess now demonstrates some 
antagonism towards the little girl’s repetitive, explorative play: “It was a pity that I needed 
once more to describe the portentous little activity by which she sought to divert my 
attention” (p. 50).  
James provides us with very little descriptive information about the governess. She is 
vaguely sketched by way of a few biographical details. We learn that she is “the youngest of 
several daughters of a poor country parson…the age of twenty…a fluttered, anxious girl” (p. 
7). We know that this is her first position following her training. The fact that James gives her 
no name is also significant. By this means he underlines that she is unacknowledged, faceless, 
and, as a member of the house staff, entirely taken for granted. Bell (1991, pp. 223–242) 
develops this point and discusses the novella as essentially a story about social classes in 
Victorian times and their relations to one another. Poovey (1989) provides a detailed account 
of the complex fundamental ambiguity in the social status and standing of the nineteenth 
century governess, an interpretation that helps to explain why, virtually invisible in terms of 




6.4. Forgetting and disorientation 
James’s story employs various familiar figures and features of nineteenth–century 
education—a private governess, boarding schools and headmasters, school reports, scheduled 
daily lessons. Yet the figures of education in this story feature only as vague presences, never 
as named and fully delineated individuals. Characters are cast either as ghostly apparitions (in 
the case of Quint and Jessel), or as blanks (in the case of Miles’s previous school classmates). 
Housekeeper Mrs Grose is a vague, uneducated woman who, presumably through life 
circumstances, has never learned to read (James, 2011, p. 17). Unlike some housekeepers of 
Victorian fiction (such as Mrs Fairfax in Brontë’s Jane Eyre), Mrs Grose proves not to be a 
force for stability and good sense. Not herself an independent thinker, but a subservient 
person, she readily falls in with the governess’s efforts to find fault with the children, herself 
fuelling the climate of suspicion against them (p. 49). While Mrs Grose does ultimately 
remove Flora from Bly, she does this only in obedience to the governess’s order, and not out 
of any sense of her own moral obligation or sense of what is morally right.  
The newly appointed governess proves in many ways to be the antithesis of a 
conscientious educator. While the novella provides few details about the lessons that the 
governess provides for her two young charges, the nature of the children’s education at Bly is 
strangely limited and circumscribed, emblematized in the account of Flora’s lesson that 
involves “a sheet of white paper, a pencil, and a copy of nice ‘round O’s’” (pp. 17–18). The 
governess reports that “There were naturally, things that in Flora’s presence could pass 
between us only as…obscure round-about allusions” (p. 13). We learn of a teaching 
programme where “almost every branch of study or subject of conversation skirted forbidden 
ground” (p. 73). The governess admits to the limitations of their classroom inquiry:  
It was as if, at moments, we were perpetually coming into sight of subjects before 
which we must stop short, turning suddenly out of alleys that we perceived to be 
blind…the doors we had indiscreetly opened. (p. 73) 
The educational environment that the governess provides is thus characterized by 
parochialism, narrowness, and ignorance and there is much that remains ever firmly 
unspoken. Vexatious topics are to be avoided at all costs, never to be discussed or even 
countenanced, and the school-room lesson content is very domestically focused. While she 
provides the children with ample “details already supplied as to the cleverness of the vicarage 




and that “the element of the unnamed and untouched became, between us, greater than any 
other” (p. 73). Further, the governess is not herself well informed, and the material of 
instruction is focussed on her own limited domestic biography rather than on an exploration 
of the wider world of aspirations, experiences and ideas: 
They [Miles and Flora] were in possession of everything that had ever happened 
to me, had had, with every circumstance, the story of my smallest adventures and 
of those of my brothers and sisters and of the cat and the dog at my home, as well 
as many particulars of the whimsical bent of my father, of the furniture and 
arrangement of our house and of the conversation of the old women of our village. 
(p. 74) 
From the get-go, James’s governess reveals that she is inclined not only to 
inconsistency, but also to flights of fancy. She (naively) considers herself to be “a remarkable 
young woman” (p. 23) and holds to the fancy that she might herself one day become installed 
as the Lady of Bly house. She seems oblivious to the declared indifference of her employer, 
and fails to notice that, against her reading of the situation, he views her with spectacular 
indifference. While he is explicit that he is interested only in signing her up to a contractual 
arrangement that will absolve him of all further responsibilities towards the two orphaned 
children, it remains her deeply-held view that this “was part of the flattery of his trust of me” 
(p. 77). She likes to imagine that the Master thinks about her when she is at Bly, and 
continues to fancy that he might pay her an impromptu visit. (She is musing on this very 
possibility when she first apprehends the ghost on the tower—a figure that only she is witness 
to, but whose description is later confirmed by Mrs Grose to belong to the previous, now 
deceased, valet, Peter Quint.)  
In James’s portrayal, the governess remains vague, ill-defined, shadowy—implying 
that she is a person of little interest or worth, since a literary character described in more 
specific detail would inevitably be more nuanced, more complex, and therefore perhaps more 
understandable. James, who elsewhere refers to the story’s central character as “the small, 
recording governess” (James, 1962, p. 71), increasingly implies the Bly governess is somewhat 
captious, inflexible and self-confirming in her interpretations, nitpicking and anxious rather 
than thoughtful and reflective.  
The governess reveals having had some slight reservations about her new role, noting 




the vanity of my original fears” (p. 28). She observes that she still suffers some misgivings 
about her decision to take up the position, and that “a small shifty spot on the wrong side of it 
all still sometimes brushed my brow like the wing of a bat” (p. 51). She also reveals that her 
readings of events are inclined to be error-prone, since she is somewhat flighty and subject to 
extremes of interpretation. This tendency to “flights and drops” (p. 11) in her judgment 
suggests that she is not a clear thinker. Her further admission to Mrs Grose that she is a 
person “rather easily carried away” (p. 11) (by which she implies that she has readily fallen in 
love with her employer), indicates that she is perhaps also naïve socially.  
Despite the absence of a physical description of the governess, we glean various 
aspects of her personality. Through the filter of her own recollected narrative, she reveals her 
inability to cope with ambiguity or ideas or experiences that are difficult to explain. Although 
she appears to seek answers to difficult questions, she habitually seizes too readily on 
interpretations that are close at hand. She claims to have had “the flash of this knowledge” (p. 
31), she declares that her interpretation of an event “can have but one meaning” (James, 
2011, p. 17), or she recalls that “there was no ambiguity in anything; none whatever, at least, 
in the conviction I from one moment to another found myself forming as to what I should see 
straight before me” (p. 42).  
Despite showing some momentary uncertainty about the soundness of her own 
conclusions and the implications of her moral judgments, such self-reflections are short-lived. 
For an instant she considers whether or not her assessment of Miles as ‘guilty’ has merit, but 
the idea that she might therefore herself be in the wrong is so abhorrent to her that she 
dismisses the notion out of hand: 
I seemed to float not into clearness, but into a darker obscure, and within a minute 
there had some to me out of my very pity the appalling alarm of his being perhaps 
innocent, it was for the instant confounding and bottomless, for if he were 
innocent, what then on earth was I? (p. 123) 
As the tale progresses, these fluctuations in the governess’s judgment become increasingly 
problematic. It becomes increasingly difficult for the reader to separate out the governess’s 
alleged memories of her experiences from the interpretations and inferences that she draws 
from them.  
Early in her account, James’s governess-narrator reflects on her situation at Bly by 




Melville’s 1855 novel, Benito Cereno. The governess ponders “wasn’t it just a story-book over 
which I had fallen a-doze and a-dream…I had the fancy of our being almost as lost as a 
handful of passengers in a great drifting ship. Well, I was strangely at the helm” (p. 15). Later 
in the story she returns to this nautical metaphor, describing herself somewhat arrogantly as 
“clutching the helm…very grand and very dry…left thus to myself, I was quite remarkably 
firm” (p. 112). James’s governess is not unlike Melville’s Amasio Delarno who, when 
confronted by the evidence of inescapable evil (to Delarno’s very eyes, the evidence that the 
ostensible whaling ship, named Bachelor’s Delight, in fact transports slaves), initially chooses to 
move on, apparently intent to read the horrendous experience before his eyes in some other 
way and to ignore altogether the meaning he ought to be taking in.  
Delarno’s capacity to overlook evil endures even the revelation to him of a fact long 
obvious to a reflective reader, that, prior to Delarno’s boarding the Bachelor’s Delight, 
insurrection has occurred, subjugating the Bachelor’s Delight’s crew to tyranny by the would-be 
slaves. For, when Delarno and his men at the last instant comprehend the tyranny and give 
aid to the Bachelor’s Delight’s crew and their captain Benito Cereno, the original tyranny, of 
slave-taking, is never for a moment in his mind. It never seems less than obvious to Delarno 
that Cereno has deserved his help, even though Cereno has himself grasped the horror of 
being captive, and so cannot reckon himself morally when those who were his captives and 
then his captors are made again captive and in fact fated to die. Just as Melville challenges 
Benito Cereno readers to read to the depths morally of a tale that its main protagonist would be 
unable even to tell, so this also is James’s challenge to readers of his The Turn of the Screw. 
Despite the passage of time and with no good reason for believing it to be so, the 
governess persists in maintaining the (false) belief that her employer, the Master, is immensely 
grateful to her for her sacrifice in coming to Bly. She remains convinced that he finds her 
attractive (and desirable), and that he will eventually come to Bly to see her again. This 
erroneous belief connects interestingly with the work of Grosz, a noted contemporary 
psychologist, who developed the view that it is sometimes “less painful … to feel betrayed 
than to feel forgotten” (Grosz, 2013, p 83). 
Grosz cites Fussell who, in his historical study The Great War and Modern Memory (2000), 
recounts British soldiers’ widespread belief that French farmers were signalling to the German 
artillery fighters in order to reveal the precise location of British soldiers “by fantastically 
elaborate, shrewd, and accurate means” (Fussell, p. 120), notes that the truer circumstance of 




psychologically both more acceptable and more compelling to feel betrayed. This 
interpretation could also apply also to the unnamed, unvalued and ignored governess. 
Alternatively, perhaps the governess does sense that she is being treated with indifference by 
her employer, and perhaps she grows cold towards the children in self-defence, to protect 
herself from the realization that the Master does not think at all about her.  
Perhaps, because of her own insecurities and fears of being unvalued, the governess’s 
mind becomes similarly affected, afflicted, and she attempts to hide her own anxiety and 
insecurity, even putting the children in danger, as part of her own deteriorating condition. 
Her agitated attention to both her ghostly apparitions and to the two children in her care 
become strangely conflated and she keeps watch on both the ghosts and the children to such 
an extent that she entirely loses her perspective on other matters, until her very attention, in 
the name of virtue, becomes a kind of paranoid obsession. 
It is plausible that the governess’s drift into paranoia can be explained in part by her 
unspoken sense of the Master’s indifference to her. Even though, surely, her discovery that 
Bly represented a place of grave danger for the children constituted the one situation that 
would entitle her to contact her employer, still, full of anxiety, she remains unable to act on 
her fears, and so to take definitive action. Her increasing suspicion of her ghosts leads her to a 
state of hyper-vigilance, and in this condition, she suffers from a distorted, or at least 
significantly narrowed, vision. Moreover, by imposing her own personal conviction that her 
fears are justified (and the children are possessed), she thereby renders herself increasingly 
susceptible to her own fears, and quite unable to countenance other possible explanations for 
her unease—perhaps including the very plausible possibility of child abuse. 
The governess’s use of language is elaborate and complex in terms of both linguistic 
and technical complexity. Hers is a story that involves “intense anomalies” (p. 129) and that 
presents some bewildering contradictions and puzzles. At times, her declarations literally defy 
understanding, as when she states: “Nothing was more natural than that these things should 
be the other things they absolutely were not” (p. 43). Her speech involves unusual word 
combinations and irregular word order, features that give her prose a quaint sense of being 
located somewhere in the past. She uses phrases like “innocent little precious lives” (p. 40); “I 
preternaturally listened” (p. 63). She describes Miles as “an unperturbable little prodigy of 
delightful loveable goodness” (p. 51). Her use of poetic, slightly stilted expressions, as well as 
figures of speech such as alliteration, assonance, rhythmic and repetitive language, all lend to 




These qualities of the governess’s language serve to work against the reader’s 
compassion for her, rendering her a figure somewhat remote and distanced. By these 
technical means James further establishes a sense of tension in the emotional state of the 
governess. In her recounted conversations, the governess’s sentences are frequently 
unfinished, laced with ellipses and dashes as she seeks to give voice to thoughts that are 
interrupted or inchoate, or to give expression to ideas that are ill-formed or difficult to 
articulate. James’s reader, like the governess, struggles to give coherence to the ideas being 
expressed. In some instances, sentences are written in such a way that any interpretation 
leaves open the possibility of a quite different, equally plausible alternative readings, such as 
when Miles laments “I want my own sort” (p. 80). (Miles’s meaning is ambiguous between his 
wish to be in all-male company, or in youthful company, or among people of his own social 
class, or perhaps in the company of those who are corrupters from having been corrupted.)  
By the language the Bly governess uses, the quality of her moral imagination is shown 
to be humanly limited, insular and ungenerous. She shows, through the words she uses, that 
she does not try to see the children accurately or kindly, but increasingly, that she sees them 
as villains. Although she tries to grasp the facts of the events at Bly as she encounters them, 
she appears insufficiently responsive to the humanness of her situation to read the situation 
accurately or well. True moral attention, as understood by Weil and Murdoch, calls for more 
than recording events. It involves a more delicate and fine-grained intellectual response that 
combines both imaginative and cognitive aspects. By the words the governess uses to describe 
the children, her moral imagination towards them is shown to be increasingly insular, 
egotistical, and ungenerous. (For an entirely contrasting moral revision, one that is 
deliberately aimed at an “improving” interpretation, Murdoch offers the parable of M and D 
in The Sovereignty of Good (2014, pp. 16–23). 
Although she tries to grasp the facts of the events at Bly, the governess is, we come to 
see, insufficiently aware of her context, and insufficiently responsive to the humanness of her 
situation and the plight of the others. Her initial efforts to “love” the children are forced and 
unconvincing, and ultimately it becomes evident that what she wants most of all is to be 
appreciated and beloved herself, and as well, to be herself entirely in control. She lacks 
rapport with the children and there is no evidence that she respects them as individuals. She 
does not act in a way that involves “attending’ to the children in the sense understood by Weil 




In her philosophical writing about attention, Murdoch repeatedly draws on Platonic 
metaphors of vision—of seeing, looking and perceiving, in terms of a moral discipline: 
It is perfectly obvious that goodness is connected with knowledge…with refined 
and honest perception of what is really the case, a patient and just discernment 
and exploration of what confronts one, which is the result not simply of opening 
one’s eyes, but a …familiar kind of moral discipline. (Murdoch, 2014, p. 38)  
Murdoch notes that the metaphors we use to describe both moral progress and aesthetic 
appreciation are crucial to the shape of our thinking. She reminds us of the ways that 
conceptual metaphors can usefully challenge and broaden our literal understanding precisely 
because of the insights and inter-connections they provide: “I can only choose within the 
world I can see, in the moral sense of “see” which implies that clear vision is a result of moral 
imagination and moral effort” (p. 37). Murdoch also acknowledges that such “clear vision” is 
difficult to achieve, and that moral thinking is hard work that has to be revisited and reflected 
upon in a disciplined way. This is because the human ego works tirelessly to limit connection 
with the reality of other people or with the world: “We are anxiety-ridden animals. Our 
minds are continual active, fabricating an anxious, usually self-preoccupied, often falsifying 
veil which partially conceals the world” (p. 82).  
Neither generous nor attentive, the Bly governess is never fully “present” with the 
children and she appears unable to determine what is the right thing to focus on given their 
situation. She is increasingly commanding and overbearing towards them. She seems unable 
to see that the two children are the ones who deserve attention, and why. Moral attention, as 
understood by Weil and Murdoch, calls for more than intellectual activity, it involves a more 
delicate and fine-grained response that combines both imaginative and cognitive aspects. 
This, we discover, is to a large degree undeveloped in the governess. 
A marked negative change in the governess’s attitude towards the children dates from 
when she learns that Miles has been expelled from his boarding school. It is implied that the 
headmaster’s letter that purveys this news attends only obscurely to the cause, perhaps 
implying that the provocation is something so dark as not to be admissible to description. 
(The contents of the letter are never disclosed to anyone but the governess.) Yet even this 
initial urge of disquiet in the governess abates as she assumes what should be the redoubled 
duty of educator to both sister and brother. Her ease within the redoubled capacity is partly 




their education. She declares “My attention to them all really went to seeing them amuse 
themselves immensely without me: this was a spectacle they seemed actively to prepare and in 
that engaged me as an active admirer” (James, 2011, p. 44).  
For the governess, as well as for the reader, the paucity of any description calls out 
eloquently that a sinister reading of events is called for. On the heels of the disconcerting news 
concerning Miles, the governess learns that both Miss Jessel (the previous governess) and 
Quint (the previous valet)—whose sudden departures from Bly are never fully explained—
have each died in somewhat mysterious circumstances. Now the governess becomes further 
anxious and filled with foreboding. She begins to harbour suspicions that that the children are 
themselves in some way involved in unspoken malevolent designs, and she begins to suspect 
the two children of wrongdoing. Ultimately, she develops the conviction that the two children 
are themselves part of an evil-minded scheme. She holds this idea with a conviction that is 
unyielding.  
Thus within a few short months, the governess has entirely abandoned her initial, 
positive bearing towards both Flora and Miles as eminently beautiful and impressionable, and 
has adopted a much more stern and authoritarian bearing towards them: 
I could only get on at all by taking ‘nature’ into my confidence and my account, 
by treating my monstrous ordeal as a push in a direction unusual, of course, and 
unpleasant, but demanding after all, for a fair front, only another turn of the screw 
of ordinary human virtue. (pp. 113–114) 
She now begins to consider the children in terms of their potential faults, their implied errors, 
and she interprets even their acts of play as pernicious and troublesome. Whereas she had 
initially sought to be enchanted by Flora and Miles, her attitude has changed to one of 
anxious concern. But this attitude soon transforms again, into a sense of heightened suspicion 
towards the children, whereupon she will barely let them out of her sight. Ultimately the 
governess appears to suffer from some kind of schadenfreude, where she views the children as 
themselves the source of evil and players in some malevolent, possibly supernatural, scheme. 
The governess is, we learn, a keen reader of gothic and romantic novels, including 
Anne Radcliffe’s The Mysteries of Udolpho (1794), Henry Fielding’s Amelia (1751), and Charlotte 
Brontë’s Jane Eyre, (1847), all specifically named. The gothic romances that she reads would 
typically involve themes of romantic love, melodrama and mystery, as well as plots in which 




(1991, p. 288) observes that the Bly governess is inclined literally to “enter into” the 
impossible romantic literary plots that she reads, and that she appears to envision herself as 
literary heroine involved in her own little romance tale at Bly. (This is consistent with the 
governess’s fanciful belief that the Master might one day come to Bly and transform her 
situation from governess to that of Lady of the house.) Bell notes further that while James 
describes this story in his literary preface as “a perfect example of the imagination 
unassisted…unassociated, a fairy tale pure and simple” (James, 1962, p. 171), James’s 
description seems to be more the view of his governess narrator than that of James the author.  
The governess is shown to be a reader who cannot both enter into, and at the same 
time stand outside of, the literature she reads. She cannot find a suitable balance between 
surrender to her reading and reflection on what she has read. Her predicament is that she 
cannot countenance being lost and confused herself. She is unable to recollect, let alone 
recognize, connections, clues, possibilities, that would make different interpretations possible.  
It is clear that there obtains a very direct connection between her idealizing reading of 
romance novels and her personal apprehension of ghosts, for it is precisely while she is 
reading Fielding’s Amelia one evening that she finds her attention interrupted by the ghostly 
apparition of Quint: “I recollect in short that though I was deeply interested in my author I 
found myself, at the turn of a page and with his spell all scattered, looking straight up” (James, 
2011, p. 58). Murdoch, unlike Weil, who explicitly mistrusts the imagination, acknowledges 
the way that a susceptibility to personal fancy can work against clear thinking, which 
Murdoch refers to as the “tissue of self-aggrandizing and consoling wishes and dreams which 
prevents one from seeing what is there outside one” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 57).40 
Similarly, it is implied that the governess seeks to impose on her lived experience, as 
on her reading, a simple fairy-tale interpretation of the world, rather than to countenance 
expansive or open-ended interpretations. The question whether James’s The Turn of the Screw is 
or is not unequivocally a ghost story is now scarcely to the point: the point rather is that 
horrors, real in every measure to those who are directly or even indirectly involved, will 
 
40 If we look closely at Weil’s comments in Gravity and Grace, we find ideas that resonate with this theme. In 
considering the relationship between literature and morality, Weil contrasts imagination (which to her was 
synonymous with fantasy), and the real. She argues that “imaginary evil is romantic and varied, real evil is 
dreary, monotonous, barren and tedious” (1997, p. 120), suggesting that real evil is able to pass our notice 





follow from the horror of adult sexual predation upon children, and even the governess’s 
benighted recounting of her own experiences fully brings this out.  
Although the governess appears to use her powers of reasoning to make sense of her 
oppressive situation, her sense-making powers prove to be flawed and she is not, for the most 
part, open to question or self-reflection. Even through her filtered recollections, her 
incapacity for sustained thinking, for reasoned argument and for fully coherent explanation 
are all duly exposed. The governess is unable to determine what matters most in the situation 
she finds herself in. She candidly admits to the reader that her decision-making is largely 
driven by random or coincidental happenings, rather than being based on a searching 
response to the given situation: “If it was a question of a scare my discovery on this occasion 
had scared no more than any other, and it was essentially in the scared state that I drew my 
actual conclusions” (p. 76). 
Williams (1993) discusses the nature of moral behaviour in another of James’ novels, 
What Maisie Knew. In relation to an understanding of moral sense in that novel, Williams 
observes that “the practice of morality demands receptiveness and freedom from 
preconceptions, because individual dilemmas must be solved through an imaginative 
appraisal of their complexities” (p. 42). Williams’s comment applies equally well to James’s 
depiction of moral attention in The Turn of the Screw: to act morally is to bring to a situation an 
appropriate, measured, informed, but not a stock, already programmed, or pre-determined 
response. 
In time, the governess’s initial interest in the children’s charms has turned to a 
negative focus on their failings and their potential faults. She begins to interpret even their 
sibling interactions in negative terms—not as signs of healthy play and outdoor exploration, 
but as evidence of likely subversive activities. She starts to blame Miles and Flora for 
deliberately denying things that, she claims, they can see quite readily—in particular physical 
reality of the ghosts of Jessel and Quint. It is her insistence on this point that leads to a crisis 
in her relationship first with Flora, and subsequently, with Miles.  
The governess’s crisis with Flora coincides with a rare moment when Flora’s voice 
sounds like that of an authentic child. Challenged repeatedly by the governess to admit that 
she has seen Miss Jessel’s ghost, Flora declares passionately: “I see nobody, I see nothing. I 
never have. I think you’re cruel. I don’t like you!” (p. 103). At this instant, Flora perceives the 




governess’s perception of Flora is transformed such that she no longer sees Flora as she had 
previously, as a “beautiful child” (p. 12), but as “an old, old woman” (p. 98, and also p. 102). 
In that instant the governess observes that Flora’s “incomparable childish beauty had 
suddenly failed, had quite vanished…she was hideously hard; she had turned common and 
almost ugly” (p. 103).  
Does the governess experience, at this instant, a fleeting insight into the truth of the 
abysmal horror that Flora, abused, has effectively been deprived of her childhood? In her 
1944 essay “Morality and Literature” Weil comments on the achievements of writers of 
genius to capture such transformative revelations: 
In the words assembled by genius several slopes are simultaneously visible and 
perceptible, placed in their true relations, but the listener or reader does not 
descend any of them. He feels gravity in the way we feel it when we look over a 
precipice, if we are safe and not subject to vertigo. He perceives the unity and the 
diversity of its forms in this architecture of the abyss. (Weil, 1968, p. 162) 
James’s story presents us with two, equally ruinous, dimensions of predation: on the 
one hand, we see evidence of the irreparable harm that is done to Miles and Flora by the 
adults entrusted to care for them, while on the other, James shows how these two children 
have themselves learned to behave in highly manipulative ways. This is troubling to the 
reader and it is right to be thus troubled. As Weil reminds us: 
… among our institutions and customs there are things so atrocious that nobody 
can legitimately feel himself innocent of this diffused complicity. It is certain that 
each of us is involved at least in the guilt of criminal indifference. (Weil, 1968, p. 
184) 
Significantly, all of the adult figures in this story are cast as either shadowy, silent, fearful, 
ignorant, or as duplicitous and manipulative. None of them responds to the children in a 
positive way, and they all work either to dismiss or to suppress, rather than openly to 
acknowledge and discuss, any dangers or difficulties that the children might encounter or be 
subject to.  
Hadley (2002), notes that this story, with its complex mix of gothic horror, mystery 
and anxiety, was written towards the latter period of James’ career (the late 1890s), a 




introspective writing style, and in particular, one that involves critical scrutiny of adults—
including tutors and governesses—as ostensible sources of moral authority. Significantly, the 
three novels written by James during the three-year period 1897 to 1899 each, in different 
ways, examines themes of innocence, guilt and the moral ambiguities experienced by young 
people who are in some way forsaken by the adults closest to them. 41 James himself refers to 
his works of this period as sharing “an unforeseen principle of growth” (James, 1962, p. 98). 
The two children at the centre of the story, Miles and Flora, are themselves eminently 
unlikeable—over-indulged, spoiled, yet also ignored, and unmistakably damaged. They come 
across as artificial, unreal, tainted, and rarely do they react as children. Not exactly helpless, 
they are palpably vulnerable as well as unloved. They live a life of privileged wealth and 
seclusion, and are largely stiff and unsympathetic. They have been cared for by a series of 
minders, none of whom appears to have had a genuine interest in them. Their only living 
relative, their distant uncle, is indifferent to them, clearly keen to be absolved of all 
responsibility towards them. Neither the governess nor any other characters attends to the 
children in a discerning and loving fashion. The governess is neither generous nor loving, but 
is increasingly commanding and overbearing towards them. She does not “attend’ to the 
children in the sense of attention as understood by Weil and Murdoch, and she increasingly 
interprets attention as a form of authority or surveillance.  
For Weil and Murdoch, attention is a both a disposition and a moral good, and they 
hold to the view that attention involves the interdependence of intellect and emotion. By 
contrast, the Bly governess is emotionally “absent” from the children. She seeks increasingly 
to exert her will over them and to monitor their every move. The governess fails to ask the 
children any interested questions or to engage them in genuine conversation. When she does 
question them, it is clear that she is working to her own agenda, and that the only answers she 
will countenance are those that satisfy her own mounting suspicions. It appears that what the 
governess most desires, is to be appreciated and beloved herself, and as well, to be herself in 
control. She lacks compassion for the children and increasingly treats them as means relating 
to her own ghosts and to her own exorcising of those ghosts, and thus as means to ends that 
she has established for herself.  
The governess insufficiently acknowledges the children as individual people in their 
own right, and so she fails to regard the children under a sense that their own persons merit 
 




her direct focus and ethical interest. The governess is too obsessed with what lies beyond the 
children to be attentive to the suffering within them that their lived experience has caused. 
Yet if the children deserve her attention as individuals whose needs have been wrought by 
maltreatment they have received at the hands of their previous adult carers, it is not from 
their possessing any very sympathetic characters that this is so. Both their situation and the 
response of the governess are woeful in truly deep-going ways. 
6.5. An aporetic text 
James text involves layers of questions and questioning, both those posed both by the 
characters, and those raised by the reader. These questions are, however, largely left 
unanswered, or the answers that are provided lead only to further questions. We could call 
this novel an aporetic text in the sense that Plato’s dialogues are also aporetic—that is to say, 
the questions raised in the text typically end in answers that are themselves inconclusive or 
they fail to provide resolution. James’s text offers explanations that are invariably either 
unsatisfactory, incomplete, or in tension with other possibilities, in a way that tantalizes. In 
Plato’s Meno (84 a–d), Socrates points out that a person who doesn’t know an answer to a 
question (and who is thereby rendered somewhat perplexed), is likely to be sufficiently 
provoked by this impasse to want to investigate further: 
At first he did not know…even now he does not yet know, but then he thought he 
knew, and answered confidently as if he did know, and he did not think himself at 
a loss, but now he does think himself at a loss, and he does not know, neither does 
he think he knows…Indeed, we have probably achieved something relevant to 
finding out how matters stand, for now, as he does not know, he would be glad to 
find out…So you think that before he would have tried to find out that which he 
thought he knew though he did not, before he fell into perplexity and realized he 
did not know and longed to know? (Plato, trans, 1997, pp. 883–884) 
In a similar fashion, James’s text draws us in to find explanations, but at every turn, 
we are confronted by flaws or weaknesses in those explanations. We encounter explanations 
that are baffling, or we encounter further puzzlement. The governess approaches the 
mysteries at Bly as if her task is to solve a carefully constructed mystery. She scrutinises and 
interrogates her environment in search of clues of explicit clarification—but, as James’s 
prefaces make clear, the nature of moral attention is something that takes the seer well 




learning about Miles’s dismissal from school, that “that can have but one meaning…that he’s 
an injury to the others’” (James, 2011, p. 17). (This points to a further horror of the story—
that the governess readily attributes responsibility for faults to the young children themselves 
rather than to the adults in their lives.) In the meantime, the incentive to make sense of the 
tale works on us as readers, and finding resolution becomes more and more compelling. Felski 
(2015, p. 104) notes that paradoxically, the less the reader of this particular text is sure of his 
or her ground, the more enticing and engrossing the reading experience becomes.  
Felski’s comments links in interesting ways with Weil’s writing on pedagogical 
attention. In her famous essay on school studies (Weil, 2009, pp. 57–65), Weil describes 
pedagogical attention in part by stressing what it is not. She says that people will often confuse 
her notion of attention “with a kind of muscular effort” (p. 60), and explains that “They have 
not been paying attention. They have been contracting their muscles” (p. 60). Weil continues 
by observing that “The intelligence can only be led by desire. For there to be desire, there 
must be pleasure and joy in the work” (p. 61). To instil such a sense of desire in his readers is 
James’s achievement in this story. Through the tantalizing experience of puzzlement and 
failure, James’s reader is challenged to linger further over the complexities of the story.  
Felski (2015) warns that the critical reader always must be sensitive to assuming a 
position of superiority over any text. She argues that there is considerable virtue in being 
mindful always of what she calls the ‘limits of critique’ (the title of her work), and that we 
ought not be too hasty in seeking to “solve” our reading puzzles. She admonishes us that 
while we may feel in command of a reading of The Turn of the Screw, “our confidence is 
premature; it turns out that James’ text is already far ahead of us, offering a prescient reading 
of its own critical readings...escaping the net of our analytical concepts” (p. 105).  
Just as the new governess approaches the mysteries at Bly as if her task is to solve a 
carefully constructed puzzle, James’s reader is similarly disposed read the text intently an 
intense search of particular clues of clarification—but, as James has made clear in his literary 
prefaces, the nature of moral attention involves mystery and strangeness, and is likely to lead 
the reader well beyond what is immediately at hand. The importance of the reader thus 
approaching James’s text with a degree of intellectual humility is also relevant to the overall 
theme of pedagogical attention. True humility in education is not based upon thinking your 
view is unworthy. Rather humility involves taking an interest in other views that might not 
initially seem robust, and with openness to discovering that other views have merit, and are 




In his essay “Speech genres and other late essays” Bakhtin (1986, pp. 60–102) argues 
that whenever we speak, write, or read, we encounter a plurality of voices since these forms of 
discourse are, by their very nature, “inherently responsive” (p. 68). In his discussion of how 
dialogue ‘works’, Bakhtin observes that in this context the speaker “does not expect passive 
understanding that…duplicates his or her own idea on somebody else’s mind…Rather, the 
speaker talks with an expectation of a response, agreement, sympathy, objection, execution, 
and so forth” (p. 69). When we consider the conversational utterances and rejoinders of the 
Bly governess, we see that she never works to establish a shared understanding through 
dialogue in the manner described by Bakhtin, and nor does she ever enable her listener to 
respond and engage. Rather, she appears systematically to block meaningful conversation 
with either the two children or with the housekeeper, Mrs Grose, her chief human 
companions at Bly.  
While the Bly governess may appear to wish to initiate dialogue, her practice is to 
pose a question but then to interrupt the other person without giving them time to reply, and 
without any attention to the nature of their response. The governess repeatedly cuts in and 
finishes the other person’s sentences for them, and she also artfully changes the thrust of a 
conversation to her own advantage. For instance, when Mrs Grose asks the governess, in 
relation to Miles’s conduct, how it is that “if he was so bad then as that comes to, how is he 
such an angel now?” (James, 2011, p. 53), the governess replies in a way that gives credence 
to her own ideas rather than to provide a direct answer to Mrs Grose’s legitimate question of 
her. The governess declares: “Yes indeed—and if he was a fiend at school! How, how, how?” 
(p. 53). Sometimes the governess uses the first person plural pronoun “we” when talking with 
the housekeeper, to give a (false) sense of a shared understanding between herself and Mrs 
Grose (p. 44), but this sense is short-lived, for while the governess appears to want to have a 
kinship relationship with the housekeeper, she is nevertheless also quite capable of being 
condescending towards the older woman. She admits that she “makes Mrs Grose the 
receptacle of lurid things” (p. 66).  
The governess uses other various linguistic tactics of blocking and obstruction in her 
communications with others to ensure that she controls how much can be said. She seeds in 
her hearer’s mind critical words and phrases that imply her own authority, and those words 
work, even if subconsciously, to give a sense that hers is an informed judgement. She uses 
terms like “know”, “see”, “certainty”, “clearness”, “evidence”, “proof”, with unjustified 




absolutely knows Quint’s purpose, declaiming “I know, I know, I know!” (p. 38). And while 
she hounds the children with questions about their own whereabouts, the questions she poses 
are clearly not intended to open up opportunity for explanation or discussion. On the 
contrary, they are proffered for the purpose of providing confirming evidence for the 
governesses’ established views. While she urges the children to be open with her, the more 
they tell her, the more her suspicions grow, and in this way, the greater her suspicions of them 
become. In a perversely contrary fashion, the more her suspicions fail to be confirmed, the 
greater are her suspicions. 
6.6. A governing authority 
As the story progresses, the governess is shown increasingly to exaggerate in her own 
mind, her sense of authority over her charges. She observes that “It would distress me much 
more to lose my power than to keep it” (p. 75). (A possible exception to this is her momentary 
display of ambivalence when the governess witnesses the ghost of Miss Jessel in the school 
room. As a fellow governess, Miss Jessel is a figure with whom she might share at least some 
sympathy, but apart from a brief acknowledgement that Miss Jessel “looked at me long 
enough to appear to say that her right to sit at my table was as good as mine to sit at hers” 
(pp. 83–84), the Bly governess almost immediately thereafter berates Miss Jessel with “you 
terrible, miserable woman!” (p. 84). The implication for the reader by this comment is 
ambiguous. Is this the moment when the governess recognizes the harm that Miss Jessel may 
have perpetrated on the innocent children? Or is the governess perhaps giving voice to her 
own self-realization that she is also implicated in the harm that has been done to the two 
children?  
The Bly governess appears to have no capacity for playful or spontaneous responses. 
She is entirely uncreative in her relationship with them. She never reaches out to them or 
responds to them in a genuinely loving way.42It is not even clear if she likes them, for her 
observations are frequently couched in a thinly veiled criticism: “Both of the children had a 
gentleness—it was their only fault” (p. 29). She is never generous, and she appears to have 
little respect for the children’s autonomy or their individuality. The quality of her attention to 
the children (and to the housekeeper, Mrs Grose), is far from the patient, loving regard that is, 
for Weil and for Murdoch, the basis of true attention.  
 




In an essay written in the early 1940s, Weil noted that “the glossy surface of our 
civilization hides a real intellectual decadence…we seem to have lost the very elements of 
intelligence” (Weil, 1986, p. 156). Here, Weil warns against too hasty readings, imaginative 
fancies, unexamined assumptions, or grasping aspirations towards personal prestige. For 
Weil, attention (and so love) involves a freedom from self-limitations, and the recognition that 
there is a reality that lies beyond one’s own self. Attention has a further bearing on this story: 
an attentive governess would love the children indiscriminately and generously. She would do 
all she could to preserve them from harm. 
In her philosophical writing on attention, Murdoch reminds us that a person’s 
capacity for attention to another involves being open, focussed and engaged in “a perfectly 
familiar kind of moral discipline” that involves generosity of spirit rather than thoughts of 
recompense or fair exchange (Murdoch, 2014, p. 37). Attention involves being responsive 
even to that which might not yet be fully clear or fully comprehensible. Murdoch reminds us 
that a person’s capacity for attention involves being open, focussed and being interested in 
“looking carefully at something and holding it before the mind” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 3), even 
though it is not always clear just what is being looked at. Murdoch’s attention is less an 
orientation than an attitude, and has more to do with willingness to be open to possibility 
rather than descriptive of a specific demeanour or disposition. (This point is developed by 
Pfau, 2014, p. 37.)  
As time goes by, the Bly governess’s vocabulary register changes. She begins to use 
words of incarceration and control. She describes herself as “like a gaoler with an eye to 
possible surprises and escapes (James, 2011, p. 78). She insists on keeping the children under 
her control. She boldly casts herself as “judge” and “executioner” (p. 123), and dislikes it 
deeply when Miles catches her out: “the boy, to my deep discomposure, was immensely in the 
right” (p. 82). At the close of the story, she appears to have herself become the very prowling 
beast that she had accused Quint of being, when “with a single bound and an irrepressible 
cry” she leaps straight upon Miles, which results in his death by suffocation (pp. 123–124). 
The governess seeks increasingly to dominate and influence the children, declaring that “my 
equilibrium depended on the strength of my rigid will” (p. 113).  
Of this change in herself, the governess appears quite unaware. While she earlier casts 
herself as the children’s “poor protectress” (p. 56) and claims (naively) that the children “were 
at this period extravagantly and preternaturally fond of me” (p. 56), she begins actively to 




importance in the eyes of the Master, and possesses as well, a greatly exaggerated sense of her 
own understanding of herself. These are failings that are entirely human, but what James 
seems to be suggesting is that the governess, in the absence of any checking on her own moral 
judgment and motivations, has the potential to become quite destructive towards the 
children. 
Doubtless James’s governess, like Charlotte Brontë’s Lucy Snowe, embodies very 
human sentiments. She demonstrates a wish for recognition. She harbours a wish to please 
and possibly attract, her employer. Perhaps as a young person she has not quite worked out 
her role and function, and she is as yet unclear whether her primary task as governess is to 
serve, to entertain, to guide, or to protect the children, or whether her purpose is simply to 
improve her own professional situation. Seen in this light she might be understood as a young 
person simply seeking to create for herself a function in life without quite knowing yet what 
that function might be. Yet James’s governess is depicted not so much as a humanly flawed 
and damaged but nevertheless authentic individual like Lucy Snowe, but as a figure who is 
increasingly distorted, even grotesque. In her increasingly obsessive treatment of the children, 
she comes to deny their self-respect and their dignity, and wants to control their every move. 
Her description of Miles at the close of the story reduces him in her eyes to the status of a 
frantic domestic animal (p. 124). Notably, in the final moments of the story, the governess 
admits to “a fierce split of my attention” (p. 120). 
Hadley (2002) notes that although the Bly governess’s account “pretends to be a story 
of service and sacrifice in Miles’ and Flora’s name…there is a sense in which all her obsessive 
attentiveness to them misses their actuality in the text” (p. 55). Hadley observes that the 
governess talks about rather than to or with the children. That is to say, she relates to them 
more as objects of her attention than as interesting and worthy individuals in their own right. 
Her interest in the children appears to be motivated more as an assignment than as an 
undertaking based on respectful relations. Hadley further observes that as the story 
progresses, the governess’s language changes from her initial subordinate “conventional 
gushing, grateful and self-doubting girlishness” to a “climactic disastrous assertion of 
dominance” by the close of the story (p. 54.)  
In time the governess effectively turns against the children and begins to treat them 
almost as if they were tainted (blighted), while simultaneously magnifying in her own mind 
her sense of her own legitimate power over them. She becomes increasingly eccentric, neither 




egotistical. Initially she described  the children as “adorable” (James, 2011, p. 77), “charming 
creatures” (p. 69), “young friends” (p. 77), having “more than earthly beauty…absolute 
unnatural goodness” (p. 51) but then, almost in the same breath, she admits to “the strange 
steps of my obsession” (p. 51) and refers to them as “little wretches” (p. 51). The governess 
seeks to impose on the children a modified interpretation of events—that is to say, her 
interpretation—and they must accept her accusations. In her mind, for Miles to be “saved” 
will require the governess literally to close his eyes and ears, to silence him and literally block 
his view to the outer world. She imposes on Miles the kind of attention that is stifling and 
ultimately annihilating. Thus the novella expresses something powerfully negative and 
monstrous about her fixed view, her absolute and unquestioning denial of the possibility of 
any further investigation. We are reminded of Weil’s comment: “Those who are unhappy 
have no need for anything in this world but people capable of giving them their attention” 
(Weil, 2009c, p. 64).  
There is ample evidence that the governess’s ego becomes increasingly unstable as the 
story progresses. She declares: “The more I saw the less they [the children] would. I began to 
watch them in a stifled suspense, a disguised tension, that might well, had it continued too 
long, have turned to something like madness” (James, 2011, p. 41). She talks of her own 
“rigid control” (p. 40) over the children. Increasingly, she reveals herself to be obsessive: 
“What it was least possible to get rid of was the cruel idea that, whatever I had seen, Miles 
and Flora saw more” (p. 76).  
The Bly governess settles too quickly on a fixed interpretation of events, she too 
readily falls subject to her own imagination and fears, her own quirky stubbornness. When 
puzzles arise, her thoughts go immediately to herself, her own personal situation, and the 
possibilities of her own ascending prestige at Bly. Her reading of the situation becomes 
increasingly narrow and suspicious, to the extent that she comes to see even the two children 
as sources of evil and wickedness. She shows she is incapable of thinking of what the children 
might themselves be going through, the afflictions they must have suffered as displaced 
orphans, let alone as abused children. James’s story gives truth to Weil’s comment that 
“whenever one tries to suppress doubt, there is tyranny” (Weil, 1959, p. 103). 
In time, the governess reveals herself to be unreliable both as narrator and as witness. 
She tells Mrs Grose of her intention to write to the Master and tell him exactly how things are 
at Bly, but it becomes evident when Miles (who pockets her letter, reads and subsequently 




at all, and that it contains, in Miles’s words, “nothing” (p. 121). The governess is untruthful in 
other ways as well. She insists to Mrs Grose that Flora definitely did see Miss Jessel’s ghost at 
the lakeside, whereas in her earlier account of ghost Jessel’s appearance at the lakeside, she 
had said that Flora had been sitting “with her back to the water” (p. 43) from which vantage 
point Flora would not have been able to see what was happening across the lake.  
This lakeside scene is of further interest since it involves a return to the earlier nautical 
metaphor, and brings to mind again James’s metaphorical suggestion that what is being 
viewed is perhaps not being adequately registered in the minds of the observers. On this 
occasion, Flora is absorbed as she attempts to screw into a small flat piece of wood a second, 
upright wooden fragment “that might figure as a mast”, thereby creating a structure that 
could pass as a convincing little boat (p. 43). While the little girl with her back to the lake 
clearly could not have witnessed the ghost that the governess wants her to have seen, we as 
readers see that the governess may herself thereby fail to recognise in Flora’s waterside play a 
connection back to Flora’s private time with the previous house staff. The reappearance of 
the metaphor of the boat reiterates the notion that this image is related to correct seeing and 
accurate interpretation.43 
The governess’s capacity for subterfuge is made evident by the way that she 
encourages the children to hope (falsely) for a visit from their custodial uncle, despite being 
aware that a visit from him would be highly unlikely. She reports that the children question 
her keenly, asking “When do you think he will come? Don’t you think we ought to write?” (p. 
77), and comments obliquely (but also in a way that reflects her own personal fantasy about 
the master) that “we lived in much profusion of theory that he might at any moment arrive at 
any moment to mingle in our circle…He never wrote to them—that may have been selfish, 
but it was part of his flattery of his trust in me” (p. 77). The governess deliberately obstructs 
the children’s channels of communication. She secretly pockets children’s personal letters to 
their uncle, and justifies this action to herself (and to the readers) with the comment that their 
letters were “too beautiful to be posted; I kept them all myself” (p. 77). This covert action on 
her part amounts to an act of hypocrisy, prefiguring as it does her reaction to Miles’ later 
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action of pocketing her own unsent letter to the master so that he can see what she has 
written—an occasion on which she reprimands Miles severely. 
The governess’s relationship with Miles reaches a crisis when he expresses a wish to 
return to boarding school. The governess, who admits to her fear of “having to deal with the 
intolerable question” (p. 82) (presumably the question of the reason for Miles’s earlier 
dismissal from school), finally raises the issue with him. Given that she alone has read the 
letter of dismissal from the headmaster of Miles’s previous school, she presumably already 
knows the details surrounding his departure. If so, her seemingly innocent protestations to 
Miles that he ought to reveal these details to her appears somewhat disingenuous. She 
declares plaintively: “Never, little Miles—no never—have you given me an inkling of 
anything that may have happened there” (p. 89)  
Miles’s explanation of the reason for his dismissal from boarding school is given in the 
vaguest of terms (albeit with vague hints of implied sexual innuendo) and is never made 
explicit. The governess chides him about being left “in the dark” (p. 89), noting that “you’ve 
never mentioned to me one of your masters, one of your comrades, nor the least little thing 
that ever happened to you in school” (p. 89). James thus deflects the reader’s attention away 
from the issue of the governess’s unreasonableness to Miles, and towards a view of Miles’s 
own unreasonableness. Then, following the governess’s own strategy of blocking meaningful 
dialogue, Miles responds to her questions with a question of his own and so, in an established 
pattern, their conversation goes no further. Some days later, the governess returns to the 
topic, and again queries Miles about the circumstances surrounding his dismissal from school. 
Miles’s eventual answer to her is again full of gaps and elisions:  
“Well I said things…Well, I suppose I oughtn’t...I don’t remember their 
names…only a few. Those I liked…they must have repeated them. To those they 
liked…Yes, it was too bad…What I sometimes said.” (p.123)  
When the governess then instructs Miles to explain to her “What were these things?” 
Miles holds his silence. The governess interprets this response as a sign that Quint is somehow 
present, and in the governess’s agitated mind, Quint’s purpose can only be “to blight his 
confession and stay his [Miles’s] answer” (p. 124). So great is the governess’s wish for 
authority over Miles, and so determined is she to be in the right, that she cannot countenance 




Hadley (2002, p. 58) notes that despite being just ten years old, Miles demonstrates 
considerable spiritedness in his attitude towards the governess. He is aware of her tactics of 
evasion in dialogue, and her resistance to discussion or the open sharing of ideas. When she 
demands of Miles “How do you know what I think?” Miles replies, wisely, “Ah well, of course 
I don’t; for it strikes me you never tell me” (James, 2011, p. 81). Miles notices too that the 
governess, in wanting always to emphasize his goodness, appears intent to have him conform 
to her ideal of how a little boy ought to be good. This motivates him to challenge her 
authority, and to head outdoors in the middle of the night to explore the grounds, seemingly 
to provoke her. He tells her that he does this to entice her to try to “think me—for a change, 
bad” (p. 68).  
Although the governess’s story provides a detailed account of how she exercises her 
appointed “authority” at Bly in the name of goodness and morality, there is no evidence that 
her recollected experience at Bly ultimately counts for anything in her life. It remains entirely 
unclear whether or not she had progressed subsequently, following the events at Bly, to a 
greater understanding of herself or others, although we do learn that that she continues her 
career as governess, since we learn in the outer tale that she has served time as governess to 
the sister of the second narrator, Douglas, and that Douglas felt love for her (“she was the 
most agreeable woman I’ve ever known in her position” (p. 5). Given the absence of 
information to the contrary, we may infer at best, that the Bly governess is a person entirely 
disconnected from the experiences of her youth, someone who as an adult has entirely 
forgotten the events of her own past. In her own reflections on her memories she notes “I 
hadn’t really in the least slept; I had only done something much worse—I had forgotten” (p. 
94).  The governess demonstrates that she is quite unable to dispatch her sense of herself, or 
to ‘recognise’ in what she attends to, in the sense of achieving ‘re-’ ‘cognition’ or realization of 
ways to see things from a wider perspective. Attention, as understood by Weil and Murdoch, 
not only humbles the self, but at the same time is the only veritable path to self-realization. 
Weil and Murdoch argue that the best personal existence is one that constantly steps beyond 
or outside of itself, and that education at its greatest lifts an individual quite outside of being 
merely individual.  
If the holy grail by which we measure the success of a literary work lies in the degree 
to which a character, or characters shows change or development, this we don’t see in the Bly 
governess—or indeed in any of the characters in James’s story, none of whom are in any way 




speech of all who are at Bly, ultimately stifles Miles’ ability to participate in the world at all. In 
her mind, for Miles to be ‘saved’ (if only from her own unarticulated fears) requires her to 
stop his eyes and ears, to silence him and literally block his view to the outer world. She 
imposes on him a kind of authority that is stifling and deadening.  
In this way James’s novella expresses something powerfully negative and monstrous 
about the governess’s fixed view. Her denial of the possibility of further inquiry and 
investigation is, obliquely, an exploration of what might happen when authority and 
domination quash imagination and exploration, and when manipulation and control 
masquerade as patient and loving care. Does this mean that The Turn of the Screw is somehow 
the antithesis of a ‘bildungsroman’—is it in fact a story in which no-one learns anything at all, 
and where moral behaviour counts for nothing? Or is it perhaps a ‘bildungsroman’ in quite a 
different way—one that is solely directed to the questioning mind of the reader? 
6.7. Summary 
The Turn of the Screw calls for patient, deliberate, reflective, and so, in Weil’s and 
Murdoch’s special sense of the word, attentive reading. On one level the story shows that to 
take up a conviction and to hold onto it doggedly (as does the governess), without further 
questioning that idea, or without being prepared to reconsider that interpretation in the light 
of further, different information, can prevent a person from achieving worthy insight, and 
may lead them to error, cruelty, even catastrophe. Similarly, the reader who is too eager or 
too determined to find an easy explanation, or who settles too readily upon the most 
consoling explanation rather than countenancing the possibility of other possibly more taxing 
readings, risks depleting the work of its essential power and mystery.  
While James’s novella yields no explicit, definitive reading, I have argued that James’s 
moral purpose, as articulated in his literary prefaces, is to lead out the attention of his reader 
into areas that go beyond what is explicitly stated. He prompts us to consider our own ways of 
thinking—how we develop a moral position, how we draw conclusions based on evidence, 
why we believe what we do—and it thereby brings to mind considerations about what might 
be obstacles to our own moral perception. This novella invites us to reflect on the Bly 
governess’s powers of self-assuredness, her absence of self-doubt, and her persistent failure to 
countenance whether or not she is distorting events. It invites us to think not just about the 





James tacitly invites us to see that certain social practices that are entirely accepted 
may also be viewed as unacceptable, unjust, pathological. He invites us to consider the 
proliferation of such social malaise as blindness to child sexual abuse, and to consider the 
ways that social conventions or group assumptions can operate as a kind of group neurosis 
that effectively impedes either individual or collective moral attention. The story implies that 
in addition to the governess’s individual blindness, there may be a wider social malaise at 
work that permits such horrors as child sexual abuse to be perpetrated, unremarked. It falls to 
the reader to take the imaginative step of considering this possibility. James’s story reminds us 
why we all need to take moral responsibility, both individually and collectively. It reminds us 
that attention to literature is a vehicle to help us to find value in the world.  
The Turn of the Screw provides insight into James’s conception of moral attention—that 
it can have application not only at an individual level, but at a collective level as well. James 
achieves this wider perspective by his deliberate authorial “suppression” of an explicit 
meaning, in order to activate and engage the reader’s own attentive and imaginative response 
to what amounts to a societal pathology. It is for James’s reader to determine whether or not 
the ghostly apparitions are to be taken simply as tropes of an oral storytelling tradition, as 
evidence of the governess’s psychosis, or as psychological manifestations of the impact of 
systemic child abuse on the victims as well as on those close to them.  
While Weil’s and Murdoch’s thesis that all learning is partly moral learning may strike 
many people as implausibly strong, the present chapter has subjected their thesis to a test that 
it has passed handsomely. James’s The Turn of the Screw explores the form that moral learning 
may take even when a society has entirely blinkered itself against certain forms of moral 
reflection. James’s work succeeds pedagogically only through a kind of individual 
accomplishment by his or her readers—not so much by way of new descriptive insight that 
leads to new forms of moral reflection, as the very opposite. As James’s readers, we 
accomplish moral insight which leads us towards new powers to describe how things may be. 
The present chapter concludes the literary investigations within this thesis. The next 
and final chapter turns to twenty-first century education policy and practice. It is an 
application of lessons learned to this point concerning the pedagogical worth of attention. It 
critiques a recent policy directive for state education in Aotearoa New Zealand, that imposes 
onto our state funded schools, open plan classrooms. The chapter finds little to recommend 
this drastic change to classroom design and delivery. It argues that conditions of thought and 




way that they militate against the standing of the teacher, and against a teacher’s ability to 





Chapter 7: The destruction of attention? 
7.0. Introduction 
This final chapter critiques the imposition of so-called “innovative learning 
environments” onto Aotearoa New Zealand state schools. It examines the sudden, swift, and 
profoundly consequential government directive that imposes onto state-funded schools an 
open classroom architecture. Ultimately it asks whose interests these changes to the physical 
fabric of a school were ever truly intended to serve, for it would seem impossible that the 
changes are intended to serve the interest to be educated of those who come to state schools 
as students. Nor are these changes likely to foster society’s coming into a situation of best 
educated citizenry. If choice of architecture for state school education could be made from 
some position of neutrality to the best interests of all, if it truly could concern what optimises 
education and brings society along best towards the ideal of an educated citizenry, then that 
choice of architecture for state school education would not, this chapter argues, be towards an 
open classroom design. A main argument that supports this conclusion concerns attention.  
The chapter calls out what a threat to attention the open classroom architecture 
represents almost as simply as by asking the question. But there are some initial specific 
questions to ask first, concerning a directive that urges open classroom architecture onto our 
state-funded schools. These initial questions are disconcerting in the negative answers to 
which they lead: 
• Is there a sound research basis to support this directive? No. (See 7.1 Origins of the open 
classroom directive) 
• Has in-service retraining of teachers occurred, so that experienced, existing teachers, 
are helped to be as functional as they might be in the open classroom environment? 
No. Are teachers likely to enjoy security of professional employment if they explain 
what the changes imperil and if they therefore oppose the change? No. (See 7.2 The 
deprofessionalisation of teaching.) 
• Does the circumstance of public school governance in Aotearoa New Zealand—
”Tomorrow’s Schools”, enlisting parent-elected trustees to govern each school—
create appropriate professional reflection and scrutiny surrounding whether open 





• Are the usual measurables (such as concern reading attainment and numeracy) that 
scale learning by students themselves telling a happy story concerning pedagogical 
effectiveness in open classrooms? No. (See 7.4 The normalisation of inattention.) 
Concerning even just these usual measurables, would a moment’s professional 
reflection lead to any other expectation? No, not at all. 
We can also ask whether the training colleges and programmes that prepare novice teachers 
are expert at preparing novice teachers for the new open classroom multi-teacher teaching 
experience. It is very difficult to understand how they could be, so swift has been the 
widespread introduction of open classroom design to Aotearoa New Zealand state schools. 
The chapter again draws on the philosophical ideas of Simone Weil and Iris 
Murdoch, both of whom saw attention as foundational to education. The chapter’s argument 
is that the new physical arrangements for teaching and learning make it virtually impossible 
that students will cultivate their individual powers of attention either to the depth or to the 
quality that is required in order truly to learn. It argues centrally that, for virtually all students 
and virtually all teachers, experience in open classrooms will not enhance opportunities for 
attention, but will, to the contrary, mostly defeat or destroy such opportunities. Structured 
into two main parts, the chapter provides first (sections 7.1–7.3) a critique of the open plan 
policy directive by addressing the questions itemised above. Part two (sections 7.4–7.6) 
advances several possible criticisms regarding this directive, including the diminution of the 
standing of the individual teacher, the inevitable loss of opportunities for classroom quiet and 
contemplation, and the loss of group cohesion. Overall the chapter provides reasons for us to 
take pause and think critically about the implications of the vaunted “innovative learning 
environments” currently being crafted for New Zealand’s state schools. 
7.1. Origins of the open classroom directive  
The phrase “innovative learning environment” (and earlier iterations of the official 
terminology—”flexible learning space” and “modern learning environment”)—has clearly 
been crafted for positive effect. Yet the vast, unprecedented and comprehensive restructure of 
the physical spaces for teaching and learning ought not be regarded as necessarily benign, let 
alone necessarily beneficial. The phrase “innovative learning environment” vaunts a 
condition where the teachers float, where children variously group themselves, where a buzz 
of interaction is omnipresent, and where activities leave children for not a single moment 




possibly think anything negative or critical of it. For who, after all, would want to be non-
”modern”, who would oppose “learning”, and who would resist, relative to education, the use 
of the encompassing, ambient, generally positive concept of an education “environment”?  
Looked at in another way, what these terms point to is not only the wholesale 
deconstruction of the traditional classroom (specifically, its replacement by open-plan, so that 
the one-time norm of a single teacher with say twenty-six school students gives way to a new 
norm of say three teachers together with around eighty school students) but also, and perhaps 
even more concerning, they point to the potential dismantling of a classroom teacher’s 
standing, as well as of that teacher ever standing up in front of a group of students whom she 
may call her own.44  
It is timely to pause over this present-day policy directive in order reflect upon its 
potential for adverse consequences. This is not necessarily to be against innovation, not 
necessarily to propose to impede learning, not at all to discount the environment, and in no 
way implies a resistance to the changes to education brought about by the increased use of 
digital technology—changes that can bring wonderful and marvellous new opportunities for 
learning (but that do also introduce new dangers). This is simply to look again at the directive 
itself, under a determination to be critical if criticism seems called for. While we are told that 
that open classrooms emphasize personalized learning, that they foster a collaborative ethos 
and promote flexible, self-regulated learning—said to be necessary skills to prepare students 
for the twenty-first century workplace—it is appropriate to question these very assumptions as 
well as raise some other questions about education itself—questions that have not hitherto 
been addressed. In the sections that follow, reasons will be presented for why student 
experience in open classrooms is unlikely to transcend what is commonplace, but is very 
much more likely to emblematise what is commonplace. But first, let us consider the origins 
of this change, and just whose needs it is intended to serve. 
To date (May 2019), there appears to be no compelling research evidence to show 
that open classroom design impacts more favourably either on teacher performance or on 
student development than do traditional classroom arrangements. A survey of academic 
journal articles published between 2010 and 2016 provides no evidence that what is being 
aspired to is actually of academic or developmental benefit. While there is much emphasis in 
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opportunity for a single teacher to work in a sustained way with their own class of up to thirty students in an 




these articles on the modernity of open classroom design, no pedagogical conclusions are 
available to establish the superiority of open plan arrangements over the traditional 
arrangement of one teacher per classroom, and various cautions are sounded. Similarly, a 
survey of recent international academic studies concerned with the open classroom design45 
provides no definitive evidence to support the view that open plan arrangements are 
conducive to academic achievement. Questions around the pedagogical challenges for the 
teacher who is required to balance spaces for autonomous student learning while managing 
the complexity of a shared space, greater teacher/student ratios, variable student responses to 
the new environment, inappropriately high noise levels, visual distractions, teacher vocal 
strain, divergence across the team of teachers regarding educational practice, logistical 
challenges negotiating spatial collaboration, and students’ sense of dislocation and being 
constantly “on the move” are just some of the themes and cautions that are raised.  
Open plan workplaces were first instigated in Europe and the United States in the 
1940s and 1950s as a means to increase worker productivity and interaction. Yet while the 
original intention of the open design was to enhance employee teamwork and creativity, 
subsequent evaluations indicate that open office design, despite offering some advantages, 
falls short of those aspirations. Repeated research investigations into the merits of open plan 
workplaces find that although these arrangements increase opportunities for aspects of 
sociability, their negative effects are considerable. On balance, investigations into the long-
term impacts of open plan configurations on workplace satisfaction have identified negative 
effects including loss of worker satisfaction, increased worker distraction (caused by intrusions 
of audible and visual events), negative effects on worker cognitive processing, as well as 
increase in worker sickness.  
Kim and de Dear (2013) identify what they call a “privacy-communication trade off” 
in open plan offices (p. 18). They conclude that “although occupants are satisfied with 
interactions in open-plan layout, their overall workspace satisfaction will eventually decrease 
unless a certain level of privacy and acoustical quality are provided” (p. 25). In their 2012 
longitudinal field study, Brennan, Jasdeep, Chugh and Kline investigate the long-term impact 
on workers of a change to open office layout. Their research identifies diminished employee 
satisfaction and indeed enduring employee dissatisfaction in response to the change. More 
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recent empirical research (Bernstein and Turban, 2018) into the effects of open offices on the 
quality of human interactions, finds, perversely, that open offices, rather than increasing 
opportunities for people to interact and collaborate, achieve precisely the opposite effect. 
Rather than fostering positive collegial interactions, workers in open offices find ways to 
disengage and effectively “turn off” from those around them. They retreat to the relative 
privacy of online interactions, and use noise-blocking headphones. Perhaps counterintuitively, 
this research finds that the removal of spatial boundaries has a negative impact on human 
collective interactions—possibly because the larger space is over-stimulating and impedes 
people’s ability to focus, or perhaps because people function better in groups that occupy a 
more bounded environment, or in smaller groups per se. The researchers conclude that the 
relation between open architecture and collective human interactions is not yet well 
understood, and likely to be far more complex than initially assumed.46 
Today’s communication technologies such as voice-activated computers and mobile 
telephones contribute to the noise distractions in the open plan office, and also significantly 
jeopardise opportunities for quiet or private conversations (which are themselves essentially 
rendered public, albeit that they may be held within a glass-walled break-out room). Open 
workstations, sometimes termed ‘hot desks’, now feature in many corporate offices. These are 
workstations not assigned to anyone in particular, but available to be used by anyone in an ad 
hoc fashion. In these many ways, open plan workplaces introduce elements of impersonality 
into the workplace. They effective eliminate any sense of pride of space or of place, even 
potentially rendering workers “homeless in their own places of work” (Weil, 1977, p. 64).  
Like open plan offices, open classrooms feature opened-up spaces (the removal of 
classroom walls) and the creation of smaller breakout areas for small-group work. Open 
classrooms house up to three or more classes at a time, all day, every day. These spaces 
introduce issues of noise, of throng-like groupings, as well as presenting constant visual and 
auditory distractions. These factors are clearly detrimental to sustaining levels of 
concentration and attention.  
Although access to multi-use space may be very attractive for some teachers, this is 
not necessarily the case when the entire multi-use space is effectively ‘commons’. In this 
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context, there needs to be constant managing of competing group needs. Furthermore, 
teacher management of the movement of large numbers of students within the open 
classroom inevitably brings with it some degree of regimentation and inflexibility. In the open 
classroom, groups of around eighty students may be bundled together under the watchful 
eyes of three or more teaching staff. In order to manage the sheer volume of students in this 
space, and even to comply with health and safety regulations, the overriding function of these 
teachers is likely to be reduced to one that is largely task-oriented and humdrum. 
Open classrooms are said to bring a strong imperative for teachers to become more 
collaborative and less individualistic in their practice. Yet open classrooms can also be shown 
to represent a serious challenge to an individual teacher’s capacity to enthral and captivate his 
or her own class. The open classroom design seems deliberately intended to deflect education 
delivery right away from the focused, challenging teacher who seeks to foster independent 
thought. Open classrooms promote a deliberate and intended de-privatization of teaching, a 
model that inevitably brings its own orthodoxy, both in conception and in consequences. 
Open classroom design mimics workplace trends, although school is not a workplace, and nor 
is the sole purpose of school a preparation for the workplace. Why, then, are we emulating 
the open plan work environment in our schools? There is to date no compelling evidence to 
support the notion that the amalgamation of several classes of students and their teachers into 
vast open classrooms is any less industrial than what has gone before, nor that such an 
arrangement will improve the quality of state education. 
Many of New Zealand’s school buildings were built around sixty or seventy years ago. 
Rectangular classrooms with doors and windows are now seen as negative emblems of that 
earlier time, which involved a formal style of educational delivery, one that typically involved 
the teacher as the sole focal point, often telling the entire class what, and how, they were to 
learn. Such teacher-dominated instruction as the sole or even the dominant mode of teaching 
has today largely disappeared from our schools. Nevertheless, all state schools are now 
required to identify, though their school property plans, how they will remediate their 
physical environment to eliminate or mitigate such design features as separate classrooms—
even although the educational and academic merits of these structural changes have yet to be 
determined. This raises important questions relative to New Zealand education policy: what 
educational considerations if any have been brought to bear on these policy decisions, and 
what if any effort has been made to base policy decisions on proper research by education 




allowed for, and who has been involved in these policy discussions? What alternatives to open 
classroom architecture for schools were considered? In opting for the open classroom 
architecture as a policy directive, whose interests have been prioritised? These are reasonable 
questions to raise, and to answer them is perfectly possible without mooting whether some 
kind of conspiracy lies behind the change. 
Roots of this change appear to date back to 2010 when the Ministry of Education 
(MoE) announced alterations to each school’s ten-year property plan. As a result of this 
directive, Boards of Trustees are required to identify their planning against three priority 
areas: health and safety; essential infrastructure; and environment. A 2012 report 
commissioned from NZCER, entitled Supporting future-oriented learning and teaching: A New Zealand 
perspective: Report prepared for the Ministry of Education (Bolstad and Gilbert, 2012) contains hints of 
the current seismic shift now being suffered by our state schools—a shift that requires not 
only a drastic change in the physical and spatial design of teaching spaces, but that also 
implies a change to teaching practice itself.  
It is now the policy of the Ministry of Education that all New Zealand state school 
classrooms be modified or retrofitted into larger, open spaces. Older school buildings are to 
be adapted by the removal of walls between classrooms, while new school buildings are being 
designed as predominantly large open spaces that will accommodate vast numbers of students 
with some limited segregated quiet areas provided. 47 Such designs are considered to reflect 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development view (OECD, Centre for 
Educational Research and Innovation, 2013) that students learn best when self-led, and in a 
context that is social and collaborative:  
The Ministry of Education shares the OECD’s holistic view of learning 
environments as an ecosystem that includes learners, educators, families/whānau, 
communities, content and resources like property and technology. It’s about 
everything working together to support teachers and learners and ensure our 
young people are confident, connected, actively involved, lifelong learners. 
(Ministry of Education, 2018, What’s It All About section, para. 1.) 
 
47 Christchurch’s newly built Haeata Community Campus, which opened in 2017, is designed to fit up to 300 




However perilous it might be to consider definitive for education the pronouncements of an 
organisation concerned with economics exclusively, it is in any case a non-sequitur to argue 
that self-led learning, in a context that is social and collaborative, was not liable ever to be 
accomplished in traditional classrooms. Not only has such learning been accomplished within 
traditional classrooms, but whether such learning can be accomplished as much or as well 
within large open classrooms is also perfectly pertinent to question. 
The current physical re-design of New Zealand state school classrooms represents a 
very significant change to the delivery of public education. The directive for open classrooms 
strongly reflects ideals for education, wherein educational processes are harnessed as part of a 
push for economic competitiveness. It could even be argued that open classrooms are very 
largely intended to socialise and prepare young students to be bland and tolerant co-operators 
who have developed the personal mental resilience to survive amidst the hubbub and 
distractions of open-plan workspaces.  
Like open plan offices, open classrooms feature spaces that are made physically vast 
by the removal of opaque walls. Within these vast spaces, smaller, so-called ‘breakout’ areas 
are created, for small-group interactions and targeted teaching. Open classrooms are 
designed to have multiple uses, and are closely modelled on the open plan office workplaces, 
with their extended utility stations, hot desks, and meeting spaces in separate glass-walled 
breakout areas. Advocates of these arrangements defend them as embodying a symbolic sense 
of a school’s organisational vision as one of transparency, and that fosters innovative, sociable 
and contemporary approaches to education. Open classrooms are said to epitomise priorities 
of “flexibility, openness, access to resources” (Osborne, 2013, p. 2). 
Yet although access to multi-use space may sound attractive, a raft of complexities are 
likely to arise when a multi-use space is effectively deemed ‘teaching commons’—a space that 
a cohort of around eighty or more students occupy for extended periods of the school day. 
These vast open spaces cannot but introduce issues of noise, of anonymity, of throng-like 
groupings, as well as constant visual and auditory distractions. Such factors are surely 
detrimental to establishing, let alone sustaining, appropriate levels of concentration and 
attention in both teacher and student. There is every reason to be concerned that we are 
moving far too quickly to embrace this pedagogical innovation, and that insufficient 




Whether open classroom design has been “visited upon” education (that is, has not in 
the first instance been instigated by educators) is a pertinent, open question. Relatedly we 
may ask who invented the official terminology that describes open classroom redesign in New 
Zealand. Given that the terminology is so seductive and clever, and so well-crafted to 
neutralise any opposition, presumably those who are behind the change operate to some 
extent under ulterior motives. They may nevertheless sincerely believe that the 
implementation of their ideas will improve state-funded education in New Zealand. Yet it is 
legitimate to ask just who exactly are these people? What specific insights into or interests 
concerning education do they possess? What vested interests might they possess? These are 
relevant questions to ponder even if this change is explained not by conspiracy but by quite a 
different kind of political analysis.  
Certainly the current radical change in educational design and delivery appears not to 
have come spontaneously from professional teachers and educators who think that it is a 
really good idea—even though it is professional teachers and educators who are expected to 
embrace the required changes to their own practice and work conditions. It is fair to mention 
but also not unexpected that some educators have embraced the change, and even declare 
that they would never return to the now pejoratively-termed “single-cell” classroom.48 An 
explanation why the change would be embraced by some is developed in the second half of 
this chapter. Despite the warm glow surrounding the advertising buzz words, and despite the 
educators who have embraced the change, there may be ill in what open classroom redesign 
of state schools will bring to education. There is every reason to pause, to take stock and 
reflect, and to consider critically why the currently charted course towards open classroom 
design may be a colossal mistake. 
What is significant about the open classroom directive is that it entrenches the idea 
that education is a skills training ground, and school is a preparation for the workplace in an 
inescapable way. Open classroom design mimics workplace trends, although surely school is 
not a workplace, and nor has it been established that the sole purpose of school ought to be to 
prepare students for the workplace. Pinar (2012) laments the influence of self-interested 
political and business ideologies on education. He argues that curriculum design should be 
motivated by educational priorities, and definitely not those of the “self-aggrandizement” of 
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corporations (p. 208). Pinar underlines that “the point of being in the world is not to exploit 
its resources and peoples for profit” (p. 207). If, following Pinar, we agree that education’s 
purpose is far more than to prepare for work, and that education plays a role in helping 
students to (begin to) shape their own conception of the world, and to develop themselves 
towards being in the world most fully, not merely via the paid work that they eventually do, 
we must strongly question the philosophy that underlies the design of the open classroom.  
An ‘industrialising’ influence on state education is all the more worrisome, when we 
recall the obligation of a democratic state to help the powers for critical, independent thinking 
of its citizenry to grow. Education grows democracy, it does not only aid industry. Implicit in 
the open classroom arrangement is the idea that each individual student is in preparation to 
be a collaborative and productive participant in an industrial economy, rather than an 
individual, contemplative and reflective, thinker, sporting values that are truly self-authored, 
and a purpose in life that is truly self-owned. The open classroom directive is also a challenge 
to the professionalism of the classroom teacher, who is now required to operate as part of a 
teaching “tag team” on a daily basis. The next section examines this change. 
7.2. The deprofessionalization of teaching 
One argument given in defence of open classrooms is that they enable teachers to 
determine how best to connect with a particular student or group of students, while for the 
students, the open design enables students to gravitate in the space to whichever teacher they 
best relate to, or to whomever can best assist them with particular problems or challenges. 
(Yet by the same inference, teachers would also be selective in the attention that they bestow, 
and, in particular, would expend little time or effort upon students whom they least relate to.) 
Open classrooms are thus said to bring a strong imperative for teachers to become more 
collaborative and less individualistic in their practice. Also implied in this arrangement is the 
educational philosophy that students learn best by way of their own, self-directed learning. 
(One also sees survival-of-the-fittest, social Darwinism, expressed in this design.) Yet while the 
open classroom is said to overcome the structural isolation of the teacher, it significantly alters 
the quality and nature of the interaction between teachers and students. Worse, it has the 
potential to significantly de-professionalise the role of teacher who has now in some sense lost 
that “proprietorial” connection to their own class.  
Equally, the teacher’s intuitive calls, judgements, grasp of “teachable moments”, and 




within the collaborative context must now align with the agreed interests of the teaching team 
and the priorities of the larger group. The oversight of eighty plus students surely renders 
truly responsive teaching particularly difficult. An aspect of the professionalism of any teacher 
is to be concerned to advance as far as possible the learning of the least advantaged student, 
and this aspect is undermined if the least advantaged student is liable to disappear in the 
crowd. The eighty-student teaching environment is redolent with industrialism. Decisions 
regarding the overall management of such a large group must be maximally responsive to the 
clock, or else “slippage” over the course of the day will mean that valuable teaching time is 
inexorably lost.  
Until recent decades, New Zealand teachers operated in a largely autonomous 
fashion, and followed a predominantly didactic teaching style. While teachers in a 
traditionally-run school would interact, maintain friendships with, support and collaborate 
with, their colleagues, sometimes pooling resources and often providing enriching across-
classroom opportunities for the benefit of their students, they would also typically hold a 
certain professional distance from one another, in the sense that each teacher would have 
licence to respond in their own way to the professional delivery of the daily, weekly, termly 
and annual programme for their students, in line of course, with school and curriculum 
guidelines. Teachers would not typically encroach upon the complexities of their colleagues’ 
teaching style. Now, within an environment that contains up to or even exceeding eighty 
students, teams of two or three teachers are housed together, and must collectively attend to 
that larger group’s needs. Such teacher oversight of very large numbers of students, while 
these students move in and out of smaller groups for specific daily instruction, fundamentally 
alters the student-teacher relationship, and must inevitably bring with it some degree of 
organisational regimentation and inflexibility. It also means that teachers are now constantly 
audience to one another.  
In the open classroom environment, the potential influence of each individual teacher 
relative to the larger group is surely less than the ability of a single-classroom teacher 
sometimes to enthral, captivate and propel into quiet reflection his or her own class. The 
open arrangement minimises each individual teacher’s capacity to teach as they individually 
and creatively see best, or to respond individually and intuitively to the arising needs of their 
collected students. All of this diminishes the professional standing of the teacher. 
As we saw in Chapter 1, Weil considers that if school studies are to have any lasting 




in developing the students’ capacity for attention. The teacher must work with the class to 
develop a shared attentive culture. The teacher is involved in fostering practices that enable 
student attention to form. Teaching involves providing a safe and suitable place in which 
specific activities can be questioned, investigated, challenged. Within the classroom, attention 
can be a shared event, in which everyone, separately, is aware of the process of mutually 
sharing something as a collective. To teach well in this environment involves taking the time 
to form attentive and appropriately loving relationships with individual students. A necessary 
condition of success is that the teacher be engaged with all her students, all considered equally 
and loved. 
To reiterate, an effective teacher seeks to engage humanly and intellectually with all of 
the students, taking into account the different personalities, interests, cultures, and other 
various particular situations within the group. We could say that that individual teacher’s 
work is founded upon attention. It is by way of attention that the teacher sets up the 
classroom, establishes with the students the culture of the classroom, responds to the plurality 
of events and people within that room, and embarks on the complex task of connecting 
appropriately with those students and leading them forth. The move to open classroom 
design appears to be driven far more by political ideology than by care for pedagogy. 
Certainly it is deleterious if as Murdoch and Weil teach us, the connection between attention 
and pedagogy is tight. 
Concurrent with the move to open classrooms has been an increased use of digital 
technology. There is coincidence in the timing but no necessary link. While there are 
undoubted merits and opportunities in the adoption of digital technology to deliver some 
aspects of the school curriculum, just as there are merits in students learning to work 
collaboratively, it is naïve to embrace open classroom architecture as if there were no other 
option that would allow digital technology to do good work to the extent that it can, or as if 
there were no other option for allowing students to learn to work collaboratively. 
Opportunities may well be lost in open classrooms to discover, as was often discovered in 
traditional classrooms, that learning can take its most emphatic forms quite without any use 
of digital technology at all. The enhancement of some kinds of learning by digital technology 
is no good reason for eliminating other kinds of learning, including some of the best kinds of 
learning. As Murdoch herself comments, “if something is no use it does not matter much 
whether it’s there or not” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 10), and so it would properly be with student 




Of course to lament the open classroom is not to argue for the total privatization of 
teaching, since teachers, as any professionals, benefit from interaction with colleagues, as well 
as opportunities to critique and reflect upon their own practice. No teacher should be 
considered “above” observation or feedback. The point here is that in order to be effective in 
their role, which is so fundamentally about forming positive educative relationships, teachers 
must be able to establish effective relationships with their students individual by individual. 
Yet one of the complexities of “tag team” teaching is that teachers must now focus on their 
own interpersonal and professional interactions with colleagues even more continually than 
upon their interactions with students. They also are faced with far greater numbers of 
individual students to think about, far more than they can grow to truly know.  
Given their already various teaching responsibilities, and the very public nature of the 
open classroom, a dominant teacher personality is likely to prevail if or when particular 
pedagogical, ethical, or interpersonal challenges arise. Teachers are assumed to have the 
requisite skills to work out their shared decision base, either on the spot, or at a time when the 
students are not present. The open classroom arrangement is likely to add to teacher 
workload since it necessitates subsequent meetings to address administrative or pedagogical 
and/or interpersonal matters, either before or after the hours of direct classroom contact.  
The open classroom environment also brings with it its own orthodoxy. It effectively 
forces the teachers into a pedagogical relationship whereby they must work collaboratively 
with others in an environment that encourages enquiry- or project-based learning as the 
predominant mode of instruction, rather than enquiry- or project-based learning as one of a 
range of ways to organise classroom studies. In the open classroom, there is scarcely any place 
for direct teacher instruction, and the individual teacher’s pedagogical role is significantly 
diminished to that of mere facilitator. In this way, the concept of open classroom design risks 
diluting the nature of the teacher/student relationship altogether. In particular, it risks 
rendering impossibly difficult that the teacher should truly gain and guide his or her student’s 
attention. Although the open classroom design is promoted as suited to student need for 
variety and flexibility, it is arguably more likely to be, for at least some students and some 
teachers, a site of alienation and displacement. How is it possible to give focussed attention in 
the midst of hubbub, interchanges, and constant noise? An aspect of the professionalism of 
teachers that may be more crucial to education than any other aspect of teacher 
professionalism is lost in this circumstance. That is a major blow, and it is an insidious de-




7.3. Institutionally-endorsed inattention 
The theme of institutionally-endorsed inattention is explored by Boler in her Feeling 
Power (1999). Boler refers to what she calls our culturally “inscribed habits of (in)attention” (p. 
180).  Acknowledging that minds are prone to become “rigid and immune to flexibility”, 
Boler emphasizes that a fundamental role for the teacher is “to identify when and how our 
habits harm ourselves and others” (p. 185). Boler identifies the central function of the teacher 
as ethical, since it is the teacher’s role to encourage “[both] students and [fellow] educators to 
examine how our modes of seeing have been shaped specifically by the dominant culture of 
the historical moment” (p. 179). In Chapter 8 of Feeling Power, Boler identifies what she terms 
a “pedagogy of discomfort” (p. 176) as a means of enabling students to undertake critical 
reflection. This approach, she explains, “is not a demand to take one particular road or 
action… not to enforce a particular agenda, or to evaluate students on what agenda they 
choose to carry out, if any” (p. 179). Rather, the teacher would, on Boler’s preferred 
approach, helpfully unsettle the taking of ideas as received, and so would encourage students 
to consider how to be reasonable, and to take responsibility for thinking as they do. This is to 
illuminate in terms of attention the truest function of the dedicated classroom teacher. 
Such a truest function for the teacher is also an especially demanding one. And yet the 
open classroom design creates a contrary impulse for teaching to be “casualized”. In the open 
classroom the relationships between teachers and students are made less formal, less clearly 
defined, and respect for the specific expertise of the teacher is potentially muted. Classroom 
interactions are more fluid, involving an assembly of people, but without a strong sense of 
“belonging” within that community—group cohesion is now circumstantial, rather than 
pedagogical. Assembled students are as travellers who share a common destination, 
eventually to be participants in an industrial workforce, rather than individuals working out 
their own individual path within life generally and within the wider state. It is likely that the 
teacher’s pedagogical influence is made more, and not less difficult, by way of open design. 
It would not be surprising if the implementation of open classrooms on the teaching 
profession proves to have a negative impact on teacher recruitment and retention. Teachers 
are typically attracted to teaching because they want to make a difference to the lives of 
students, and to participate in sharing their own expertise. For many teachers, a distinction 
between being respected as a professional in one’s own right, versus being viewed as a 




levels of frustration, stress and burnout that will, for some, accelerate their departure from the 
profession altogether. 
Of course, in considering the implications of this current change directive, it is 
important not to fall into a benighted sense of nostalgia for times past. Some readers will 
appreciate the importance of not glossing over previously poor aspects of state school 
education. Some school classrooms of earlier decades were thoroughly negative places, sites of 
rigidity, and even cruelty. Prior to the major reforms of Tomorrow’s Schools in the late 1980s, 
teaching in Aotearoa New Zealand was viewed as a vocation, and teachers were considered 
above scrutiny, so not held to account. In former times, many schools used corporal 
punishment as a form of discipline. Many teachers used verbal threats and ridicule as 
weapons to bring students into compliance. New Zealanders who were educated even four or 
five decades ago may recall unbending and rigid classroom situations that involved didactic, 
negative, and vindictive teacher judgments. Little, if any attention was formally given in these 
times to human vulnerabilities around matters of gender, ethnicity, language, culture, or 
other areas of possible inequality. The call for teachers to work collaboratively could in this 
light seem clarion, as though the only good protection against teachers being bullies is for 
them always to be observed by one or more other adults. 
It is perhaps arguable that overtly cruel, unfair, or patently unprofessional teacher 
behavior would not readily occur in an open classroom in which each adult is under the 
watch of other adults, although the mutual surveillance of teachers has not been identified as 
the motivation for implementing open classrooms. By the same token, however, gravitational 
drawdown towards overall teaching mediocrity, and suppression of any teacher’s opportunity 
to be magnificent, surely also can follow from mutual surveillance. It is even possible that 
some bullying behaviours by teachers could rub off on the fellow teachers.  
In terms of logistics, the open classroom structure introduces complexities including 
those around the best groupings of students, and the logistics of tracking and managing 
student movement in and out of groups and teaching spaces across the school day. As a 2018 
New Zealand Education Review Office national report into so-called “innovative practice” 
reveals, teachers who teach in a collaborative setting are much more likely to rely on gathered 




these teachers may not hold a detailed picture of each individual student.49 Thus the open 
classroom design further reinforces teachers’ trust in gathered assessment data ahead of other 
more intuitive ways of knowing their students. This is not at all to discount the usefulness of 
testing and assessment information, if used appropriately and well, but rather to point to a 
way in which the open classroom arrangement effectively valorises assessment data, which 
can then be seen to provide the “final word” ahead of knowledge of each individual student. 
The demands of open classroom design may also negatively influence the nature and 
quality of the teaching programmes that teachers devise. Back in 1987, philosopher of 
education Neil Postman observed that our expectations of what education entails have come 
to be heavily influenced by screen-based entertainment, particularly television, the chief 
consequence of which has been, in his view, the conflation in people’s minds of the functions 
of teaching and entertainment (1987, p. 150). Postman warns of the risk of what he terms a 
“decline of the potency of the classroom” by this trend, since “no-one has ever said or implied 
that significant learning is effectively, durably and truthfully achieved when education is 
entertainment” (p. 150). Postman expresses a further concern that screen-based 
entertainment undermines the notion that human understanding is cumulative, hierarchical, 
or built up over time, and points to the fact that screen viewers are largely fed discrete events. 
Television-inspired material, because its purpose is entertainment, cannot be too perplexing 
or too intellectually taxing for its audience (pp. 152–153).50  
Postman’s comments point to the kinds of teaching approaches that work best within 
the open classroom—the provision of a constantly moving series of activities that entertain 
and engage the larger group, while small-group ‘targeted’ teaching takes place, possibly out of 
sight of the majority, in a withdrawal area. Postman’s observations are pertinent to our 
discussion of the open classroom insofar as opportunities to pursue the ideals of shared 
pedagogical attention, sustained focus, and the continuity of extended thoughtful enquiry are 
all perpetually ‘marginalised’ by these large open spaces. Attention to slow-moving activities 
like contemplative reading are highly likely to be marginalised within this physical 
arrangement. Postman also notes that teacher emphasis on perpetually short-term or discrete 
classroom activities are likely to undermine their students’ conceptions of sequence, 
 
49“Agentic learning is great, but we always come back to the data.” (Leaders, St Clair School, as cited in 
Education Review Office, 2018b, p. 29). 
50 Postman’s comments are directed to television shows, and predate the arrival of televised dramas or filmed 




consequence, or of the progress of cumulative or reflective thought—again, such as are called 
upon in the experience of imaginative reading. Indeed, we might wonder if experiences as 
quiet, sustained reading are even possible within the large, open classroom space. Given the 
sheer numbers of students involved, and the absence of a set position in the classroom for 
each student to claim as their own, there is a potential sense of chaos, of the flux of constant 
movement,—a surfeit of energy that needs to be contained, managed, somehow restrained.  
If, as this thesis insists, the aspects of education that matter most are also those aspects 
that are least able to be measured, the open classroom design appears to be an unfortunate 
educational experiment rather than a worthy educational approach. For Weil and Murdoch, 
it is the intangible aspects of education that are of greatest intrinsic value. Their vision for 
education, built upon the idea of learning as improving, involves, among other things, time to 
give due regard and respect to the achievements of others. Their vision leaves space in the 
educational context for individual thought and contemplation.  
In considering the cogency of Weil and Murdoch’s inspirations for education, I turn 
in the second part of this chapter (sections 7.4–7.6) to consideration of some hitherto 
insufficiently discussed but nevertheless glaring demerits of the open classroom approach. 
7.4. The normalisation of inattention 
Contemporary educational philosophy as played out in the open classroom not only 
does not value quiet, thoughtful attention, but, to the contrary, renders attention virtually 
impossible. We could even say that open plan environments dictate that attention, as 
understood by Weil and Murdoch, not even be part of education. Sustained pedagogical attention 
within a group of eighty plus individuals is, if not unattainable, at least highly unlikely. 
Education in this manifestation appears fundamentally destructive of opportunities for 
attention. The open classroom normalises inattention to the extent that it destroys 
opportunities for attention.  
Human powers of attention need to be inculcated, practised, repeated, and developed 
into patterns of behaviour. As Eppert (2004) observes, “powers of attention cannot simply 
become visible at the first call to pay attention in a meaningful way… Rather than being 
effortlessly acquired, these abilities demand extended cultivation” (Eppert, 2004, p. 52). 
Eppert comments further that “perhaps most fruitful and necessary to a relearning is to 
expose our students to the awareness of inattention as a problem of our contemporary times” 




Debord (1995) also offers an analysis of contemporary culture that connects with 
concerns about societal distraction. He considers that “the spectacle epitomises the prevailing 
model of social life” (p. 13). Debord laments what he perceives as a generalised loss of critical 
awareness in society today. He identifies what he considers to be a societal inertia that 
“manifests itself as an enormous passivity out of reach and beyond dispute” (p. 15). In this 
state of mental inertia, Debord argues, individuals come to believe that “everything that 
appears is good; whatever is good will appear” (p. 15). Debord’s comments are relevant to the 
current discussion, for open plan education appears itself to have embraced the character of 
the spectacle, with students and teachers alike reduced to the roles of spectator while 
simultaneously functioning as participants in an unfolding drama.  
Open classroom design is founded on a mind-set that forces people away from private 
spaces, that diminishes the importance and influence of the individual teacher, and that 
inevitably compromises sustained contemplative opportunities. Officially, student studies are 
directed towards tasks of group interaction, analysis, synthesis, and categorisation, often 
through the use of technology. The reality for students who are not engaged is that many of 
these intended tasks of study do not occur. Yet even when these tasks of study do occur, their 
shape scarcely allows them to involve deep thought or individual contemplation. For after all, 
to think deeply for oneself or to contemplate requires quiet, space, time, and a far different, 
far richer, kind of stimulus that typically could only be orchestrated by a thoughtful, mature, 
loving, patient, inspired adult.  
Most tasks that officially are meant to fill an open classroom also assume that there is 
a right way or a right answer, that defines what success is in the activity. A buzz of interaction 
is meant to reflect pursuit of that winning way or answer. The electronic devices may convey 
pre-programmed indications to individuals when success has been achieved. So what is not 
honed is judgment of the nuanced kind about which pre-programmed resolution is not the 
ticket. While critical and analytic skills of kinds about which there indeed are clear differences 
between right and wrong or between achieved and not achieved are obviously not 
unimportant, they alone are not adequate to the full development of a young person’s 
intellect and creativity.  
In the open classroom, all social interactions are designed to be on display. Around 
eighty students are now bundled together, ostensibly under the watchful eyes of three 
teachers, who are themselves not only watchers but also watched. Following Debord, we 




control on both students and teachers alike. The open classroom seems deliberately intended 
to deflect education delivery right away from the focused, challenging and professionally 
motivated teacher who seeks to foster independent thought. The extent to which children will 
be capable of belonging within their classroom is scant because they are ever to be in and out 
of associations that are more circumscribed than would involve eighty children and three 
teachers or the whole of the space let alone the whole of the school year. The extent to which 
the children will be capable of belonging to a teacher, as the teacher’s special responsibility 
and object of love, is vanished in the open classroom by its very design. 
Debord’s lament concerning just such a loss of unity and a sense of dispossession and 
alienation resonates with Weil’s comments in her posthumously published political treatise, 
The Need for Roots. In this work, Weil identifies up-rootedness as a profoundly disrupting 
societal phenomenon. A fundamental need for all people, if they are to live meaningful lives, 
Weil argues, involves their having a sense of belonging. In this work, Weil identifies two chief 
vectors in society that spread what she terms the “disease” of uprootedness—money, and 
education (Weil, 2002, pp. 44–45). Weil considers that uprootedness in education is 
characterised by what she terms a “stove-pipe atmosphere” of busy-ness, and production, 
emphasis on assessments and examinations (p. 45), priorities that, in her interpretation (and 
her experience), suffocate creative thought: 
To be free and sovereign, as a thinking being, for an hour or two, and a slave for 
the rest of the day, is such an agonizing spiritual quartering that it is almost 
impossible not to renounce, so as to escape it, the highest form of thought. (Weil, 
2002, p. 73) 
Weil describes uprootedness in education as a form of impoverishment that raises 
ethical, even spiritual concerns. Her concerns relate not simply to the absence of a specific 
place for each person to call their own, but to a more serious disregard for the human need 
for a sense of connection. The quality of human connection, Weil would argue, is not 
achieved simply by assemblage based on proximity, or coincidence. For a sense of human 
connection, there needs to be appropriate attention, regard, and respect. Weil defends the 
importance of attention for education because the act of attending opens up and draws out 
each individual person. She argues that only when we experience truly focussed attention, 
and thereby genuinely acknowledge the reality of other people, other ideas, other 




Weil also warns against what she sees as the systemic use of persuasive but empty 
rhetoric, another salutary warning for contemporary education aficionados. Weil argues that 
“when empty words are given capital letters, then, on the slightest pretext, men will 
begin…piling up ruin in their name” (Miles, 1986, p. 221). She notes also her disdain for 
what she sees as the destructive effects of capitalism on human aspirations, and records her 
discomposure over “the speed with which bureaucracy has invaded almost every branch of 
human activity” (Weil, 1958, p. 13). Writing of the soulless demands of blue-collar factory 
work, Weil’s comments can also be read in a way that sheds new light on the possible 
consequences of these latest educational developments in Aotearoa New Zealand: 
Everybody in it is constantly harassed and kept on edge by the interference of 
extraneous wills while the soul is left in cold and desolate misery. What man needs 
is silence and warmth; what he is given is an icy pandemonium. (Miles, 1986, p. 
59) 
Weil’s warning of our human susceptibility to ideas that may in fact have no substance 
at all, including those delivered from the highest of levels, is salutary in relation to the rhetoric 
of innovation, modernity, and flexibility that surrounds the open classroom initiative. Weil is 
aware of the very great danger, not so much from those who promulgate such ideologies, as 
from the readiness of masses of ordinary people who fall in behind such ideas, whether the 
intentions be malign, or naive, without giving them due scrutiny: 
We must also distinguish between the soul’s foods and poisons which, for a time, 
can give the impression of occupying the place of the former. The lack of any such 
investigation forces governments, even when their intentions are honest, to act 
sporadically and at random. (p. 92) 
Inattention is, for Weil and for Murdoch, a moral matter because any kind of 
distraction implies a mind preoccupied, a mind vulnerable to suasion, too easily led, a mind 
that is wandering or wasting itself on fantasy, a mind centred on the self. This, they argue, is a 
moral problem. It reflects an imbalance and a failure to think well, and a failure to be 
sufficiently aware of the wider context. In Oppression and liberty, Weil urges us to consider the 
important intellectual demands that lie at the heart of education:  
Thus, in all spheres, thought, the prerogative of the individual, is subordinated to 




that we have lost the notion of what real thought is. (Weil, 1958, p. 110) 
Weil and Murdoch show us that attention importantly shapes our cognitive, moral 
and even spiritual thought, and that these matters are what is fundamental to education—to 
enable young people to form themselves in terms of values and priorities, and to consider 
what is of most worth. The vaunted emphasis on sociability and interaction in the classroom 
also brings with it a potential dilution to the process of individual learning, a process that Weil 
and Murdoch see involves encountering and addressing one’s own failings, misapprehensions, 
since acknowledging error, although sometimes hard, is a primary way of making educational 
(and moral) progress:  
Each of us is always tempted to set his own failings, to a certain extent, on one 
side… relegate them to some attic, invent some method of calculation whereby 
they turn out to be of no real consequence. (Weil, 2002, p. 101) 
As Murdoch says: “serious reflection is ipso facto moral effort and involves a heightened sense 
of value and a vision of perfection” (Murdoch, 1992, p. 437). 
Thus the normalization of inattention via the promulgation of open classroom design 
is freighted morally. If it is destructive of the possibility of moral growth as Weil and Murdoch 
would have us understand moral growth, it doubtless comes with an opposite inclination 
concerning morality itself. But it is equally clear that this opposite inclination is not truly a 
thinking one. The apparent readiness with which the open classroom directive has been taken 
up by the New Zealand education community, seemingly without deep scrutiny, may itself be 
symbolic of a deeper societal inattention.51 An alternative reading could suggest how firmly 
neo-liberal convictions have taken hold in Aotearoa New Zealand according to which, the self 
is pitted simply towards self-advancements of ultimately material kinds, and towards getting 
down what needs to be got down in order to get ahead of others? Have even the teachers 
become caught up in decisions on the basis of what makes their own responsibilities clearer 
and easier? Is love for one’s still developing fellows at such a low-point with the ascendancy of 
individualized thought-forms, that the traditional motivations even to be a teacher are far 
remote from the present scene? 
 
51 An exception to this is Mark Wilson, then Principal of Cashmere High School, Christchurch, whose 2015 
sabbatical report, published on the Ministry of Education website, provides a balanced but searching critique of 




Publicly, at least, many teachers are said to think very well of their new arrangement 
into multi-teacher open classrooms. Such readiness to be seen to embrace new forms of 
functioning may be genuine, or may, perversely, reflect the phenomenon that sometimes 
members who operate within a particular system such as education, are unable themselves to 
provide a meaningful critique of its operation, so close is their involvement in it. 
Weil writes about this very human tendency. In Oppression and Liberty, she explores 
themes of political and personal freedom, and examines various forms of oppression. In her 
view, limitations on people’s personal freedom can have unexpected and counterintuitive 
outcomes. She argues that “slavery degrades man to the point of making him love it” (Weil, 
1958, p. 117) and that “the powerful, if they carry oppression beyond a certain point, 
necessarily end by making themselves adored by their slaves” (Weil, 1997, p. 214). Postman’s 
1987 observations about the uptake of educational innovations are also relevant here. 
Postman observes that “educators are apt to find new methods congenial, especially if they 
are told that education can be accomplished more efficiently by means of the new 
techniques” (1987, p. 147). In a similar vein, philosopher David Hume, in his A Treatise on 
Human Nature, observes: 
There is no quality in human nature which causes more fatal errors in our 
conduct than that which leads us to prefer whatever is present to the distant and 
remote, and makes us desire objects more according to their situation than their 
intrinsic value. (Hume, 1952, 11, p. 239, as cited in Olson, 1971, p. 39) 
This is to suggest that the largely unquestioned acceptance of open classrooms into 
New Zealand state schools may reflect a degree of passivity or acceptance within the teaching 
profession and the education community more broadly, and may reflect a systemic failure to 
critique adequately the full meaning of the initiative. This line of thinking is resonant with 
Dewey’s lament in Individualism, old and new, where he argues that once there is a 
diminishment of intellectual and moral aspirations for education, the way is opened to 
standards of mediocrity and aspirations that are commonplace: 
Difference and distinctions are ignored and overridden; agreement, similarity, is 
the ideal. There is not only absence of social discrimination but of intellectual; 
critical thinking is conspicuous by its absence. Our pronounced trait is mass 
suggestibility …Homogeneity of thought has become an ideal.  Quantification, 




subdued the soul to their own dye. (Dewey, 1931, pp. 26–27)  
Dewey’s views hold relevance for us today, for they remind us that schooling reflects the 
wider society which it represents. Not only does the open classroom invite a profound level of 
homogeneity, for what teacher would ever be able to orchestrate anything extraordinary in 
such learning spaces as these, but on the contrary, teaching in the open plan classroom risks 
becoming a humdrum public performance, where the classroom environment is reduced to 
an open arena in which all hopes of attention diverge into fractured inattention.  
7.5. Diminished group cohesion 
Opportunities for joint attention of the quality championed by Weil and Murdoch, 
are far less likely to occur in the context of a three-teacher open plan space than they are in 
the integrated and supported way that is made possible in a teacher-led classroom. Within the 
confines of his or her own classroom, an individual teacher can curate opportunities for 
students to articulate and share their ideas. In this context, students can develop their oral 
language confidence under the safe but watchful eye of their attentive teacher. Individual 
teachers are also able to develop within their classroom a culture that is built upon a set of 
shared beliefs—commitments to what is of value, how the classroom will operate. Within a 
teacher-led classroom, the teacher is able to guide and develop the students’ joint attention—
to build upon this and to support the group to see and to understand what it is to belong to a 
whole community of individual selves. While this is not impossible to achieve within a huge 
crowd of students, it is far less likely to yield the same pedagogical benefits. 
Indeed, as Olson’s 1971 research indicates, to achieve such cohesion and sense of 
shared purpose is much less likely in a larger group. In his work The logic of collective action: 
Public goods and the theory of groups, he analyses through empirical study, the relationship 
between group size and group functioning. He presents an analysis of optimal group size in 
relation to individual members’ overall benefits. His research indicates that group size has a 
significant bearing on group behaviour, and that smaller groups (in his research these are 
groups of under twenty) function far better for individual members than do larger ones 
(groups in the hundreds), in terms of fulfilling the group’s overall common purpose: “The 
larger a group is, the more agreement and organization it will need. The larger the group, the 
greater the number that will usually have to be included in the group agreement or 
organization” (Olson, 1971, p 46).  Olson’s findings have a bearing on the current discussion 




classroom. Olson champions what he terms “the coherence and effectiveness of small groups” 
(p. 53) and he establishes that the larger the group, the less attention is likely to be shown by 
(or to) each individual member, and that consequently, the proportion of overall attention 
given to any one member is likely to be less within a larger group than within a smaller one. 
He argues further, that larger groups cannot work towards a common or shared purpose in 
quite the way that smaller groups can: “The larger the group the smaller the likelihood of 
…interaction that might help obtain the good”, and “the larger the group the higher the 
hurdle that must be jumped before any of the collective good at all can be obtained” (p. 48). 
…the larger the group the farther it will fall short of providing an optimal supply 
of a collective good, and very large groups normally will not, in the absence of 
coercion or separate, outside incentives, provide themselves with even minimal 
amounts of a collective good. (Olsen, 1971, p. 48, cited in Cusick, 1992, p. 232) 
Olson concludes that “size is one of the determining factors in deciding whether or 
not it is possible that the voluntary, rational pursuit of individual interest will bring forth 
group-oriented behaviour” (p. 52). In other words, “small groups will further their common 
interests better than large groups” (p. 52). It follows that members of larger groups are less 
likely to co-ordinate themselves or some kind of action, since there is little reason for them to 
do so. Members of smaller groups have greater incentives to work towards the collective 
good. The inverse relationship between group size and group cohesion offers further reasons 
to doubt that individual members a very large class group could ever achieve the sense of 
meaningful social cohesion that a smaller group can achieve. Olsen’s research provides 
further reasons to question whether students might attain collective, sustained, focussed 
concentration on anything at all for any length of time in the open classroom. As Nussbaum 
(2010, p. 55) argues, and as most teachers would agree, the size of the class group is critical to 
the quality of the educative interactions that take place therein.  
A further angle to consider in this regard is a May 2019 ERO national report, Bullying 
Prevention and Response in New Zealand Schools which identifies that New Zealand primary schools 
in particular, have a relatively high incidence of bullying. (Forty-seven percent of primary-
aged, and twenty-eight percent of secondary-aged students report at least some recent 
experience of being bullied at school.)52 The report’s summary, while recommending further 
 




actions against such themes such as racism and homophobia, concludes that some drivers for 
bullying behaviour may be beyond any school’s direct influence. Given that some bullying 
can take the form of insidious practices like ostracization, rumours, or other repeated 
psychological practices that can be perpetrated unnoticed, a question for further investigation 
could be to investigate to what extent open classroom groupings expedite an environment 
where bullying can pass by undetected. 
In Experience and Education, first published in 1938, Dewey reminds us that the class is 
itself a community, and as such, is bound by the cohesion of regular practices and activities: 
The educator is responsible for a knowledge of individuals and for a knowledge of 
subject matter that will enable activities to be selected which lend themselves to 
social organisation, and organisation in which all individuals have an opportunity 
to contribute something, and in which the activities in which all participate are the 
chief carrier of control. (Dewey, 2015, p. 56) 
A defining feature of open classroom design is the loss of quiet spaces for students to 
think quietly, or to read or be otherwise quietly involved in their studies, except in small 
withdrawal rooms. The majority of the teaching day is spent within the larger, open space. 
Writing in 2004, Zembylas and Michaelides suggest that “the current educational system in 
the West is ultimately built upon in what they term a “fear of silence” (p. 208): 
It is a tremendous challenge for educators and students to construct the space and 
time in the classroom to foster the kind of “contemplative” silence that nourishes 
creativity, passion and wonder lying at the heart of all significant learning and 
living…The inexpressible also points out an aesthetic of silence that runs contrary 
to mainstream contemporary educational systems and their tendency to 
emphasize languages. (p. 209) 
The majority of teachers would agree that when students are able to think quietly and 
to give a classroom task their full and undivided attention, this has a positive impact on their 
thought and concentration. Priorities of student collaboration and group work, such as the 
open classroom promotes, mitigate against providing such opportunities. As Hart (2004) 
notes, “whereas the analytic tends to measure categorize, and evaluate, the contemplative 
simply beholds what arises within us or in front of us” (Hart, 2004, p. 32). Neither the 




Weil and Murdoch, have much of a chance to flourish within the current re-design of our 
schools and education institutions. Individual thought and reflection appear to be esteemed 
only insofar as they demonstrate mastery of completed inquiries or investigations.  
What are the chances that each and every individual student in a group of up to 
eighty students will receive their due of watchful, sustained, attention from any of their three 
custodial teachers? Further, where, in this new open plan environment, with so many students 
congregated into a large space, are the opportunities for students to enjoy quiet, reflective 
thought, the intimacy of the whole class enjoying with their teacher a shared book, the entire 
class all reading or writing independently but simultaneously, the spontaneous decision by the 
teacher to take the class outside for a lesson under a tree, or to deviate from the planned 
classroom programme to talk to the class about something of interest and relevance to the 
wider world? Emphasis in the open classroom is invariably given to group activities, team 
problem-solving, explanations and presentations—activities that entail conversation and 
interaction, and away from more imaginative experiences. Thus the very architecture informs 
the curriculum, and in a sense becomes, the curriculum. 
A further, related concern about the move to open classroom design is the impact that 
this is likely to have on those students not naturally drawn to large public spaces. Cain (2013) 
points to a contemporary preoccupation with people presenting themselves in terms of what 
she terms the “extrovert ideal”. Cain observes that while our culture claims to value 
individuality, this is implicitly limited to a particular type of individual—one who is, as she 
argues, comfortable “putting himself out there” (p. 4). Cain argues that contemporary culture 
posits as the ideal and the best kind of person to aspire to be, one who is “gregarious, alpha, 
and comfortable in the spotlight,” someone who “prefers action to contemplation, risk-taking 
to heed-taking, certainty to doubt” (p. 4). Cain, whose research involves the relationship 
between work environments and productivity, disputes the notion that interaction and 
collaboration are necessarily always “the key multiplier for success” (p. 78). Even in the 
workplace, Cain argues strongly for the need to preserve quiet working spaces where people 
are able to think, focus and reflect quietly.  
Cain’s research invites us to consider whether the open classroom arrangement subtly 
advantages students who fit with Cain’s picture of the “ideal self’”, and whether the open 
classroom invites a preferential bias towards more extrovert students, by way of 
unacknowledged internalised stereotyping by teachers. Open classrooms are likely to be 




unfamiliar with spoken English, let alone those who are hard of hearing, or who find it 
difficult to regulate their own behaviour. Further, students who encounter specific cognitive 
challenges (such as in literacy, or learning another language), are likely to experience more 
difficulties within a large, noisy, so-called collaborative space. Open classrooms are designed 
to reward those who thrive on group activities and high levels of interaction. It follows that 
these classrooms may equally well disadvantage those students who are more quietly 
disposed, including those students who like to think quietly and slowly. 
Murdoch and Weil consider education’s purpose is to help form us in ways that we 
may come to appreciate, with others, the worth of beauty and goodness. This includes 
learning how to use language precisely. Murdoch emphasises the ways that we use language 
concepts to develop our thinking, and how that depth of understanding of language concepts 
develops over time: “The careful responsible skilful use of words is our highest instrument of 
thought and one of our highest modes of being: an idea which might seem obvious but is not 
now by any means universally accepted” (Murdoch, 1997, p. 462). Murdoch gives the 
example of an individual pondering over whether or not he feels repentance for some earlier 
event, and then mulling over just what repentance now means to him. Such reflections, 
Murdoch explains, involve the person in a review of their current understanding in relation to 
that of earlier times, in a way that takes account of their lived experience. Such developments 
in understanding are, she argues, fundamentally educative, and developments such as these 
are likely to be part of a teacher’s dialogue with his or her students. Similarly, Laverty (2010) 
notes that “it is within the complex interplay of meaning and life that concepts come to be 
understood in greater depth” (p. 36). Attentive classroom teachers, in their myriad 
interactions with their students, develop and help advance shared understandings through 
language, in part by exploring with their students the importance of detail, context, and 
nuance. Again, Laverty provides clarification: 
Language used well, like good art establishes communion through the creation of 
shared meaning. We understand one another and the world around us, better, 
saving us from the despair of a solipsistic universe. (Laverty, 2010, p. 36)  
This gradual building up of collective understanding and appreciation is part of any 
teacher’s task of inculcating a shared community of the classroom, and an appreciation, too, 
of the classrooms inhabitants’ shared reality. The classroom teacher works to establish a 




to determine what approaches and methods will work best with the students that makes up 
the class, any teacher, regardless of their style, needs some latitude, some degree of what we 
might call “discretionary space” (meant in terms both figurative and literal), to achieve this, 
for it is by means of the meaningfulness of the connection that the teacher establishes with the 
students that that teacher engages the attention of the students, and their motivation to learn.  
In a single classroom, the teacher is able to build up a particular culture in negotiation 
with the members of the class. Individual teachers build in their classroom a culture of social 
awareness, justice and fairness. The class is a small community within the larger community 
of the school. Within each classroom there are agreed rules or protocols of respect and 
acceptance that are established early in the year and built upon as the weeks pass. These 
agreed “ways of operating” are likely to involve classroom protocols around routines, sharing 
different perspectives, and the use of the classroom space and place. Different teachers are 
likely to have different ways of working with their students to identify and embed these values, 
and, over the course of their school experience, students will benefit from this variety. It is 
unclear how, in the open classroom environment, where there are multiple points of view and 
multiple perspectives, teachers will be able to draw out ethical and moral values and qualities 
in community with their students, except in the most surface of ways. The open classroom 
arrangement appears to place little emphasis on group values, ideals, virtues, beauty and 
goodness. In particular, it runs counter to Weil’s notion of justice, itself founded on the 
Platonic view that individual interests are subordinate to those of the collective, and that the 
good of the group is in proportion to the needs of individual members.  
According to Plato, harmony involves justice and balance. Each individual performs 
their duties in accordance with what they are best suited to. Plato’s ideal state is nothing like 
the potential disharmony and chaos of the open classroom, where roles are flattened out and 
where student movements are fluid and ever changing. Plato’s dialogues also remind us that 
the teacher’s influence on the student is one that is at its best, “experiential” rather than 
“directive”, and that the teacher’s task is to guide the student so that intellectual progress can 
be made in new directions. The teacher achieves this partly by the Socratic technique of 
aporia, and partly through positive guidance. The teacher’s task embodies Murdoch’s “just 
and loving gaze” (Murdoch, 2014, p. 33.) In Meno 86b, Socrates summarises: 
I do not insist that my argument is right in all other respects, but I would contend 
at all costs both in word and deed as far as I could that we will be better men, 




know, rather than if we believe that it is not possible to find out what we do not 
know and that we must not look for it. (Plato, trans, 1997, p. 886) 
Weil’s and Murdoch’s views on inculcating attention stand in stark opposition to the 
educational priorities of neoliberalism as manifest in the open classroom directive.53 These 
two philosophers advance a view of attention as a creative activity rather than something that 
involves either performance or prowess or mastery. They argue that to develop attention 
takes priority over specific subject learning, for only the former develops the mind, and only 
the former enables the individual person to develop his or her capacity to think well. They 
argue that attention is an orientation to that which is good in and of itself. For them, the goal 
of education ultimately connects with the question how to live a good life in community with 
others in the world. By learning to give attention to thought, we cannot but develop an 
awareness of others in the world, since intelligence and humility work together in 
fundamental ways. As we develop our capacity for attention, we sharpen our sensitivity to the 
predicaments of others besides ourselves. Thus to bestow attention is important both in that it 
reminds us of our own individual un-importance, but also points to the greater importance of 
interacting respectfully with others.  
Dewey’s insights are also helpful in this connection. In his Experience and Education, 
Dewey argues that “perhaps the greatest of all pedagogical fallacies is the notion that a person 
only learns what he is studying at the time” (Dewey, 2015, p. 48). He argues further, that 
“collateral learning in the way of formation of enduring attitudes, of likes and dislikes, may be 
and often is much more important” (p. 48): 
The most important attitude that can be formed is that of desire to go on learning. 
If impetus in this direction is weakened instead of being intensified, something 
much more than mere lack of preparation takes place. The pupil is actually 
robbed of native capacities which otherwise would enable him to cope with the 
circumstances of his life. (p. 45) 
Just as Plato’s dialogues are open-ended, thought-provoking, and require the reader to 
reflect and make sense for themselves, Murdoch and Weil consider the overarching 
imperative of education to be that of encouraging and training thought itself. They view 
education as much more open-ended, and much more concerned with possibilities and 
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potentialities for transformation and change than a training ground for skills or a preparation 
for the regulated and conformist behaviour expected in an open plan office. They view 
education in terms of individual self-fulfilment by way of coming to appreciate the value of an 
understood common good, and a belief in something larger and fundamentally more 
interesting than the interests of the self.  
Weil and Murdoch identify the deep connections that obtain between ethics, morality, 
and education. They show that if education is to begin to address moral and ethical questions, 
its first task is to initiate students into communities that nurture such opportunities. They are 
aware that, without providing opportunities whereby attention may be enabled, attention is 
unlikely to take root on its own. They illuminate for us why education must involve a much 
richer perspective than one that is focussed on preparation for office work and gaining 
qualifications. As Weil says, “an education method which is not inspired by the conception of 
certain form of human perfection is not worth very much” (Weil, 2002, p. 216). They each 
argue that moral activity involves paying constant attention to the otherness of human life: we 
learn about ourselves precisely by attending to how well we understand the needs, situation, 
and achievements of others. They also argue that human beings can be readily deflected from 
what they ought best to focus on, by shallow collective thinking, by distractions, noise, false 
assumptions, egotistical preoccupations. They warn that that the things we come to focus on 
the most, or are exposed to the most, are the things we will end up most valuing. These 
insights are salutary reminders of what we are at risk losing by the unquestioned acceptance 
of open classrooms. 
Weil and Murdoch consider that education is made worthy when attention is brought 
to the fore. They do not shy away from acknowledging that to achieve attention is likely to be 
difficult, elusive, demanding, even painful, and may take years. Attention involves 
pedagogical components that include withholding hasty judgement, seeking to be well-
informed and to confront one’s own ignorance, and also a kind of decentring, an 
“unlearning” or readiness to change, to review previously held beliefs. Both Weil and 
Murdoch consider that the benefits of developing one’s capacity for attention have positive 
impacts on other aspects of life—a diminished sense of self-importance, appropriate humility, 
and a better sense of social connectedness. They also identify ways that, in the right 





Weil and Murdoch share high expectations regarding a teacher’s standards for 
intellectual and moral rigour. They each consider that we truly learn when we are faced with 
correcting our errors and our faults. As Weil says, “There is nothing nearer to true humility 
than intelligence” (Weil, 1997, p. 183). Weil warns that unless we take on board the need to 
correct our faulty ways of thinking, we won’t change, and that is the height of unintelligence. 
Thus we make progress, both intellectual and moral, when we get things wrong and come to 
acknowledge, understand, and seek to remediate the source of our errors. Weil and Murdoch 
advocate an environment in which one is able to recognise and learn from one’s mistakes 
ahead of one that overlooks accuracy, for the reason that they consider that latter is more 
likely to curb creative thinking: 
The most serious mistakes, those which warp completely the mental processes, 
destroy the soul, placing it outside the reach of truth and goodness, cannot be 
discerned. For they are caused by the fact that certain things escape the scrutiny of 
the mind. (Weil, 2002, p. 219) 
It is not unreasonable to suggest that today’s open classrooms are much more likely to 
skirt around such matters of rigour and demands for accuracy, and rather, to applaud 
evidence of group effort and participation far ahead of giving attention to acuity in student 
work. This is because students in the collaborative setting are simply not required to work to 
the highest of aspirational levels, so much as they are encouraged to demonstrate the ability 
to work well together in teams.  
I submit that Weil and Murdoch would consider such teaching and classroom 
arrangements as those of the open plan to be not only potentially chaotic, but also patently 
unjust. They would question how such an arrangement could be seen as morally good, or 
how it could serve the interests of any but the already most advantaged students. They would 
be likely to see that the arrangement imperils any opportunity for genuine pedagogical 
attention, and that this absence has ethical and moral implications for the quality of the 
education provided. They would fault the imposition of a market ideology onto the delivery 
of education since such an approach is so diminishing of ethical considerations of human 
dignity. As Murdoch reminds us at the close of her book on Sartre, “the real lesson to be 
taught is that the human person is precious and unique; but we seem unable to set it forth 




Justifications for the open classroom directive include that themes of rapid and 
unprecedented social change are somehow unique features of the present day. Thus open 
classroom design is advanced as an approach that will somehow “future proof” students 
against looming (but still undefined) future developments. Education policy makers proffer 
the argument that the best and surest preparation for future employment possibilities in this 
unknown future lies in the development of teamwork, and skills of interaction and 
collaboration.54 Yet, as philosophers of education since at least the time of Plato demonstrate, 
questions around how teachers might best equip their students to cope with themes of 
uncertainty and complexity are not unique to the present day, but are perennial. The 
difficulty of translating the principles of collaboration and teamwork into the classroom by 
way of the open classroom directive may reflect a deep misunderstanding of the complexities 
of teaching and learning. 
In the philosophy of Weil or Murdoch, the teacher does not, indeed cannot, provide 
specific answers, nor can they provide for students anything like the depth of clarity that their 
students might or might not be seeking. Rather, the task of the teacher is one of engendering, 
through attention—both for themselves and for their charges—an awareness of what to take 
into account in framing such questions. Weil and Murdoch both understand the craft of 
teaching as one that is singular, demanding, open-ended, and humanly involving. They 
identify as best preparation for the future, the development in students a bearing that opens 
them to think well: 
Education—whether its object be children or adults, individuals, or an entire 
people, or even oneself—consists in creating motives. To show what is beneficial, 
what is obligatory, what is good—that is the task of education. Education concerns 
itself with the motives for effective action. For no action is ever carried out in the 
absence of motives capable of supplying the indispensable amount of energy for its 
execution. (Weil, 2002, p. 188) 
Before concluding this chapter, several limitations of this critique of open classroom 
design must be acknowledged. For one thing, there is to date no prima facie evidence to 
establish that teachers and students are patently worse off in the open plan space than they 
were in separate classrooms. To date, stated objections to open plan are based largely on 
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anecdotal reports or on the perceptions of individual students, teachers and parents. Nor is 
there to date any nationally gathered comparative achievement information that might shed 
light on the impact on student progress in the open classroom. A further limitation is that 
there is, to date, no peer reviewed field study with a control group, so that other variables 
might be considered. Without this information it is impossible to determine empirically 
whether the impact of the change directly improves outcomes, is neutral, or is deleterious to 
students and teachers. Therefore it cannot be concluded with any degree of certainty whether 
open classroom design truly is, as it appears, and as I have argued, a very bad thing, since 
there may be other factors at play.  
Nevertheless, the current discussion is important for several reasons. First, it identifies 
the ideological change to the role of the teacher in the new environment. Second, it reminds 
us that for attention to flourish, the conditions for attention must be appropriate, and third, it 
points to the need for robust, longitudinal, peer-reviewed research into the long-term 
consequence of directives such as the change to open classrooms, to enable us to distinguish 
between enthusiasm for novelty, and more grounded considerations of the likely long-term 
educative value of such a change. Finally, the discussion exemplifies the way that the 
philosophical concept of attention is one that is, as Weil and Murdoch argue, is entirely 
grounded in everyday experience. 
7.6. Summary 
Teachers and educators inevitably and directly see some sobering things about 
society—they see that that some people, for reasons that are complex, are highly likely to live 
lives that are richly rewarded, and some other people, again for reasons that are complex, are 
highly likely to live lives that are impoverished both in opportunity and satisfaction. 
Educators also see that there are some people whom education fails completely. On average, 
educators would be likely to agree that all school students deserve to receive individual 
attention from their teacher in a coherent environment, that they are entitled to be helped 
specifically by their teacher to develop their own powers of attention, their capacity for 
concentration, their own sense of mastery, their own sense of belonging. Whether the open 
plan classroom school re-design will help or hinder educators from accomplishing these things 
does not seem to have been an operative question within the re-design. Rather the thinking 




vulnerability of least well off members of society seems liable to have been compounded. The 
purposes of education itself that surround attention, seem liable to be greatly harmed. 
Weil and Murdoch explain why it is fundamental to education to inculcate attention, 
to cultivate humility and respect for others, and to invite inquirers forward in such ways as 
invites them to relinquish the ego. If within the state school system we are to provide 
educational opportunities that directly engage thinking	in the ways that Weil and Murdoch 
inspire us to do, then the policy drivers will be moral in quality, and concerned to foster 
human flourishing and intelligent democracy, not specifically concerned to do industry or 
business some good. If this were our purpose with the state school system, as it should be, 







The central concern of this study has been attention, by which is meant a kind of 
accomplishment by a person that quite dispatches that person’s sense of herself or himself. By 
truly attending to something, one appreciates the shared world itself, that one is a part of, so 
that one’s own existence as a thinking, experiencing individual eclipses itself in one’s reaching 
out to something far greater. Attention kindles the recognition that we are all equally 
members of a community, and that we are all subject to inter-subjective standards for 
thought. These standards are not only greater than any one individual, but they are also 
greater than all individuals combined. Thus attention is a profound “leveller”. When 
attention expresses itself in a school classroom, the participants in that attention fall into 
coherence with each other naturally, to the extent that reason in each individual pulls all 
individuals equally to the conclusion that is best or most beautiful. Whenever such coherence 
is negotiated and achieved, an educational accomplishment has been realized that is more 
precious than any other. 
Now, it is true that, the barked command to “Pay attention!” appears to us 
pedagogically unfortunate. Such outward command to marshal the attention diminishes a 
person’s individuality so severely that any opportunity to think for oneself is threatened. Such 
a command sets up in its hearers (to the extent that they submit to it) the stance of submission, 
as though instruction under command is the pertinent form for pedagogy to take—in other words, 
as though learning were best made by imprint upon a blank, anxious mind. Yet since minds 
that are submissive, blank and anxious are apt to learn nothing at all, there is clearly a lot that 
is wrong pedagogically with barking out a command to “Pay attention!” Does this argue 
against extolling the pedagogical worth of attention altogether? 
This thesis has argued that it does not, and that all that the present example illustrates 
is the obscenity of barking at people in the name of teaching them. If one attempts to bark 
what is beautiful, one thereby simply vanquishes all the beauty. To think ‘for oneself’ is a 
veritable good, and yet this good concerns not only thinking ‘for oneself’, it also and more 
fundamentally concerns thinking. Truly to think is a requirement if one is to think for oneself. 
My argument has been that attention, rightly understood, preconditions the possibility of 
truly thinking. 
A teacher-led classroom can be an environment in which effort by students to become 




led by a teacher, who potentially possesses the courage and the insight requisite for leading 
her or his charges to learn to attend, the present thesis has extolled, in part by discussion of 
literary fiction. For in a classroom where time in reading and in thinking and in sharing are 
all mentored and brought to involve respect for the thinking and the perspective of others, 
individual students can also discover the way to be self-respecting, imaginative, judicious, 
curious, reflective, and alive. In short, the students can learn to attend. A teacher’s aim to 
assist just such discovery is especially courageous, and when it succeeds will produce the 
profoundest learning. 
This thesis has defended the accomplishment of attention as morally improving. It has 
even fashioned the accomplishment of attention as the very essence of being morally 
improved. Attention, while quietly humbling of the ego, improves persons not only in what 
they grasp and how they grasp things, but also thereby in the very quality of their being. To 
realise that there are standards for thought or judgment that are bigger than any individual 
and indeed bigger than all individuals, is humbling, yet at the same time this humbling 
realization is a precondition for education in the broadest sense.  
To apprehend beauty is to take pleasure in something not according to whim or 
personal fancy, but rather in the recognition that such taking of pleasure is owed to that 
object, by anyone. Consequently, when beauty is apprehended, the individual self effectively 
drops away. Similarly, an accomplishment or recognition of something beautiful opens the 
mind to new thoughts, and to wonder. Beauty is in this way implicated in pedagogical 
progress. Attention is itself beautiful in an emblematic way. Attention truly happens only 
when the self, of its own accord, is diminished, and a plane higher than merely personal 
experience or conviction is achieved. 
To think for oneself involves keeping one’s individuality and ego in check. To think 
well is to weigh and to judge, and this is neither a capricious nor a fanciful process. To think 
well is to hold one’s self to a standard, and this standard is not something that comes, as it 
were, from within. To think well is to think beyond one’s own self-interest, since thinking 
involves the recognition that the self is not alone. What it is to ‘recognise’ some matter to 
which one attends involves ‘re-’ ‘cognition’. (The verb ‘to recognise’ comes from the Latin 
recognoscere, meaning to ‘know again, to recall to mind’, from re-’again’ and cognoscere ‘to learn’.) 




Through the use of reason, we are guided to re-attend, from an altered attendant 
perspective. Truly to think involves reaching out to something that is larger than the self. 
Truly to think is an act of humility, since it is an act of reaching out to something that is 
greater, beyond understanding. To think for oneself involves one in the presupposition that 
there are standards for thought that are beyond not only our individual determination but 
also our collective determination. These are standards for thought that somehow connect us 
to the possibility of thinking at all.  
8.1. The metaphysics of attention 
Attention, then, although it is the first step in thinking, at the same time requires 
orientation towards an ideal. While we cannot begin to comprehend if we fail to attend, we 
likewise cannot begin to attend unless we engage selflessly in the struggle to comprehend. 
When we direct our mind by way of focussed attention, we achieve this focus not randomly, 
but by virtue of mind itself involving capacity for thought. Attention advances us into 
recognition of other minds, other persons, for through attention we effectively ‘surrender’ for 
a time our subjective view, in order to orient ourselves outwards. Attention has an aesthetic 
quality: when we give attention, we value what we are focusing upon. We bestow attention on 
something in order to understand it better. We seek the best or most beautiful way to 
comprehend it. The quality of this attention is also moral. To achieve insight or 
understanding is to be improved as a person. When by achievement of insight or 
understanding we widen our perspective beyond its being merely individual, we come at the 
same time better to appreciate the claims of others in our shared world. Humility ineluctably 
accompanies any such achievement. Attention involves recognition that there is something 
attention-worthy that is quite beyond the individual self. 
If, within the notion of a metaphysics of attention, the theme of spirituality comes to 
the fore, that alone is not a reason to dismiss the notion. The noetic dimension of attention is 
educationally relevant insofar as: attention allows us to separate the individual from the ego; 
attention involves connecting the mind to something larger than itself; attention is more 
oriented to connection than to isolation; and, attention adjoins us to the world. There are, as 
Weil and Murdoch agree, spiritual overtones in these ideas. Perhaps in order to avoid any 
acknowledged dangers from invoking the themes of spirituality, the best check is that of 
invoking the role of humility in attention. Through humility, the risk of one person’s 




8.2. Beauty and pedagogy 
When we register the beauty of something that we judge beautiful (another person, a 
natural scene, a literary achievement, a musical theme, a mathematical theorem), we do this 
not merely by being made pleased by it, but rather, by identifying in it qualities that are 
intrinsically pleasing, and that we judge that others would also be drawn to be affected and 
made pleased by as well. This registration of beauty involves us in a sense of what ideally 
others would also find pleasing. That is to say, there is in registering this kind of individual 
delight, a quality that is at the same time inter-subjective and that draws us to desire to 
connect to others. 
Attention to the beautiful is also inseparably connected with humility, since to be 
arrested by something we find beautiful is to be involved in respectful admiration of 
something ‘other’ which elicits our own sense of wonderment. To think ‘for oneself” is, 
similarly, to be drawn beyond one’s self. In this sense, humility and self-realization are not in 
tension with each other, but rather, are human qualities that mutually inform one another. 
Attention, which preconditions the very possibility of thinking for oneself, incorporates 
humility to its very core. At the same time, the most choice-worthy life (that is to say, the life 
that is the most meaningful, the worthiest of having been lived, the most fulfilling—and 
thereby, to use Platonic language, the most beautiful), is also the life that is the fullest of 
thought and attention. As Plato’s Meno suggests, we best develop the capacity for attention by 
turning away from self-interest and towards a more contemplative and reflective stance. We 
best realize our self by our efforts to get beyond or outside of, the limitations of the self.  
8.3. The educative worth of attention 
This thesis has argued that the educative worth of attention seems to be largely lost 
from view in the reigning contemporary understandings of education and pedagogy. Much as 
self-realization seems (in my view erroneously) to have become equated with coming on to a 
high income, so contemporary education is viewed under the desperately narrowed guise of 
necessary preparation for jobs. Individuality is understood in terms of self-advantage, appetite 
and the ego, and in terms of acquiring skills that confer competitive advantage within the 
economy (but that may confer disadvantage to other persons who lack that advantage). The 
only morality promoted in this context is that of winners and losers, almost so that 
Thrasymachus in Book 1 of Plato’s Republic (344c) is taken to have got justice right when 




988). In today’s lexicon we use the words ‘pleasurable’ ahead of ‘beautiful’; ‘profitable’ ahead 
of ‘enlightening’; ‘useful’ ahead of ‘inspirational’. Beauty is reduced to self-presentation, or is 
dismissed as a subjective nothing, a fuzzy distraction not liable to help one to get ahead.  
The ideas in this thesis are potentially controversial, especially because they run 
against the tide of contemporary educational thought. In particular, they challenge the bias 
towards self-directed learning, personalised learning, student voice and student agency—
themes that are integral to a student-centred, personalised curriculum. While the implications 
of the current educational directions are far from clear cut, the thesis has proposed a robust 
challenge to theories of what education stands for in this, the first quarter of the twenty-first 
century. 
The thesis has argued that contemporary society has significantly lost its way in regard 
to the educative significance of attention, and can regain itself only by recovering to itself and 
to its institutions of education, an understanding of the singular worth of attention. While I 
have not shied away from the inherent rationalist-spiritualism of this idea, my interpretation 
of attention is more secular than spiritual. People are not well helped even to be scientists or 
worthy technologists unless they are helped with the apprehension of beauty, and helped to 
grow a deep moral sense. Yet we develop aesthetically and morally only by being helped to 
think for ourselves. The humility of attention is the humility that is inherent in the act of 
thinking independently. The capacity to be moved by the beautiful is fundamental not only to 
our effective functioning as part of a human community, but is fundamental to any capacity 
at all that we possess to develop our understanding. To this end, the present thesis points to 
the fundamental ways that narrative and storytelling (as well as other aesthetic forms) have 
(and maybe always have had) a significant part in shaping our humanness. 
8.4. Learning from Weil and Murdoch 
Two beacons who have guided this study are the mid-twentieth century philosophers, 
Simone Weil (1909–1943) and Iris Murdoch (1919–1999), for it is very much their ideas 
about attention that has been adopted and extolled. Following these two, the present study 
has found a special appreciation for the study of literature as an occasion to activate aesthetic 
awakening, to activate moral growth, for the cultivation of attention, and for especially deep 
learning about the world. (Doubtless pedagogy in mathematics, or science, or indeed in 
history, geography, physical education, music, or indeed in any subject, also is suitable for 




herein by reference to the study of literature. However, those other subjects are less familiar 
to the present author than is the study of literature, and so the point of choice of 
concentration has partly been to cleave to what is best known about.) A further purpose, 
however, in choosing to concentrate on literature, has been to criticize the environment of 
Aotearoa New Zealand state education precisely for its deep-going unfriendliness to 
cultivation of attention through the study of literature. The thesis presents the argument that 
pedagogy in Aotearoa New Zealand is enfeebled by this in ways that can be specifically 
pointed to, especially by following Murdoch and Weil in their point of view. 
When the thesis argues that the concept of attention is largely absent in contemporary 
education policy and practice in Aotearoa New Zealand, whereas it ought to be given central 
importance as a matter of priority, it has regard for an absence that seems entirely 
conspicuous. Yet this absence is not liable to be in the least bit conspicuous to those who have 
themselves helped to set the contemporary priorities in education in terms of competition and 
production. Those people define education in terms of commercial imperatives, remarking 
education as “a machine for producing diplomas, in other words, jobs” (Weil, 2002, p. 121), 
or as skilling the workforce for the sake of the economy.  
When the thesis has argued for a re-visioning of education in terms of the concept of 
attention, it has at the same time appealed to a very different understanding of educational 
imperatives. It has argued for quite different things to prioritize and to value. The rich 
capabilities that education ought to aim to achieve would manifest themselves in a person’s 
understanding of: 
• how a life has worth;  
• the dignity and worthiness of thinking for oneself; 
• how goodness and beauty are interrelated; 
• each person’s original and inescapable connections with their fellows; 
• the dangers of tribalism; 
• the dignity of citizenship. 
Whether a person is destined to be a personal trainer, a technologist, an accountant, a 
mathematician, a tradesperson, a teacher, a leading hand, a scientist, a lawyer, an artist, or 
whether or not a person is destined to be someone else’s lifelong partner or a parent, the rich 
capabilities just mentioned remain of paramount importance for becoming truly good at 




narrowly in terms of supposed imperatives of the economy is, arguably, to undermine 
everything, perhaps including, in the end, even the economy. 
When the present thesis has argued that attention has an educative function that 
relates to the individual’s capacity to be released from the self, and to enter into a more 
selfless realm, it has concerned itself with something that seems to Weil and Murdoch obvious 
and of most obvious worth; but the rub is that in current times very many people are 
oblivious to the worth of selflessness. The present thesis extols attention as not competitive, as 
not even capable of involving winners and losers, and as in no obvious way quantifiable in 
terms of metrics that could be standardised or reported against. The rub is that in our times 
very many people no longer catch view of anything beyond the terms of profit and 
quantification. Attention, as this thesis has argued, may aspire to levels of spiritual or mystical 
connection, and further, such aspirations are in no way feeble or pathological. Yet the rub is 
that in our current times very many people are disposed to deprecate or diminish the 
spiritual. Many present-day persons would disregard as passé, stodgy, or self-limiting, values 
with which the promotion of attention is deeply imbued. 
Even if the reigning culture has become reductive, and so has rendered many people 
oblivious to values and insights that in fact are important for everyone, still every single 
person who is able to function in society will have been helped along their way at least 
somewhat, by attention (at least inchoately expressed), although they may not realize it. And 
even though the qualities of that attention may have been too little cultivated in them to have 
become central to their bearing or consciousness, still, if they were to reflect, it is likely they 
would be able after all to recall those instances of inchoate attention. 
The current study has not claimed to provide a full account of the many and diverse 
philosophical traditions from which the concept of attention originates, nor has it pretended 
to be a complete analysis of the philosophical and psychological concept of attention. The 
purpose of the study has simply been to bring into the limelight the philosophical notion of 
attention through a detailed philosophical analysis of the thought of Weil and Murdoch, and 
to show how that can be applied to literary texts, in order to deepen an understanding of 
what pedagogical attention amounts to, and to consider the implications of pedagogical 




8.5. Implications of the present study and possibilities for further research 
The present study opens the way for other interpretative studies of literature to 
illuminate the ways that attention, which focuses thought, re-engages pedagogy. Further 
literary works that have an educational context and that invite textual study along these lines 
could include, for example, Jane Austen’s Emma (1815), Anton Chekov’s short story The 
Student (1894), F. Scott Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby (1925), Thomas Hardy’s Jude the Obscure 
(1895), and Marilynne Robinson’s Gilead (2005). Many other examples could be found. 
Philosophically, I believe that the present study invites exploration of the relevance of habit to 
education. While the American philosopher of education, John Dewey, is referenced in the 
present study, thorough investigation into Dewey’s philosophical writing, and in particular, 
into his theory of habit, is likely to raise further themes for critique in relation to pedagogical 
attention and contemporary education policy. 
The present study holds contemporary relevance in that it has provided a critical 
response to some pressing current issues for public education in New Zealand state education, 
such as the strategy to introduce open classrooms into our schools, a move that could be seen 
as an effort to further industrialize our schools by making them more like open-plan offices, a 
policy directive that appears to be motivated less by principles of educational improvement, 
and more as a mechanism for rendering schools more like workplaces, with obvious 
detrimental results for our state-funded education system.  
The present study holds potential significance on a broader scale as well. It proposes 
that such policy changes as the move to open classrooms may jeopardize opportunities for 
teachers to encourage their students to think critically, or to have opportunities to be 
intellectually challenged, to engage in question and debate, or to read and reflect 
independently. A democratic society is one where the citizenry is able to question, and, where 
necessary, to insist on changes to ensure that justice is done and seen to be done. An educated 
populace is one whose members have the capacity to question and to challenge authority. 
Any move to delimit quality educational experiences to the privileged (i.e. those who are able 
to avoid the open plan classrooms of the state education system entirely and have their 
children attend private schools), could be seen as a way to compound disadvantage for those 
students whose education is already potentially compromised by the current demographics of 




8.6. In closing 
It is with an eye to these wider themes that the present study has sought to be a voice 
on the front line of the debate about the function and purpose of education in Aotearoa New 
Zealand. Educationists must reclaim the power of education to help to realize people’s 
highest ideals. They must protect and enhance opportunities for contemplative and informed 
critical thought. 
Educationists need to reflect deeply upon what counts as education, and upon what 
education ought to accomplish. They must speak out against reductive misconceptions of 
their calling. Society appears to have narrowed almost cruelly how it eyes the value of state 
school education. Yet a market-driven approach to education that views schools basically as 
training grounds for work simply cannot inspire, in the ways that Weil and Murdoch do, the 
intellectual, moral, and imaginative dimensions of civic education. 
Reading literary fiction is not solely for entertainment or skill development but 
possesses profound purposes for education. That curated literary texts are a pre-eminently 
powerful teaching resource is an understanding that educationists need strongly to renew. 
This thesis holds to be very dear and very important every implication of these 
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